Signs for the Times

Brian Opie

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Signs for the Times:

The humanities, government and democracy to-come

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Dedication

This book is dedicated to all those who believe in the future of the humanities.

In particular, it commemorates Professor Jonathan Mané-Wheoki, who was there from the beginning of HUMANZ and stayed until after the end, and Professor Mike Taggart, whose death was a grievous loss to the Council for the Humanities.

And it is an offering in love and gratitude to my partner, Anne, and our children, Rachel and Joss. Your humanity, your commitment to social justice and the value of intellectual endeavour, and your desire for a better future have sustained me in this work.

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Signs for the Times: The humanities, government and democracy to-come

…… …where a clearing's formed,
A good beginning's seen, prelusively
Of happier events to be brought forth,
Though still in future hid; as harvests good,
Of plenteous return, are the results
Of industry in spring; so future things
Indicative of great events to come
In the still further future, are results
Of small beginnings buried in the past!
William Golder, "The New Zealand Survey" (1867)[1]

Preface

In the tsunami of destruction (often mistermed creative destruction) unleashed on the world in the past 30 years, the failed attempt between 1993 and 2008 to found an independent national humanities organisation in Aotearoa New Zealand stands as a symptom of what continues to be at stake. By advancing technocratic over moral knowledge, modern Western governments have turned the pursuit of knowledge and innovation for human betterment to the service of private profit and wealth creation as ends in themselves. The radical and chaotic social force of the market, to be regulated only when the interests of those in power are threatened by too much risk, has been substituted for the much more complex processes of thoughtful and collectively overseen social and cultural evolution. The opacity of its highly technical operation, the financial benefits conferred on its expert operatives, and the risk of social revolution which attends upon its gross inequalities, together mark a startling hollowing out of the meaning and purpose of democracy.

In part, the problematic of this book was set out centuries ago by Sir Thomas More and John Milton. In *Utopia* More foregrounded the problem facing

renaissance humanists of how to give advice to those in power in the nascent nation states of Europe. The world traveller and philosopher, Raphael Hythloday, who brings to actual London news of the ideal city of Utopia, asserts that giving advice based on knowledge of the object as such rather than on knowledge of the recipient of the advice is a waste of time. In the process he indicates the quite different ways in which knowledge is used, in the mental, fictional and conceptual spaces of thought as such, and in the time-bound settings in which knowledge is blended with politics, wealth and power. It is difficult to imagine where in human history knowledge as such could have been completely freed from politics, wealth and power, not even (or especially not) in universities; nonetheless, the burden Hytholday recognised of finding the ways and means to communicate knowledge which is true in itself effectively to publics and governments still rests on those who make claims to possess such knowledge.

I have used as epigraphs to the book's chapters quotations from Milton's anti-censorship text, *Areopagitica,* a decision made in 2008 during the celebration of the 400th anniversary of Milton's birth. While this text can be counted as one among many of his prose writings to engage in humanist politics, it is *Paradise Lost* which presents modern readers with the most extraordinary envisaging of the exercise of powers – intellectual, scientific, technological, political, historical, economic, social, affectional and environmental – which constitute the modern world and its subjects, and most especially Western techno-scientific, capitalist and democratic nations. Milton remarkably anticipated the postmodern condition when he depicted the twin zones of the order containing our world as marked by the love for humanity (Heaven) and the hatred of humanity (Hell). The supreme individual, Satan, sought absolute power: through the power of the creative application of intelligence and techno-scientific knowledge, he sought to make the universe into his model of it; and, under the guise of a commitment to the freedom of the angels and humanity from divine tyranny through the invention of democracy, to make himself the sovereign power. The vivid worlds brought to imagined and moral life in a reader's engagement with the poem can speak now more fully to us about the actuality of the modern world because the past as future which it contemplates has come to pass; for example, in their manner of exploiting the Earth's resources, humanity learned from the fallen angels when they "with impious hands/Rifl'd the

bowels of thir mother Earth/For Treasures better hid" (1.686-88), a mode of action now known as creating economic growth or the resource curse. The poem foregrounds the moral complexities of every human choice and action, a powerful contrast to bureaucratic language which converts the often awful actuality of people's lives into calm abstractions like collateral damage or the housing market or reducing rates of crime or expenditure on health or traumatised children or the aging population. Referencing *Utopia* and *Paradise Lost* here introduces what will be a regular practice in this study; examples from fiction will be used as having evidential standing for analysis and argument concerning the governance and futures of any society and culture.

A matter of terminology

The term *humanities* has little or no purchase on decision-making by governments and the major institutions which provide form and continuity to democratic societies and individual lives. But there is no better term in English for the kinds of knowledge to which it traditionally refers. In this study, the term is used to refer to

- a disciplined and professional mode of intellectual practice based on the analysis and interpretation of textual objects, typically associated with university-level or advanced research and inquiry, and
- the global corpus of this knowledge in all the media forms and languages in which it is expressed and recorded.

In these ways the term humanities has a universal application, however much its outcomes are inflected by local contexts. The knowledge work of the humanities has multiple audiences, and its professional workers must acquire the rhetorics appropriate to communicating with those audiences. It is constituted in interaction with the media forms available for representation and communication of thought in a particular society. In the case of globalised, digitally networked societies, this interaction is producing a new multi-mediated humanities. Its domain is public; its scope is inclusive of all forms of knowledge; its setting is the city; its locus of application/productivity is the emancipated citizen.

It is therefore important to distinguish between the knowledge created by this high-level, institutionalised mode of intellectual work and what becomes of it when it is disseminated through the multiplicity of media channels available in postmodern societies and re-formed by its active and insightful application to local and immediate situations and events. I understand this highly distributed and constantly re-forming version of the humanities as *humanistic knowledge*. It is value-laden knowledge produced by singular minds in negotiation with others in all social contexts with the aim of informing decision and action; it is grounded in the always elaborating contents of cultural knowledge and, even while seeking truths, actually providing always provisional answers to the question, What does it mean to be human?

But there is also a third kind, which in this study is called *humanities-aronui,* or Aotearoa New Zealand humanities. What this term means is discussed in some detail in Chapter One; it suffices to say here that while the advanced pursuit of enquiry in the humanities is always inflected by the cultures and histories of the place where it is carried on, there is also a domain within the global humanities which has a specifically local/national focus and purpose. In the instance of the writing of this book the place is Aotearoa New Zealand. The double name came into usage late in the twentieth century when the political and bureaucratic agencies of the state, and many civil society organisations, were attempting to respond to the bicultural and bilingual challenge of the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi to achieve a postcolonial settlement between the two principal cultures and languages in the territory of New Zealand. It remains relevant because it signals that the issue of linguistic and cultural diversity in the composition of a postmodern nation has become more rather than less important internationally. I will typically use New Zealand to refer to the land mass and its peoples, but will use Aotearoa New Zealand at points in the discussion when it is important to be reminded that the nation of New Zealand is officially bicultural and bilingual (Māori and English), while being actually and increasingly multicultural and multilingual.

Those who participate in the creation, dissemination and reproduction of this mode of knowledge, academic and public, are *humanists*. Even though, in the British tradition, the term humanist refers to a member of the Humanist

Society and a rational, secular conception of the world, the term is used here as it is in the United States to refer to a person with professional training and interests in the humanities.

In any account of the creation of knowledge in the modern humanities, the interaction between a print text and a reader is normative, and also critical to the conception of invention in the humanities. But the textual objects available for study now exist in multiple media forms, each of which has a different term for the person interacting with the medium (reader, spectator, viewer, auditor/hearer, user, player), as it does for the origin of the text (author, poet, dramatist, choreographer, composer, film-maker, historian, philosopher, musician, actor, director, designer, architect, scientist, writer, and so on). I was tempted to use the term beholder as the most general term for the former group, but it has too strong a connotation of passive observation; so I will use the term *reader* not because of its print association but because of the connotation of interpreting as an active and constant aspect of engagement with any text in any medium. As for the originator(s) of a text, I will use *writer* unless the context requires a more specific term.

There is also the question of what term to use for what is variously referred to as nature, the material world, the physical world, or the given world. I will tend to use *the given world,* meaning everything that exists, including our evolution as a species on Earth, and which will continue to exist whether humanity does or not. It also provides the most direct contrast with the worlds which humans (according to human conceptions and desires) have designed and made, and are continuing with increasing power to design and make, by appropriating the matter and energies of the given world to their uses. Within this inclusive term there is a strong binary which haunts our inhabitiation of the planet, namely, humanity and its other, the non-human.

The problem of the (missing) humanities

In one respect, this book is about the profound exclusion of the modern humanities as the body of traditional Western knowledge from the thought of those most responsible for the management of knowledge work, the generating of new knowledge and the application of knowledge to the

problems resulting from the headlong rush to exploit the resources of the planet, natural and human, for financial gain.

It seeks to establish the parameters within which the humanities as a body of knowledge and a distinctive practice in knowledge creation (a humanities to-come) can claim a new place in the complex system of knowledge evolving in twenty-first century postmodern Western democracies. These societies are marked not just by the extraordinary power over the given world accomplished by science and its technological expressions, but by the power of electronic networks in the transmission and manipulation of signs (specifically signs for knowledge and money). In another register they are also marked by the dispersion of cultural nations, their distinctive languages, inherited knowledges, beliefs, and values across the territorial boundaries by which nations were defined in the twentieth century, both physically and in cyberspace.

It is a daunting prospect, facing a panoramic scene constituted by the current systems of world knowledge and trying to locate the proper place of the "humanities-to-come" among those systems; but that place must be found if the current subordination of the humanities to techno-scientific knowledge is to be redressed. From one perspective, the humanities are simply invisible, since for the majority of knowledge workers the domain defined by the term science occupies the whole knowledge space when the term social is added to it. A desire to try to reassert the "original" meaning of science as methodically produced knowledge and to rename the humanities as the human sciences evades the core issue, which is that the methods and objects of science are integral to one another, are constitutive of the modern scientific project, and are incompatible with the methods and objects of the humanities. Nature is not a text, except figuratively (that is, humanly); and humanity is not only nature. Scientific method reduces language to denotation in the search for the universal; method in the humanities amplifies language and semiosis in the search for the meaning of the plural idea of humanity to-come.

Yuri Lotman (2009 140), whose thought plays a major role in this book, wrote that

> A differentiated science focuses on research and on actualizing as yet unknown truths or untruths for the sake of structuring a realm of

> possible propositions by means of the true/untrue code and on the basis of decision programs (theories, methods) related to this code. At the same time, science treats currently improbable or rejected perspectives as a reservoir for findings that may turn out to be tenable after all.

As a succinct entry into the acount of the humanities I am offering here, I would propose the following rephrasing:

> A differentiated humanities focuses on textual research and on realizing as yet unknown or forgotten truths, meanings and values by structuring a realm of possible propositions by means of the human/non-human code and on the basis of decision programs (theories, methods) appropriate to interpreting materials composed in relation to this code. At the same time, the humanities treats currently improbable or rejected perspectives as clues to the discovery of obscured or suppressed truths, meanings and values in past and current cultural settlements.

Human complexity requires the development of conceptually complex discourses able to make this complexity available to thought and to permit theorisation based on culturally created evidence. At every point of discrimination, the inherited patterns of thought based on the human/non-human code are challenged, for example, through the study of animal intelligence or the development of autonomous machines. As with the sciences, the findings of humanistic inquiry can be translated into discursive forms enabling the conversation of society to be enriched by *conceptions* of the given world and humanity which make the human position in the universe more comprehensible and therefore more available to productive adaptation, especially now when faced with conditions which are the result of collective human action. With such knowledge also comes moral responsibility for the effects of human decision-making.

It is not sufficient to attempt to reassert the modern humanities within the current system in which the techno-sciences exercise hegemonic dominance, and to claim a value for the modern humanities as knowledge that really counts which can overcome their present greying out. The gross imbalance in the politics of knowledge and its derivation from the mirror relation linking

the state and the globalising corporation means that what has been marginalised cannot be recovered. This work (which is intellectual and political) cannot be accomplished from within the modern academic humanities, because (however brilliant their practitioners, and however much their work graces the claims of the western university to represent the whole of knowledge), they exist more under the patronage of those with actual discursive power (scientists, technologists and managers) than demonstrate an ability to shape the frameworks of knowledge policy and practice either in universities or in the governmental and corporate worlds to which the university has become (but perhaps has always been) subservient. Reframing the disciplinary apparatus of the western university could lead this rebalancing, but among other conditions that would require a fundamental shift in the professional model of the academic, especially in the humanities. Hence what is required is advocacy for a new humanities, the signs of the becoming of which are especially evident in organisations seeking to represent the postmodern humanities in national jurisdictions.

I have tried to identify accounts of key issues which precede the discourses dominating the past three decades, and which exemplify the role of objectified knowledge and the collective memory in shaping analysis of our present. Immersion in the dynamism of politics and government in the immediate moment makes it difficult to perceive that new thinking and policy is so often the old cut in another way by generational change among policy makers catching up with the present, and by shifts in discourse and social power and the politics which bring them to the public surface. Contrarily, those seeking to shift power in their direction often find the figure of the child's innocent openness to the world, with nothing to forget, compelling as a model of the mind disposed to accept the new without resistance.

In the local and among singulars

This study of the humanities is grounded in a local history. It orients itself to the large world of empires, powerful nations and global forces from a geopolitical position in the South Pacific and one of the smaller nations, Aotearoa New Zealand. It names some people whose lives intersected at a specific point in time and space, who shared enough - in beliefs, politics, intellectual formation and curiosity, and the will to effect considered and

considerate change in a society and nation to which they belonged - to be able to work together in a collaborative enterprise structured and energised by an idea.

This book aims to exemplify the character of the humanities: it exists as written language; its sources are a selection from among the extraordinary multiplicity of texts circulating in the world of texts (the semiosphere) which are marked by their time and place of composition and are not in themselves definitive or conclusive in the domains of knowledge and discourse out of which they have come; these sources are both translated (literally into English where their first language is not English, and into the situated version of English which is my language of origin in New Zealand) and interpreted through the screen of my own knowledge and experience; its effects are effects in thought which only become effects in social reality when thought is translated by any reader into decisions to think and act in specific ways conditioned by another context than that in which this book has been written. If the argument of the book can lay claim to innovation, it is not innovation measurable in the ways in which Western governments now measure innovation, by calculation of economic value.

I have referenced texts which have in one way or another impressed me with their thoughtfulness and helped me to understand better what I needed to write. Each issue is embedded in extensive bibliographies and academic and institutional/professional specialisms and interests, and I make no pretence to have thoroughly explored any of them. When discussing policy issues to do with knowledge, innovation and culture I have usually referred to policy texts local to Aotearoa New Zealand (but which can include Australia). All fictions build the imagined worlds in which they involve their readers out of imagined localities. Those that find a place here do so because of what they encourage their readers to think, now, at the time of encounter, exemplifying the mode of intercultural dialogue in the context of overarching principles sought by the New Humanism which is discussed in Chapter Four. What I hope to have done is to have captured a theme running through some of the thought about knowledge and human purposes in the complex conversation of modern and postmodern humanity.

While humanity is a global phenomenon, its manifestations are inherently local. Culture and language are universal human attributes, but cultural and linguistic diversity make universalist claims difficult. Societies may be categorised in terms of stages or socio-economic levels or political-class structures or ideologies; but what matters is the specific combination of these features which together constitute a particular society and its ability to meet the needs and interests of its citizens. Hence, while this book aims to raise issues which are of broader significance than to one nation state, Aotearoa New Zealand, a humanities' perspective requires that the local should not be merged with the universal, but should retain its voice so that others hearing it (literally and figuratively), by hearing it differently may question the uses to which it is being put. Like the process of interpreting works of art in any medium, the process is one of building more general knowledge while preserving the uniqueness of the objects on which that knowledge is founded.

Unlike the conventions applying to much publication in the social sciences and humanities, I have used quotation rather than reference or paraphrase so as not to merge the textual voices of writers into a neutral, impartial voice. A text in the humanities stages a conversation between texts across time and space and its composition must be anchored in respect for the integrity and uniqueness of every text. There is an obvious and perhaps utopian politics in this conception of composing a text; not a procedure to force a specific society or text or human being into a universal mould, but always challenging the imposition of categories, however useful these are, as limits rather than as enablers in the further evolution of humanity grounded in its local variants.

Chapter One: *Humanities in the Knowledge Society*, will take the process of attempting to establish a national organisation to represent the humanities in New Zealand as exemplary of the situation of the humanities in a technoscientific-dominated global knowledge order. It is both a narrative history and a commemoration of a process which, on my assessment, should have succeeded but actually failed. Others will regard the outcome as a success, however qualified, because the humanities in Aotearoa New Zealand, like the social sciences, found a place which was previously lacking in an existing national organisation representing knowledge. Whether or not this local history matters is itself a test of, the declining condition of

the humanities as a part of the global human project of knowing the given world and ourselves.

Chapter Two: *Creating new knowledge: the way of the humanities* will develop an account of what is distinctive about the creation of knowledge in the humanities, how it contributes to innovation and value in postmodern societies, and why a new humanities is needed. It will focus on advanced knowledge, the university being the conventional and public institutional site of its creation.

Chapter Three: *The education state and the centrality of policy for arts, culture and heritage* argues that education and not the economy should be the primary focus of a democratic government, and that its underpinning policy should be cultural policy.

Chapter Four: *A new paradigm: cultural policy, the writing city, and the education state* works out the principal components of a social order in which a new humanities provides foundational knowledge in and to a state actively exploring/revealing/instantiating "democracy to-come" through its citizens and its institutions.

Chapter Five: *Locating the New through a New Humanities* explores the origin in the arts, and ultimately in the poem, of a new humanities. This chapter proposes that there is a track (complementary but also very different to that laid down by technoscience and business) leading to innovative thought opened up by the works of artists in all forms and media and given possible definitions in the knowledge derived from them by the interpretive work of a new humanities.

Notes

A note on authorial voice

With respect to the narrative of Chapter One, I played an integral role in all aspects of the conceptualisation, development, and administration of the Humanities Society (HYMANZ) and the Council for the Humanities, the planning and presentation of projects, conferences and seminars, fund raising, and meetings with government officials and representatives of other

national humanities organisations. I have tried to write about it as dispassionately and impersonally as possible.

A note on sources

The records of HUMANZ and The Council for the Humanities are now held by the Alexander Turnbull Library. Most of the public events were audio recorded, and most recordings were transcribed with the aim of publication – but neither the energy or the funds were available to fulfil that intention. Key documents will be made available (again) on the web.

The names of those who sustained this work of institutional invention as members of the various Councils, those who became the first Fellows of the New Zealand Academy of the Humanities, and those who received the award of Pou Aronui, are listed in the Appendix.

I am grateful to Michael A. Peters for permission to present in revised form in Chapters Two and Three material previously published as Opie (2013 and 2014b).

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[i] William Golder, *The New Zealand Survey; A Poem in Five Cantoes. With Notes Illustrative of New Zealand Progress and Future Prospects. Also The Crystal Palace of 1851; A Poem in Two Cantoes. With other Poems and Lyrics*. Wellington: J. Stoddart and Co., 1867, 61. http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/tei-GolNZS.html

Timeline

1991	First meeting to discuss forming a national organisation for the humanities
1992	Draft Constitution adopted and Interim Council elected.
1993	Launch of the New Zealand Academy for the Humanities Te Whāinga Aronui Inc.
1994	The Strategic Plan and Budget 1994-97 completed. HUMANZ Newsletter begins publication, and continues to 2005.
1995	First meeting of national humanities organisations in San Francisco
1996	Research policy completed. Logo design accepted. Humanities entry to the Marsden Fund negotiated.
1997	The Academy becomes the Humanities Society of New Zealand Te Whāinga Aronui Inc. *Book & Print in New Zealand: A guide to print culture in Aotearoa* is published. The HUMANZ website is launched. The Knowledge Policy Research group is set up.
1998	Cultural Foresight
2000	DICE – Directions in Information, Culture and Economy. Meeting with Government Ministers about the future of the Humanities Society. A report to the Ministry of Research, Science and Technology, *Knowledge, Creativity and Innovation.*
2001	The *Five Year Strategic Plan*, commissioned by the Government.
2003	Development of the Humanities Research Network initiated.
2004	The Humanities Research Network Te Whatunga Rangahau Aronui launched. An Interim Council is established with membership from the universities and other sector bodies.
2005	A new report to Government, *The Humanities – Charting a Way Forward.* The Humanities Trust of Aotearoa New Zealand established. It was to be known as Te Whāinga Aronui The Council for the Humanities
2006	The first Pou Aronui appointed. MOU with the Royal Society

	of New Zealand signed. The Humanities Society of New Zealand Inc. is wound up.
2007	The New Zealand Academy of the Humanities Te Mātanga o Te Whāinga Aronui established. First Fellows appointed. The second Pou Aronui appointed. The first Academy Lecture on Research given.
2008	Creative Commons Aotearoa New Zealand licences and website launched. Second Group of Fellows and third Pou Aronui appointed.
2009	The Humanities Trust is wound up and its assets transferred to the Royal Society of New Zealand. Fellows of the New Zealand Academy of the Humanities become Fellows of the Royal Society.

1. Humanities in the Knowledge Society

"when your prudent spirit acknowledges and obeyes the voice of reason from what quarter soever it be heard speaking" (Milton 1974 199)

Although this discussion of the situation of the humanities in postmodern democratic societies, and specifically in Aotearoa New Zealand, will proceed as unemotively as possible, there remains so much justification for rational anger about how our societies are currently governed that, from time to time, it is necessary to be reminded that anger captures a truth that the disciplined "voice of reason" can miss. One such recent example is Manuel Castells' research into and meditation on the social movements gathered together under the nominations of the Arab Spring and the Occupy Movement. He writes that

> the roots [of social movements] are in the fundamental injustice of all societies […]. In each specific context, the usual horses of humanity's apocalypses ride together under a variety of their hideous shapes: economic exploitation, hopeless poverty, unfair inequality, undemocratic polity, repressive states, unjust judiciary, racism, xenophobia, cultural negation, censorship, police brutality, warmongering, religious fanaticism (often against others' religious beliefs), carelessness towards the blue planet (our only home), disregard of personal liberty, violation of privacy, gerontocracy, bigotry, sexism, homophobia and other atrocities in the long gallery of portraits featuring the monsters we are. And of course, always, in every instance and in every context, as the primary formation of a/n (unjust) social order, sheer domination by males over females and their children (Castells, 2012: 12).

This trenchant anatomising of the dark underside of human civilisation (and especially of the version promised by Western democracies), the qualities of human social living which undermine the claims to progress, enlightenment and human betterment by advances in knowledge and technology, draws on powerful traditions in Western thought which have been kept in the

foreground by such apocalyptic texts as the Book of Revelations and are now the stuff of twenty-first century television news and drama, documentary and fictional film making, novels, and the social movements discussed by Castells. The key term, humanity, will not however signal that the bodies of knowledge most pertinent to the understanding of our monstrousness are to be found in the humanities. Instead, the current conventional response, especially in government, would be to regard the sciences and the social sciences as the sources of both the relevant knowledge and the means to address the diversity of the kinds of inhumanity characterising the postmodern global (dis)order.[1]

Here can be found the starkest challenge to those making claims for the continuing importance of the ways of knowing characteristic of the humanities, the knowledge generated by human thought throughout human history and conserved by the humanities and the cultural institutions on which they depend, and the new knowledge created by contemporary interpretation of and reflection upon texts in all media and languages from all times and places. What does this knowledge make available for thought and enquiry which is not already provided (or will be in due course) by the sciences and social sciences? What knowledge work can and do the humanities perform in society which is as fundamental as that performed by the sciences?

If religion, law and the arts engage directly with the monstruous in human affairs, through theological analysis, the moral framing of social issues, and pastoral care grounded in communities, through legal analysis and the practice of the institutions of the legal system (professional bodies, courts, police and prisons), or through all kinds of aesthetic representations, what is left to the humanities as a fraction of the totality of academic knowledge? As a body of knowledge and intellectual practice the humanities persist as marginal to the dominant knowledges of the postmodern western university and lack (with the possible exception of historical societies) an institutional extension into society like that provided by churches, the legal profession and arts organisations. Very few would argue that, just as technoscience extends into society through all aspects of the economy and government, so do the humanities.

The purpose of the narrative, enquiry and analysis which follows is to ask three questions: “Why do/should the humanities continue to matter as a branch of fundamental human knowledge?”; “Why does it matter that the humanities should be able to speak directly and intelligibly to the governments of democratic societies?”; and, “What needs to happen in, to and for the humanities for those questions to find an answer?” Such questions point to the worldly contexts beyond the academic locations in which modern humanities continue to live, move and have their being. But they cannot be addressed without also acnowledging the typical dominance of the social sciences in academic, business and governmental representations of the kinds of knowledge most relevant to addressing questions about human societies. Apart from Castells’ cultural reference to the horsemen of the apocalypse, most policy makers and social researchers would not think of the humanities as sources of relevant and useful knowledge in the consideration of his indictment of humanity’s destructiveness and the complex array of humanity’s failiures towards itself and the world on which the continuation of our species depends.

1. Beginnings

1.1 An overview

Over the past two decades, organisations representing the humanities in various Western nations have worked vigorously to affirm, especially to governments, the necessity of the humanities as a fundamental and distinctive dimension of human knowledge. Successes in modifying the effective exclusion of the humanities in official thinking have occurred but have not affected the completely dominant position of science and technology. The most striking instance of this situation is the subject of this book. In the nation states with which New Zealand would typically compare itself , national organisations representing the humanities were established before the impact of neoliberalism intensified their marginal status; one of their successes is simply their survival under the regime imposed by neoliberal thought. But no such independent national organisation had been created in New Zealand before the neoliberal catastrophe struck and the fact that, in the aftermath of

the purist application of neoliberal conceptions of government, economy and society, an attempt to establish one failed simply makes the conditions largely determining the present situation and capacity of the humanities in Western democracies more vividly apparent.

This chapter aims to tell the story of the attempt during the last decade of the 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century by individuals and organisations in New Zealand to remedy this lack. Unlike other European and Anglo-American nations, New Zealand did not until the twenty-first century establish (briefly) a national organisation with the double function of representing the interests of the humanities to government and the public and of recognising the intellectual achievements of its professionals. In the first phase, an incorporated society, The New Zealand Academy for the Humanities Te Whāinga Aronui (HUMANZ) initiated in the 1990s a series of meetings and national conferences, wrote discussion papers, and formulated a strong conception of what such an organisation in and for Aotearoa New Zealand should be like and how it could work. In 2000, HUMANZ began a discussion with the then Labour Government, seeking official recognition and funding to fill the empty space in the representation of knowledge at the national level next to the Royal Society of New Zealand. The second phase began in 2005 when HUMANZ was replaced by The Humanities Trust of Aotearoa New Zealand, otherwise known as Te Whāinga Aronui The Council for the Humanities. The Council established the New Zealand Academy of the Humanities Te Mātanga o Te Whāinga Aronui in 2007 but was unable to achieve recognition and funding from the New Zealand Government; the Trust was wound up in 2009, some of its functions passing to the Royal Society of New Zealand. Given the shift in official thinking during the past two decades towards conceptions of societies and economies as knowledge–driven in a global environment but distinguished by cultural, historical and geographic factors, it should be remarkable that these developments occurred so late in international terms and should still be unacknowledged by the New Zealand government. This is particularly the case because, from one perspective, the body of knowledge gathered under the term humanities can be regarded as the traditional knowledge of British and European settlers, the source of the dominant culture in New Zealand.

Reviewing at this point two examples of developments during this period in the countries to which New Zealand is most closely related historically and culturally will provide a succinct context for interpreting this state of affairs. The first is the establishment in 2005 of the Arts and Humanities Research Council in the United Kingdom. The parallels with the situation of arts and humanities research in New Zealand are striking and suggest that a set of inherited factors underlie the lack of infrastructural development for knowledge creation in these fields. At the risk of gross simplification, while the British Academy, representing academic research in the arts, humanities and social sciences, had been in existence throughout the twentieth century, only the sciences and social sciences were represented by the research councils established to channel public funding to research. In the early 1990s the British Academy began a campaign for the completion of the spectrum of research councils. The extraordinary outcome was its failure; the legislation to establish the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) was defeated in Parliament, apparently the result of a perception that the inclusion of this segment of academic research would diminish funding to the sciences. Because the Government had expected that the Council would be established, funding which had been earmarked for it was retained and in 1998 the British Academy set up the Arts and Humanities Research Board (AHRB) to administer that funding. The AHRB operated as a research council in all but name. Nearly a decade later, the process was repeated, this time successfully, and in 2005 arts and humanities research joined the sciences in the research councils structure, which is now administered through the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. The AHRC has in a short time generated a strong account of research in these fields and programmes for its development, including research into the situation of the arts and humanities in order to argue for policy and funding improvements from the government. All of these actions demonstrate the value of investment in the arts and humanities and of having an organisation responsible for acting as an interface between them and the government. Observing what happened in the United Kingdom offered a clear warning, that any attempt to insert a new organisation into the existing governmental infrastructure for administering knowledge and to seek public funding for it, however justified it seemed, would not necessarily be successful.

The second example is Australian, the formation in 2004 of the Council for the Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences (CHASS). Although Australia has a fully developed Academies structure, partly funded by the government, and a joint Academies body had been set up to represent the interests of academic research as a whole to the government, it was clear to those in the Humanities and Social Science Academies that these fields were persistently marginalised in government policy for research and development, whether for research as such or research relevant to government interests. The case was vigorously argued that it was not in the national interest to exclude these domains of knowledge from participation in government policy development, and the result was the government's decision to fund a peak body which would draw its representation from all the learned societies and professional organizations in arts, humanities and social sciences, and bring their expertise to bear on issues relevant to the future of Australia. CHASS and the AHRC were both set up to be interface bodies, mediating between researchers focussed on research as such and the government's need for knowledge applicable to policy formation and social and economic development. As with the AHRC, CHASS sought to extend academics' conceptions of the value and relevance of their research and the government's ability to engage with and value that knowledge.

Broadly speaking, the framing concepts in official thinking about research in the United Kingdom and Australia within which these developments occurred was fundamentally the same as that in New Zealand.[2] Its main features are the dominance of scientific and technological research as the source of knowledge of value, the emphasis on that part of the economy directly dependent on scientifically generated knowledge, and the priority given to economic over social development.[3] While parts of the cultural sector have been brought into this frame, notably creative industries, this has underlined the inherited distortion in the representation of the economy, when statistical collections are still basically defined by categories reified from the characteristics of the traditional industrial economy. But a critical difference between the three nations in respect of the humanities is that, at the time when the pressures for globalising research and economic policies became intense in the last two decades of the twentieth century, both the United Kingdom and Australia had well-established national organisations, like the British Academy and the Australian Academy of the Humanities, to speak for the

arts, humanities, and social sciences, whereas nothing similar had developed in New Zealand. Only one organisation, the Royal Society of New Zealand (RSNZ), which had evolved from its origins in the later nineteenth century as an inclusive knowledge organisation to focus on science only, was funded partly by the government as an Academy of Science and Technology. It underwent major changes during the 1990s, as did similar academy organisations in related countries under pressure from governments for more return from the public funding provided to them, especially through the provision of expert advice. The RSNZ emerged with a wider conception of its role, and a much enhanced position in its sector, including membership of the social sciences, in the context of government efforts to shift New Zealand from its dependence on primary commodity production. What follows in this chapter is an account of the attempt made to fill the gap in the national infrastructure for knowledge resulting from the absence of a research council and an advocacy body for the humanities.

1.2 The local setting

Until the mid-1980s research in New Zealand was publicly funded through the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) and the block grants to the universities. The creative arts were funded through the Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council; the arts were not then thought of as engaged in research and claims that creativity is as much a factor in science as in the arts were not then apparently necessary as part of the case for scientific research. No body like the Australian Research Council existed to oversee academic research as a whole, a task which was carried out by the University Grants Committee until it was wound up by the government in 1989 and some of its responsibilities (but not its funds) were handed to the Vice-Chancellors' Committee (NZVCC), now Universities New Zealand, which became the national advocate for the universities.

When the government moved in 1990 to bring contestable funding into the (science) research system, and to privilege research oriented towards government priorities, it dissolved the DSIR, created from its funding the Public Good Science Fund (PGSF), and formed a number of Crown Research Institutes (CRIs) which would gain their funding by bidding into the PGSF pool under a variety of output categories. In effect, for the first time,

New Zealand acquired something like a research funding council system, except that there was one fund and administration for all publicly finded non-academic research (the universities became eligible to contest for research funding from the PGSF some years later). The social sciences were included in the PGSF, the arts and humanities were not. The reform process was not driven by scientists, one outcome of which was a disruption in the affairs of the RSNZ because scientists employed by DSIR and who opposed the changes did not get the support they sought from the RSNZ, which was governed by the RSNZ Academy Fellows. A new grouping of scientists was set up to contest the changes, and played a considerable part in the review of the RSNZ Act in the mid-1990s, which occasioned a major change in its constitution. A new governing body more broadly representative of the science-based professions, the Council of the Royal Society, displaced the Fellows, who became members of the Royal Society Academy within the RSNZ and were represented on the Council. In this way, the RSNZ responded to new demands from government for knowledge deemed relevant to government interests, a process which was occurring in other similar jurisdictions like Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom. The traditional academy was not well constituted to meet this expectation.

This brief narrative is necessary to provide a local contex, within an international process of structural change in government and the public sector, and a deeper epistemic change within democratic societies, for the response made on behalf of the humanities. In 1990, at a meeting of the university Deans of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences, concern was expressed about the future of humanities research, given the introduction of contestable funding and the entry of the universities into the PGSF. Following this meeting, the Dean of Arts at the University of Canterbury, John Jennings, undertook to investigate whether a body representing the humanities could (and should) be established to represent the interests of the humanities nationally and, specifically, to campaign for research funding. Representatives of about 50 organisations (universities and others with interests in the arts, culture and the humanities) met in Wellington in 1991, agreed that action was needed, and set up a working group to draft a constitution for an incorporated society.

1.3 Founding Ideas and Issues

But exactly what kind of an organisation was needed to represent the humanities? How should its aims be defined, and what should its name be? And what did "the humanities" encompass in New Zealand, both institutionally and in terms of domains of knowledge and practice, especially when there were two established knowledge traditions, the cultures of the indigenous Māori and the Pākehā (British and European settlers)? The disciplinary representation of the humanities differed from university to university, and humanities knowledge was at work in society in contexts which did not match academic disciplines. Furthermore, did "the humanities" also include "the arts", or mātauranga Māori, or should those bodies of knowledge and aesthetic practice be separately named in the organisation's title and Constitution? And – a question which was never finally answered, not least because most of the organisations represented at the first meeting, apart from the universities, were themselves small and depended on member subscriptions and voluntary work to achieve their aims - where were funds going to come from to make the work of representation both possible and on-going?

The broad answer to these questions was that it should be a national organisation, multi-institutional and multi-professional in its representaiton to ensure that the actual work of the humanities as a mode of learning and knowledge creation should be as fully represented as possible. It was decided not to put easily contested boundaries around its domain by adopting a definition of the humanities, but instead a statement of objects would define the scope of the organisation's work, acceptance of which would provide the basis for membership.

Some initial decisions became guidelines: although organisations provided the basis for the first meeting, it was decided that only personal members could be elected to governance positions; if a small group of people were to attempt meaningful national representation of the humanities, the governing body would need to be made up of regional representatives, who would have a primary responsibility for engaging their regions in the work of the national organisation and informing it about regional concerns and issues; as a national organisation established to address the government on behalf of the humanities, it would need to be based in the capital city.

The working group met and exchanged documents, building on the guidelines from the 1991 meeting. Drafts of the Constitution were circulated for comment, with the aim of keeping consultation as open as possible. At a meeting in Wellington on 26 June 1992 the Draft Constitution was discussed and approved in principle, the English name was agreed and a procedure for determining an appropriate Māori name was decided, and an Interim Council (as the executive committee became known) was elected.

The primary task of the Interim Council of the New Zealand Academy of the Humanities was to prepare for the first General Meeting in 1993, at which the Constitution would be approved, the first Council elected, and the plans and programme for the launch of the new organisation decided. The Chair, John Jennings, closed the meeting with the following observation:

> the point of no return had been passed. All those involved in the humanities are involved in fundamental intellectual activities which consider issues that are related to human life and human values. One important aim in research and teaching is to develop the skills and techniques of independent enquiry into issues central to our particular and distinctive culture in Aotearoa/New Zealand. The new organisation alone will not succeed in realising the objects adopted by this meeting. Personal commitment to the objects - to promote activites in the humanities and to increase public understanding of humanities - and hard work by the Council, are prerequisites to success. Public education will play a significant role.

1.3.1 Finding two names

The New Zealand Academy for the Humanities.

Many of the conceptual issues which were raised in these discussions came into clearest focus in the matter of the English name. The term Academy was adopted, but this brought out clear differences of perspective; it would not elect Fellows (a patriarchal concept) but be based on personal and institutional members; those preferring the term Academy tended to work in universities, whereas those not so located perceived this term to have elitist implications; and what sense did this term make in Māori culture? Of particular importance was the distinctive location in New Zealand of this

proposed national organisation, and the need to respect the partnership between Māori and Pākehā enshrined in the Treaty of Waitangi (1840).

Te Whāinga Aronui

The gifting of the Maori name needs particular mention because it makes vividly apparent the anchoring of the humanities in culture, and that culture is specific to place, history and language. The meeting was clear that the organisation's name should be brief, the term humanities should be understood to include the arts, and the objects should be taken biculturally, a position to be visibly exemplified in a Māori name. It was decided that Te Matawhanui, the Māori University Teachers' Association, would be approached. After various consultations with scholars and with Professor Timoti Karetu, Commissioner of Te Taura Whiri i Te Reo Māori the Māori Language Commission, the name Te Whāinga Aronui proposed by Te Matawhanui was confirmed. Professor Wharenui Milroy (Waikato University) explained that in Māori tradition, Tane fetched the baskets of knowledge including Te Kete Aronui from the heavens. This basket dealt specifically with the humanities and the welfare of people. Following Māori convention, the name was received as a gift from Professor Milroy.

Te Whāinga Aronui is not a translation of the English name but invokes Māori concepts and traditions. Prosaically, it can be translated as "The way ahead for the humanities." It is important to emphasise the force of a name which has its roots in Māori knowledge traditions and was in no way positioned as subordinate to the dominant English traditions of knowledge by being merely a translation of the English name. It evokes "New Zealand" because Māori is the language unique to the islands making up the territory of the modern nation. It recognised, as the new organisation continued to attempt to recognise, the incommensurability of the two traditions and the need to engage both in its work.

It is also for this reason that the hybrid term humanities-aronui became commonly used in Academy policy papers and conferences. It was used to describe the distinctive bilingual and bicultural environment in which, in the context of global and multi-cultural perspectives, the on-going formation of culture and language occurs in Aotearoa New Zealand, and hence also the formation of a distinctive mode of the humanities, New Zealand humanities.

Aotearoa had for a long time been accepted in English as the Māori name for New Zealand, and was increasingly being used in a similarly hybrid form as the name for the nation. In this way, a major difference between the humanities and the sciences was simply identified; cultural knowledge in both indigenous and settler traditions did not have universal application but evolved locally and differentiated itself over time both from its own origins and in interactions between the two principal knowledge traditions and languages.

1.4 Widening Consultation

To further broaden the range of input into the formative process, people not at the 1991 and 1992 Wellington meetings were contacted for their views. One group came together for a half-day meeting in Wellington; they were provided with copies of the draft Objects and the draft programme for the launch of the Academy, and were asked to consider the following questions:

1. What should be the top priorities of the Academy?
2. Are there Objects or specific functions which are not included at present?
3. Does the Launch programme give a clear signal that the Academy is attempting to position itself in relation to a New Zealand and international future perspective?
4. Which persons and organisations do you think would be useful in the development of the Academy and/or as a contributor to the Launch event?

Out of these discussions emerged a practical answer to two linked questions: "How could a small executive committee based on one member from each of 6 regions (basically the main centres, but therefore also the university cities) hope to represent the diversity of interests in the arts, culture and the humanities either in their region or nationally?"; and, "Where could an organisation dependent for its base funding on member subscriptions find sufficient resources to achieve this representation, fulfil the Academy's objects in a way which would meet members' expectations, and encourage the growth and public recognition of the Academy?" The fundamental insight was that the Academy had to plan its activities and projects in partnerships

with established organisations in its sphere of activity, drawing upon its collective resources of knowledge and drawing into collaborative events and projects a diversity of interests and perspectives which would illustrate a theme or policy issue. Each project or event should have a strategic value, advancing understanding of the distinctive contribution the Academy could make because it was there to link together nationally and regionally humanistically trained people in mutually beneficial, public conversations. The plan for the Launch was designed to exemplify this approach.

In retrospect, the seeds of all of the subsequent developments initiated by the Academy can be found in the records of these discussions. The most important, to be discussed in more detail later, were:

1.4.1 Creating an advisory board

Creating an advisory board of persons of distinction in the arts and humanities to advise the Council on matters of relevance to the work and development of the Academy. The absence of any equivalent to a body of distinguished Fellows suggested this as a possible solution to the problem of the limited representation of the sector by Council members alone. Persons of standing in their respective communities of endeavour would thus be closely identified with the Academy's work. Such a group would exemplify the scope of the Academy by careful choice, and their working together would provide a very useful model of how cross-disciplinary and cross-professional relations might be worked out on a larger scale within the Academy and between it and other related organisations. It could ensure a flow of advice into the Council which Council members, however well-intentioned and however wide their interests, could probably not achieve by themselves. As it turned out, informal consultations with such people were an important source of advice and of participants in conferences and seminars, but the formal establishment of such a group had to wait until the founding of the Academy of the Humanities in 2007, when it was expected that the Fellows would constitute a kind of advisory board and make their expertise available as a reciprocal to their becoming Fellows.

1.4.2 Contributing to public policy formation for the humanities

Focussed and applied expertise would be needed to perform this critical function. The formation of think tanks during this period as a means of

focussing highly trained intelligence on matters of sectoral and public interest offered a possible model. The concept of an Institute for the New Humanities was briefly considered, in the context of coming to understand more about the kinds of work being undertaken by humanities organisations in other countries. The nearest the Academy came to implementing such a concept was in the development of the Knowledge Policy Research Group, and the creation of the Steering Committee of the History of Print Culture in New Zealand research project. An Advisory Board meeting the description in the previous paragraph was established for the Print Culture project as an expert (and multi-professional) body able to advise on project development and provide public endorsement of the worth of the project.

1.4.3 Providing services

It was also recognised that the Academy could not depend only upon good will and commitment to the founding idea as the terms on which people became, and stayed, as members. The Academy would have to provide services of value to members. Holding conferences in different regions on broad topics of current relevance to the sector rather than to specific academic disciplines, and under the auspices of museums and galleries as well as universities, was one approach, which was also designed to identify and scope policy issues the Academy should be taking up.

1.4.4 Communicating with its sector

A newsletter, HUMANZ, was first published in 1994 with the intention that it would circulate beyond the membership as a means of informing potential members about and promoting the Academy more widely; the very small beginnings of an information service were made in its diary section. But it also became quickly apparent that it would be very difficult either to expand such a service very far in that format, or to enlarge its scope and maintain its accuracy through voluntary effort.

Even so, it was apparent that a powerful and practical way of defining the role and scope of the Academy while meeting a generally perceived need would be for the Academy to institute and maintain an information network which would record in the form of a diary all events, significant activities and programmes, conferences, visitors etc in the humanities nationally. It was also clear (before the birth of the World Wide Web), that such a diary would

need to be computerised and be able to be accessed through a network as well as in other formats. It would operate as a service to members, but it was considered that it could be sold as a service to non-members both as a whole and selectively (an instance of the need to undertake work that could return funding to the Academy, which was and would continue to be a constant preoccupation of the executive committee). In the event, this proposal was implemented in the form of the Humanities Research Network a decade later.

1.5 Initiating national and international relations

Bringing the existence of the Academy to the attention of government organisations in New Zealand and to humanities organisations in other countries opened up further dimensions of the work of the Academy during this inaugural period. Among government Ministries and other agencies the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, the Ministry of Research, Science and Technology, the National Library of New Zealand Te Puna Mātauranga, The National Museum Te Papa Tongarewa, The National Archives, Te Puni Kokiri The Ministry of Māori Affairs, and the New Zealand Vice-Chancellors' Committee, were the most immediately important. Although education as a major domain of government activity was clearly of fundamental interest to the humanities, at this stage the Ministry of Education's brief was for the whole of the system except universities. This was to change when the Tertiary Education Commission was set up in 2003. Initial meetings with officials were constructive, and important associations developed through the 1990s.

But there were two difficulties of major significance for the Academy. Firstly, no Ministry recognised a particular responsibility for the humanities; and, as a consequence, making a case for funding of the Academy's work could be successful only on a project by project basis. This state of affairs was confirmed in another way by an early assessment of the diversity of issues in public policy in which the Academy should be interested. The list looks like what it is, a process of writing the humanities in to areas of government activity and development from which they were missing, and at a time of rapid and extensive social, economic and governmental change:

- the role of the humanities in education and training

- the role of the media in society
- the role of humanities in the information society
- the role of the humanities in the economy
- the role of the humanities in cultural development and change.

Implied in this simple list is most of the representational and policy-oriented work done by the Academy on behalf of the humanities during the 1990s, culminating in the DICE programme of meetings in 2000 which will be discussed later. Secondly, the time had passed when the humanities could be regarded as a "good thing" by government as patron on behalf of the public; instead, an organisation seeking funding for public interest purposes had to be able to offer services which the government deemed were needed nationally but which it would not itself provide.

Contacts with people and organisations working directly on the interface with government were also inititated. Reasons similar to those motivating the establishment of the Academy motivated the formation of the Federation of New Zealand Social Science Organisations (FoNZSSO), and their representative attended the 26 June 1992 meeting. Unlike the humanities but like the sciences, the social sciences had both discipline–based and professional accreditation organizations, which led to the decision to set up a federal body rather than one based on personal members. Ultimately, however, neither approach provided a secure or sufficient source of funding to enable the adequate and independent development of a strong national organisation. The solution adopted by FoNZSSO was made possible following the review of the RSNZ Act in 1997, which widened the RSNZ to include the social sciences and set up a college within the RSNZ Academy for the election of Social Science Fellows. The Panel conducting the review commented that there had been considerable discussion over whether the humanities should be included in the revised conception of the RSNZ, and about the difficulty of defining a boundary between the humanities and the social sciences; but whether or not there should be a separate academy for the arts and humanities was beyond the terms of the review, and including the humanities would have required extensive changes to the Objects of the RSNZ. The fact that these matters were considered at all shows how much change in thinking and in organisational relationships was occurring in the early 1990s, and is a significant anticipation of what subsequently took place

more than a decade later with the assimilation into RSNZ of the humanities. The setting up of Te Tumu Toi The Arts Foundation in 2000, with the aim of recognising and financially rewarding life-time achievement in the arts, exemplifes the long-standing relation between the creative arts and the corporate sector, an association not readily available to the humanities.[4]

A more general theme running through all these relationships is knowledge boundaries. Building a representative body based on an inclusive conception of the humanities required linking the current traditional academic humanities disciplines, creative and performing arts, mātauranga Māori, law, qualitative social sciences, the cultural professions which manage the resource-base for creative and critical research, and the media professions and systems in which this research is formulated and by which it is circulated and conserved. This spectrum of knowledge work was distributed over various government Ministries, and otherwise represented in segments by many discipline- and profession-oriented organisations. Even if a logic of association could be found which would extend beyond the academic humanities, was it conceivable that there could be sufficient in common at the national level between this body of knowledges and that of science and technology for one organisation, like RSNZ, to encompass the whole knowledge spectrum and provide equality of representation? My answer then, and now, is No; and that is a primary reason for this book.

Understanding what kinds of services might be required by or of interest to the government was much assisted by making contact with the national humanities organisations in other countries. A crucial decision was made by the United States Information Service to fund the Interim President, Dr Brian Opie, to attend the 1992 Modern Language Association conference in New York, and to engage subsequently in a programme of visits to a variety of organisations in the arts and humanities. These visits provided very important and timely information, not only about the spectrum of agencies involved at a national and state level in some aspect of the arts and humanities, but also about the issues of most concern to them and the forms being taken by advocacy. The single most important meeting was with Dr Stanley Katz, then President of the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS). The future of the National Endowments for the Arts and the Humanities was in doubt, and major changes in government policies

concerning knowledge and digital technologies were being undertaken with little consideration for the arts and humanities. It was a remarkable opportunity, being brought fully into acquaintance with front line work on behalf of the humanities as the new information order was taking shape.

1.6 The Inaugural General Meeting and the Launch of The New Zealand Academy for the Humanities Te Whāinga Aronui, 25-26 June 1993

The Inaugural General Meeting (IGM) was held in Wellington on the evening before the Launch. The IGM adopted the Constitution, members signing the documents for incorporation, and confirmed the membership of the First Council following member nominations in an electoral procedure that did not require an election because the number of nominations was equal to the number of places to be filled. This situation was typically repeated throughout the life-time of the Academy, Council places usually being filled following recommendations from retiring Council members.

The members of the First Council were: Richard Corballis (Manawatu), Alastair Fox (Otago), Mary Houston (Wellington –Treasurer), Deborah Jones (Waikato), Jonathan Mané-Wheoki (Canterbury–Vice-President) Brian Opie (Wellington - President), Terry Sturm (Auckland); Michael Volkerling (Wellington).

The Objects, or Kaupapa, of the Academy were:

1. To promote public support for all aspects of the humanities.
2. To provide an independent public voice on all matters affecting the humanities to government, commerce, industry, and the media.
3. To contribute to the growth of knowledge in the humanities by initiating, co-ordinating and facilitating research, scholarship and publication.
4. To organise public lectures, seminars and conferences.
5. To establish a strong and representative organisation for the humanities.

6. To establish and maintain contacts with similar organisations world-wide.
7. To recognise distinguished service to the humanities.

The aim of the Launch Conference, which was held at the National Library of New Zealand Te Puna Mātauranga, was to place the Academy in an international context as well as to open up policy themes of national significance for the humanities and bring together people making active use of humanistic knowledge in both Māori and Pākehā knowledge traditions.

The conference began with a Powhiri, a formal Māori greeting, and it was opened by the then Minister of Cultural Affairs, The Hon Douglas Graham.

The opening keynote address. "Looking towards the 21st Century; the role of the humanities in Aotearoa/New Zealand", was given by Dr Claudia Orange, Editor of the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography. It was followed by a panel on *Humanities and Public Policy;* and then the meeting broke into discussion groups on the following topics:

Research in the humanities. The discovery, circulation and uses of humanities knowledge;

Databases for the humanities. Social and cultural memory; libraries; museums/galleries; information technology;

The arts and the humanities. Humanities learning from, informing and being informed by the arts; and

The media and the humanities. The role of the humanities in communications media.

It concluded with a plenary session where reports were made on issues arising in each group.

This conference in effect laid out the broad scheme of issues and work which the Academy would attempt to address in the following years. Although much that was discussed throughout the day was already in humanities researchers' minds, two areas opened up challenges to humanities practitioners which were also challenges to the Academy. To attempt to affect the rapidly changing world order as it erupted in New Zealand required engaging in policy discussions and effective representations to government, and recognising the critical role of the media in all the processes of disseminating knowledge and information and defining the matters for debate

in the public sphere. In the event, the Academy Council focussed on the relation to government and the attempt to affect policy, and tried to bring its activities into the media space as much as possible. But the deeper issues raised about the humanities' relation to the media –

- becoming more adept at making academic knowledge more accessible to the public through the media for the public good;
- ensuring the retention of a non-commercial public radio network and the establishment of a non-commercial public television channel under a charter that would guarantee their independence and define their democratic role as contributing to public understanding of New Zealand society in its global conext, developing cultural, artistic and musical awareness and encouraging debate on the issues of the day; and
- assisting the development of investigative journalism -

were prescient, directly pertinent to a conception of applied or public humanities, and unable to be advanced because of the slenderness of the resources the Academy was able to marshall to support its work. The issue of public radio and television continues to haunt the otherwise unrelenting commercialisation of media in New Zealand.

The launch of the Academy brought together people with diverse professional and personal interests in the humanities and began the process of forming an organisation able to represent that diversity nationally and publicly. Over 100 people attended, the majority from out of Wellington. The Academy's commitment to recognising the partnership between the two principal humanities traditions in New Zealand, Māori and Pākehā, was strongly reaffirmed at the launch. All those present were faced with the two principal measures of the future success of the Academy: becoming an organisation in which the partnership between Māori and Pākehā was a reality; and providing articulate advocacy for the humanities in all aspects of public policy, especially in the context of continuing reductions in government investment in the arts, humanities and social sciences.

More of the flavour of the moment, in which in all aspects of New Zealand society and government were undergoing the turmoil of structural change, is given in Dr Orange's keynote address. She established a context for her

discussion of the role of the humanities by referring to “two significant features of the condition of New Zealand - a perceived lack of national vision, and an increasingly diverse population and culture.” She affirmed that this period of rapid change was accompanied by an “uncoordinated, ad hoc and uncertain situation over national issues […] the Academy has a crucial role to play - central to developing a New Zealand that is confident and vigorous in the many expressions of its identity and culture.” Those at the Launch were reminded that “we share much in common: we work in areas that are concerned with human experience. We deal with knowledge that is - potentially at least - socially transformative.” The principal features of New Zealand, “Small in size, few in numbers, mixed backgrounds […] are the very strengths which will enable us to redraw the boundaries of activity in the humanities. For it is clear that the traditional definition of the humanities as the province of academic study is too narrow and too short-sighted. Already the Academy has pointed the way by the democratic structure of this conference.” Dr Orange identified four large areas to be carefully considered in the establishment of the Academy: structures, resources, communications, and programmes. The need for “working structures appropriate to the New Zealand scene” was supported by noting that “While a central body for the Academy is essential, regional input and decision-making is critical to [its] vitality and growth”, and by reference to the differing structures being developed by other major cultural institutions like the Arts Council and the Museum of New Zealand. Dr Orange noted that they were responding institutionally in varying ways to Māori traditions and interests, and asked, "which way for the Academy?"

On funding, Dr Orange identified “The need to achieve a better balance in the valuation of the economic and social importance of the humanities in relation to science and technology” pointed towards cooperative work with the Ministry of Cultural Affairs. On databases, Dr Orange emphasised the lack of, and the urgent need for, information sources in all areas of work in the humanities. Communications “will be one of the most important functions of the Academy. A co-ordinating role by the 21st century will see the Academy […] ensuring that the significance of new knowledge is interpreted to as wide a spectrum of the populace as possible; ensuring that knowledge is used in the context of activities of value.” On research programmes, Dr Orange instanced the *Dictionary of New Zealand Biography* as an example of

humanities research which is national in scope, collaborative and, in its results, producing knowledge which enhances "the historical awareness of the nation [and is] accessible to as wide a range of the public as possible."

In her conclusion, Dr Orange affirmed that "A nation's vision - its sense of identity and self-worth - lies in the memory of its past, in the appreciation of its present (with all its multitudinous facets and participants), and in a sense of anticipation (even excitement) in the possibilities of its future. The humanities must play a central and co-ordinated part in developing and cultivating that vision. It is too large a matter for the few, whether academics, politicians or public servants. It needs a representative group - one ready to take the humanities to humanity, and to reinvigorate the humanities with humanity."

The force and point of her conclusion remains, even if the organisation which offered her grounds for hope that the humanities could be at the centre of the process of transforming a nation's vision of itself and being transformed in turn did not survive the first decade of the twenty-first century.

But, at this moment, even with the already visible issue of how to fund the quite startling scheme of work presenting itself to the Academy, the future did seem open and confidence was high in the conception of the Academy given full expression in the Launch conference. The organisation in 1993 of a national lecture tour by a leading American academic theorist of the information society, was also a remarkable success, not least because it helped identify the Academy with significant contemporary issues in the humanities. Professor Mark Poster, of the Centre for Critical Theory, University of California at Irvine, was heard by about 1000 people at meetings in the main centres, and his visit was recorded in various media. This tour demonstrated the existence of a significant public audience for challenging ideas about the social and cultural implications of new information technology; but it could not have happened without sponsorship, in this instance from The Trustees of the National Library and Telecom NZ. It also proved the concept of project partnerships as a principal means by which the Academy could advance a programme of events and activities with public significance for the humanities.

The first consequence of the encounters with other national organisations representing the humanities was the making of invitations to the then President of the AAH, Professor Deryck Schreuder, and the then Chairman of the British Academy, Sir Antony Kenny, to attend the launch of the Academy. Short notice made their presence impossible, but messages of congratulation from them and from the President of ACLS, Dr Stanley Katz, were read at the Launch. It was a very welcome beginning for the New Zealand Academy for the Humanities Te Whāinga Aronui, to be assured of support and cooperation from these related organisations, and a valuable testimony to relationships of critical importance to the future development of the Academy.

But this was not all. Although Dr Katz was unable to attend the Launch of the Academy, he came to New Zealand shortly afterwards, met with Council members and government officials and spoke in various settings about current issues in both research and philanthopy. While in New Zealand, he decided that the convergence of issues facing the arts and humanities in Western societies meant that it would be useful to bring together representatives from arts and humanities organisations in various national jurisdictions to share knowledge and methods of dealing with the new challenges. The first meeting occurred in San Francisco in 1995, and set a pattern for annual meetings through the rest of the decade. From the Academy's point of view, these meetings were without qualification the most critical source of current thinking on large issues which were also at the heart of the problems facing the humanities in the new order, and provided invaluable access to people who were doing this thinking and the documents they produced for their own governments. Given the historical similarities between Australia and New Zealand, it is hardly surprising that the AAH became the closest associate of the Academy in the evolution of its work. But this could not have made such a positive difference if the AAH had not been engaged in changing its conception of its role, as was the ACLS for exactly the same reasons. Perhaps the single most important value to be gained from this opening of horizons was the encounter with very knowledgable, admirable people with much experience of working on the interface between the arts and humanities and the agencies of the state and who were deeply committed to advancing the interests of the arts and humanities in this complex coming into being of postmodernity.

1.7 One Strategic Plan and Two Policy Papers

After the launch, it was imperative to define priorities. The Council knew that it needed access to more management expertise than it had amongst its members to develop a management plan and was fortunate to find people who could volunteer that expertise. It was also fortunate that a member of the Council, Michael Volkerling, was widely experienced in government financial and strategic planning. The outcome was the *Strategic Plan and Budget 1994-97*.

The Plan was developed from a close analysis of the Academy's Objects, and built on a re-presentation of them as four modes of activity with specific financial features, as follows:

- Services (conferences, visiting speakers, information service) [project funding]
- Public education (campaigns, policy formation) [sponsored]
- Academy projects (symbolic events, publications) [fund raising]
- Proactive research and development (new policies for the humanities, new knowledge in the humanities) [project funding]

By detailing the kinds of activities implied by each category, it became possible to understand how activities could be prioritised, in respect of both immediate effect and finding sources of funding, and phased in over the three year period.

It also made clear what kind of administrative base would have to be set up for the Plan to work. The (unsurprising) requirements, including an Executive Director, were:

- a national office equipped to initiate and maintain effective communication
  -- internationally, with other Academies and comparable organisations both in the Pacific and in Europe
  -- nationally, with government, business, education, cultural institutions and organisations, the media

-- and regionally, with Academy members and regionally based institutions and organisations;
- an adequately resourced Council able to represent the views of members, to formulate new policies and to enhance public understanding of the importance and scope of the humanities in the late C20th;
- a regional presence to ensure that local and national activities are closely interrelated;
- a database identifying the diverse kinds of expertise of members and others in the humanities so that the work of the Academy can be based on the best sources of information and advice;
- a reliable, national information service to members providing general access to activities, programmes, visitors, grants and awards, conferences, seminars, and public meetings.

The Budget accompanying the Plan estimated the total income required to fund it and the effect of expansion over three years to be: 1994 - $152,000; 1995 - $167,000; 1996 - $187,000. These figures were so far out from the actual income of the Academy at that point that it could have been more sensible, with that realistic information, to decide not to proceed. The Budget, as it had to, stated the obvious in its preamble: "How far and how quickly the Academy can develop is a function of income. A critical issue is the proportion of the operating costs of the Academy which can be provided from members' subscriptions." It then offered several options to members for finding these amounts of money:

> OPTION 1. the Academy has a part-time secretariat devoted to Member Services and Public Education financed wholly from subscription revenue (calculated on the basis of 1000 members paying $50 annually);
>
> OPTION 2. the Academy has a full-time secretariat undertaking the full programme funded wholly by subscription revenue (calculated on the basis of 1000 members paying $125 annually);
>
> OPTION 3. the Academy has a full-time secretariat funded by a mix of subscriptions, grants, and sponsorship which would also carry

> out the full programme. In this case, grant and sponsorship revenue totalling $102,000 would have to be raised by 31 March 1994.
>
> Even Option I requires both a 500% increase in membership and a 250% increase in the subscription. The budget demonstrates that some such development is essential; without a rapid increase in funds, the Academy cannot expect to survive as a significant organisation.

Anyone familiar with this situation would know that it was quite unlikely for the Council, or the membership, either to give up at this point or to accept such fee increases. And since membership was voluntary, at the level of membership fees humanities academics would tolerate it would be impossible to develop a competent organisation with membership fees alone, even if every academic were to join. Project funding and partnerships with other organisations would be necessary and, until a sufficient level of income could be assured, work for the Academy would have to be voluntary. If the Academy had been developed as a professional body, the fee level estimated in the Budget would have been quite normal; but there was no move for that kind of organisation, even though every other science-related profession had such a body (which, incidentally, also took an interest in curricula development and the standing of qualifications). In this respect, as in many others, the humanities represented the persistence in the modern scientific university of the residue of the pre-modern institution and its mode of professional formation.

In the context of policy changes in education and the increasing use of charters, mission statements and audit procedures to judge whether public sector organisations were fulfilling their obligations, the NZVCC set up its own Academic Audit Unit in 1993 to conduct audits of the universities; it also held meetings to receive input about the effectiveness of its audit procedures from the spectrum of professional bodies with interests in university degrees. The Society was invited to participate in these meetings, which were very informative. The absence of professional bodies providing an interface between arts degrees and the work-force was striking – and disadvantageous to academic development in those programmes, since most arts and humanities students, like students in all other degree programmes,

join the workforce outside the university rather than find employment in it. This was another important interface area in the evolving infrastructure linking knowledge organisations outside the universities into academic development and government policies for education and employment.

The meetings and the ongoing contacts with other national humanities organisations helped the Council position the Academy as a channel through which international thinking about the position of the arts and humanities in the changing global order of research, education and digital networks could be interpreted into New Zealand. This became a key function of the annual conferences which the Council organised in its attempt to present issues relevant to all humanities researchers and to the government, rather than to follow existing discipline orientations. It was also clear that relevant work was being done by professionals in the various national and regional cultural institutions, and that relations between academic researchers and other professionals in the field of the arts, culture and the humanities needed to be foregrounded in the Academy's work.

So, the only solution was to work to the Budget, and the Plan, but on those activities for which funding and voluntary contributions of expertise could be found. That meant conferences, meetings, submissions to government and, most importantly, policy formulation.

1.7.1 Research policy

Discussion about the form and content of an Academy research policy for the arts, culture and the humanities had been under discussion more or less from the beginning, but the push to formulate it as the documentary basis of representations to the government followed the formal establishment of the Academy and its Council in 1993. The Council developed a research policy drawing substantially upon the knowledge derived from participation in meetings with the other national organisations led by the ACLS, and by the follow-up work so much facilitated by the Internet (just like the more potent flow of ideas into New Zealand government policy from international business).

On the principle that the modes and ends of research in the humanities required a different approach to that of the sciences, a key element in the

policy was a proposal for a research funding body complementary to the PGSF for the sciences, a Public Good Fund for Research in Culture and Society. The anchoring statement was: "The Academy believes that the development of a national knowledge policy is critical to the successful transition of New Zealand from a resource-based to a knowledge-based society. The formation of a national knowledge policy must be a fully collaborative process including all the principal producers and users of New Zealand's intellectual capital." One part of the argument had to do with a key cultural and social function of the humanities, their contribution to the maintenance of democratic societies through the education of new generations of their citizens in democratic principles, traditions and values; another had to do with the contribution of the humanities to innovation and economic development.

Various reports and strategy documents provided the means for the Academy to sharpen its policy teeth and become familiar with the modes of discourse and structures of thought through which policy documents were created. A good illustration is work which was being done in in 1993 on research strategies for the social sciences by the Foundation for Research, Science and Technology (FRST), which administered the allocation of research funding from the PGSF.

In comments on a FRST paper concerned with the social sciences, the Academy wrote that

> The use of 'social research' and 'social science research' as possibly equivalent terms (but then perhaps not) through the paper indicates an area of critical ambivalence in the whole project of attempting to justify and expand the presence of social science research within the present Foundation framework, let alone attempting to introduce the humanities. The term 'science' effectively discriminates against (because it questions the credibility of) qualitative research methodologies which are characteristic of the humanities and significant elements of those disciplines which have come to be grouped as 'social sciences'. […] The logical conclusion is that at least one more Foundation for Research must be established in which the interests and conventions

of scientific and technological research are not determinative. Such a step is necessary if the public investment in the provision of knowledge necessary for the future development and management of New Zealand as a competent twenty first century society is to be adequately repaid. […]

The report, *Bridging the Gap. The Social Sciences and Humanities in Australia* (1993), by the Australian Science and Technology Council (ASTEC), observes that

> In Australia and overseas, the emphasis on science and technology has, to a significant extent, been shaped by the assumption that investment in research will lead to products and hence economic growth. This linear model assumes that science has its origins outside society, that basic scientific discoveries are translated into technologies which result in economic growth. However, this model is incomplete, since it takes no account of the mutual interaction between society and science and technology. […]
>
> In ASTEC's view, the complex interactions of knowledge, society, technology and change are of fundamental importance to Australia's future. The model of society which underlies much current thinking about science and technology policy is inadequate, and must be strengthened by a more explicit recognition of human and social factors. [..]
>
> Government is a major funder of research and shapes the institutions which perform that research in the social sciences and the humanities. It is also a major user of research results, in areas such as the economy as a whole, health and welfare, issues related to Aboriginal people, and family law. This gives the government a major interest in the organisation of the humanities and social sciences and in policy-making in relation to them. However, there is no focus for policy about the organisation, funding, research, or training and skills requirements in the same way as there exists a Minister with responsibilities for science, an ASTEC, and Prime Minister's

> Science and Engineering Council or a Coordination Committee on Science and Technology. (2, 3, 6)

This example makes it unavoidably clear that a public policy for research in the arts and humanities in the 1990s had to address both the sciences and the ill-defined space (disciplinary as well as in policy) where the modern humanities and social sciences overlapped, and that the issues being encountered were not unique to New Zealand, even though culture, history and the post-colonial settlement between indigenous and settler components of the population would require distinctive policy outcomes.

One further example can succinctly complete this sketch of the situation facing the Academy. A sentence in the November 1994 Executive Summary to *New Avenues for Crown Funded Social Science Research* located the fundamental, long term, infrastructural and investment issues for both the Social Sciences and Humanities in arguing for an appropriate conception of their contribution to the creation of new knowledge in and of New Zealand:

> The review reveals what social science does not have: a history of being nurtured by a strong government department, a powerful professional organisation lobbying for its interests, or a mechanism to describe ongoing and completed research.

This report opened a correspondence with the Minister for Research, Science and Technology the Hon Simon Upton, one letter (3 December 1995) making the point that "the historical underinvestment in infrastructure and research training for the Social Sciences will undoubtedly be significant in the process of inclusion of the Humanities/Aronui in the present research funding system", especially in the context of the competitive basis for the allocation of public research funding from the PGSF.

The issue of HUMANZ for May 1995 carried a copy of the whole Research Policy document as it had been developed to that point, seeking responses and noting that it would be discussed at the 1995 Conference. The account of the humanities-aronui as a body of knowledge and modes of creating it which were distinctive and could not be simply inserted into a science-based concpetion of research and the uses of knowledge served as a foundational

text for much of the subsequent work and activities of the Academy, not unlike the Ten Commandments. Its position was defined in this way:

> The humanities/aronui are that body of knowledge and those modes of enquiry and reflection which concern what it is to be human[5], including our inhumanity and our relation to the non-human. In the Western tradition, the humanities have been identified with literacy and with value-laden knowledge, the core requirements for establishing and maintaining a civil society. They connect the texts of the law with those of religion, philosophy, ethics, economics, history, science, technology, the arts and architecture.
>
> In the more holistic Māori world view te kete aronui (the basket of secular or profane knowledge), which is one of nga kete wananga (the three baskets of knowledge), may encompass theoretical and practical knowledge about the sciences as well as the humanities. The other kete contain ritual knowledge and occult knowledge (about witchcraft, evil, war), respectively. Love, compassion and peace ensure that wananga aronui is used for benevolent purposes but the possibility remains that it will be used instead for evil and destructive purposes.
>
> The humanities/aronui are diffusive. Because it is value laden, knowledge in any aspect of the humanities/aronui may be (but is not necessarily) significant in any other aspect; because its medium is language in whatever mode (spoken, written, in print, on television or the information superhighway) humanities knowledge cannot be pure or universal knowledge but is always caught up in the processes of social and cultural change. Its ultimate 'products' are citizens capable of playing a full part in the shaping of their society, beyond the economic roles of producers and consumers.
>
> The humanities/aronui are also accumulative: new knowledge is not necessarily better than old knowledge; specialist knowledge exists in a spectrum with popular knowledge and local knowledge rather than providing the only correct account. The texts of the past are

> always available to be read, viewed or heard again by anyone in the present and have power to modify the future.

One very significant issue, which was nowhere present in New Zealand government thinking, was highlighted in the Policy document by drawing from a report by the Social Science Federation of Canada, *Basic Research in the Social Sciences* (1984), which stated that

> Social reality is not the same in North America, in Japan and in Europe; there is not even homogeneity between Canada and the United States. Unlike the natural sciences, the social sciences are highly specific. And also contrary to the situation prevailing in the natural sciences, Canada cannot rely on foreign countries to produce the necessary knowledge of itself. The study of Canadian social realities must always remain 98% Canadian. Knowledge of other societies matters to us and must be promoted for our own self-interest: amongst other things it serves to have a better understanding of the specificity of our own human environment. (7)

The Research Policy paper extended the force of this observation towards the humanities by stating that

> New theories of culture and interpretations of history are challenging the now conventional disciplinary divisions in the humanities just as changes in economic and political relations have shifted New Zealand's focus from Europe to the Pacific and to Asia. Not only is cultural knowledge, both of ourselves and of other societies, an increasingly important factor in our competence as a nation in the world economy, but it has been observed in *Humanities and the Arts on the Information Highways*, p. 35, that 'The humanities and the arts […] are the producers of the intellectual property that will be one of the nation's most valuable economic resources in the new information economy.'

The second quotation is from the 1994 report on a national initiative sponsored by the Getty Art History Information Program, the American Council of Learned Societies, and the Coalition for Networked Information. These two quotations can stand in for the complex of issues and relationships

which the Academy was attempting to manage in formulating its fundamental policy on research. They locate the international resources on which the Academy was able to draw, and the convergence of postmodern developments in disciplinary discourses, new information and communications technologies and their cultural and economic implications, and new geopolitical alignments which were critical factors shaping a new environment for arts and humanities research and modifying the inherited forms and conventions of that research.

1.7.1.1 The Marsden Fund

In 1994 the then Minister for Research, Science and Technology, the Hon Simon Upton, responded to criticism from scientists whose research did not fit the priority criteria of the PGSF by creating the Marsden Fund, competition for funding from which would be based on the sole criterion of excellence. It was (and is) administered by RSNZ, not FRST, in order to make its difference from government priorities clear. This decision provided an opening for the Academy to propose the inclusion of the humanities in the fund, requiring a much more limited case than that which had defined the formation of research policy for the arts and humanities to this point. On 17 April 1996 the Council was represented by its President and a Council member, Dr Deborah Jones, at a meeting of the Ministerial Advisory Group for Research, Science and Technology for an exploratory discussion about the inclusion of the humanities in the "research, science and technology system", as the invitation defined it. The Minister, the Hon Simon Upton, was present and directed the discussion, which was based on the premise that it was now feasible to include the humanities within the Marsden Fund and even to modify the Output categories of the PGSF to admit the humanities. The Minister's response to representations from the Council of the Academy based on its research policy was to widen the scope of the Marsden Fund to include the humanities. A new Humanities Panel was constituted, and the Council 's nominee for its first Chair, Professor Sturm, was accepted.

At this time it was acknowledged that this decision was a first step towards a fuller consideration of research funding for the humanities and the role of the PGSF; it was also clear that it was only because the Minister promised an increase in Marsden funding that the entry of the humanities was accepted by scientists. This achievement was of more symbolic and practical than

financial significance to the humanities, in the sense that the amount of money made available for humanities research was about 0.15% of the whole PGSF. But it did acknowledge the need to make contestable public funding available to humanities researchers, and it did provide an incentive for those researchers to become familiar with the new practices required to win such research grants. Just as some scientists had criticised the PGSF for its restriction to government priorities, so many humanities researchers saw it as imposing a set of assumptions about research applicable to science but not to the humanities, notably the practice of team and/or programme research. The application forms were also designed on the basis that scientific conceptions of research were normative and consequently highlighted fundamental differences with research practices in the arts and humanities.

However, in the light of what was to follow, entry of the humanities into the Marsden Fund was the high point of the Academy's advocacy to the government on behalf of arts and humanities research. Further expansion of the position of the humanities in the research funding system did not occur, and it was clear that there was no possibility at that time that a separate Public Good Fund for Culture and Society would be set up. In his report to the 1996 AGM, the President observed that, while the work on access to research funding could attract new members and more support, "The Academy still depends absolutely on the voluntary energy, commitment and time of its Council members, without which it would by now have ceased to exist. The context in which the Academy has been established, nationally and internationally, is not encouraging to its continuance."

1.7.2 Cultural Computing

This discussion paper was also included in the May 1995 Newsletter for discussion at the 1995 Conference. It set out in a series of grouped lists a broad spectrum of issues raised by digital information and communications technologies for arts and humanities research and, more broadly, for many aspects of social and cultural evolution. A position which informed much of the Academy's thinking about the role of educational and cultural institutions, and the distinctive character of knowledge in the humanities, within the overall conception of the knowledge society was succinctly expressed in the statement, "Information and knowledge are educational, research and creative assets accumulated and developed by past generations and invested

for future generations." Once again, the work done by other national humanities organisations provided the Academy with critical sources enabling it to formulate a relevant set of positions on which to base policy argument. But local expertise, especially from university library personnel who were caught up in the complicated process of adaptation by universities to the new digital technologies, was also very important.

The report anticipated that much of what it identified in point form could become the subject of developed policy papers, although the main outcomes were submissions to government. Another quotation from *Humanities and the Arts on the Information Highways* prefaced the paper: "Like the Internet, the Humanities and the Arts have as a primary purpose making connections: between events, concepts, disciplines, institutions, and individuals. As a conceptual network, the humanities and the arts encompass multiple styles and perspectives; they interconnect memory and innovation, imagination and interpretation, knowledge and inspiration. The nation can justifiably celebrate the enrichment that the humanities and arts bring to the quality of its individual and community lives, and work with equal enthusiasm to adopt the National Information Infrastructure as an extraordinary opportunity for the sharing, preservation, and enrichment of our cultural heritage" (25).

One idea, the establishment of an Electronic Information Resources Facility for the Humanities which would, among other functions,

- Establish comprehensive access to electronic information resources nationally and internationally in association with other equivaIent centres; and
- Create a substantial information resource on Aotearoa/New Zealand society and culture which would complement that utilising other media) that is easily accessible nationally and internationally,

carries within it the kernel of the idea for what subsequently became the Humanities Research Network. Another, the statement that "Networked information can generate positive synergy; the more people that have access to it, the more people will use it and find new uses for it, thus attracting more users", can be seen in retrospect to point towards Creative Commons (see below 3.3.5) and to the proposals for open access to government information. And the position on the digitising of items and collections held

by cultural institutions raised another set of fundamental issues distinguishing the sciences from the arts and humanities, on the one hand, and the requirements for professional competence in modern humanities research, teaching and publication from those required for effective professional knowledge work in a digital environment, on the other:

- Significant initiatives have taken place in relation to the digitising of cultural heritage information but there is no overall plan;
- The benefits of the digitisation of elements of our cultural heritage should not blind us to the need to preserve original materials for they will retain their unique significance and value;
- The digitised image is not a "reasonable facsimile", simply an image pointing to the original;
- A key issue to be adressed is the matter of the ownership of digitised elements of our cultural heritage;
- There is a need for Humanities' researchers to have a stonger voice in the planning of electronic networked information especially that relating to elements of our cultural heritage since much of the input thus far has been from scientists;
- The digitising of the complex resources of the Arts and Humanities presents special challenges best solved by dialogue between Humanities' researchers and technologists;
- Humanities' researchers can encourage the development of appropriate new tools and methods of knowledge representation;
- Humanities' researchers may be able to develop standards to ensure that Humanities' information will retain its quality and authority and remain viable over time.

These points, to do with the nature and ownership of collections, the development of standards for digitising pre-digital objects (the notable example here is the development in a joint collaboration between British and American scholars of the Text Encoding Initiative), the design of techniques and training appropriate to the use of digtised materials in research, teaching and publication which have now come together under the headings of e-research and digital humanities, go to the heart of deep change across the spectrum of professional work in the arts, culture and the humanities. And these changes are the more challenging because what changes is the medium,

not only in which this work is carried on but also of the textual objects which are the "raw" materials of research in these fields.

The association with the National Library of New Zealand, the Alexander Turnbull Library, and the Trustees of the National Library, which had developed from the inception of the Academy, brought the Academy up close with the policy work being done by the National Library. For very much the same reasons as the Academy, the National Library had to make a case for being involved in knowledge policy formation at the level of research and innovation, since it was not obvious to government that libraries had anything directly to do with new knowledge creation.

At this time, thinking was being informed (and complicated) by much new writing on the social and cultural implications of the new digital technologies. Professor Timothy Luke, Professor of Political Science at Virginia State University and Polytechnic Institute (VirginiaTech) and Director of the Cyberschool, a virtual university development, came to New Zealand in 1995 as a Fulbright scholar on a project on this topic jointly organised by the Department of English and the School of Communications Studies at Victoria University of Wellington. A series of monthly seminars under the rubric, *Communications Technologies: What are their Social and Cultural Implications for New Zealand?,* began in 1996, was jointly sponsored by the Academy and the Telecommunications Users Association of New Zealand (TUANZ), was held at Victoria University, and was continued for the following two years. The question it explored sought to move discussion away from the strong association of the new technologies with technological determinism, and the one-way relationship between culture, society and technology signified by the term "impact": How does culture shape communication technologies, how do communication technologies produce new cultural forms? It provided an important bridge between academics, public sector officials and people in the private sector who shared interests in the new information and communication order. It also provided the Academy with significant knowledge about local developments and current thinking, including the work being done by the government on "information superhighway" issues. The Academy made regular submissions on policy discussion papers, and was particularly focussed on their implications for cultural institutions, most notably the National Library, and

education. These matters also became a regular aspect of Academy conferences, where the diversity of perspectives characteristic of the "conceptual network" of the arts, culture and the humanities could be recognised.

Any concern with the economic role of knowledge in the "information society" necessarily required a position on the kinds of education and training required for such a society to function effectively. One move in this direction, in an Academy document entitled *Key Points in the Formation of Policies to Enhance the Future of the Humanities/Aronui in New Zealand* (1996), based an approach to the issue of skills on an amplified definition of literacy, which included:

- the recognition of cultural diversity, not the assertion of monocultural absolutes;
- a firm grounding in a birth culture and language, the ability to acquire other languages, and an understanding of other cultures;
- an increasingly sophisticated literacy, which includes qualitative and quantitative modes of analysis and the ability to work with pictorial, graphic and numeric as well as alphabetic representations;
- the ability to analyse information ethically, imaginatively, and historically as well as logically, to articulate values as well as facts;
- an understanding of the transformations being wrought by new information and communications technology in the ways we think and interact with one another, especially in research, scholarship, and the access to and management of knowledge resources.

This position was influenced by another strand deriving from the United States, the writing across the curriculum movement and its engagement with the new digital writing (and reading) machines, in respect of learning, teaching and research and the lack of investment in computer labs and other infrastructure for academics and students in the arts and humanities. *Key Points* asked a question which the Academy was never able to address

directly, but which made explicit the kinds of issues a professional body would have taken up:

> The general BA has been taken in the western university to be the proper grounding for much professional training. With the onset of the informational society, what is the role of higher education in the humanities/aronui?

1.7.3 Implementing research policy – The History of Print Cultu re in New Zealand (1994-2002)

Another development in 1993 turned out to be remarkably timely for the Academy. Professor Don McKenzie, then at Oxford University, a New Zealand Fellow of the British Academy and an editor of the British History of the Book, was back in New Zealand and sought to enlist support for a New Zealand history of the book project. A conference in response to his advocacy which took place at the University of Auckland in 1995 was the first public event in what became a national research project, the History of Print Culture in New Zealand. From the perspective of the Academy, as discussions developed during 1994, such a project offered an ideal opportunity to apply its research policy in a demonstration of the ability of researchers in the arts and humanities to undertake significant collaborative research at a national level without compromising the independence of individual researchers.

Planning the project was accomplished at meetings among people with scholarly interests in the field, including from universities, libraries, printing, publishing and bookselling. A project group was set up to explore options and it was decided that scoping a full-scale history could not be undertaken until what was currently known in the field had been surveyed. This work resulted in *Book & Print in New Zealand: A guide to print culture in Aotearoa*, Penny Griffith, Ross Harvey & Keith Maslen (eds), (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 1997). This book was funded by grants from the Trustees of the National Library and comprised survey essays on the principal dimensions of print culture in New Zealand, together with a very substantial bibliography. It achieved its intended purpose of defining the scope of the field of enquiry and enabling the setting of priorities for new research. It also became the first e-book published by Victoria University

Press with the Electronic Text Centre at the university and, by that means, became a much more widely accessed resource.

Initial planning was based on the Academy's Object 3, to facilitate research, and the requirements for making successful applications to the PGSF were investigated. Funding was, as usual, a major issue, and an application (unsuccessful) was made to have it funded as a Year 2000 project. In the event, with the creation of the Humanities Panel in the Marsden Fund, that became the focus for planning project applications. A Steering Committee convened by the President of the Academy, based in Wellington (but with members in Auckland, Hamilton, Wanganui and Dunedin), and an Advisory Board, were established. The Print Culture programme received grants for projects from the Marsden Fund in its first two years (mostly for projects carried out by independent scholars), but it was not subsequently successful. While it was very productive of research outcomes, it did not achieve recognition as a model for collaborative research at a national level from most academic humanities researchers with interests in the field. Besides traditional conceptions of research, new disincentives for participation came from the increasingly competitive emphasis among universities on success in the research funding rounds and the lack of interest in collaborations beyond the borders of each institution and academic unit.

A brief summary of the programme can be found in an introduction to the *Turnbull Library Record 2001*: a special "Print Culture in New Zealand" issue, where it was noted that "Important partnerships have been established that provide a support and continuity that is essential for what is a largely voluntary effort: in particular the Turnbull Library has provided administrative help and a meeting place for the Committee, as well as specific assistance in kind for seminars and conferences, and as contractor for research projects conducted under the print culture umbrella. The financial management services provided by the Alexander Turnbull Library Research Endowment Trust have enabled us to take on the responsibility of research grant funds and projects." Over about 8 years, the programme produced 7 monographs, it organised 7 conferences and seminars in various parts of the country, and it was successful in gaining funding from the Marsden Fund for 5 research projects, all of which resulted in publications.

Little of the research work could have been completed, or even begun, without Marsden funding. Applications at the very beginning of the Marsden Fund's operation provided valuable experience in what was required of humanities' researchers to succeed in competitive national funding rounds, and also assisted the Fund managers in getting to grips with the difference of humanities from scientific research. But three other factors were also important:

- Work on the first publication, *Book & Print in New Zealand*, provided all applicants with a strong basis for linking their specific research projects into the survey by building on it and so expanding the scope of what was known about the introduction of printing and publishing into New Zealand. It was specifically hoped that, because colonisation had brought printing and print literacy into contact with Māori oral culture relatively recently, research into that contact might produce valuable new knowledge of relevance to the study of the history of the book beyond New Zealand.
- Applications under the Academy's auspices would not have been successful without the Turnbull Library's and the Endowment Trust's involvement. Not only did the participation of the principal national humanities research library link the research programme directly into the national collections, but the ability of the Endowment Trust to act as fund manager for the projects got over the problem that the Academy by itself lacked the ability to guarantee to the Marsden Fund's managers' satisfaction the security and proper oversight of the funds. Looked at from another angle, this outcome was of great importance in showing how a national research programme in the humanities could be conducted by means appropriate to the humanities and could directly involve the expertise of the library professionals managing the relevant national collections. If this demonstration appeared to offer an anlogy with the Crown Research Institutes for science and technology, it could have no purchase on government policy. National and regional cultural institutions, their collections and their concentrations of professional expertise were not conceived to be integral components of the nation's research capability. A proposal was made to the National Library for the establishment of a Centre for Research in Print Culture with the capability of directly linking

researchers, funding, a national research programme, and the fundamental collections and expertise of the Turnbull Library, but without success.

- The third factor was the international context of the research programme, which added the essential dimension of an international reference group. Conversations were opened up with scholars working in other national projects: the History of the Book in Australia, the British History of the Book, the History of the Book in Scotland, the History of the Irish Book, the History of the Book in American Culture, the History of Print Culture in the United States, and the History of the Book in Canada. Some of these scholars participated in conferences in New Zealand.

It seems fitting that, near the end of the programme brought about by the failure to gain new research funding, the final conference was commemorative. The July 2001 conference, *Remembering Don McKenzie*, financially supported by the Friends of the Turnbull Library, was a major international conference marking the contribution to the field made by New Zealand's most distinguished book historian.

2. Standing Back and then Going Forward: 1997 to the century's end

The Research and Cultural Computing policy papers established the intellectual foundations for programme development, partnership planning, and working relations with other organisations, and continued to have this function throughout the life of the Academy as an incorporated society. But by the mid 1990s, meetings with the other national humanities bodies, whether academies, research councils or federations, demonstrated that the inclusion of the term "Academy" in the name of the New Zealand organisation was misleading, since it did not perform the traditional academy function of electing Fellows. At the AGM in 1997 it was agreed to replace "Academy" with "Society", and the new name became The Humanities Society of New Zealand/Te Whāinga Aronui.

The paper making the case also served as an assessment of the direction being taken by the Council to develop the Society. It surveyed developments with respect to national organisations representing knowledge in New Zealand and overseas, affirmed that what was increasingly being called HUMANZ (from the title of the Newsletter) was evolving as a unique kind of organisation and that its Strategic Plan and Objects were appropriate. It noted that other academy-type organisations were developing a think tank function, enabling them to make research-based representations to their governments either alone or in collaborations on matters of common concern. The Royal Society of New Zealand had moved the Fellows of its Academy from their central position in governance. Its range of functions, and the services purchased from it by the government, described the terms of the case the Council had determined to make to the government for the Humanities Society and further supported changing the name. But the Council was not, therefore, walking away from its final Object, which required it to offer recognition to those with distinguished achievements in the humanities. The question was more, how could this best be done?

It is worth quoting one section from this paper, which summarised the Council's understanding of the scope of the work the Society had undertaken in some way and its main themes:

> There are 5 main dimensions of the sphere of activity which the past four years have shown is available to and required of HUMANZ if it is to become a strong national public organisation with a secured reputation as THE voice for the humanities/aronui. These are:
>
> *relation to governmen*t:
> policy advice and policy formation in all areas to do with the production, transmission and conservation of cultural knowledge in New Zealand; contribution to improvement of relations with other countries through exchanges and meetings;
>
> *relation to learning*:
> the recognition of excellence and achievement in all domains in which cultural knowledge is the basis of expertise and qualification; the creation of awards and prizes; the stimulation and funding of research and publication; the organisation of conferences, seminars

and other public meetings; facilitating the movement of experts between New Zealand and other countries; encouraging new programme development;

relation to society:
the dissemination of advanced work in the humanities/aronui to the public of New Zealand;

relation to employment:
the formation of clear and appropriate professional standards and expectations for work in the humanities/aronui in New Zealand; defining appropriate frameworks for education and certification; engaging with issues of professional significance eg copyright; providing opportunities for professional development; improving the means of communication amongst knowledge workers in the humanities/aronui; research on, and interventions in, the market for the range of qualifications in humanities/aronui;

relation to other organisations nationally and internationally:
collaborative work on shared issues and policies; the support of exchanges and fellowships for further education and training in cultural knowledge and cultural relations; the creation of endowments for these activities.

The paper closed with the optimistic affirmation that the Humanities Society had proved itself to be a "necessary organisation which must now assume its proper place nationally and internationally as a strong and very well informed voice for the humanities/aronui."

2.1 Designing a Logo and Creating a Website

Further steps in consolidating the identity of the Society and locating it in the new communicational space opened up by the World Wide Web were taken at this time.

HUMANZ
The Logo

Illustration 1

The design of the Academy logo followed the same understandings as the process of consultation leading to the gifting of the name Te Whāinga Aronui. After various discussions, a meeting with the artist John Bevan Ford (Ngati Raukawa ki Kapiti) led to his proposing a visualisation of the term humanities/aronui based on a conception of the ancient origins of the peoples inhabiting Aotearoa New Zealand and the journeys taken to this distant land (Illustration 1).

The design was accompanied by the following explanatory text:

> The two components of the logo are a palm tree from a Cretan vase from about 1900 BC and a hei or Māori fish hook amulet from early North Island New Zealand. They combine to represent the partnership between Māori and Pākehā which, in our history, is symbolised by the Treaty of Waitangi.
>
> These images also refer to the natural world which sustains us. By suggesting how the land and sea of New Zealand have become caught up in the global flow of cultures, they signify continuing cultural change.

> The fish hook is a reminder of the Polynesian cultural innovator Maui who by "fishing up" the islands of the Pacific created a pathway from Asia to the Pacific just as, together with the palm, it also suggests the ships which linked Europe to New Zealand.
>
> The Cretan palm is a reminder of the invention of writing, specifically the development of syllabic script at Phaestus in the same period.
>
> Language, spoken and written, is the foundation of the humanities/aronui as the gathering together of cultural knowledge. Our logo images the arts and humanities endlessly interacting with each other, creating and interpreting our cultures.

Ford's design concept was warmly endorsed by the Council, and his gift of the logo to the Academy was acknowledged with gratitude at its 1996 AGM. He became the first Honorary Member of the Academy in recognition of his contribution to its development.

Additional design work was done by Mark McGuire, School of Design, University of Otago. This design (Illustration 2) is one example of a larger design process carried out for the Society which emphasised the aesthetic qualities of the material means by which the Society presented itself in its communications.

Quite beautiful design work was done by Sarah Laing for both paper and web documents, and part of the sadness associated with the demise of HUMANZ is the loss of these visual representations of the values and purposes of the Society at the various stages of its evolution.

Illustration 2

The Society's website followed the Newsletter as a further attempt to broaden understanding of the Society's work by amplifying its "voice", and to encourage membership and participation in the Society's conferences and policy work.

The website was created in 1997 with the address: http://www.vuw.ac.nz/humanz/. It was developed and maintained by a graduate student, Brendan Mosely, and it was initially hosted by Victoria University of Wellington, becoming www.humanz.org.nz when it moved off the university's servers. The site was intended to be a central component in the Council's strategy to improve its means of communication with members and non-members of the Society, but it served principally as a publicly accessible archive of the Society's on-going work in document form.

2.2 Implementing policy – Cultural Foresight and the Knowledge Policy Research Group

A critical issue for everyone involved in trying to advance the interests of the humanities was not just learning how to deal with government, both Ministers and Ministries, but was working out who to deal with. As a field of enquiry and the creator of significant knowledge, the humanities were nonetheless invisible to government. It was clear that the sciences (and RSNZ) linked to

government through the new policy Ministry of Research, Science and Technology. But what did the comma signify: that the Ministry was in principle responsible for all research policy, but primarily for science and technology; or that the comma was in effect a colon, and the Ministry was responsible only for research in science and technology? This problem was never resolved, although the means were offered in a report commissioned by the government in 2005 (which will be discussed below).

It seemed obvious that the proper channel would be the Ministry of Cultural Affairs (MCA), the policy ministry for creative and performing arts and cultural heritage. Between MRST and MCA, the whole spectrum of knowledge creation (at least of western knowledge) was included. From another angle, if the principal means of applying scientific knowledge to society was through industry, then the principal means of applying humanities knowledge to society was through education. Neither MRST nor the Ministry of Education (MoE) recognised an immediate connection between the humanities and their primary areas of responsibility, although MCA participated in Academy and then Society conferences from the beginning. At this time, the brief of MoE excluded the universities; if MCA had included from its inception, as had been intended, the Historical Publications Branch of the Department of Internal Affairs (DIA), it would have had a traditional humanities component (see Chapter 3). During the 1990s MRST assumed leadership in knowledge policy and its role expanded considerably; by contrast, MCA was lowly ranked, its areas of responsibility were not seen as integral to economic policy, and the cultural agencies which it funded seemed quite independent of it. During the 1990s, the most continuous and substantial support for the work of the Academy came from the Trustees of the National Library, the British Council and the Australian High Commission, and Fulbright New Zealand.

An Australian initiative in knowledge and research policy provided a valuable context for interventions in knowledge policy and programme development in New Zealand. The National Scholarly Communications Forum (NSCF), founded in 1994, sponsored by Australia's four Learned Academies, involves researchers, librarians, publishers, and specialists in information technology and copyright and was set up to investigate the implications of a global knowledge system for research and its

dissemination, ownership of the results of research, and access to those results in a small nation. Research was commissioned which led to the publication of a report by John Houghton,*The Economics of Scholarly Communication*(2001) which concluded that, in respect of academic research, a country like Australia paid twice for knowledge, once for its production and then a second time when the published research was bought from international publishers who owned the journals. By bringing together representatives of the range of agencies and interests in the research system (including cultural institutions), the NSCF provided a highly effective model for enquiry into current issues raised by governments' emphasis on the relation between research, innovation, and economic development, and for making recommendations on government policy.

The papers from the Forum in 1993 which led to the foundation of the NSCF in 1994 were published in 1993 by the Australian Academy of the Humanities in *Changes in Scholarly Communication Patterns – Australia and the Electronic Library*, edited by John Mulvaney and Colin Steele. Its most recent Roundtable, 23, was held in 2013 on "Open Access in Research: Issues in the Humanities and Social Sciences". The Forum is exemplary of the thoughtful public work on behalf of research and publication in the arts, culture and the humanities to which the Society gained access through the Australian Academy and which it sought to accomplish in New Zealand. During the past two decades the AAH has directly confronted in its Symposia and in representations to the Australian government the implications of the profound shifts in public policy and corporate action which together led to the increasing marginalising of the humanities as a relevant domain of public knowledge and expertise, and the defensive inward turn in academic humanists' thinking. A full review of its Symposia publications, reports and submissions on the AAH website will make the grounds for this high estimation very clear.

In New Zealand, discussions about public policies for knowledge were led by MRST in the late 1990s under the banner of Foresight (see Chapter Three). The aim, a consistent feature of MRST's understanding of its public role, was to bring together the various components of knowledge-based production – research institutes, businesses, and government agencies – and, with the assistance of papers, speakers, and workshops, to generate thinking

about the shape(s) of the (knowledge) future for New Zealand and so achieve more effective policy and planning. Since the overarching banner for the Foresight project was *Building Tomorrow's Success*, it might have been expected that the cultural agencies and producers might have been involved – but the programme assumed that science and technology in association with business provided the knowledge that mattered.

The Society's Knowledge Policy Research Group (KPRG) first came together towards the end of 1997 with the aim of shifting the debate about the knowledge society towards a more inclusive conception of knowledge than that represented by science and technology alone. It became the organisational and developmental core of the Society's activities in the area of knowledge policy, and its work was sponsored by a grant from The Trustees of the National Library.

The KPRG also attempted to deal with what appeared to be a fundamental problem concerning the term humanities. It was hardly ever used in the media, not all universities used it in the names of their administrative units, and it seemed to have no place in official discourse. The phrase "science and technology" had, by contrast, achieved popular as well as official recognition as the shorthand term for knowledge, especially new knowledge. The question was, could a term be found which could achieve the same generality as "science and technology", but with meanings that made it a true description of the kinds of knowledge characteristic of the arts, culture and the humanities in both principal knowledge traditions in Aotearoa New Zealand, and consistent with the account given in the Research Policy. The KPRG settled on the term cultural knowledge and gave it a working definition:

> Cultural knowledge is understood to refer to a nation's whole stock of knowledge (including science and technology), as that knowledge is shaped by values, beliefs and traditions, as well as the knowledge created by artists and by people in the ordinary processes of social living.

This conception remains true to what is probably better termed humanistic knowledge even if the Society lacked the discursive power to impose "cultural knowledge" on the government or the media. Its principal

affirmations, which give it value and power, are that science and technology are a part of a culture's stock of knowledge and not independent of it, and that a culture's people are all contributors to the common stock of that culture's knowledge.

The Society initiated discussions with the Ministry of Cultural Affairs and organised seminars with the aim of building a case for the inclusion of the cultural sector in the Foresight process. The two seminars which took place in 1998 under the title, *Cultural Knowledge and the Shaping of the Future, I and II*,*w*ere billed as components in the Society's *Research Project towards the Formation of a National Knowledge Policy*, the aims of which were defined as:

> To provide the best and most current account of the terms on which a national knowledge policy for New Zealand should be formulated, from the perspective of cultural knowledge and its role in society and the economy.
>
> The interactions and differences between the two principal knowledge traditions in New Zealand, Māori and European, largely constitute the distinctive basis on which New Zealand now engages and will in the future engage with global flows of information for the purposes of cultural and economic development.

Their immediate purpose was to engage cultural organisations in the Foresight process by discussing issues it raised for the cultural sector. In the letter of invitation sent to state sector Chief Executives and a broad spectrum of related organisations, the Society stated that

> We believe that it is necessary, and urgent, for organisations and individuals in the cultural field to accept MoRST's encouragement to formulate alternative perspectives on how to think about the future. To that end HUMANZ, as a national organisation committed to promoting a greater recognition of the contribution that humanistic, social scientific and cultural knowledge can make to the development of public policy, has decided to organise a seminar on 'Cultural Knowledge and the Shaping of the Future'.

The keynote speaker for the first seminar was the Fulbright scholar, Professor Timothy Luke, on 'Thinking into the Future, Culturally'. This theme was continued through the day, with a paper prepared by the KPRG, a session on Māori knowledge and the future, and a session on science fiction, addressed by two New Zealand science fiction writers, Stephanie Johnson and Phillip Mann. The second seminar extended the discussion of the significance of culture in knowledge policy to radio, film and digital technologies, Māori media, new media and nationhood.

During this year the KPRG joined public sector officials in the Cultural Foresight Group, which was made up of representatives of a number of government departments and non-governmental interests, including the Department of Internal Affairs, Radio New Zealand, Te Mangai Paho, the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, Creative New Zealand, the Hillary Commission, Te Puni Kokiri, the National Library, and the Historic Places Trust. This group provided the context in the cultural sector from which the members of the KPRG participated in the larger Foresight meetings and planned the third seminar in 1999, *Seizing the Future - Cultural Value in the Knowledge Economy,* which was sponsored by McCabe and Company, Intellectual Property Lawyers and Patent Attorneys. One of its members, Dr Derek Wallace, wrote a substantial background paper, *Notes on Cultural Capital in a Knowledge-Based Society,* which was provided to seminar participants.

The brief for the seminar was:

> As New Zealand moves forward into the post-industrial age of the new century, economic transactions that are based on the production and consumption of material goods are being added to and enhanced by economic relationships based on the exchange of information and knowledge. In this kind of economy, access to information and the way some information is privileged and therefore promoted above others will be defining characteristics of our economy and our society.
>
> 'Culture' and cultural issues become increasingly important in this new economic and social order. Here, an individual's cultural wealth or capital, (derived from their family and societal up bringing, from their education and from the media) will have a

> significant bearing on how they are able to provide and access information and therefore economic wealth. It will affect the degree to which they are able to participate in public and commercial life. Similarly, a community's or nation's cultural wealth or capital, (drawn from their shared understandings, history, rites and rituals, arts and recreational life and icons) will enable it to achieve a distinctiveness which can be drawn on to create interest and competitive advantage in global markets. This 'capital' also contributes to the creation of viable business opportunities within internal markets and has the added benefit of enriching the life of the inhabitants of the community and the nation.

The seminar was opened by the then Minister of Cultural Affairs, Hon Marie Hasler, who observed that

> We are routinely told that we live in an information age, but little thinking has been done in New Zealand at least about what this really means in broader cultural terms. This seminar provides an opportunity to analyse the phenomenon as it unfolds, and to influence its development, rather than waiting to gaze back ruefully later on. Now more than ever, poised as we are on the brink of a new millenium, we need to ask questions of ourselves.

She concluded her address with the following comment:

> Fittingly, the Cultural Foresight group was initiated by the Humanities Association of Aotearoa, New Zealand, HUMANZ and Creative New Zealand, in response to the Ministry of Research, Science, and Technology's call to develop outcomes to guide the government's investment in scientific and technological research. I appreciate the work that your group has done to develop cultural sector submissions to this project and acknowledge the discernible influence you've had on the set of draft outcomes.

It was uncommon to hear public endorsement from government Ministers of the work being done by the Society (which is one reason for quoting it here). But these comments were encouraging, and did have an influence on the

decisions made about how to build on this work, with a national election to occur towards the end of the year.

This project proved to be of great interest to those involved but it could not be carried on by the Cultural Foresight Group itself because to do so would have exceeded the mandates of the public sector officials who made up the greater part of its membership. This experience was extremely valuable for the Society because it demonstrated conclusively the limits on public sector agencies in contrast to independent advocacy organisations in respect of their role in working for the public interest. It provided a clear justification for the claim being made by the Society to have a role in the policy field.

The papers given and the discussions stimulated by them at the third seminar were recorded, transcribed and published as *Seizing The Future – Cultural Value in the Knowledge Economy. Cultural Foresight, Seminar Three, Turnbull House 9.3.99,* facilitated by Ian Fraser and edited by Louise O'Brien. This was one of the few occasions when a publishing intention was fully carried through. Most of the HUMANZ conferences and seminars were audio recorded and the tapes transcribed, but the pressure of new work and deadlines meant that the final and time-consuming work of formal publication was not usually achieved.[6]

Another example is the concept developed in detail in 1998 for a serial publication, speculatively bi- or multi-lingual in its contents, called *Cultural Knowledge* (there were apparently no competitors, local or international, for that title at the time). It was specifically designed to publicise the term cultural knowledge, to develop an account over time of the implications of the working definition, and to provide a medium for communication and dissemination of ideas to the broad constituency invoked by the definition. *Media Information Australia* was seen to provide an attractive model for such a journal, but neither time nor an obvious source of funding could then be found for its development.

If the blog format had been available then, perhaps that would have solved the problem. But in 2007 a new opportunity was offered when the Kiwi Advanced Research and Education Network (KAREN) sought applications for development projects under its terms of reference. It was considered that

advancing the concept of *Cultural Knowledge* as an e-journal through an application for funding to KAREN would add a valuable new capability. The application was made but was not successful.

2.2.1 A Reflection

Cultural Foresight was a very important and testing experience for those involved in it, because it showed the value and importance of having a diverse group of professionally trained people in the cultural sector working together on open-ended issues of general significance. The Society devised programmes for its annual conferences which adopted a similar approach and which were based on creating exchange across sectors and engaging different kinds of expertise through inviting speakers and composing topic-oriented panels. Taken together, these meetings were intended to sketch over time the scope of the cultural field and the diversity of issues being raised by intellectual, technological and policy changes. They were also intended to discover and demonstrate what the core work of the Society as an interface organisation locating itself among the various already existing organisations making up the cultural sector should be. It was evident early in this process that such an approach was consistent with the way in which public servants understood their work, but it did not so readily complement academic work.

The perspective of those in academic institutions whose concern was the institution as a whole and its relations with society was similar; the difference was evident in the situation of disciplinary academics, for whom conference attendance and funding were defined in discipline terms. Although the Society's conferences aimed to tackle questions of immediate importance to academic researchers in the wider context of their institutions and changes being wrought by government policies, they were not perceived to be of immediate relevance to most academics. Clearly, it was not the task of the Society to emulate disciplinary meetings; its areas of proper concern with direct academic relevance were, for example, the large national issues of research funding and infrastructure.

One aspect of infrastructure had become apparent from the start, in the matter of institutional membership. A couple of university Deans had made their faculties members, but what stood out in comparison to the RSNZ was the

almost complete lack of professional associations in the humanities, and the underdevelopment of learned societies. The latter was the more immediately important because learned societies are critical components of research infrastructure through their provision of scholarly publication and conferences. The strongest learned society in the humanities was the New Zealand Historical Association, which included school teachers of history and public historians as well as academics; in this it brought within itself the diversity of ways of being an historian in Aotearoa New Zealand, as much as the Humanities Society was attempting to represent the diversity in the field of humanistic knowledge, in both the creation of that knowledge and its social and cultural applications. But even the Historical Association depended on voluntary service for its continuing operation; and it was an associate member of RSNZ, History being recognised as a social science. It was clearly not possible for such associations in New Zealand either to find sufficient members or to charge sufficiently high fees (exactly the problem encountered by the Society) to enable them to employ staff or expand the scope of their representational activity, for example, in research into policy developments relevant to their members. It was (and is) also the case that the larger learned societies are Australasian in structure and membership, and are linked into Australian more than New Zealand relationships, for example, by the Council for Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences. While there is much in common between the two countries, government agendas and processes are not in step and representational work on behalf of the disciplines tended more usually to be responsive to Australian imperatives. Besides the difference in scale between Australian and New Zealand institutions, the Australian Federal Government was typically well ahead in policy formation and the creation of knowledge about Australia.

2.3 A major collaboration

In the midst of these meetings, planning programmes and the preparation of papers a major cultural studies conference took place in Wellington between 10-12 July 1998.

Culture Shocks. The Future of Culture/Global Spaces, Pacific Places was the first national Cultural Studies conference in New Zealand, organised by Te Papa Tongarewa Museum of New Zealand, Museums Aotearoa, the NZ-

US Educational Foundation, Victoria University of Wellington, and the Humanities Society. Over 200 people participated in wide-ranging discussions about culture, media, and institutions. Although HUMANZ could not be a major participant financially, a considerable contibution was made to planning the programme and selecting speakers. The Society did, however, with assistance from the Australian High Commission, support and arrange the participation of Professor Meaghan Morris, of the University of Technology, Sydney, a public intellectual and an internationally respected writer and speaker on cultural and political issues. This conference was an excellent example of how research and development in the humanities could be focussed at a national level and by linking institutions whose collaboration opened up new spaces for intellectual enquiry.

2.4 At last, a commission

An important outcome of the Cultural Foresight intervention was an invitation from MRST to submit a project proposal on matters raised by the project, in the context of MRST's developing interest in the issue of creativity in the arts and sciences, and its role in innovation. This was the first opportunity the Society had found to engage in funded development work of the kind anticipated in its first strategic plan. To do the work, the KPRG was expanded to include people who were very interested in these issues, who had participated in one or more of the Society's Foresight seminars, and who were prepared to volunteer themselves to contribute to the research needed for the project report and to work as a reference group.

Once again, this was an important precedent setting process for the Society. The report demonstrated that it could produce a text which was able to engage a wide range of current research work in arts, humanities and social sciences relevant to New Zealand's specific situation. Throughout the 1990s, organisations like the Business Roundtable were downloading into New Zealand knowledge and argument about development for New Zealand which were accounts of practices and models developed in and relevant to societies and economies hugely different from New Zealand in economic and organisational scale, to say nothing of differences in history, culture and values. The aim of the Knowledge Policy Research Group was to explore these models and the research on which they were based, but to assess it

critically in the very different context provided by New Zealand. The final report, *Knowledge, Creativity and Innovation: Developing a knowledge society for a small, democratic country* (September 2000), was authored by three members of the KPRG, Louise O'Brien, Brian Opie and Derek Wallace; it established for the Society a firm grasp on the key issues and relations between them which were a product of adopting a humanities perspective on these policy questions and which provided the grounds for further interventions into government thinking and policy formation.

2.5 DICE – Directions in Information, Culture and Economy

The culmination of what could be called the second development phase of the Society was accomplished in the Forum and Seminar presented early in 2000 under the banner of DICE – Directions in Information, Culture and Economy. A new Labour government was elected in late 1999 with a strong commitment to stepping up the emphasis in policy and funding on research and innovation, including the creative industries as a key component, and dealing with the financial problems of national cultural institutions. The Society concluded that it had to attract this government's attention if it were to secure its development. After seven years, the Society had not achieved the financial base it needed to increase the range of its work and to build its public profile; in fact, membership was declining in part because the Society depended on voluntary contributions of time and energy to accomplish anything at all and had not been able to offer services to members which could secure their on-going support. Gaining entry for the humanities to the Marsden Research Fund was the single notable achievement in this respect, and the means by which that had been accomplished – and credit for the accomplishment - were quickly forgotten in the universities. It was also obvious that the RSNZ, during the same period, had been granted more than $1m a year to provide for the sciences the services that the Society sought to provide for the humanities. The gap was only growing greater, year by year, between the substantial public investment in the support of the sciences and the nation's techno-scientific infrastructure, and the negligible investment in the humanities. The case for funding from government seemed

incontrovertible – except that it was also apparent that no-one in government seemed to be aware that the deficiency existed.

DICE sought to foreground two main lines of approach to key issues in knowledge and innovation policy, the role of culture and the importance of public institutions. The DICE Forum, under the rubric, *Developing a National Research Information Infrastructure*, was held in the Library at Victoria University of Wellington on 17 February 2000 and was opened by The Hon Steve Maharey, Associate Minister for Tertiary Education. Its purpose was

> to bring together representatives of the principal agencies and institutions active in the creation, dissemination and conservation of knowledge in New Zealand.
>
> This forum will consider the value of adopting the model provided by the Australian Coalition on Innovations in Scholarly Communication. It will place particular emphasis on the distinctive characteristics of cultural knowledge and the institutions now needed by a small nation in a global information environment.

The Forum discussions were introduced by Colin Steele, University Librarian at the Australian National University, on the topic "Coalitions for Knowledge. Australian and International Perspectives", recognising the work done by the coalition of research libraries, the National Library of Australia, and other cultural institutions to open up consideration of the role of public institututions in the evolution of the knowledge society.

The DICE Seminar, held at Victoria University of Wellington's School of Architecture the following day, under the rubric *Directions in Information, Culture and Economy*, was opened by the Hon Marian Hobbs, Minister responsible for the National Library and National Archives. It was designed to

> demonstrate the complex work of cultural institutions in twenty-first century societies of the kind New Zealand aspires to be. It is a key component in an ensemble of meetings aimed at providing the basis

for an integrated policy towards cultural knowledge in New Zealand.

International developments in thinking about the relations between cultural and economic development, between libraries, the knowledge economy, and the informed citizen, and between cultural vitality and the future of cities have powerful implications for government policies in the domains of information, culture, and the economy.

The keynote speaker for the Seminar was Charles Landry, of Comedia in the United Kingdom, a leading thinker and practitioner concerning the role of culture and the arts in the renewal of cities in the postindustrial evolution of Europe. His address on "Rethinking culture and cultural institutions for a knowledge society" was responded to by Dame Cheryl Sotheran, Chief Executive, Te Papa Tongarewa Museum of New Zealand. The remainder of the seminar comprised three panels: Maintaining and creating cultural knowledge; The library as a cultural institution; and Cultural institutions, communications networks, innovation and the knowledge economy.

Charles Landry also gave a public lecture during the evening between the Forum and the Seminar, *Putting creativity centre stage - responding to global transformation.* He repeated this lecture in Christchurch and Auckland; it was expected of international visitors that their travel should where possible include other university cities so that people resident outside the capital could also hear them and learn something more about the HUMANZ programme at the same time.

2.6 Making the Case to Government

Following the participation of the two Ministers in DICE the Society resolved to seek recognition from the government. Having opened a new institutional space "next to" the Royal Society of New Zealand (as the only national and non-governmental organisation established to represent the interests of knowledge as such) with the aim of providing complementary services to the government and its sector, the Society presented a case to the government in these terms. The President and the Treasurer attended a

meeting about the future of HUMANZ with Hon Steve Maharey, Minister of Education (Tertiary), the Hon Judith Tizard, Minister for Culture and Heritage, and the Hon Pete Hodgson, Minister for Research, Science and Technology, on 16 November 2000. The meeting had considerable symbolic significance, because the three Ministers represented a large part of the knowledge spectrum which the Society was attempting to think together. A meeting had occurred previously with the Hon Marian Hobbs, whose ministerial responsibilities for the National Library, National Archives and public broadcasting gathered together the other principal components of the spectrum. The obvious absence was that of the Minister of Maori Affairs.

The Minister for RS&T became the lead minister for an investigation into the need for national representation for the humanities, research being the key term. The three Ministries provided officials for a committee to manage the investigation, and funding for the appointment of a consultant to prepare a business plan with the Society. The spread of Ministries was itself an eloquent testimony to the range of ways in which the humanities could interact with government, and to the lack of any prior decision about which Ministry might have the prime interest in the work of the humanities. However, during the development of the plan the Ministry of Education official withdrew because of a lack of fit with the Ministry's priorities.

The writing of the business plan was a valuable learning experience for the Council, even though it absorbed most of the Council members' time and energy[7] for several months in 2001. Helpful commentary on the first draft of the plan was provided by members of the officials' committee, and the final version, *Five Year Strategic Plan: A Report to the Ministries of Culture and Heritage, Education, and Research, Science and Technology* (31 August 2001), was regarded as providing a very strong basis for the future development of the Society. In the event, the government response was that an organisation to do the work defined in the plan was needed, there was no other organisation proposing to do this work, and the plan was a good plan which the government could support. But another test was required. The question that was asked was, Is the Society recognised by its sector as representing it? Specifically, did the universities support it?

Accomplishing this work had been a major commitment, and this response provided a fundamental challenge to the ongoing commitment of Council members. Given that membership was continuing to decline, that the universities (with some notable exceptions) had shown little interest since the initial meeting of the Deans in 1991, and that the Society had little money in reserve to support further efforts, there was a clear case for deciding that the task was too hard. After all, the business plan proposed a budget of only about $300.000 a year, some of which would depend on success in gaining project funding; while a major increase on current income and expenditure, it was not going to make up for decades of under-investment nor facilitate major programmes to change thinking quickly in government and among researchers about the importance of the humanities to government and society in the digital era. Since there had been complete disclosure of the Society's affairs to officials during the work on the plan, it was disappointing that no funding was made available to assist the Council to meet the further requirements.

2.7 The Humanities Research Network Te Whatunga Rangahau Aronui.

Two factors decided the immediate strategy of the Council: firstly, the business plan was a real asset, perhaps the only asset the Society had, and it was worth making as much use of it as possible; and secondly, if the Society were to fail to survive, it should make a purposeful use on behalf of the sector of its remaining financial reserves. The Humanities Research Network *Linking minds and energies in the arts, culture and the humanities* (HRN) began as a project proposed in an appendix to the Five-Year Strategic Plan to illustrate the kinds of work of national significance that a financially stronger Society would undertake, and the initial conception was developed by a group representing the Ministry for Culture and Heritage (Dr Jock Phillips and Dr Claudia Orange), Te Papa (Ian Wedde), the National and Turnbull Libraries (Margaret Calder), the Stout Centre for New Zealand Studies (Dr Lydia Wevers), and the Society (Dr Brian Opie). It was central to the conception of the HRN that it would provide a virtual infrastructure enabling individual researchers, cultural institutions and other organisations in the sector to identify each other, exchange information about events and interests,

and collaborate on research. Because knowledge creation in the sector occurs in many locations other than universities, it was decided that registrations would be open to any person with professional (tertiary) qualifications or their equivalent in the arts, humanities/aronui, law, social sciences etc., who engaged in knowledge work (the creation of cultural knowledge) in the modes characteristic of the humanities/aronui. It was apparent that creating a common point of information exchange would mean that the benefits of the funding invested by universities and other organisations from time to time in visitors, seminars, conferences and so on could be much more widely spread if timely knowledge about them were to be available. The concept included a Forum function, intended both to assist and encourage the on-line discussion of issues in the sector and the development of policy papers, and facilitate collaborative research and writing among researchers in different parts of the country or overseas. The large aim was to create for the first time an inclusive representation of knowledge work in the sector which would demonstrate its diversity, richness and capability, and to provide the kind of web-based facility which would bring the sector within the government's planning horizon for ICT development and improvements in research capability. Government planning did not, of course, typically consider the humanities to be a crucial component of the national knowledge system.

The HRN was, therefore, designed to encourage new ways of thinking about the overlapping domains of knowledge which are represented by the arts, humanities, social sciences, other related fields like law, and mātauranga Māori, and new relationships among their practitioners. It was intended to support the creation of cultural knowledge as a broadly based, multi-professional and multi-organisational practice. In other words, it would aim to provide a representation in a digital environment of the humanities-aronui in all its dimensions, from cultural archive to cultural production in many different organisational and professional settings, and in a variety of languages and media. It was also conceived as a dynamic network and not a static database, linking people to each other and to a broad spectrum of current information relevant to the humanities and related fields and specifically designed to provide content in English and Māori. One major issue was the development of a classificatory schema allowing registrants to self-identify by selecting from a range of categories. After quite a search, a

modified version of the fields and sub-fields used by the United Kingdom's Arts and Humanities Research Board, paying particular respect to the Pacific context of humanities research in New Zealand, was adopted. The burden (management and financial) created by these decisions was a high level of web administration, especially during the registration phase. But it was also recognised that the HRN would develop further only if it were perceived by its sector to continue to be relevant to members' interests.

The launch of the HRN took place on 15 October 2004 in the Council Chamber, Victoria University of Wellington, at an event preceded by a half-day seminar. The seminar programme focussed on the topic of new knowledge creation in the humanities and its links to the arts and social sciences, under two themes: *Creating new knowledge: research and research funding in the arts and humanities*; and *Sustaining knowledge: the role of national organisations*. Recent developments in Australia were discussed by Toss Gascoigne, Executive Director of the new Council for Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences (CHASS) and John Byron, Executive Director of the Australian Academy of the Humanities. Their presence was on-going evidence of the support offered by Australian leaders in the humanities to the work in New Zealand, and their interest in the HRN as an innovative development. The launch ceremony following the seminar was introduced by Professor Stuart McCutcheon, Vice-Chancellor of VUW and Chair of the NZVCC, and the HRN was launched by Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Palmer.

The website went live in late December 2004 after an intensive development period working with the contractor, CWA New Media, a Wellington-based educational web design company. By June 2005 the HRN had about 750 initial registrants, about 25% of the estimated 2400 core users. 300 organisations in one way or another using, conserving or creating humanistic knowledge, for which it was providing news and current event information, were listed, as well as about 40 funding agencies. Other organisations like the Royal Society of New Zealand could define the membership of their sector with considerable precision as comprised of well-defined and established learned societies and professional bodies, together with Fellows of an Academy. But the same was (and is) not true for the humanities in New Zealand. A good example would be that the publications with widest

circulation in New Zealand that could be said to be publishing humanistic knowledge were the journals of the Historic Places Trust (now Heritage New Zealand) and the Royal Forest and Bird Society; most academic research in the humanities carried out in New Zealand was not published in New Zealand. As will be discussed below, the lack of an Academy to grant fellowships recognising academic distinction was a further evidence of underdevelopment of the infrastructures taken for granted in much larger democratic societies.

The HRN could not have been set up without sponsorship. The Founder Sponsors were: Massey University (Professor Barrie Macdonald, Pro Vice-Chancellor); Victoria University of Wellington (Professor Stuart McCutcheon, Vice-Chancellor); the National Library of New Zealand (Penny Carnaby, National Librarian); and Auckland University of Technology (Professor Rob Allen, Dean of Arts). A Board was established to oversee its administration and further development. It reported to the Council of HUMANZ and comprised the President of HUMANZ, Jonathan Mane-Wheoki (Chair), the Executive Officer of HUMANZ, Dr Brian Opie (Project Manager and Board Secretary), Michael Okkerse (HUMANZ Hon Legal Adviser), Margaret Calder (Chief Librarian, Turnbull Library), Keith Webster (Victoria University of Wellington Librarian), and Derek LeDayn (General Manager, Libraries Consortium of New Zealand). Dr Louise O'Brien had worked closely with CWA throughout the development process, and became the Site Administrator. Managing the HRN became a substantial administrative task, significantly subsidised by CWA New Media. But because it provided access to a very wide spectrum of arts and humanities research in New Zealand, for researchers (especially those whose work was internationally oriented and who may not have been aware of others locally working in related fields) and for anyone locally or internationally who wanted to contact a researcher in a specific field, the HRN provided an on-line (and the only single) source of information about the knowledge work going on in the arts and humanities in Aotearoa New Zealand.

In retrospect, the plan for the HRN was both ambitious and risky because humanities academics were not typically taken into account in university or government policies for digital investment, a situation repeated internationally. This did not mean that some in the humanities had not seen the

value of moving some of their work into a computing environment; but lack of investment, training, and career incentives (still an key issue in the development of digital humanities), the fact that much of the material base of humanities research remained in non-digital formats, and that it was early days in the development of the World Wide Web as a now habitual part of humanities academics' working lives, meant that the use of the HRN did not take off in the way its developers had hoped. If undertaken now, an HRN concept would undoubtedly be implemented in very different ways.

3. Back to the Universities, and Forward to a New Conception

Demonstrating that the Society had the support of the universities was a different matter. The decision to approach the Deans of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences for support was made on the basis of the business plan and the HRN, as clear marks of the ability of the Society to work effectively for the sector and with government. The initiative taken by HUMANZ was to propose to the seven Deans that they should join a new body, the Interim Council for the Humanities. An equivalent number of people at senior levels in non-academic organisations engaged in work linked to the humanities would also be invited. The task of this group would be to review the business plan and the government's response, consider whether a national organisation was needed and, if so, whether the Society or a new kind of organisation should be developed to fulfil this role. The Society administratively supported the work of the Interim Council, which decided to establish a new national organisation. The universities, through their senior managers for arts, humanities and social sciences, each agreed to provide core funding of $10,000 annually for three years.

3.1 The Humanities Trust of Aotearoa New Zealand

The new organisation was named The Humanities Trust of Aotearoa New Zealand. The Interim Council, with its breadth of institutional representation, became the new Council for the Humanities. Two members of the HUMANZ Council, who had been involved from the beginning in 1991, transferred to

the Trust, one as Deputy Chair and the other as Executive Director. The Trust largely took over the constitution, mission statement, functions like the HRN, and the financial reserves of the Society, which was subsequently wound up in 2006.

A notable event in this transition was the Hui Whakawhanaungatanga, organised by the Society and held at The Alexander Turnbull Library, National Library of New Zealand, on 27 June 2005. It was a ceremony to confirm the transfer of the name, Te Whāinga Aronui, from The Humanities Society of New Zealand (Inc) to The Humanities Trust of Aotearoa New Zealand. It was noted at the ceremony that "The name Te Whāinga Aronui was given to the then New Zealand Academy of the Humanities (Inc) at its inception in 1993 by Professor Wharehuia Milroy. He has graciously agreed that the name should be transferred to the new national organisation to represent the humanities/aronui, the Humanities Trust of Aotearoa New Zealand, at its inception."

The new body, Te Whāinga Aronui The Humanities Trust of Aotearoa New Zealand, was established by deed on 17 June 2005. Its Mission and Goals were:

> To promote recognition of the value of the humanities in the creation, conservation and transmission of knowledge essential to personal well-being and the cultural, social and economic development of New Zealand.

Acknowledging the partnership principles under the Treaty of Waitangi in its practices and policies, the Trust shall carry out its purposes by:

1. engaging in research-based advocacy;
2. securing the inclusion of the Trust in the process of public policy-making;
3. promoting public awareness of the value of the humanities in a democratic and inclusive society;
4. recognising distinction in the humanities;
5. encouraging cooperation between institutions engaged in work in the humanities;

6. supporting the formation of networks amongst individuals engaged in work in the humanities;
7. engaging in discussion and cooperation with related organisations in New Zealand and overseas; and
8. engaging in any other lawful activities conducive to the fulfilment of the Trust's purpose.

The decision to establish it as a Trust was a direct response to the difficulties faced by HUMANZ in attempting to maintain its legitimacy through the normal procedures of an incorporated society, which imposed a heavy burden of administrative work and persistently challenged HUMANZ Council members to find ways of linking what was never a large membership, distributed across the nation in diverse professions, to the advocacy and developmental work which centred on government in Wellington, however much at least one major event, like a conference, took place each year out of Wellington. Because the scope of the humanities was much wider than their academic representation, it was also important to hold events in museums, libraries and galleries as well as universities. One of the hopes for the Humanities Research Network was that it might have offered a solution (or at least part of one) to this problem. The Trust decided that it would build its relations with its constituency through its advocacy work, the HRN, a new website, and the formation of an Academy. As a Trust, and registered with the Charities Commission, it would also be able to raise funding, maintain endowments and otherwise offer a secure basis for financial management.

3.1.1 Launching the Trust

The Trust was publicly launched at Archives New Zealand on 24 November 2005 following a day conference hosted by Victoria University of Wellington on its Pipitea Campus. The conference was introduced the previous evening by a public lecture given at and hosted by the National Library of New Zealand by John Holden (Demos, UK), on *Cultural Value: a new concept for public policy*. A principal purpose in distributing the three parts of the Launch event across three locations in the Government Centre was to foreground the role of the new national body as an interface between the humanities-aronui and government. Having the launch at Archives New

Zealand placed the culminating moment directly in the presence of the Treaty of Waitangi, which was on display there.

The conference theme was *The Humanities-Aronui, Cultural Value and the Public Good*. As with other HUMANZ conferences, the speakers were invited (rather than a Call for Papers being made) because the programme was designed to make specific points about the positioning of the humanities-aronui in the space between knowledge work and policy formation. Although it produced coherent outcomes and significant combinations of diverse perspectives, the principal disadvantage of this approach (which was as much a general problem for the new Council as it had been for HUMANZ in relation to its potential academic constituency) was that the normal academic practice of conference attendance and funding being dependent on having offers of papers accepted could not be used.

More specifically, the event was planned to give public expression to major facets of the work, purposes and relationships of the new Council. It therefore included, following the practice now well esablished by the Society:

- overseas speakers and representatives of related organizations;
- government representatives;
- topics representing a sectoral rather than a disciplinary approach to defining issues;
- speakers linked with the main discipline areas of the humanities;
- topics/sessions enabling discussion of both mātauranga Māori and European humanities;
- as much direct involvement by Council members as possible;
- direct participation by organisations representing the sector.

To illustrate. The conference was opened by Hon Steve Maharey, Minister for Research, Science and Technology, having been welcomed by the Vice-Chancellor, Professor Pat Walsh. The four sessions of the Conference were: *Research in the humanities/aronui; Traditions, Languages and Knowledge of Value; Digital Humanities; and Futures/Issues for the Humanities-Aronui: perspectives from New Zealand and Australia.* Three sessions were panels with several speakers each from different disciplinary, insitutional and national locations; the first session, on a matter of fundamental policy

and intellectual significance for the humanities-aronui in New Zealand, had just one speaker, Professor Ian Donaldson FBA (Director Humanities Research Centre, ANU; Vice President, Australian Academy of the Humanities), who spoke on "Research Centres in the humanities: models, innovation, funding". Trust Council members acted as respondents and chairpersons, as a way of publicly introducing the members of the new Council.

All the sessions merit comment, but I will give more detail about only one. The *Digital Humanities* session was intended to connect with a rapidly developing dimension of government policy work in which the humanities had little presence or influence, and which was also of increasing importance for thinking about the evolution of the humanities-aronui. To do this, it brought together a leading humanist from the United States, a public intellectual, and a younger academic: Dr Charles Henry, Vice Provost and University Librarian, Rice University in Houston, Texas, speaking on "Cyberinfrastructure and the Humanities?"; Russell Brown, Media Commentator and Journalist on "*Public Address* and the humanities in the public sphere" and Dr David Ciccoricco, English Programme, School of Culture, Literature and Society, University of Canterbury, on "Digital Fiction and Techo-Literary Criticism." The spectrum of relations exemplified in this session, from public policy developments in the United States towards digital ICTs and their implications for humanities research and the infrastructures facilitating it, to the role of a blog engaged with current issues of public importance, and to new forms of intellectual enquiry concerning new kinds of fiction being created in digital media, brought together in one session an insight into the scope for the humanities offered by the creative and communicational capabilities of new digital media, the internet and the world wide web. The complex ways in which humanities-aronui knowledge moves and can have effects in the world were clearly suggested here, and each of the sessions added further dimensions of understanding of the importance of approaching the work of the new Council from a position between the multiplicity of agencies and modes of work in and by which knowledge in the humanities-aronui participates in and contributes to social, cultural and economic development.

The final moment of this public inauguration of the Humanities Trust and its new Council was the Launch itself, which was performed at Archives New Zealand by Hon Dr Michael Cullen, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, Minister for Tertiary Education, and Leader of the House. Re-reading his speech is a matter for sombre reflection and regret. His observations were both accurate and appropriately optimistic, but also now succinctly identify what has been lost in the subsequent winding up of the Humanities Trust. In his address he said:

> I am sure all of you will agree that a body to represent the humanities in New Zealand is an idea whose time is long overdue. […] It seems to me that there is still a great divide amongst New Zealanders over the question of the value of the humanities. That is part of a much larger and more basic question which still divides us: the question of whether society exists to serve our economy, or our economy exists to serve society. […]
>
> A third barrier to the development of the humanities has been the more practical issue of the lack of a national infrastructure to represent the humanities, to advocate on their behalf, to educate the public about their role in social and economic development, and to coordinate the efforts of the various institutions and numerous individuals involved. That gap is now being filled by the creation of Te Whāinga Aronui.[…]
>
> I look forward to the Council becoming an articulate voice for the humanities, both within the agencies of government and with the wider public.
>
> As a Finance Minister with strong sympathies towards the humanities, I can say that having a peak organisation that shows leadership and innovation is a very good platform for developing good working relationships with government and funding agencies. I trust that Te Whāinga Aronui will develop those qualities, and I am sure that if does it will earn wide respect both in the corridors of power and elsewhere in the community.

3.2 Recognising Distinction in the Humanities-Aronui

One of the original Objects of HUMANZ was to recognise academic distinction. As already noted above, the adoption of the term Academy for an incorporated society rather than a body constituted by the election of Fellows placed the Society in a strange position in relation to traditional academies, which were typically the bodies relevant to its interests internationally (although the American Council of Learned Societies did not conform to this pattern, a learned society being, basically, an organisation representing a discipline or academic field which published a peer reviewed journal). The HUMANZ Council was clear that establishing an award scheme which gave public recognition to achievement in the humanities, in both academic and other modes of the creation and dissemination of humanities knowledge, was a high priority; not only because such recognition was available for those in scientific, technological and social scientific research, but because it would be a direct way of engaging leaders in humanities research with the work of the Society.

Initial work on a possible award system was undertaken by the Society in 1999, with particular emphasis on what should be distinctive about awards for accomplishment in the humanities-aonui, or New Zealand humanities. Consultation with Te Taura Whiri i Te Reo Māori The Māori Language Commission led to the term, Pou Aronui, in which "pou" literally referred to the pole supporting the whole structure of a building.

But this work could not proceed because it was obvious that a body with a small personal membership, with little organisational backing, and few academic credentials, could not by itself invent and promote a credible national academic award scheme. In order to legitimate it, association with an organisation or organisations with national standing was necessary. The Society approached the New Zealand Vice-Chancellors' Committee (NZVCC) for assistance in launching a scheme. This approach was unsuccessful because the NZVCC was not in a position to commit its member universities to supporting proposals of this kind. The matter was also informally discussed with the then Governor-General Sir Michael Hardie-Boys, who expressed a willingness to consider becoming Patron of the

Society, but this conversation was not advanced because of concern about the slow but continuing decline in membership of the Society.

The establishment of the Trust and, particularly, its more broadly representative Council, provided the necessary legitimation for establishing an award scheme, in the context of recognising, as the Royal Society of New Zealand had recognised in the review and revision of its Act in the mid-1990s, that a body seeking to represent the interests of a major component of the national knowledge system could not be properly effective if constituted only as a traditional academy. Consequently, the Trust was established as an advocacy organisation, just one of its aims being to provide the means of publicly recognising distinguished accomplishment in its various domains of activity. The accomplishment of this aim, nonetheless, was seen to have a high priority; providing the means of awarding distinction would both engage the various humanities professions with the wider work of the Trust and would also provide critical evidence and support for advocacy.

Because of the commitment to a bicultural and bilingual approach to the humanities in New Zealand as the humanities-aronui, in this discussion of an award for distinction in knowledge work particular attention was given to the modes of knowledge creation and the marks of distinction characteristic of mātauranga Māori. An award scheme for the humanities appropriate to New Zealand conditions would have to give equal value to the modes of knowledge creation and the institutions supporting them which were characteristic of the two principal knowledge traditions in New Zealand, humanistic knowledge derived from the distinctive European and Māori traditions.

Furthermore, the view was adopted that the ways in which knowledge in the humanities was conserved, disseminated, applied and created were significantly different from the sciences. While the term research was generally applied to all academic knowledge creation, it disguised the markedly different kinds of professionalism and organisational contexts in which humanities knowledge was created, circulated and had its principal social effects. The conclusion reached was that there should be two kinds of award, the Fellow (under whatever title) for distinction in research which met the requirements for high achievement in both western academic and

Māori knowledge creation, and the Pou Aronui, which would recognise distinguished service to the humanities-aronui, taking into account not only contributions to knowledge as such but to its public advancement, including in particular distinguished contribution at a national level to the institutions supporting and communicating humanities–aronui knowledge.

The outcome of detailed planning and discussion by the new Council was the decision to establish the New Zealand Academy of the Humanities-Aronui. It would comprised elected Fellows, and the election process would be managed and funded by the Trust for the first three years after the introduction of the Fellowship. It was expected that the Academy would then take over responsibility for the election of new Fellows. There would be no fee for membership in the first three years, but one aspect of the transfer of the management of the Academy to its Fellows would include the need to discuss its future financing.

Becoming a Fellow of the New Zealand Academy of the Humanities (FNZAH) Te Mātanga o Te Whāinga Aronui required satisfying criteria which were consistent with other academies. It would recognise distinguished achievement in research in a field associated with the humanities-aronui over a sustained period, where this achievement is demonstrated by a combination of peer esteem, outstanding publications, and contribution to the well-being and development of the professional field.

The Council established a Fellowship Selection Committee (FSC) from its academic members, which acted as a sub-committee of the Council and was chaired by Professor Warwick Slinn (Massey University). It was decided that candidates would be selected on individual merit alone; there would be no quota allocation between the different disciplines. It was anticipated that the number of new Fellows to be elected each year during the first three years of the Academy could be up to 15, with an expectation that the first year would include a significant number of emeritus professors. A rigorous nomination and selection procedure was instituted, the information provided by nominators and peer reviewers being confidential to the FSC, but with the final recommendations of the FSC being considered and approved by the Council.

Because of the need to conduct a flawless selection process, and the time it would take, the Council decided to call for nominations to the Academy in 2007, but to proceed to make an award for the Pou Aronui in 2006.

3.2.1 The First Pou Aronui Award

It was, of course, necessary to ensure that the first award fully exemplified the concept of the award, which was understood to be the highest award to be offered by the Trust and would confer membership of the Academy. Although never directly stated as such, the quality underpinning the conception of the award, in which is manifested the fullest practice of the humanities, is the quality of wisdom – as I understand it to signify a deep possession of knowledge collectively acquired in culture and social practice over time, reflected upon analytically, critically, morally and experientially by a person who becomes a singular example of humanity and whose singularity is recognised and expressed publicly in the governance and onging evolution of human institutions. Wisdom is on the side of meaning rather than knowledge, in the sense that knowledge is wrought into a comprehensive understanding of the human situation by experience, moral insight and empathy.

Professor Wharehuia Milroy (Ngai Tūhoe) was chosen as the first recipient. The epigraph to the text of his citation vividly located the cultural grounding of distinction in the humanities-aronui which the making of the award sought to recognise:

> Tēnei au, Tēnei au te hökai nei o taku tapuwae, ko te hökai nuku, te hökai rangi, ko te hökai nei o töu tüpuna a Täne-nui-a-rangi. I pikitia ai ki ngā rangi tūhāhā ki te tihi o Manono. Rokohanga atu ia ki a Io Matua Kore ka heke iho ko ngä Kete o te Wānanga. Ko te Kete Tuauri, Tuatea me Aronui. Ā, ka tiritiria, ka poupoua, ki a Papatūānuku. Ka puta ki te whei ao, ki te ao mārama. Tihei mauri ora.
>
> This is me, in my entirety an imprint of the soles of my feet, embossed into the earth and the sky. The stamp of our ancestor God, Tāne-nui-a-rangi who ascended into the heavens to reach the pinnacle of the cosmos where he transformed, addressing an energy

> pure and parentless from which descended three vessels of knowledge, Tuauri, Tuatea and Aronui. These sacred vessels enabled the essence of human intellect to gestate and emerge as a child of Mother Earth breaking forth into the world of light and understanding, bringing the breath of everlasting life.

The award was made at a ceremony at Parliament on 2 August 2006, hosted by The Hon Steve Maharey, Minister of Research, Science and Technology, Broadcasting and Education. The award was preceded by a lecture by Professor Stuart Cunningham, Director of the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for Creative Industries and Innovation, Queensland University of Technology and a member of the Council of the Australian Academy of the Humanities, on *The Humanities, Creative Arts and the Innovation Agenda.* Following the lecture, the Hon Steve Maharey presented the first Pou Aronui Award for distinguished service to the humanities-aronui to Dr Wharehuia Milroy.

3.2.2 Inaugurating the New Zealand Academy of the Humanities Te Mātanga o Te Whāinga Aronui

On 12 November 2007 The New Zealand Academy of the Humanities Te Mātanga o Te Whāinga Aronui was inaugurated at a meeting held at the National Library hosted by the Chair of the Council for the Humanities, Professor Ken Strongman. On this occasion the first 16 Fellows were announced, their citations were read, and they were congratulated and presented with their award certificates by Professor Margaret Clunies Ross, Fellow and Past President of the Australian Academy of the Humanities and McCaughey Professor of English Language and Early English Literature and Director, Centre for Medieval Studies, University of Sydney. The disciplines and fields represented by the first Fellows included Anthropology, Education, English Literature, Film, History, Languages, Law, Maori Studies, Media Studies, Philosophy, and Religious Studies. Professor Clunies Ross's presence at this ceremony was a further means by which the Council sought to secure the standing of the Fellowship; the Australian Academy of the Humanities had maintained a close association with HUMANZ and then the Trust, and it seemed entirely appropriate that their standing and traditions should play a part in this inaugural event. Messages of congratulation were received from the ACLS and the International Union of Academies.

The second Pou Aronui award for distinguished service to the humanities-aronui was made to Professor Lloyd Geering o this occasion, and the first Academy Lecture was given by Professor Philip Esler, Chief Executive, Arts and Humanities Research Council (UK), on *Arts and Humanities Research Benefiting the Nation: The UK Experience*. This lecture continued the attempt to bring into New Zealand knowledge and information about developments in the humanities in other, similar jurisdictions, and especially where these bore upon the interface between academic humanities and government research policy. The decision finally to establish a research council for the Arts and Humanities in the United Kingdom was particularly significant, given that no such agency managing public funding for research in these academic fields existed (or yet exists) in New Zealand. Hon Pete Hodgson, Minister of RS&T, met with Esler and Trust representatives to discuss the work of the AHRC.

Close attention was paid to the design of invitations to the award ceremonies, and the certificates and citations which accompanied them. They were designed by Sarah Laing, their remarkably fine asthetic qualities capturing much of the distinctive ethos of the humanities-aronui.

3.2.3 Other awards and prizes

The RSNZ offered an array of awards and prizes, including to students in secondary education, and it was easy to be envious of the ways in which these forms of recognition of achievement both provided a beneficial public service and also brought the RSNZ media attention. But the Society did what it could. A donation from a previous graduate student of English at Victoria University of Wellington enabled it to set up the HUMANZ Callen Prize, which was offered for singular achievement in English Honours. A collaboration with the UNESCO Human Sciences Subcommission, RSNZ and the Trust led to the award of an annual Humanities Writing Prize for senior secondary school students which began in 2007.

And when the Society was wound up, its reserves were passed to the new Council on the basis of an agreement that they would be used to fund prizes for emerging researchers. The terms of three prizes were agreed by the Council in 2007; they were to be awarded by a selection committee of Fellows of the Academy of the Humanities. They were “intended to

commemorate the work of the Humanities Society by recognizing excellent creative, critical and theoretical knowledge work in the humanities-aronui in New Zealand/Aotearoa", and were to be known as:

- the HUMANZ Innovation Prize, awarded annually for a text that is innovative at the intersections between academic humanities and matauranga Māori.
- the HUMANZ Innovation in Digital Humanities Prize, awarded annually for a text using electronic media in ways that are innovative in digital theory, conception, design, and/or purpose in digital humanities; and
- the HUMANZ Innovation in Doctoral Research Prize, awarded annually for a Ph.D. thesis in the humanities-aronui that is innovative in method, presentation, and/or research outcomes.

This intention was not in the event implemented, and no awards were made. In the context of planning for the Academy, the Trust Council also decided to complement the Fellow and Pou Aronui awards with a Medal for special achievement in research in fields associated with the humanities-aronui. The model for it was the Hamilton Medal awarded by the RSNZ to the best annual researcher in the sciences, an annual award for immediate achievement in the preceding year, as opposed to the title of Fellow which was for achievement over a sustained period. This intention also was not implemented[8].

3.3 On-going Policy and Development work

One of the useful strategies adopted by the new Council was to invite key people in other organisations with a national mandate to join a Council meeting for discussion and, usually, to stay for lunch so that further informal conversation could take place. These discussions were very informative for Council members and advanced understanding of the potential breadth of its advocacy role, they established personal connections with related governmental and non-governmental agencies in some part of the arts, culture and humanities field, and they increased knowledge among Council members of the range of the agencies' current work and interests. Detailed summaries of the visitors' presentations were, once having been cleared with them,

included in the Minutes of the meeting. Of particular significance, given the subsequent outcome of the attempts to establish a national organisation for the humanities, was the early meeting with Dr Steve Thompson, then Chief Executive of RSNZ. The full report on his account of the situation of RSNZ is contained in the Minutes for Friday, 19 May 2006, and provides an excellent insight into the pressures on such a national, non-governmental organisation at that time. He emphasised how little the RSNZ could achieve if it were to be dependent on income from members, whether individuals, associations or Fellows.

The relative ease of access to governmental and other national organisations, because they were located in the capital city, underlined the importance of the Trust's presence in Wellington. Another good example was Museums Aotearoa; meetings with the Executive Director Phillipa Tocker provided valuable insight into the issues facing museums nationally and ways in which their representational and policy work converged with that of the Trust and provided grounds for collaboration (and also helped the Trust to find suitable office space in the same building when the rent on the space it was using became too expensive).

After the Launch conference, the Council adopted as a directive for conferences the concept of *transformations*, and the meetings became congresses, to emphasise their intention of bringing together people from across the field of the arts, culture and the humanities to discuss issues of broad national relevance. The model was the annual Canadian Congress, at which all the learned societies in humanities and social sciences held their annual meetings together, and events associated with their interests were linked to a theme of public importance to which the contribution of the humanities and social sciences was foregrounded in keynote lectures and other meetings. Even if a key difference was the comparative lack of learned societies, the Humanities Research Network provided a link to a wide spectrum of organisations in the arts, culture and humanities field. The Congresses continued to serve an important function at the interface between government and professional workers in the humanities-aronui.

Transformations '06 was held at the Auckland University of Technology. Its theme was *Working Knowledge: Transforming Aotearoa New Zealand*

through education, the arts and the humanities-aronui and the statement of purpose read:

> The purpose of this conference is to investigate the interrelationships between education, the arts and the humanities/aronui in the creation and dissemination of knowledge of value.
>
> Education is to society as industry and business are to the economy. Cultural knowledge is the bedrock on which human societies and economies are built; it is vital knowledge, being both created and conserved by real people in the ordinary process of social living in specific places and landscapes. The most complete diffusion of cultural knowledge is achieved primarily through the systems of life-long education, cultural institutions and public media.
>
> In the present world order, thinking about knowledge is dominated by the interrelation of western science, technology and economic production. Research-based innovation is highly valued, but the role of the arts and of teaching as powerful means of generating new knowledge and initiating innovation, especially innovation leading to new social and cultural forms and practices, is not. A new account is needed to guide and inform further social and economic transformation in Aotearoa New Zealand.

This meeting was organised as other conferences had been, with a programme of invited speakers. But a significant step was taken with Transformations ’07, which was held at Victoria University of Wellington on the theme, *Composing the nation: ideas, peoples, histories, languages, cultures, economies*. Keynote speakers were invited, but there was also a call for papers, which encouraged more academics to attend and participate. The statement of purpose read:

> National identity is a strategic priority of the New Zealand government, and a critical issue in the evolution of the nation-state in an era marked by globalisation, new ICTs, post-colonial revision of national histories, cultural and religious conflict, knowledge societies and creative economies.

This conference aims to

- foreground the diversity of research into these issues being carried out in Aotearoa New Zealand
- explore the relation between this research and public policy formation on national identity, and
- showcase this research, build coalitions of interest, and identify new lines of enquiry, especially across disciplines, cultures and media.

On this occasion, the Congress was opened by The Honourable Anand Satyanand, PCNZM, Governor-General, who had become the Patron of the Council for the Humanities, and Hon Steve Maharey, Minister of Research, Science and Technology.

Planning for the 2008 Congress had identified a title, *Education in the twenty-first century: culture, citizenship, media, economy, innovation*, and a statement of purpose, anchored by a quotation from John Dewey:

> The devotion of democracy to education is a familiar fact. The superficial explanation is that a government resting upon popular suffrage cannot be successful unless those who elect and who obey their governors are educated. Since a democratic society repudiates the principle of external authority, it must find a substitute in voluntary disposition and interest; these can be created only by education. But there is a deeper explanation. A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. […] A society which is mobile, which is full of channels for the distribution of a change occurring anywhere, must see to it that its members are educated to personal initiative and adaptability. Otherwise, they will be overwhelmed by the changes in which they are caught and whose significance or connections they do not perceive. [John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (1916), chp.7 sec.2]

> Education amplifies the work of the family, laying the foundations of cultural identity and citizenship, transmitting collective knowledge to new generations, opening minds to global (and wider) horizons.
>
> This conference proposes to enquire into and celebrate the role of education in a globalising and networked world order, not as a service industry but as a key factor in the survival of human society and the invention of sustainable modes of living.

But the circumstances of the Trust, facing the ending of the financial support from the universities and the failure of the second attempt to be funded as a service provider by the government, meant that planning was suspended.

3.3.1 Staying Centred on Research Policy

As the central policy focus of the Trust, significant further work was done on applications of the Research Policy. A couple of major initatives were developed, which serve now as both a logical evolution of the thinking done during the two decades marking the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first, and evidence of the kinds of claims which needed (and need) to be made for the value of new knowledge creation in the humanities-aronui.

One proposal was to establish a National Institute for Research the Humanities-Aronui (NIRH-A). Such an institute would

- provide a model for the evolution of new modes of research in the humanities-aronui, especially modes which link the range of professional institutions engaged in some aspect of the humanities-aronui;
- provide evidence for policy argumentation aimed at changing the valuation of work in the humanities-aronui (teaching, research, conservation and dissemination of knowledge) as it is currently expressed in category funding and other measures for the allocation of public funding for knowledge work.

Examples of research projects which could be conducted by an NIRH-A were: Science in the Humanities-Aronui; The Humanities-Aronui and

National Identity; and, The Humanities-Aronui and Economic Transformation.

From another angle, the Council developed a multi-pronged plan for research related to government objectives, again as a way of demonstrating the pertinence of research using humanities methodologies and modes of analysis. *Humanities-Aronui Research and Public Objectives* (2006) was a substantial document. Its purpose is stated directly:

> The proposal addresses itself to the government's strategic priority areas of economic transformation, families, and national identity. It puts forward a cluster of research projects, each of which is designed to connect in some way with the others so that a substantial body of interlinked knowledge is created and relationships between the priority areas are made apparent. It is intended to assist in the creation of new models for thinking about the future of Aotearoa New Zealand.
>
> The ultimate test of a society and a nation is its answers to the question, "What does it mean to be human?" This is also the question which underlies knowledge creation in the humanities-aronui.

The research programme was set out in a grid formation, with the three strategic priorities of the government – economic transformation, families and national identity set out across the top, and the themes down the left hand side – policy, education, culture and innovation, and digital (content) strategy. The titles of specific projects were written into each of the cells where theme and priority intersected. The first phase of the research would be the close analysis of the texts of government policy documents in each priority area.

Three outcomes of the project as a whole were to be:

> 1. an inclusive description of the constituents of the humanities-aronui sector (cultural and educational institutions, public sector organisations, media organisations, legal institutions, civil society

organisations) on the basis of which an accurate account of their economic and social value can be achieved;

2. establishing appropriate criteria for measuring and representing the economic value of humanities-aronui knowledge, including the creative arts and media; and,

3. establishing that advanced knowledge and training in the humanities-aronui (including the creative arts and media) can provide the fundamental cognitive and imaginative capabilities needed for further development of the knowledge society as a society based on innovation.

And then it put a figure on the proposal, $1.5m over three years, beginning in 2007. This level of funding for a complex set of inter-related research projects (an echo of the plan for the History of Print Culture in New Zealand programme of research) would also

provide a practical means of further evaluating the means and structure through which public funding for research in the arts and humanities-aronui is provided and allocated. Given the widespread concern with the cost of administering funding systems, the methods of funding allocation should also be considered. There are many possible models, for example, the Foundation for Research, Science and Technology, the Tertiary Education Commission/BRCSS, the History programme in Ministry of Culture and Heritage, Creative New Zealand, the recently established Arts and Humanities Research Council in the United Kingdom.

The humanities-aronui have been challenged to demonstrate the real value of the knowledge which they create, and to focus research expertise on issues of particular significance to New Zealand. This research programme is offered as an immediate and practical solution to this challenge; but it cannot be implemented unless a new allocation of public good research funding is made available. It would clearly not advance any knowledge sector's interests if the establishment of the funding envelope we are proposing were to be at the expense of other areas of research.

As was so often the case during the nine years of the Labour government, Hon Steve Maharey was the principal recipient of this proposal.

Was the proposal hopelessly unrealistic? Nothing came of it except one unfunded publication, *Representing the Family: an analysis of concepts of 'the family' in some New Zealand government policy and research documents, 2003–2007*

(2008), by an independent researcher, Dr Anne Opie. But how else to dramatise the effective exclusion from the research funding system of research in the humanities-aronui (this was, after all, a tiny claim in the context of techno-scientific research) and to illustrate its potential, both to government and to humanities researchers?

A revision of the inherited *Research Policy (1996)* was undertaken following the completion of the second report commissioned by the government in 2005 (discussed below), with the aim of advancing discussion of its recommendations. It kept the description of the humanities-aronui, but relegated it to appendix. Instead, it opened with a claim,

> Public policy for arts, culture and humanities-aronui research is a crucial component of research, innovation and cultural policies. The purpose of this paper is to argue for and achieve full recognition in government knowledge policies of this fact and of the value of knowledge created in traditional and new disciplines by arts, culture and humanities-aronui research.

It went on to locate the case for funding to develop humanities-aronui research as a fully contributory dimension of a national research system by anchoring its argument on the need for a Research Council as the core component of a national arts, culture and humanities-aronui research system:

> 2.1 A Research Council;
> 2.2 A Centre of Research Excellence;
> 2.3 Capability building and infrastructures for research in the digital environment;
> 2.4 Coordinated information which demonstrates the contribution of cultural knowledge creation to society and the economy, enabling

effective policy development for and planning of the research system;
2.5 Means of disseminating research;
2.6 Integration of the key sectors of an arts, culture and humanities-aronui research system, including research organisations, cultural institutions and government agencies;
2.7 Formation and sustaining of communities of research interest (traditionally known as "learned societies"); and
2.8 Means of enhancing national and international forms of collaboration and exchange in research and development in the arts and humanities-aronui.

The obvious precedent used in the paper was the establishment of the United Kingdom Arts and Humanities Research Council. The paper included a schematic representation of the Cultural Knowledge (arts, culture and humanities-aronui) Research System, which identified what was distinctive about its resources, institutional and funding infrastructure, modes of expertise and research practice, forms of research outcome, and modes of dissemination. On the matter of funding, the paper located in a brief form the basic changes required of both the government and the humanities:

> It is important to recognize that the historical imbalances in investment in the different principal kinds of knowledge in New Zealand reflect long-standing differential valuations of these kinds of knowledge in western societies.
>
> To begin the process of redressing these imbalances will require new investment, not just the redistribution of existing allocations within the cultural sector. Arts, culture and humanities-aronui researchers will, correspondingly, need to form new accounts of the work they do which demonstrate the importance of cultural knowledge for New Zealand's present and future development in the contexts of its complex cultural history and the evolution of global culture.

3.3.2 Languages Policy

The long-term failure in New Zealand to formulate a languages policy was an issue acknowledged from the beginning, and exemplfied in the 1995 Conference *Fragments and Fusions. Language, Culture, Media*, which was particularly focussed on Māori Language Year. But substantive work on it really got underway during the formation of the new Council for the Humanities. A workshop on languages policy took place on 28 February 2008, at Victoria University of Wellington. It was organised by Victoria Link in association with the Council, International Languages Aotearoa (ILANZ), and the Pacific European and Asian Languages Advisory Group (PEALAG). The Council agreed to take a lead role in further work, and the Humanities Research Network was to be used to facilitate discussion. A member of the Council, Dr Sharon Harvey (AUT), continued this work after the incorporation of the humanities into RSNZ (discussed below), and a report, *Languages in Aotearoa New Zealand,* was published in 2013[9].

3.3.3 Digital (Content) Strategy

Throughout the transition period from the Society to the Trust, submissions and representations continued to be made. One main strand from the beginning, not exemplified in this narrative, was tertiary education. Another was cultural institutions, and specifically libraries. The rapid development of digital information and communications technologies brought with it new policy developments as the government got to grips with access, investment and infrastructural issues. In June 2004 the government published the draft Digital Strategy, and the Society made a substantial response which was also a critique of the policy. The opening paragraph provides a succinct statement of the overall position informing the Society's argument:

> The vision addresses a very important situation, the global introduction in a short period of time of new technologies for the communication, conservation and creation of knowledge and information. However, it confuses ends with means persistently. The social and cultural processes of knowledge creation and use for social and cultural purposes (including economic purposes) are not determined by the available ICTs but exist in a dynamic relationship with them. It typically attributes the current economic importance of the businesses developing and installing digital networks to the technology itself, rather than observing that this period is

> distinguished (like the period following Gutenberg's invention of the preceding mass ICT, print technology) by complex social and cultural transformations which are both demanding and creating opportunities for new ICTs. The common factor in the vision as it combines and recombines the terms 'economic', 'social' and 'cultural' is the economic. Reducing the social and cultural to the economic will produce a reductive vision, an outcome the Strategy seems to be aware of ('narrow economic viewpoint', 8) without being able to prevent. The strategy is profoundly confused in its multiple uses of the term 'culture', and yet it is culture which will provide the content by which, and the grounds on which, the vision of an innovative knowledge society will be realised.

In another section of the response, the very limited role ascribed to the National Library was taken up in stating a position on the integral relation between a nation's stocks of knowledge, the institutions which conserved and provided access to them, including most importantly, education, and the technological infrastructures which connected them and the citizens who made use of them:

> Neither conservation nor education are clearly identified as fundamental components of an ICT infrastructure. Although the National Library is clearly visible in the Strategy, its role as a provider of access to content (27) is emphasised over its role (as a policy leader) in an as yet underdeveloped national system of collective memory institutions (libraries, archives, galleries, museums, databases, mass media, local heritage collections); the National Content Strategy (28) seems to point in the latter direction. Education is not represented as a uniquely important, life-long social and cultural process, on the basis of which all work of economic value with information depends, but is dispersed (as in Tertiary Education Commission documents), between skills acquisition on the one hand, and advanced research on the other.

These matters were addressed in the National Library's subsequent draft New Zealand Digital Content Strategy, published in November 2006. Goal 1 of the Strategy was, "Content important to New Zealand is easy to access, is

protected, and kept safe for use by future generations", and two of the Objectives related to this goal were:

- Support the introduction of a Creative Commons licence for New Zealand
- Promote greater public understanding of rights and responsibilities under Copyright legislation, including protection of intellectual and cultural property rights

Before the release of the document, the National Library called a meeting of organisations and individuals interested in the issue of open access to information. Its outcome was the establishment of Creative Commons licences for New Zealand.

3.3.4 Creative Commons Aotearoa New Zealand

The National Library meeting in August 2006 brought together a group of interested persons (from universities, the legal profession, government agencies and non-governmental organisations), to discuss the development of Creative Commons (CC) licences for New Zealand. An outcome of this meeting was a decision that the Trust would be asked to lead a project to establish these licences. This decision was made because of a perceived fit between the principles of open access and the domains of knowledge represented by the Trust. As a non-governmental organisation it was capable of initiating work in an area of interest to government which agencies like the National Library, which led the development of the Content Strategy, could not themselves undertake.

It became a premise of this work that resisting the apparently unlimited extension of private ownership over knowledge of all kinds (by corporations rather than individuals, when it was perceived to have actual or potential economic value) and re-asserting the fundamental importance of public good conceptions of knowledge, was of particular importance to the humanities-aronui. Not only was the economic value of humanities-aronui knowledge largely unspecified in statistical descriptions of the economy, but the fact that it had its roots and immediate relevance in civil society - culture, history, systems of belief, arts, law, philosophy, governance, and their on-going revision and re-interpretation – and that its sustaining was largely the

responsibility of government through publicly funded institutions, made it clear that arguments for the value of the humanities-aronui were also arguments for public good conceptions of knowledge.

The Trust Council decided that the concept of establishing the licences was consistent with the Trust's Objects and offered a means of making its work better known. It delegated responsibility for managing CCANZ to the Board of the Humanities Research Network (HRN), which included finding funding for the work. A successful application was made to the Community Partnership Fund (CPF) managed by the Department of Internal Affairs; the basic requirement was that the applicants had to include partners to the project who would provide 50% of the funding (in money or in kind), the CPF providing the other 50%. The Board was augmented by the inclusion of people with expertise in ICT applications in the humanities and intellectual property, and partners in the CPF project. Its meetings were hosted by the Alexander Turnbull Library.

CCANZ differed in significant ways from other national CC projects. Most were run by academic lawyers based in university Faculties of Law, the model being one of a Project Lead (a lawyer) and another supporting institution with responsibility for promoting the use of the licences. The requirement that CC licences had to be compatible with current domestic copyright legislation meant that legal expertise had an obvious priority in the process of setting up a national set of CC licences; but making them also freely available for use was another important function.

The Council for the Humanities combined both functions by being defined in an MOU signed with Creative Commons International as the Lead organisation while having the development work carried out by the HRN Board. It was not possible for a Faculty of Law in New Zealand to undertake the Lead role; but the Board was very fortunate to have the support of several lawyers whose collaboration (and donation of time and expertise) resulted in excellent versions of the licences and who negotiated the changes they wanted to make with CC International. The Legal Team were: Associate Professor Susy Frankel, Victoria University of Wellington, Andrew Matangi (Buddle Findlay) and Paul Sumpter (University of Auckland). The Creative Commons licences for New Zealand were derived from the English law

versions, which were themselves derived from the international (American) base licences. The New Zealand licences set a precedent by adopting plain language conventions.

Leading work on Creative Commons was being done by Creative Commons Australia, located in the Law Faculty at Queensland University of Technology, and a close relationship was built up. The licences were launched at a one day seminar on 27 October 2007 hosted and organised in association with the Trust by the National Library, *Expanding Copyright Horizons through Creative Commons – A seminar to build understanding of the new licensing environment in the digital world.* The keynote speaker was Dr Anne Fitzgerald, intellectual property and e-commerce lawyer and Adjunct Professor at the School of Law, Queensland University of Technology. Members of the Legal Team were joined by Dr. Catharina Maracke, International Coordinator, Creative Commons International, on a panel focused on understanding the licences, and discussion of the uses of the licences made up the rest of the programme. Hon Judith Tizard, Associate Minister for Commerce, attended and spoke at the conclusion of the seminar. The seminar attracted over 100 registrations and the event was recorded and webcast.

Throughout 2008, following the launch of the licences, much assistance and support was given by CC Australia. By integrating CC development with academic research and with graduate project research in law, CC Australia was able to provide a valuable knowledge base on which CCANZ could draw. It was an enviable model which the Trust's very limited resources could not allow it to emulate. A simple website (www.creativecommons.org.nz) was developed with CWA New Media so that the licence texts could be made easily available for immediate use. The site was upgraded in August 2008 with project funding through the Community Partnership Fund, which increased the website's functionality and ability to promote and model the use of the licences, especially by offering case studies of the uses of CC licences by New Zealand artists and teachers. The partners in this project were: The National Library of New Zealand, The Ministry of Education, Te Taura Whiri i Te Reo Māori The Māori Language Commission, and UNESCO New Zealand.

Initially, among the various potential groups of users, priority was given to creative arts and education, and the first administrator, Jane Hornibrook, concentrated on publicising the licences through various networks in the creative arts. This work was assisted by funding for the administrator from the Ministry of Education, which was collaborating with Australian authorities in the development of digital learning resources, and by the existence of a list-serv set up by people committed to open access principles which became the CCANZ list. Otago Polytechnic was the first tertiary institution in New Zealand to make CC licences the core of their copyright policy. Subsequently, university libraries began to set up institutional repositories for the deposit of theses in digital format, and the use of CCANZ licences was adopted.

A significant issue, and one not simply local to New Zealand, which became clear during the meetings to set up CCANZ was how indigenous cultural property ownership, being based on collective rather than individual ownership conventions, could be represented by Creative Commons. This had a curious relation with the issue of Crown Copyright. The Ministry of Economic Development published *Te Mana Taumaru Mātauranga Intellectual Property Guide for Māori organisations and communities* in 2007, and discussions with officials involved in that major project confirmed that Creative Commons could offer an important licensing alternative which could be more sensitive to Māori conceptions of property ownership and use. Several meetings were held during and after the Launch but no decisions were then made about how to proceed. However, translating the CCANZ licences into Māori was agreed to be a useful first step, possibly overseen and funded by the Māori Language Commission; but that, too, could not be undertaken immediately.

The failure of the Council's second approach to government for funding in 2008 threatened the sustainability of CCANZ as an on-going administrative and educational function tasked with both maintaining the licences and promoting their use. Work by officials in several government agencies on Open Access to Government Information had been proceeding for some time before the development of the CCANZ licences was undertaken, as evidenced in the Digital (Content) Strategy paper. After the change of government in 2008, interest in implementing open access was led by Hon

Bill English, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance. When it was decided in 2009 to adopt the CCANZ licences as the official mechanism for licensing public use of government information, the government accepted a recommendation from the officials' group managing the initiative that funding to support the maintenance of the New Zealand CC licences should be made available for three years.

4. An apparently fortunate conjunction

The first business plan, *Five Year Strategic Plan: A Report to the Ministries of Culture and Heritage, Education, and Research, Science and Technology* (31 August 2001), was written during the first term of the Labour Government, and when the Council went back to the government to report on the successful meeting of the requirements placed on the Humanities Society, it dealt with the same ministers (even if there were some portfolio changes), principally Hon Pete Hodgson, Hon Steve Maharey, and Hon Judith Tizard, linking ministries and departments in science and technology, culture, and tertiary education. The Prime Minister's commitment to the fine and performing arts (notably in the rebuilding of the funding base of the nation's major cultural institutions) and the cultural significance of heritage (especially war history but more generally in projects concerned with national identity, like the *Dictionary of New Zealand Biography* (now on-line) and *Te Ara*, the digital encyclopedia of New Zealand), and the Deputy Prime Minister's strong interest in the protection and development of research libraries, all seemed to provide a favourable context in which the discussions with government about the future of the Humanities Trust might be productively resolved and the basis of a strong and independent national organistion representing a sector only poorly conceptualised in government policies for knowledge and innovation might be accomplished.

In the event, none of these favourable signs led to an actual outcome of the kind sought through discussions with the government over its nine year period in office. What seemed like a unique opportunity to maintain a discussion with the same principals in the government ultimately came to nothing.

Just before the launch of the Humanities Research Network in October 2004, Hon Pete Hodgson, then Minister for Research, Science and Technology, met with HUMANZ and CHASS representatives. At this meeting, in addition to a discussion about the reasons for the setting up of CHASS by the Australian Government, the Minister heard about the work done by HUMANZ to complete the Business Plan process. He invited HUMANZ to report to him again early in 2005 about progress in the implementation of the Interim Council and the development of the Humanities Research Network. When the Interim Council came to arrange this meeting, which took place on 6 April 2005, the Minister was Hon Steve Maharey.

At the meeting, the Minister affirmed the value of the proposal for a national humanities organisation, but noted that it would be difficult to make any progress on funding for 2005-6 because the budget process for the new financial year was in its final stage. The HUMANZ Strategic Plan estimate of about $300,000 in each of the first three years was put forward as an indicative amount. Instead of moving towards a discussion of proposals in the Strategic Plan for service provision by the Council, the Minister proposed that MRST should work with the ICH to prepare a paper for him setting out a costed plan. It would need to demonstrate that a national humanities organisation was needed, and it would have to indicate other sources of sponsorship. It would be important to meet again well in advance of the election, and he proposed another meeting by July.

The report he had commissioned to review progress by the Council, *The Humanities – Charting a Way Forward* (August 2005), was written by a consultant, Sally Munro, of Munro Duignan. It required a lot of time from the Council but, unlike the previous report, was fully written by her. It is an excellent review of the period about which it was written, especially developments in government research policies and their implementation. The report made a number of important recommendations designed to clarify the relation of the humanities to the government. In particular, it affirmed that the government related to research through three Ministries: science and technology through the Ministry of Research, Science and Technology; social sciences through the Ministry of Social Development; and the humanities through the Ministry for Culture and Heritage (MCH).

Nominating MCH as the lead ministry for the humanities only confirmed after nearly 20 years what had seemed obvious at the beginning, that the government had established in that phase of restructuring two policy Ministries, one for science and technology and one for arts and culture, and that the humanities would expect to work to the government through the culture ministry. Working relations were maintained throughout these two decades, but were more active during the first; the relationship seemed even more obvious when the Ministry of Cultural Affairs (MCA) became the Ministry for Culture and Heritage and took into itself the Historical Publications branch of the Department of Internal Affairs, which had initially been included in the plans for MCA. This move, which brought into MCH the *Dictionary of New Zealand Biography* and the *New Zealand Historical Atlas* projects, had the effect of making MCH the manager of the largest humanities research projects being conducted in New Zealand. When it took the further step into born digital publication with the *Te Ara* project, it placed itself at the front of new humanities R&D in Aotearoa New Zealand. But the Ministry retained a traditional Arts Council conception of its cultural and cultural policy mission, and so oriented itself much more towards the creative and performing arts than to the academic humanities, thus inverting the traditional relationship between these domains of knowledge creation in the university which (at least in the British tradition) was slow to find ways of including the creative and performing arts within its conception of research.

However, it is still not possible to find the term humanities used on the MCH website to refer to any of its functions; History and Heritage define the space in the Ministry's conception of its knowledge base which otherwise might be taken by the humanities as a more inclusive term. A search for "humanities" on the website amusingly produced the question: did you mean "womanities"? The difficulty here is that, as with UNESCO, the discourse employed by cultural policy is social scientific in origin and assumptions.

By 2008, with an election scheduled for the end of the year, there was only one decision left to be taken, since all the requirements set by the government had been met by the Trust Council, and that was the decision to fund the business plan through a purchase agreement of the kind the government had with the Royal Society of New Zealand. The decision was in the hands of the

Minister for RS&T, Hon Steve Maharey; but he left the government towards the end of 2007 to become the Vice-Chancellor of Massey University, and the discussions were again taken up with the Hon Pete Hodgson, who returned as Minister of RS&T.

A meeting with the Minister was sought to update him on progress and took place on 10 December 2007, at which the Council agreed to consider a proposal for a closer association with RSNZ, and the Minister agreed to investigate funding. In a meeting on 13 March 2008 the Minister responded positively to the Council's representations, but reaffirmed what had been his consistent position, that he was in favour of an association with RSNZ. The following Council meeting on 11 April 2008 considered the situation in detail; the Minutes of the meeting is a very important document for its record of the discussion in the Council about the terms on which negotiations with the RSNZ and discussions with the Minister should be conducted. Following this meeting the Chair of the Council, Professor Strongman, wrote to the Minister congratulating him and RSNZ on the joint creation of the Rutherford Foundation (with a very large endowment) and pointing out that, at the follow up meeting on 13 March, there had been no mention of funding for the humanities. The letter requested another meeting on that topic.

The next step is marked by a crucial letter (18 August 2008) from the Chair to the Minister which included a paper, *The Humanities-Aronui in the national knowledge system.* This paper set out a detailed review of actions by the Council and the government in relation to the recommendations of both reports commissioned by the government; it demonstrated that very little of what had been recommended as government actions had been undertaken. The response was a meeting on 19 September 2008 between representatives of the Trust Council and RSNZ chaired by a MRST official and including officials from TEC and MCH.

The Council's Executive Committee Minutes for a meeting later that day record a summary of discussions at the meeting, in which it was as though nothing had been done, and no reports written for government, before this moment. The Council representatives were told that, although the then Minister, Hon Steve Maharey, had affirmed his acceptance of the

recommendations of *The Humanities – Charting the Way Forward,* the key point now was not the content of a purchase agreement:

> the basic issue which CH has to confront, as does the government, is, What demand is there in government for what the Council has to offer?
>
> The emphasis in the subsequent discussion remained substantially on the matter of the 'value proposition', with the RSNZ representatives underlining their need for a text which would make it clear to RSNZ members what value CH would add to the RSNZ.

The observation that "the government had two principal priorities, integration and innovation", seemed to apply only to the incorporation of the humanities into RSNZ, whereas the Council in its paper to the Minister which occasioned the meeting noted that "*The Humanities-Charting a way forward* acknowledges the fragmentation of the arts, culture and humanities-aronui in government. The Council's broadly representative Trust Board is designed to advance integration of the sector but requires government support to fulfil this role."

The chasm which opened up at this point can be succinctly illustrated from a section of the letter from the Chair of the Council, in which he observed how the on-going delays in settling the situation of the Council meant that critical work on behalf of the humanities-aronui was not being done:

> A most dramatic instance of this urgently needed work is provided by the just published *From Strength to Strength. Government's Agenda for New Zealand Research, Science and Technology* (MoRST, 2008). In its draft form as *The New Zealand Research Agenda*, the aim to set out an inclusive policy for research was to be highly commended even if the document was principally about the role and requirements of scientific research and its technological applications. The final version has clarified its purpose, notably in the Note for Readers, where it is clearly stated that 'Wider knowledge-creating activities, such as research contributing to non-scientific knowledge in the arts, cultural and humanities spheres, are not a focus of this Agenda.'

The position paper included the following proposal, to make the point in a different way:

> The Council for the Humanities should be commissioned to prepare a report, *A New Beginning: The Government's Agenda for Research - Arts, Culture, and Humanities-Aronui*, to advance the research prioritisation exercise.

The Humanities – Charting a Way Forward surprisingly did not explicitly incorporate the previous business plan, but proposed that various actions be undertaken by MCH and the Council which would be the first steps in developing the Ministry's lead role and also demonstrate the Council's ability to provide evidence-based policy advice to the government. A policy research project initiated by MRST in partnership with MCH on cultural industries, proposals for which were to be submitted by 1 October 2007, was set up as the test of the ability of the humanities to contribute to evidence-based policy formation. Background to the proposal included a recommendation from *The Humanities – Charting a Way Forward* that "in order to match humanities research with government outcomes, there needed to be a clearer articulation of demand from government end-users." Interested applicants were advised that "This project is interested in the way the cultural industries intersect with the creative industries. Cultural industries generally refer to libraries, museums, music, screen, performing arts, literature and the visual arts. […] The research project will examine issues facing the development of New Zealand's cultural industries and the role of government in supporting their development and ongoing sustainability."

Instead of the Council's being invited to undertake this project as a test of its capacity, which seemed to be the intention of the report, a call for tenders for the research project was advertised by MRST. The Council made a bid, as did other research agencies, and the contract was awarded to Otago University. This procedure was normal for competitive, government-funded research projects but contrasted to the earlier project, when MRST contracted the Humanities Society following the Cultural Foresight project to write a report which would demonstrate the value of applying humanities methodologies to public policy issues, and which resulted in *Knowledge,*

Creativity and Innovation: Designing a Knowledge Society for a Small, Democratic Country (2000), discussed above. Making the new project contestable placed the Council in competition with university research offices and private research organisations who were constantly trawling for external research funding. As a result, a critical development opportunity for the Council was lost. It was critical in various ways, because it could have: positioned the Council as a distinct voice linking its sector to government, through the application of humanities methodologies in policy advice to the government; given the Council experience of managing work integral to its advocacy role; allowed the Council to mobilise its international connections and so add value of that kind to policy development in New Zealand; and, of course, the project funding would have helped sustain its administrative development.

4.1 Addressing Members of Parliament

As part of the process of advancing its Research Policy, the Council refreshed the document it had inherited from the Humanities Society in 2007 and circulated it to Chief Executives and Members of Parliament. Achieving awareness among Members of Parliament about the work being done for the humanities was much more difficult and demanding of available resources than working through Ministers and their respective Ministries. However, the holding of the first Pou Aronui award at Parliament provided an occasion and an incentive to widen contact. All MPs were consequently invited to attend this event, and some positive expressions of interest were received. In 2007 the Council discussed the concept of a humanities caucus in Parliament, following the example of the ACLS. An informal conversation with Hon Bill English led to the suggestion that he, together with Hon Dr Michael Cullen, could be asked to form a cross-party grouping. Members of Parliament and Chief Executives of relevant Ministries and Departments were invited to the 2007 Congress and the subsequent launch of Creative Commons. In Australia, breakfast meetings at the Federal Parliament with speakers from the arts, culture and humanities talking on public policy issues, had been introduced. CHASS had created a list of academics who would be willing to meet and talk with Members of Parliament, and was providing some training in how to approach and conduct such conversations. None of these possibilities were able to be implemented. The way of involving MPs in the

work of the Trust largely remained what it had been from the beginning, invitations to Ministers to open and speak at conferences.

4.2 Joining the Royal Society of New Zealand

Throughout the two decades from the inception of the New Zealand Academy for the Humanities, contacts had been maintained between its officers and those of the RSNZ. From the Academy's point of view, the RSNZ was the only national non-governmental organisation representing knowledge as such, and so it was important for close contact to be made and maintained. Apart from any other consideration, there was a lot to be learned about how to fill such a space, not least when questions of independence arose as a result of being the recipient of public funding. Many of the conversations which took place were similar to those with the administrators of other national humanities organisations, focussing on the implications of occupying a space between academic and professional bodies on the one hand, and governmental agencies on the other.

An MOU was signed between the RSNZ and the Society in 2006. From the beginning of the Strategic Plan process in 2001, the notion of widening the objects of the RSNZ to include the humanities was a shadow over the discussions because it declined the Society's principal argument for the difference in the national knowledge system of the arts, culture and the humanities, and the need to have that difference fully articulated. Superficially, since universities contained most of the spectrum of disciplinary knowledges, one organisation should be sufficient to represent the whole. But this position overlooked the fact that humanisitic knowledge is not always or typically produced in a research environment conforming to conventions of objectivity and rational method; it also overlooked the issue of advocacy, and the fact that a single organisation would be unable to engage with questions of public policy and funding allocation when its parts were in competition, especially for funding. The RSNZ as an organisation representing the sciences was able to engage directly with the government since both parties used a shared techno-scientific discourse; this situation did not pertain for the arts, culture and the humanities.

One of the officials' recommendations following the completion of the *Five Year Strategic Plan* was "4. Association of the humanities with the Royal Society, on the model of the arrangements for the Social Sciences." Representatives of the Society met with the Council of RSNZ, and a brief report of this meeting was included in a 2002 Newsletter to members:

> The questions which were put to the RSNZ Council were these:
>
> Do you believe that it is actually in the Royal Society's interest as well as the nation's to have a strong national organisation representing the humanities/aronui? If you do, then HUMANZ would appreciate your support in making this point to the government.
>
> If you think that one national organisation can feasibly represent the whole knowledge spectrum with some kind of equality of representation, is this a task which the Royal Society would want to take on, and within what time frame?
>
> A further meeting at which the complex issues raised by Option 4 can be discussed in more detail has been foreshadowed. It may be more appropriate for a proposal to establish an electoral college for the humanities in the Royal Society to come as a joint proposal from university representatives of the humanities.

With the formation of the Humanities Trust, a new MOU emphasising collaboration in areas of common interest was signed in 2006. The assumption informing the last point quoted from the 2002 Newsletter remained in place until quite late in the discussions in 2008 with the RSNZ, that is, that even if the academic segment of the humanities got access to Fellowships by becoming an electoral college of the RSNZ Academy, a national organisation representing the much broader interests of the humanities-aronui would continue.

Correspondence and Minutes of the Council's meetings during 2008 provide a full and clear record of the issues the Council was attempting to negotiate in its relations with the government and the RSNZ, while keeping in the foreground the lacunae in government policy and national infrastructure which the Council was doing its best to identify and to fill. It is clear that the

Council was, until very late in the process, working towards establishing a closer relationship with RSNZ on the basis that the Trust would continue as an independent organisation.

Late in 2007 the government was presented with what appeared to be a way out of any responsibility for the future of the Humanities Trust, or the development of policies specifically for research in the humanities. At a meeting with the Minister, the President of the Royal Society offered the Royal Society as a home for the humanities. From the perspective of the Council's discussions with the government, the timing could not have been worse. While neither Minister had made any commitments beyond accepting the reports, the only action left in the long process was for Hon Pete Hodgson to affirm or refuse an arrangement whereby the government would purchase services from the Trust as set out in the first business plan. The offer from RSNZ had not been formally put to the Council before it was made to the Minister and its immediate effect was to derail the discussion with the government at its final stage. Instead of furthering the obvious relationship with MCH, MRST became again the agency under whose aegis the new process was to be conducted. A clear implication was that any funding from the government for the humanities, like the funding provided for the services RSNZ provided on behalf of the government to the science sector, would be channelled through and administered by the RSNZ. The narrower conception of research, as the term under which relation between the humanities and the government was persistently located, ignored the whole scope of the work of humanities knowledge in society which those working towards securing a national organisation for the humanities had endlessly affirmed and described.

The Council understood that it had no choice but to work through the proposal since it had been endorsed by the Minister. It was not that there was no desire in the Council for a strong working relationship with RSNZ; in fact, the contrary was the case, and the MOU committed both bodies to cooperation in areas of mutual interest. Joining RSNZ had been proposed as a solution during the first business plan process, the then Minister, Hon Pete Hodgson, agreeing to effect changes in the RSNZ Act to include the humanities; but the suggestion was withdrawn when it was realised that the RSNZ Act, being a private act, could not be changed by the Minister, and the

Act was very clear that the purposes of the RSNZ were to promote only science and technology. At that time, the Royal Society of Canada had been proposed as a model, since it followed the form of Enlightenment academies in including the whole spectrum of formal knowledge. The analogy was questionable, since the bodies actually representing the humanities to the Canadian government – the Canadian Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council - were new interface organisations designed to meet the government's need for expert advice and reflecting a bureaucratic and not academic mode of classifying knowledge. On the later occasion, the Royal Society of Edinburgh was proposed as a feasible model, whereas the key United Kingdom organisations at the interface with government were the research councils and, for the humanities and social sciences, the British Academy. As I have already noted, those involved in setting up the Humanities Society were fortunate to be able to observe, through international links established early in the 1990s, initially through the American Council of Learned Societies, the pressures for change in the work of traditional academy-type organisations. Governments were requiring more in return for the funding they provided, especially expert contributions to policy development, and these organisations were having to develop new capabilities to meet this demand.

It is also important to note that, in 2007 and 2008, RSNZ was going through another review. One consequence was to realign the Academy with the RSNZ Council. But the scale of the review was fully revealed in April 2008 at a "New Horizons" event at which, among other developments for science in New Zealand, the 100th anniversary of Sir Ernest Rutherford's receiving the Nobel Prize was celebrated with the endowment of the Rutherford Foundation. This action was in such a startling contrast to the response to the representations of the Council on behalf of the humanities-aronui that I will quote from the report I wrote for the Trustees of the Council on this aspect of the whole event. The Foundation will

> provide funding for doctoral and postdoctoral research and early career development, and support for science teachers ('the foundation of the science system'). The Governor General, who is patron of the RSNZ, has agreed to be Patron of the Foundation. […]

> It will begin with $2m and fund Phd scholarships and postdoctoral fellowships at Cambridge University (UK), and postdoctoral fellowships within New Zealand to attract back NZers who are overseas. In association with the Royal Society (UK) it will support science leadership training for Phd and postdoctoral researchers; in association with the RS (Edinburgh) it will support enterprise training. Other training will be made available through partnerships with the Royal Navy and the Royal NZ navy.

The Minister, Hon Pete Hodgson, announced that the government would be giving $1m annually to the Foundation, the other initial $1m coming from the RSNZ. In international terms, these are tiny amounts of money. In the terms on which the Council was approaching the government, they seem breathtaking. I commented in that report that

> There was no mention of the humanities or of funding. It continues to surprise me that scientists' 'mentality' is so dominated by the double sense of inadequate appreciation of their value to society and its correlation with inadequate funding for their work. […] The effect of negligible public investment over decades in infrastructures for the humanities, in comparison to the sciences, is unstated and undescribed but is critical to the issues facing the Council in its relation to its sector. Scientists EXPECT public investment and support.

The Council established two conditions that were to provide the basis of discussions about the terms on which the humanities could enter RSNZ: the independence of the humanities should be maintained in any future form of association; and, the RSNZ Act should be revised to include the humanities-aronui. These conditions should have presented a significant difficulty, because the development of the Humanities Trust was premised on a broad rather than exclusively academic conception of the composition of what could otherwise be called the "non-science" sector. The leadership role adopted by the Trust Council in the implementation of Creative Commons licensing in New Zealand, the management of the Humanities Research Network, the policy work done by the Council, its well-established links with other similar bodies internationally, its distinctive logo and signage, and

its status as a charitable trust were clear evidence that revision of the RSNZ Act to include the humanities would require more than merely inserting the term humanities wherever "science and technology" currently appeared.

5. The last phase

I have only observed this phase, which marks the almost complete loss of an independent identity for the humanities, from a distance. But it has followed a predictable course, which I will comment upon in respect of the outcome for main components of the Humanities Trust, including its Council, its Academy, the Humanities Research Network, and Creative Commons Aotearoa New Zealand.

The Trust Council

The Trust Council transferred as a whole to RSNZ at the beginning of 2010. The outcome for the Council and its members was anticipated by the initial intention in the RSNZ that the incorporation would be achieved by taking only a selected group from the Trust Council into the Social Science panel. However, the transitional process, in order to respect the requirement of the Council that the humanities would be regarded as a distinct knowledge domain within the RSNZ, now to have almost universal coverage of the academic research spectrum, required the transition of the full Council, half of its members representing non-academic bodies in the cultural institutional field, into the RSNZ structure as a new panel, the Humanities Panel.

In effect, the mode of thinking which governed this process of incorporation of a a "foreign" body into RSNZ was that of academic organisation. The Humanities Panel initially was like a university Faculty or College of the Humanities (with a few extras), but then was moved even closer to the most characteristic formation, with humanities and social sciences bundled together in one administrative unit. This unit is distinguished by its objects of study, society and culture, by its marginality to the current knowledges of most value in the sciences and business fields, and by its low level of access to research funding. It is also distinguished by a fundamental split, in conceptions of research method (empirical and interpretive) and the purposes of and audiences for the knowledge created by academic work, and

by the almost inevitably political significance of its teaching and research. All of these disabilities in the current official settlement in government and university about what constitutes knowledge of value could only be mitigated for the humanities through advocacy by an organisation dedicated to the specific, non-scientific qualities and purposes of humanities knowledge, able to work in association with similar, well-established organisations internationally. Little if anything of those links and relationships established with such organisations and with much support from them will have carried over.

This decision brought with it some administrative difficulties, since the procedure for election to panel membership required an electoral college of professional organisations to nominate panel members. One of the many differences already noted above between the humanities and the science, social science and technological knowledge domains is that there is no professional organisational structure for humanities disciplines (there is, for example, no professional organisation external to the universities with an expert view of research and teaching, as there is in most other professionalised areas of knowledge work). This point is onfirmed by the small number of organisations constituting what is now the humanities portion of the Humanities and Social Sciences Discipline-Based Forum: The Australian and New Zealand Communications Association, the Institute of Registered Music Teachers of New Zealand, the New Zealand Historical Association, and the Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia. The range of even traditional humanities disciplines is clearly unrepresented.

Although RSNZ undertook to provide the funds necessary to cover the additional costs of bringing the humanities into the RSNZ, it turned out that the expectation that the Government, having agreed to this course of action, would provide those funds, was disappointed. A shameful consequence was that the HUMANZ reserves, the result of voluntary effort and donation, which were transferred to the Humanities Trust on the basis of a formal agreement that they would be used to support research in the humanities, especially among emerging researchers, were instead used to cover the administrative costs of the incorporation.

It was not the case that members of RSNZ immediately perceived that value would accrue to RSNZ as a result of the participation of the humanities, the process of adjusting to the participation of the Social Sciences having been quite a challenge to disciplinary professionals in both the natural and social scientific domains in the 1990s. Members of the RSNZ Academy had from time to time expressed concern about the lack of recognition available to humanities researchers, but that was not quite the same thing as a decision to include the humanities among the spectrum of kinds of knowledge represented by RSNZ in public policy and funding discussions. There were Fellows of the RSNZ Academy whose academic work was conventionally regarded as in the humanities, for example, historians, but their acceptance had come through the social sciences.

The New Zealand Academy of the Humanities Te Mātanga o Te Whāinga Aronui

When discussions about the entry of the humanities into RSNZ began, the New Zealand Academy of the Humanities had only been established for two years, and about 30 Fellows had been elected. It was anticipated that a governing body for the Academy would be set up in 2009, after which the Academy would become responsible for conducting the election process itself, following international conventions. Looking ahead to the Academy's assumption of responsibility for the election of Fellows in 2009, the Council appointed one of its members, Professor John Burrows, who was also a Fellow of the Academy of the Humanities, to act as transitional convenor of the Academy.

However, this stage was not reached, and the Fellows (including those elected in 2009) were invited to change their Fellowships in the Academy of the Humanities and become Fellows of the Royal Society. Given that the purpose of an academy is to recognise research excellence, the assimilation of the Academy of the Humanities into the Royal Society Academy was the simplest step because it replicated the ordinary situation of university coverage of the academic disciplinary field. It was not automatic that the persons who had become FAHNZ would be invited to exchange that Fellowship for the title of FRSNZ but, in the event, all but two were. The Fellows were not aware of the discussions taking place until they were offered the opportunity to change the title of their Fellowship. There was

some protest about the lack of consultation, and the loss of humanities in the Fellowship title, but the incorporation went ahead anyway. One area of potential difficulty, the recognition of Māori scholarship outside the conventions of western academic work, was obviated by the appointment to Fellowships of Māori scholars whose Western academic credentials were well established. It is pleasing that the Academy Fellows page on the RSNZ website includes the title FAHNZ for those who became FRSNZ.

But at least there was a clear analogy in the purpose and method for the Fellow award. The same did not apply in respect of the Pou Aronui. This was designed to be a higher award than that of the Fellowship, and included membership of the Academy of the Humanities. Its purpose was to acknowledge the distinctive means by which leadership in the humanities-aronui was exercised in Aotearoa New Zealand, through research, teaching, public action, communal leadership, guardianship of linguistic and cultural inheritances, a singular vision for the future of humanity. The conception of wise leadership, of a person who would, as a result of the award, reciprocate by being willing to be consulted and offering advice on the work of the Council, was lost. In its transfer to RSNZ, the Pou Aronui has become just another form of recognition of service, and does not include membership of FRSNZ. The RSNZ has continued with the annual Academy Lecture, as the Aronui Lecture.

Creative Commons

Because overseas developments in open science were only just beginning to filter into RSNZ thinking, the potential of Creative Commons was not initially perceived. But the government's decision to provide funding to sustain the dveelopment of the licences encouraged RSNZ to provide a space for this project alongside other special purpose funds the Society administered; RSNZ reciprocally provided a secure system for managing the funds. But Creative Commons could no longer be presented as an integral component in the public good work of the humanities.

Humanities Research Network Te Whatunga Rangahau Aronui

The Humanities Research Network which, in view of subsequent developments in virtual research infrastructures, could be said to have been ahead of its time, was parked. No further action was undertaken to redevelop

it; and nothing has been introduced to perform a similar function for the humanities. In general, the infrastructures for humanities research, and the funding of that research, have continued to fall behind the sciences, a pattern widely repeated in western democracies but of greater importance in New Zealand because of the negligible infrastructure or funding already established and provided before neoliberalism and business interests began to determine the postmodern shape of the knowledge economy and to define research priorities.

6. Not so much an end, as unfinished

The decision to bring the sciences and humanities together in one organisation could have turned out (and may still turn out) to have remarkably beneficial consequences. Knowledge creation and knowledge policy in the twenty-first century are dramatically different from what they were when "the two cultures" were identified by C. P. Snow early in the twentieth century. A single organisation capable of achieving an overview of this complex field would be truly innovative internationally. It would accomplish the equal representation of diverse and distinctive forms of research activity, from science and technology through social sciences to the humanities and the creative and performing arts, in the forms of knowledge characteristic of at least Western and Māori traditions and practices in Aotearoa New Zealand; it would recognise that research policy must include as an integral component policies for and investment in the conservation and transmission of knowledge, through cultural institutions, educational institutions, and public media; it would maintain an on-going review of the role of knowledge creation in the economy, and particularly of the relation between the twin principles of copyright and open access to publicly funded knowledge; and it would nurture the public interest in knowledge work of all kinds. It would provide policy perspectives on knowledge work which the inevitable departmentalisation of government agencies impedes. It is inconceivable to me that, at least in Aotearoa New Zealand, a single organisation could be created and funded to meet this extraordinary range of responsibilities.

Those working in and for the humanities at the beginning of the twenty-first century are unable to match their deep conviction about the fundamental importance of the cultural knowledge they interpret and recreate for the present and future of the societies in which they live, and the apparent denial of value which public policies and funding regimes have entrenched. The hegemony achieved by science in Western countries, both as the default model of research and as the only valid source of knowledge for technocratic social management and policy formation, reverses the dominance in knowledge work once enjoyed by the traditional university arts curriculum. It is not surprising that, since the sciences evolved research methods which were, in contradistinction to the language- and text-based methods of the humanities, committed to producing the real as such uninflected by culture or perception, there should be a deep incompatibility of assumption and practice between these modes of knowledge creation.

At the heart of these matters lies the need to articulate a new (democratic) politics of knowledge, one which is founded not on the given world but in the negotiations of human cultures with their inherited knowledge, the given world, and each other. Such a politics is present in the modes of thought developing under the aegis of postmodernity, whether in the sciences or the creative arts or the humanities. At issue is not a choice between methods or kinds of knowledge. If the task of the sciences is to formulate knowledge universals, the task of the humanities is to formulate provisional meanings and possible truths. The wonder of human existence lies in the astonishing diversity of knowledge created over the human centuries, and the human ability constantly to rework that knowledge in the process of learning to live productively with each other and our planet, which requires our care as the condition of sustaining our continued existence.

Reading around in the archive of documents which are the material remains of the national organisation for the humanities-aronui so many people had worked to build is like walking in a ruined city, where the idea of the city and the activities which sustained it can be imagined but the reality is fragments.

As I have noted at the beginning of this chapter, Ben Jonson's play, *The Staple of Newes* (1626), by a humanist scholar deeply engaged in applying

his knowledge to understanding profound change in the culture and society of his own time, provided for me a persistent backdrop to the work of institutional creation and social invention carried out over two decades with the aim of establishing the New Zealand Academy for the Humanities Te Whāinga Aronui and its successors, the Society and the Trust. Materialising ideas in organisational and semiotic forms means creating new information spaces which, once materialised, can only persist if sustained by three kinds of energy - mind, belief and money. It is possible to go a long way with only the first two, but without the third enduring social existence is not possible. The humanities are just as much "in the economy of capitalism" as any other body of knowledge, industry, worker, child or landscape. Furthermore, just as capitalism is caught up in the profound changes in the relations between societies, cultures, histories, economies, knowledge and media in the period of the postmodern, so are the humanities. A new humanities, coexistent with changing cultural, social and economic formations and capable of comprehending them, is taking shape in all the sites of cultural invention.

The rest of this book is an attempt to draw out the larger implications of what was attempted, in the hope that this analysis might provide another ground on which minds and beliefs (and even money) may come to converge and make the difference in Aotearoa New Zealand which was sought but could not finally be accomplished in the two decades bracketing the turn into the twenty-first century.

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[1] An excellent example is Steve Fuller's 2011 book, *Humanity 2.0: what it means to be human past, present and future*.

[2] A succinct summary of the ways in which Australia adapted to the pressures for change in the late twentieth century can be found in Slaughter and Leslie, (1997). The situation in New Zealand is described simply by replacing "Australia" with "New Zealand" in this account.

[3] A valuable overview of this process and the centrality to it of higher education is given by Sverker Sörlin and Hebe Vessuri (2007). In their analysis of the use of the terms "knowledge economy" and "knowledge society" they identify the very different implications for policy and thinking deriving from the use of these terms and the new values being attributed to

knowledge creation and application during this period. Not surprisingly, their account does not refer to the humanities.

[4] The inauguration in 2001 of the Maxim Institute, a corporate-funded organisation promoting traditional humanities, made at least one version of the link between knowledge politics and funding apparent.

[5] I recognised subsequently that a crucial issue was hidden in this apparently unexceptional phrasing, where the emphasis falls on "human", and "to be human" can be read as "approximating to or exemplifying the nature of the human species". Even though the rest of the statement does offer an extended paraphrase, I have "corrected" the phrase to read: "what it means to be human".

What it is to be human signifies the possession of species-specific characteristics, whereas what it means to be human signifies the conceptions and beliefs humans have formed about themselves. In this difference is all the difference between the humanities and the sciences, as I hope this book demonstrates.

[6] These records are now held by the Alexander Turnbull Library.

[7] One reason for the decline was made clear in a Council Report (7 Nov 2003) which referred to the new pressures imposed by the Performance-Based Research Fund for increased research productivity while not changing the overwhelming bias to the sciences and social sciences in New Zealand's research funding system, a situation which further complicated the work of HUMANZ. Council members who were employed in universities were already aware of this effect of the PBRF. It became increasingly difficult to find people who had a personal and intellectual commitment to the future of the humanities as a broad field of enquiry with critical social and cultural significance, and who could make any time available to contribute to the work needed at a national level.

[8] The RSNZ established the Humanities Aronui Medal in 2011.

[9] https://royalsociety.org.nz/assets/Uploads/Languages-in-Aotearoa-New-Zealand.pdf

2. Creating new knowledge: the way of the huma nities

“We must not think to make a staple commodity of all the knowledge in the Land, to mark and licence it like our broad cloth and wooll packs” (Milton, 1644/1974: 226)

The period during which HUMANZ came into existence is the period marked by the ideological triumph of neoliberalism, a period unpropitious for the humanities in all Western countries. This is one indicator that, following the Second World War, a period of profound epistemic change was inaugurated, most hopefully manifested in the formation of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. I align myself with those who adopt the term postmodernity to locate fundamental shifts in the dominant discourses and processes of subject formation of Western societies in the second half of the twentieth century, while having to acknowledge that it is the politically and ideologically conservative form of this shift which has now been imposed upon societies and cultures everywhere through supranational agencies using law and finance to override national settlements and redefine economic and social relations in accordance with commercial imperatives.

But this shift is evidenced in many other ways than through economic re-structuring. For me, the period comparable to the past fifty years is that of the Reformation, a period which saw a profound split in Western Christianity, which provided the truth system, the universities, the international language (Latin) and the international institution overarching the nascent nation states of Europe, the beginnings of the development of mercantile and city-based economies and imperial expansion, the formation of the modern conception of science, the advancing of democratic conceptions of government and society through revolution, and the development of a new information and communications technology, printing. It is the latter which served as a common enabling factor for all the others, just as new digital information and communications technologies are the common enabling factor in the new

order of postmodernity. Right at this beginning, in a novel linking the seventeenth century to California in the 1960s, Pynchon (1965) had one of his characters in a fictional revenge tragedy, *The Courier's Tragedy* (in which the early postal service is a significant component of the action) observe what is now blindingly clear in the global expansion of corporate media and information businesses and state intelligence agencies: "whoever controls the lines of communication, among all these princes, would control them" (113)[1].

If the Reformation also brought the modern humanities (in both its culturally conserving and critical modalities[2]) into existence, the period of postmodernity has produced, for the humanities and the humanistic social sciences, a variety of "turns" – material, cultural, linguistic, ethical, digital, speculative – in various ways meshed with a defining mark of the 1980s and 1990s, the culture wars. These various attempts to reframe humanistic thinking in Western democracies and challenge the modern settlement reached between academic humanities and the sciences (in Anglo-America if not in Europe), in which history and philosophy dominated because they, like the sciences, affirmed objectivity and rationality as their method and "the real world" as their object of enquiry, can also be seen as expressions of the politics inherent to knowledge work but typically obscured by scientific criteria for the creation of true knowledge. At the time of forming HUMANZ a succinct assessment of the intellectual and methodological challenges to the writing of history which had been elaborated during the twentieth century was published as the introduction to a collection of his essays by Roger Chartier. Drawing its title, *On the Edge of the Cliff,* from Michel de Certeau's characterisation of Michel Foucault's work, Chartier's essays discuss the thought of a number of writers whose work has in common an attempt to shift how the writing of cultural history was conceived and practiced. He makes an observation which is of fundamental importance to any conception of a new humanities, and which it is the task of the second part of this chapter to elaborate: "Rendering intelligible practices that are not governed by the laws of the formation of discourses is a difficult, unstable enterprise poised at the edge of the void. It is always threatened by the temptation to do away with all difference between heteronomous but nonetheless interconnected forms of logic – the ones that organize utterances and the ones that command action and behaviour" (Chartier, 1997: 1).[3] I will specifically take up the concept of the void in relation to writing and the

formation of knowledge in Chapter Five; at this point what is most relevant to my concerns is Chartier's succinct stating of the break involved in the passage from modern to postmodern history writing, when he asks:

> What are the criteria by which a historical discourse – always a knowledge based on traces and signs – can be held to be a valid and explicative reconstruction (or at least more valid and explicative than others) of a past reality it has defined as its object? There is no easy answer to this question, even more so today than was true when the deep-rooted certitudes of critical objectivity and an epistemology of a coincidence between the real and knowledge of the real protected historians from all anxiety about its regime of truth. This is no longer the case. (9)

As Chartier writes of history in postmodernity, so it is true of government. The current dominant official model of knowledge production is technoscientific[4] and is still based on "an epistemology of a coincidence between the real and knowledge of the real", and the professional ethic governing the application of knowledge to the government and administration of society (including its knowledge institutions) is technocratic, both being in principle if not in fact apolitical and value free.[5] The technocratic framing of its knowledge work disguises its inherently political character, policy discourse objectifying the social and cultural domains of governmental action and the apparently impersonal processes by which change occurs. To write that "This is no longer the case" is to recognise that postmodern relations between a democratic state, its publics and global institutions have become profoundly unstable, and that kinds of knowledge pertinent to government exceed technocratic limits.

A long retrospective can sometimes yield a clearer view of present complexities. It is easy to assume from much of the literature, and especially the self-representation of digital, networked ICTs by their manufacturers and promoters, that knowledge societies and innovation-led economies are very recent in their formation. In marking the advent of the city-based market economy in the seventeenth century, Milton observes in the epigraph to this chapter that market logic encourages the extension of commodity concepts from agricultural and industrial products to knowledge. Milton's conception

of knowledge after the Fall in *Paradise Lost* anticipates in astonishing ways what postmodern capitalist societies are now forced to recognise as the contradictory imperatives of economic growth (Hell) and ecological sustainability (Paradise). The creative technological imagination as that is formed by a combination of intellect, knowledge and the will to power over matter exercised through material instruments divorced from generational obligations and moral bonds is brilliantly anticipated in the character of Satan, and more recently re-imagined in in Monty Python's representation of Satan's fascination with technological futures in T*ime Bandits* (1981). Milton's opposition in the name of freedom of thought to the more traditional controls over the circulation of knowledge exercised by the core early modern institutions of Church and State was focussed on reformation in religion, the formation of democratic citizenship, and the discovery of new knowledge through enquiry in every domain of learning. In the time of civil war he identified the city of London rather than the universities as the engine of new knowledge creation, and he drew an exact correlation between the freedom to think and the quality of government. Those arguing for censorship "doe as good bid ye [Lords and Commons] suppresse your selves; […] the immediate cause of all this free writing and free speaking [is] your own mild, and free, and human government" (1974: 240). At the heart of his defence of the freedom of the press (a defence which has not lost its political and intellectual force in the more than 350 years since the publication of *Areopagitica* in 1644) is the succinct statement of what a free mind requires of the State: "give me the liberty to know, utter and argue freely, according to conscience, above all liberties" (241). For Milton, it was print technology and its developing institutions which provided the equivalent of the internet as a channel through which individuals could address the public. But he clearly recognised the potential in the new system for creating and distributing knowledge for a new set of controls based not on "truth" determined by State institutions but on private ownership, both of content and the means of distribution. Several hundred years later, in the democratic societies which evolved in Britain and elsewhere out of the English civil war, a new "age of enclosure"[6] has arrived, confirming Milton's anticipation that particular interests will always seek to dominate and control the circulation of knowledge in opposition to the public good, which is served by open access to the knowledge accumulated and conserved socially throughout human history.[7]

Another brilliant example of extraordinary prescience is the discovery and analysis by Milton's older contemporary, Ben Jonson, of the birth of the new market economy and knowledge society within early seventeenth century London, and the integral role new and old social media were playing in its birth, which he brought to public consciousness in his play *The Staple of Newes* (1631) and to which I have briefly referred in Chapter One. Before the novel evolved a narrative form capacious enough to bring the complexity of the modern world into representation, or disciplined social scientific analysis took the place of literary, homiletic, historical and philosophical writing as the privileged source of authoritative knowledge about and critique of society, or television series like *The Wire* (2002-2008) and *The Bridge* (*Bron-Broen*, 2011-) exposed their viewers to morally and intellectually challenging explorations of the individual and collective complexities of postmodern urban life, Jonson used the theatre as a media technology to the same ends[8].

The play reveals how a city-based market would begin putting a price on access to information in response to demand, would invent new forms of organisation to manage this demand, and would reconceptualise knowledge and education in response to the perceived need for new kinds of expertise.[9] The demand for information in the context of the invention of a new information and communication technology generated new forms of knowledge and knowledge organisations which had never previously existed, and which challenged the intellectual authority of the university and school as these were based on the content, training and modes of transmission characteristic of the traditional humanities.

As though it were anticipating the excitement created in the late 1980s by the deregulation of the financial sector, the play opens with its principal character, Pennyboy Junior, about to come into his inheritance and so become independent of paternal authority. He gathers around him those of his own generation who will help him enjoy his wealth. In his case, although he does not know it, his self-knowledge is being tested by his father, Pennyboy Senior, who is believed to be dead but is present in disguise and ultimately punishes his son's failure to distinguish between the goods of a city market-based consumer society and his moral duty to manage his wealth, not just spend it. In the process of working out this narrative, Jonson engages in an

extraordinary exploration of the constitutive features of the new market economy and its social formations and values. He gets to grips with the problem of understanding the new social and economic order by taking knowledge organisations as his focus of enquiry; to this end he stages both a new medium and a new university, in both of which Pennyboy Junior invests. Jonson makes perfectly plain what humanities academics have tended to forget, that knowledge cannot be either conserved or created without public or private investment, and that access to that investment involves persuading those with capital to make such investments – in the play's allegorical terminology, by forming a loving relationship with Lady Pecunia. In this respect, the question asked is, who should control wealth and knowledge and determine their social application? The postmodern answer would seem to be corporate technoscience and business interests; Jonson's answer, proper to a social conservative of his time, was that the good father knows best.

The new medium is the newspaper, which is invented because there is a demand in the city market for current news. In this early recognition of the knowledge economy as a consumer economy based on the new, not the traditional, and on the socially useful, not the universally true, Jonson demonstrates that the news organisation is itself organisationally and culturally innovative. Those who set it up have the characteristics which have belatedly been captured by the term "entrepreneur"; they are members of the younger male generation who, lacking a fixed social position or wealth, open up a new social space for action and social influence governed by law, regulation and profit. But it also has features which mark it out as different from the traditional production of goods; as distinct from face to face communication, which is the traditional means of circulating information ("gossip", in the play) the news is a textual product requiring money to gather, organise and disseminate, and to which access is limited by the ability to pay.

The College of Canters, the new university which Pennyboy Junior decides to found as a vigorous assertion of his belief that the new generation should have the means to materialise their vision of the future, is built on the same principle. Unlike the invisible college of the great writers and thinkers of the past from which humanism drew its authoritative knowledge, the professors of the College of Canters will be those who have useful knowledge derived

from experience in the new economy based on trade, consumer goods, and knowledge which can be converted into products and activities with economic value. The characters of poet and herald perform the modern functions of public relations, celebrating and publicising wealth and social position; the lawyer is a money-manager working primarily for his own interest, the law being used to strategic effect; entrepreneurs raise capital in order to found a news business, a business which (like the university) evaporates at the end of the play when the capital is withdrawn.

Jonson was not an apologist for these new social and economic formations, but he made an extraordinary attempt to understand fundamental changes going on around him and to present that understanding to his society by means of the theatre[10]. He believed that his audience (or the majority of it) would be attracted to the new, and hence open to exploitation by the merchants of the new, notably the newspaper and the consumer market of which it is a component, and the new knowledge of economic value (in trade, technology, law) for which the media system and university are the power centres. But he also knew, in contrast to the ruthlessness manifested in the recent crises of capitalism, that the control and flow of money by humane and socially responsible agents is fundamental to social harmony and justice.

His play consequently aims to expose what he perceives to be new economic and social forces at work in society which are destructive of morality, order and truth. These qualities are hidden for most of the play as characters model the heterogeneity of the city's cultures, and their interactions in the free market make apparent its potential for innovation and profit; they are revealed only when the father strips off his disguise and regains control of his wealth at the end of the play – an ending by means of which poetic justice is authorially achieved even though Jonson has vividly staged the contrasting energies and beliefs of a new, urbanised generation. And then, as now, the plot trajectory is clearly an exercise in wish-fulfilment, since the flows of wealth are more potent and immediate in their social, political and personal effects than moral knowledge or commitment to social ideals like equality.

It is refreshing to be reminded that contemporary conceptions of the knowledge society have long roots, quite predating the invention of digital ICTs, and that their current formulation in economic, institutional,

technological and commercial terms represents a profound narrowing of their original scope in the set of ideas originating in civic humanism and represented here by Milton and Jonson (however contrasting their politics). The double imperative of human betterment through new learning and democratic participation in the governance of the nation, as it was expressed in the context of the industrial revolution, can be exemplified in a speech given to the Auckland Mechanic's Institute by William Gisborne (1852: 3) on the topic 'The Age We Live In". The conviction and excitement about a future of progress and improvement in all aspects of human affairs deriving from new learning in science and technology is no different from the way in which business leaders and parliamentarians speak now about the importance of a research-driven economy; what is different is the set of ideas which give shape and social purpose to the accumulation of knowledge:

> One of the great characteristics of the present age is the strenuous effort made to disseminate knowledge among the masses of the human race, and to facilitate their mutual intercourse. […] It is difficult justly to speculate upon the fall of nations; but it has sometimes struck me that, among other reasons for the decay of those once eminent nations, in whose lands we now find proofs of former civilisation of a high order, was the fact of this monopoly of knowledge on the part of a small minority, and this want of it on the part of a great majority. Learning, wealth, and power may nourish for a time among nations where knowledge is confined to a few,—where the flow of its living waters is artificially banked up, but I hold it impossible for such nations long to remain prosperous, and long to keep the lead in the course of civilisation. This system of mental restriction is essentially false, and carries in itself the cause of its fall. The pyramid rests upon its apex, and not upon its base. […] As the commerce of nations creates material wealth, so are the treasures of learning best secured by the free commerce of mind and mind. Knowledge ought to know no monopoly.

And, in case the link between communications technologies, the collapse of distance, and the centrality of knowledge to human evolution is supposed to be a distinctive recognition of the late twentieth century and the product of digital ICTs, Gisborne is worth attending to again:

> Every mental faculty is now exerted to accelerate locomotion, to bring together the most remote portions of the globe, and to facilitate, in the highest degree, the inter-communication of man and man. And this brings me to the great means which now exist, and materially aid in the attainment of these objects, — the general education and rapid intercourse of the human race. Means, which form the grand feature of the present age. — Printing, Steam, and Electricity. These are the three powerful genii of modern time, — whose wonderful achievements and strange transformations far transcend the miracles of their fabled predecessors. The barriers of time and space are being swept away.

The cluster of ideas informing this account is anchored by the term civilisation, understood as the ongoing achievement of a democratic society with open systems of communication, in which the human resources of knowledge, intelligence and creativity are liberated by education to serve long-term collective social and moral ends. The present contraction of this broad conception to economic development is succinctly indicated by collapsing the metaphor of treasure in the previous quotation, "learning" becoming a commodity like any other and valued only as a source of material wealth.

This contraction of thinking and its deep social and cultural implications was analysed in (for me) a seminal study of the new information age from a position in academic literary and cultural studies. Alan Liu described the desire which motivated his *Laws of Cool* as a desire to "write about the fate of the knowledges for which I cared most deeply – historical, literary, artistic, *humane* knowledges – in the new, brazen world of information" (2004: 385; emphasis in the original). He observed that "knowledge work is not simply indifferent to humanistic knowledge, it opposes it on principle. [From the mid-1990s] competing models of knowledge work, once rooted semi-autonomously in academic, business, media, health-industry, government, and other sectors, suddenly seemed to fuse into a single, parsimonious continuum – so-called 'worldwide' – able to afford just one global understanding of understanding" (6-7). Through a close historical analysis of the interrelated evolution of information technologies, the organisation of work, the worker subject of knowledge work, and corporate

culture through the phases of automating, informating and networking, Liu demonstrated just how complex the social and cultural changes of the past half-century are, and how central to them is the global reach of, and interaction between, information technologies and postindustrial corporations. Culturally, while all cultures are different, "to the extent that all cultures want to achieve productivity and profitability, they will end up being quintessentially American. Mainstream American culture, in other words, gets to be both a distinct cultural identity (Yankee practicality and problem-solving) and something universal" (59). Critical to the indifference to humane knowledges is an association between history and obsolescence: "Instantaneous, simultaneous, and on-demand information is the engine of the post-industrial 'now'" (8). In this new order of knowledge work, with its mainstream of technical, managerial, professional and clerical workers (8, and Appendix A: Taxonomy of Knowledge Work) and its emphasis on life-long learning, Liu asked, "how will the academy adapt to its diminished role as one among many providers in a potentially rich and diverse – but also potentially impoverished and culturally uniform – ecology of knowledge?" (22). One part of his answer is by being subsumed within the roles the information economy provides; the other is by turning the principle of creative destruction against "what is most valued in knowledge work – the content, form and control of information" (8). By turning the concept of creative destruction against its corporate application to boundless innovation, its "other side" being "the equally ceaseless destruction that produces historical difference" (8), a version of the hacker character can recover to the humanities and creative arts a critical and creative role in what is otherwise becoming a unitary and global knowledge order determined by post-industrial corporate culture. Liu argues that "Knowledge work and information culture must be evaluated by the measure not just of individual weal or national wealth but of global commonwealth. The important question is: what standard of well-being might emerge from the seemingly closed circuit of well-informed citizenry in the West that can transform the U.S.-led vision of a world as all 'global competition' into a less fundamentally cruel imagination of wealth in common?" (287).

Official and public conceptions of the value of knowledge once possessed a humanistic breadth of reference. The dominance of corporate culture and technoscience as the knowledge of value in late twentieth-century democratic

societies has brought about a contraction of this breadth and the marginalizing of the traditions of inherited knowledge in these societies and their methods of enquiry.[11] It has also dramatically changed the status and functions of the institutions, notably universities, libraries, archives, and media, which were developed to administer the inherited stocks of knowledge and to disseminate and build on them. I intend to consider the institution of the university primarily in the remainder of this chapter, and cultural or memory institutions and media organisations in subsequent chapters. In each case, the question of the interactive relationship between specialist professional and generalist public knowledge will be taken up as a question about the work of knowledge in a democratic society, when creativity and innovation have become the terms framing this work in public policy.

1. Re-thinking the Humanities and the Univers ity

If the objects originally investigated by the sciences are those constituting the heterogeneity of the given world, including ourselves, the objects investigated by the humanities are those constituting the archive of humanity's collective knowledge. Two ideas foundational to these investigations and elaborated by them over time are the ideas of nature and humanity. As ideas, "nature" and "humanity" have complex histories (including the history of their relationship) and carry powerful ideological, cultural and political loadings. For Derrida, " The old question about what is specifically human needs to be entirely reworked. Not only in relation to the life sciences, not only in relation to what is called by that general, homogeneous, and confused word, 'the *animal*,' but also in relation to all the traits that metaphysics restricted to humans, of which *not one* is resistant to analysis". Humanity is therefore "a problematic concept". Like human rights, "both as concept and as reality it is still, for the most part, to come" (2005a: 104, 107). To formulate such concepts anew and to revise previous formulations of them is the distinctive work of the university; however, it is also distributed across society. It is in the academic humanities, as in the academic sciences and social sciences, that the most advanced methods for thinking about the

complexity of life on Earth are developed, applied, critiqued and revised by intellectual work. The question motivating this book is, what is it that is distinctive about the humanities, and about the current dominant conception of the character and purpose of knowledge, which has led to their marginalisation – in universities, government, and the public sphere - in the performance of this fundamental function in advanced societies?

The institution of the university exists to locate a society's advanced knowledge capabilities within the global spectrum of knowledges. It therefore differs in two important ways from research institutes, whether publicly or privately funded, and from organisations representing specific domains of knowledge, whether as professional bodies or organisations in the public sphere. Firstly, it perpetuates a commitment to make access to the whole of human knowledge locally available in some representative way; and, secondly, it is required not only to advance knowledge but to educate new generations in its understanding and social uses. Having these purposes, and marked by its history and location, each university is a singular institution, even though this singularity continues to be challenged in policy and practice as universities are required to respond to market imperatives, knowledge priorities and claims on public resources of global business and finance, and the governments advancing those interests.

The academic humanities are an array of textually and disciplinarily constituted domains of knowledge, the ordinary work of which is the recollection and interpretation of parts of the textual production of a culture, with the aim of assisting that culture's more complete self-understanding. Over time, the parts taken to be of value have become more fully representative, but there is still much which is not normally included in teaching and research. To achieve the highest level of abstraction and codification appropriate to academic knowledge work, the academic humanities employ a range of investigative and interpretive techniques and theories appropriate to the semiotic objects providing the material equivalent of the objects of the given world for the scientist. As a domain of knowledge, the humanities came into existence together with the invention of writing and cities[12], and they exist in an interdependent relationship with writing technologies (media) of all kinds.

The humanities are nonetheless granted only token value in the present era of neoliberal and technocratic valuations of knowledge because both the method and object of research – textual interpretation and the universe of knowledge created by humanity throughout human history – are not regarded as productive of certain knowledge or knowledge of significant economic value. Whatever the claims one might want to make about the affirmation in postmodern humanities of uncertainty and indeterminacy as a constitutive factor in knowledge creation, transmission and reception, it remains the case that this attempt to bring the academic humanities into an association with their proper materials and methods in a manner relevant to the cultural contexts of the twentieth and twenty first centuries has not enhanced perception in the Western university of the humanities as knowledge creators.

To question this state of affairs in the name of the humanities is not an effect of a nostalgic desire for the return of the traditional university. Quite the contrary. More than any other social institution, the university must not only react to changes in its environment, but it should be anticipating those changes by creating the knowledge needed to understand and shape them to good ends. While this new knowledge may be of global significance, one might think that the reason why a particular society or nation would invest in a university is so that its citizens can achieve more of *their* goals for the future of *their* society through being well-informed about the challenges facing it and them and the possible ways of thinking through these challenges to socially inclusive, productive solutions. From this perspective, most universities are local institutions whose task is to interpret global knowledge into their localities, and to modify and advance that knowledge as an effect of its further development through interpretation, testing and application in a distinctive social and ecological environment. At present, however, as a consequence of the universalist model of scientific research and the neo-imperialism of global corporations and their complementary supranational institutions, universities are typically expected (and now expect themselves) to be engaged in research according to programmes and criteria established by the most scientifically advanced nations, where the "international" standards for evaluating and rewarding research are set.

At present, the humanities disciplines which are regarded in the humanities as of most value are those which can be positioned adjacent to the sciences:

history and philosophy, and those aspects of other humanities disciplines which employ empirical methods and digital technologies in research. The first text of literary theory in English, Sir Philip Sidney's *An Apology for Poetry* (1595), anticipated this situation by opposing poetry to history and philosophy as modes of formulating and communicating knowledge (See below, Chapter Five). In the same way, in developing my case I will privilege my own field, the least disciplined of humanities fields, English Literature (but meaning by that to embrace the study of aesthetic texts in all media, including performance, print, still and moving images, music, mass media, digital media), because the principal objects of study are fictions. But creativity and innovation are currently understood by governments and universities to be attributes of science and technology, with the creative arts retaining their traditional claim on creativity and being regarded as innovative only in the context of industrial media production and the markets for art[13]. In this account, the humanities have no recognised claim to either attribute, and this is one reason why their place in the twenty-first century university is increasingly marginal.

It would seem, then, counter-intuitive to consider the question of the postmodern university from the perspective of the humanities. But it is exactly this line of enquiry which must be followed through if the humanities are to redefine and reassert their role in fundamental knowledge creation. Derrida has pointed the way in his discussion of a new or transformed humanities, the humanities to-come, and his view that "the space of the new Humanities […] will not let itself be contained within the traditional limits of the departments that today belong, by their very status, to the Humanities" (2005b: 13). The humanities to which he refers are kinds of knowledge "capable of taking on the tasks of deconstruction, beginning with the deconstruction of their own history and their own axioms" and extending to embrace "everything that concerns the question and the history of truth, in its relation to the question of man, of what is proper to man […] without condition and without presupposition" (12), and linked to "the question of literatures, to a certain democratic institution that is called literature or literary fiction" (16)[14]. This new humanities is for Derrida the most complete manifestation of "the university without condition: the principal right to say everything, whether it be under the heading of fiction and the experimentation of knowledge, and the right to say it publicly, to publish it" (13-14). Milton

made the same affirmation when he sought from government "the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely, according to conscience". The whole work of thought, its dependence on the moral integrity of the individual, and the importance of its public dissemination is here contained within and linked together by the concept of liberty, but it is important to emphasise that this condition of liberty for thought and argument is not a fact of social nature; as with Derrida's "right to say" it is a gift of the state to be confirmed in law and social and political practice. Without that gift, the institutional space of the university contracts and becomes a colony of those with social and financial power.

In his reference to publishing Derrida recognises both the issue of "the marketplace in publishing and the role it plays in archivization, evaluation, and legitimation of academic research" and the importance of making that work public by finding "the best access to a new public space transformed by new techniques of communication, information, archivization, and knowledge production" (12). The university without condition is a unique institutional space within society "in which nothing is beyond question" (13), including its own principles and axioms and the ways in which it categorises and administers knowledge. Its research work is open and public, disciplined in intellectual method but lacking policed disciplinary borders, a human invention with the fundamental purpose of enlarging our conceptions of what it means to be human, or, put another way, the idea of humanity.[15] To be open to the possibility of a humanities to-come is to be open to humanity to-come; as Douzinas (2010: 71) has argued, "History has taught us that there is nothing sacred about any definition of humanity […] Its metaphysical function lies […] in the incessant surprising of the human condition and its exposure to an undecided open future." From this conception he draws a conclusion which has extraordinary resonance now as ethnic nationalism takes hold across the world, affirming that the postmodern role of Law and the Humanities is to be found in "resistance to the biopolitical turn of post-political politics and culture. The duty to resist places the university (Law and the Humanities) in opposition to many and great powers, which include the nation, the state and its sovereignty, and those mediatic, ideological, religious and cultural forces that stop and prevent the cosmopolitanism to come" (71). But the Western university as an institution is now at least as deeply enmeshed in the interests of global economic powers and the elites

directing nation states as it was previously in the interests of the Church and dynastic families in pre- and early modern Europe.

Two quotations will serve to relocate the grounds for the humanities in and beyond the university. The first is from Kim Stanley Robinson's novel *2312*, which foregrounds the intimate and fundamental role of language in creating new possibilities of thought and perception, and the human universality of this role:

> To form a sentence is to collapse many superposed wave functions to a single thought universe. Multiplying the lost universes word by word, we can say that each sentence extinguishes 10^n universes, where *n* is the number of words in the sentence. Each thought condenses trillions of potential thoughts. Thus we get verbal overshadowing, where the language we use structures the reality we inhabit. Maybe this is a blessing. Maybe this is why we need to keep making sentences (2012: 550]

Robinson's assessment of language is apparently negative, emphasising the loss of potential in the act of forming a specific sentence and the persistence of past structures of thinking into the present; but since the process of "making sentences" is a universal human practice, it points as well to the means built into language not only for formulating, communicating and recording what has been thought, but for venturing beyond those completed sentences in multiple and unpredictable ways into what has not yet been thought or given intelligible form. If attention is shifted from the work of the writer to that of the reader, the interpretive work of the reader can also be seen to be generative of possibilities of meaning not foreseen by the writer.

The second observation is made by Rauna Kuokkanen in her powerful critique of the Western university from the perspective of indigenous knowledge. In the introduction to her analysis, she locates herself in a very specific cultural, geographical and linguistic context:

> The Deatnu, regarded as one of the best salmon rivers in Europe, is considered the border between Norway and Finland. For many of us along the river, the Deatnu is not a border but rather a bond that connects the families who live on its banks. […] I want to start by

> situating myself with the Deatnu – a river that runs through my home in Samiland. […] The Deatnu's fluid, shifting nature defies clear, fixed boundaries. This ambiguity is the river's strength, which cannot be reduced to binary oppositions. Literally, the river – both as a physical entity and as a concept-metaphor – demands that we look beneath the surface […] Cultural and linguistic mingling has a long history along the Deatnu and is still taken for granted by many local people. […] Communication along the river takes place in various languages, and there are always people who do not understand all of the languages spoken. This is entirely normal (2007: ix-xii).

The common experience affirmed in this example is of communication over time between people in languages not universally understood, in which languages and cultures reciprocally draw from each other but do not cancel each other out. Like the river, languages and cultures however disseminated are embedded in a specific place through time, and exceed the forms and limits imposed by dominant social groups, laws and economies, just as the object of any discipline exceeds the rules which from time to time govern the formulation of knowledge in it and the use of language to express and record that knowledge.[16]

What I want to sketch here about the coordinates defining the new space of the humanities in the university to-come is embedded in these statements, and is readily highlighted if the Deatnu is taken as a concept-metaphor for language. The interactivity between universes of thought in formation, formal knowledge, and cultural identity which is effected and sustained by languages in their localities and across times and spaces is both the substance of the humanities and the vital source of creativity in human societies. If the humanities can be properly recognised as giving presence in the university to the plenitude and mingling of languages and inherited cultural knowledge and, through interpretation of this knowledge in its many languages, as generating new worlds of thought, then they may provide a means for grasping what systemically could make it possible to locate creativity as well as reason at the core of the postmodern university.

Texts flow from the past into the present and the future. Opening this chapter with discussion of a poem and a play from the early modern period has a strategic purpose. It is partly to make an obvious point that nonetheless needs to be made, that there are very few thoughts which are absolutely unique and have no precedent, and the related point, that writing from the past, and from fiction, can offer powerful perspectives from which to analyse the present world order and form arguments to shape policies for its humane evolution. It is also to highlight the fact that all knowledge has indigenous origins and is inevitably inflected by culture.

The modern intellectual orientation of creativity and innovation is powerfully evoked in the titlepage of Bacon's *Instauratio Magna* (1620), containing the *Novum Organon*. In physical space, a ship sails towards the reader, moving from a circumscribed to an open domain without coordinates[17]. The columns marking the boundary across which the ship is about to sail emphasise that the boundary is humanly created and not naturally imposed. But the means to breach the boundary are also humanly created, signified by the technology of the ship which is also a figure for the media which transport knowledge from one time and place to another. By placing the reader in the unfixed (aporetic) space connecting the present to the open/the future/the possible,[18] the image challenges readers of the book similarly to place themselves outside the familiar boundaries of the known world. In adopting that position, readers are nonetheless placed by the orders of knowledge (the universe of mind) of which they are bearers and by which their minds are formed, just as the technology which enables their movement (literal and virtual) into that space is also what it is, of its time and place.

There is obviously another meaning of the image, the ship representing imperial Europe employing then advanced technologies to extract material value from the new world and literally ship it back to the old. It is that meaning which underpins the current dominant concept of innovation, in which outcomes are ranked by their market value to the rights owners rather than their public, social value. The first push of (European) imperial expansion was to create wealth wherever land could be controlled by farming and mining the world's natural resources and shipping the products back to the home countries; the second is an apparently metaphorical replay of the first, to create wealth wherever knowledge could be appropriated by

farming and mining the world's informational and cultural resources and transporting the products by various technological means to global markets and the profits to those who owned the processes of extraction, production, and distribution.

Just as Bacon's thinking was conducted in the context of the structural challenge to the hegemony of inherited knowledge (classical and Christian) represented by the Renaissance and Reformation, and marked the inauguration of modern science, so postmodern societies have been brought to the same point of crisis by hegemonic knowledge, in our time by the association between science, technology and business/finance capitalism. Humanity needs a new Novum Organon, one which thinks the humanities with Derrida's inclusiveness or, as another example, with Alain Badiou's conception of philosophy as conditioned by four generic procedures: love, art, science and politics. As he writes, "What happens in art, in science, in true (rare) politics, and in love (if it exists), is the coming to light of an indiscernible of the times, […] that which detains in its multiple-being all the common traits of the collective in question: in this sense, it is the truth of the collective's being" (2007: 17). To think of the task of intellectual work in the humanities as revealing to a human collective that which has not yet become apparent in their thought about themselves, and also as illuminating previously unexplored dimensions of the idea of humanity, is to bring all knowledge, in all times and places, within the scope of humanities enquiry and to centre that enquiry on the question, what (more) does it mean to be human (than humanity already understands)? It grants a value to thought itself as a way and a means to valid knowledge and truths.

FRANCISCI
DE VERULAMIO
Summi Angliæ
CANCELLARII
Instauratio
magna.
Sim: Pass: Sculp:
Multi pertransibunt & augebitur scientia.
Anno
LONDINI
Apud Joannem Billium
Typographum
Regium.
1620.

Illustration 1: Bacon, *Instauratio magna* (1620), titlepage.

A compelling example of work which argues for a new Novum Organon is Bonneuil and Fressoz's *The Shock of the Anthropocene* (2016). Accepting that the Anthropocene marks a point of no return in the relations between humanity and the given world, they show "how this forceful, even violent, return of the history of the Earth into world history creates a new human condition and requires us to reintegrate nature and the Earth system at the heart of our understanding of history, our conception of freedom, and our practice of democracy" (20). Performing this work, that is, conceiving and understanding the Anthropocene. "requires a new environmental humanities. For this strange species, the 'naked ape' that has plunged the Earth into the uncertain future of the Anthropocene is not simply a biological entity. It is made up of social and ideological systems, institutions and imaginations, pervaded by power relations that govern an unequal distribution of the benefits and ravages of Gaia, of legitimacy in speaking *of* and *for* the planet, and of the possibilities of influencing technological and economic choices" (44). Among other things, therefore, humanity needs a new environmental humanities fostering dialogue between the humanities and the sciences, politics and history "on the geological scale" (67, 80), "redefinition of what it is to be human" (93), and the invention of "a more sober civilization" (21). If this seems an impossible task, Bonneuil and Fressoz ask their readers to note that "The wealth of humanity and its capacity for future adaptation come from the diversity of its cultures, which are so many experiments in ways of worthily inhabiting the Earth" (72).

Two other studies which make explicit in different ways what is at stake for the humanities in enquiry oriented towards understanding what is becoming of humanity are Hayles' *How We Became Posthuman* (1999; see also Hayles, 2005) and Fuller's *Humanity 2.0*. (2011). Both place their studies in historical contexts, specifically histories of the ways "the human" has been conceptualised; both engage fully with the technoscientific direction of postmodernity and specifically with the concept and programme of transhumanism in its anticipation through biotechnology of the merger between humanity and its machines; both engage in what Fuller (92) calls "textual interpretation" as a method in both the social sciences and the humanities; both accept that "humanity's nature is forever fugitive" (Fuller,

102); both draw upon a particular resource for thinking beyond the materials of techno-science and philosophy, and it is here that their most striking difference in approach becomes apparent. For Hayles it is speculative or science fiction; for Fuller it is theology.[19] If Fuller (70) believes that "'social science' is losing its salience" because "the humanities and natural sciences are rediscovering their common historic interest in *human nature*, with stress now unequivocally placed on 'nature' rather than the 'human'", Hayles (24) hopes that her book will demonstrate "how crucial it is to recognize interrelations between different kinds of cultural productions, specifically literature and science. […] The scientific texts often reveal, as literature cannot, the foundational assumptions that gave theoretical scope and artifactual efficacy to a particular approach. The literary texts often reveal, as scientific works cannot, the complex cultural, social, and representational issues tied up with conceptual shifts and technological innovations." For both (and as Fuller unambiguously states in the full title to his book), the focus of analysis is humanity's cultural productions – humanity's "thought" in all its diversity of cultural and historical origins and textual forms – through the question, what does it mean to be human? and the shifting horizons of the idea of humanity.

Hayles presents her work (which I am presenting as an instance of a new humanities in action) as a "way of understanding ourselves as embodied creatures living within and through embodied worlds and embodied words" (1999: 24). The concept of a new humanities, and the university without condition, which Derrida has advanced under the aegis of the "to-come" presents a complex and urgent challenge to the present, but also lays the groundwork for thinking about the future.[20] I will approach the relation between the humanities and the postmodern university from four directions:

- by considering the humanities' position in the formation of knowledge policies;
- by providing a sketch of the conceptual coordinates by which "the space of a new humanities" can be demarcated;
- by considering the nature of the objects of humanities enquiry; and, finally,
- by giving a name to the university to-come.

2. The Humanities in and out of Knowledge P olicy

The New Zealand Government, among other Western democracies, may be unique in the completeness of the erasure of the humanities from its conception of knowledge work and what constitutes knowledge of value. Traditional conceptions are endorsed, through awards to authors of fiction and non-fiction, life-time achievement awards to artists, and the funding of "creative research" through Creative New Zealand, but the cultural sector is not integrated into government policy or funding for knowledge creation. The use of terms like "creative industries" and "cultural industries" obscures the fundamental question of the nature and value of the knowledge work which is characteristic of the cultural sector and especially of the academic humanities, which is its most abstract and theoretical dimension. It also obscures the profound dependency of the humanities on public conservation of society's texts, in archives, museums, galleries, libraries and their digital extensions. The objects held in these collections are characterised by their heterogeneity - of forms, media, languages, time and place of composition, and cultural purposes.

To accept the claim of ANY discipline or specialism as having a unique capacity for innovation is simply to accept the conventional politics of knowledge in which, as in the ordinary political domain, claims to rule are based on social and economic power and the maintenance of disciplined social boundaries. But innovation is an outcome of an orientation towards knowledge in any domain, an outcome of a state of mind (individual and collective), a poetic process[21] by which some aspect of the potential or the possible comes within the range of human perception, comprehension and experience. Innovations have positive value and meaning when they assist humanity to understand and live better with themselves and the given world.

The relations within knowledge which have had the effect of marginalising the humanities are political, not essential, and therefore not permanent, even though the ongoing entrenchment of science and economy as the primary concern of democratic governments makes it difficult to perceive how and when a constructive re-balancing might take place. My aim is to present a

local perspective on the global processes of change impelled by the ideological imperatives of neoliberalism as a set of doctrines about knowledge of value, the processes of its creation and consumption, and the subordinated roles of government to the market and the public to the private sphere.

Throughout the period during which HUMANZ was active, I contributed to submissions on policy issues and wrote a number of papers for conferences and seminars analysing some of the key texts which both defined and expressed the new (that is, postmodern conservative) policies which were fundamentally revising inherited conceptions of the role of democratic government and the public institutions tasked to accomplish that role on behalf of the public interest. I critiqued New Zealand's policies for research, research assessment and tertiary education in the context of endeavouring to insert a claim for consideration of the humanities into a technoscience-dominated conception of knowledge (Opie 2004), and have described the Performance-Based Research Fund, (the name for New Zealand's research assessment exercise) as an exemplary instance of public sector innovation, even though New Zealand's neoliberal governments have been unable to factor public sector agencies into their conceptions of research, the knowledge society, and innovation policy (Opie, 2009b). The point of these critiques was to demonstrate how tertiary education policy, governance and funding in New Zealand was discursively reconstituted during the 1990s and after according to the now very familiar neoliberal principles of research as scientific research, quantified assessment of research outputs, technoscience-led innovation, commercialisation of knowledge, and education for employment, and the marginalising of the humanities which accompanied these reforms.

Since those papers were written, there has been further, major reorganisation of government ministries in New Zealand. So dominant is the influence of the private sector that the previous independence within government of the two principal branches of research and learning, the agencies respectively representing the science and technology sector and the arts and culture sector, have been wholly or partly "integrated" into larger ministries. The most important is the Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment, in which science and technology, economic development and public research funding

are located; the National Library and National Archives are now part of the Department of Internal Affairs, rather than the Ministry of Culture and Heritage; and Education remains outside both of these groupings, reaffirming its problematic situation which is the result of its fracturing between knowledge creation (as research) in tertiary education, education for employment, and education for living in a democratic society and the postmodern world. But the critical point is that it has not been possible for New Zealand governments to build a knowledge policy and its strategic development, funding and implementation on a coherent and integrated conception of the role of knowledge in a postmodern, democratic society. The redirection of government is consistent with the premises on which neoliberal policy is formed, and profoundly reductive as a representation of how knowledge works in a democratic society, even if it suits business and financial interests. I will take up this matter further as it concerns cultural institutions in Chapters Three and Four.

The discussion of the Two Cultures initiated by C P Snow still has currency[2] [2] and, in contrast to some, I believe that the distinction needs to be heightened rather than dissolved in order to avoid misrecognition of foundational features of a postmodern society's knowledge system. The attempt to make the "two cultures" disappear by assimilating the humanities into the Anglo-American technoscience system for managing knowledge creation, for example, by adopting the term "human sciences" from Europe, has to be resisted.[23] It is not that knowledge creation is carried out in hermetically sealed domains, but that fundamental differences in object and method constitute two complementary and overlapping worlds of mind.[24] The science system is distinguished by: its "given world" objects of research (which includes the human species); the search for universals, by experimental methods and quantification; its progressive conception of the discovery and obsolescence of knowledge, and the power of that knowledge when applied to materially transforming the given and social worlds; the commercial contexts in which its knowledge is valued; and its imperial tendency to assume or require communication in one dominant language. There is no aspect of this list to which the humanities can properly conform, however much current dominant policies for research evaluation and funding have required the academic humanities to conform themselves to bureaucratic technologies of measurement and evaluation based on the

science system. Assuming universality for the research methods, practices and institutional formations which are specific to technoscience dislocates the work of humanities research; the historically evolved, learned and internalised structuring of the former fails to mesh with the historically evolved, learned and internalised structuring of the latter. But, as Hartley (2012: 36) observes, "the distinction between the humanities and the sciences is itself dynamic." [25] What needs to be recognised and properly theorised in policy work is the multiplicity of knowledge cultures within the frames of the two worlds, and the dependency of the effective social, cultural and economic adaptation of any society to its existential conditions on the quality and openness of the interactions between them.

Specifically in relation to the humanities, it is important to ask what have been the effects of introducing scientific criteria and methodologies for knowledge formation, especially objectivity, universality, quantification and a language restricted to denotation, into the domain of non-scientific knowledge formation, if it is the case that those criteria and methodologies have limited application to the objects of and purposes for knowledge creation in that domain. The issue is not whether scientific approaches to knowing can contribute to the creation of culturally valuable knowledge, but whether they can be properly taken to provide a universal model for knowledge creation and hence the definitive means of discriminating between valuable and other kinds of knowledge. Translated into the work of state organisations, the issue is how those organisations, having responsibility for the management of the whole of a society on behalf of that society as it is represented in Parliament, on the one hand, and by its publics, on the other, come to establish priorities in the allocation of public funds for different kinds of knowledge work. It is clear that the dominant technocratic discourse of government, grounded in the social sciences but typically abstracted from their qualitative, historical and theorising dimensions, is both universalising and unable to accommodate forms of knowledge which do not conform to the requirements of that technocratic discourse.

It is also clear from recent government policy papers that this discursive structure is as firmly entrenched as ever, despite the fact that New Zealand never seems to quite make the transition to the technoscience-led, world-ranking innovative economy promised by the repeated policy initiatives. In

particular, comparative measures with other "advanced" nations continue to show an apparently stubborn refusal by the New Zealand economy and its knowledge society to conform to "international" criteria, even though New Zealand universities seem to be doing well in international ranking systems. In my view, the misrecognised core of the problem lies in New Zealand's history as a colony of a global empire. New Zealand universities were initially conceived as colonial institutions, presenting the curriculum of the imperial nation to first degree level; advanced study and research in any field required travelling to the United Kingdom for that purpose. The New Zealand economy was designed to serve the needs of the imperial society. In effect, as the horizons of advanced knowledge have expanded at an exponential rate, and economic globalisation has imposed new demands on its population, New Zealand has not been able to transcend that colonial status, and is now under the imperial or neo-colonial sway of other "international" knowledge and financial systems, notably the United States and Europe and the supranational institutions of the global financial system.

Not that this is how analysis of New Zealand's deep difficulties in conforming to international models is being presented by the government. *The Draft National Statement of Science Investment 2014–2024*[26] is disarmingly explicit (and tunnel-visioned) about the knowledge needed for both economic growth and policy formation: "New Zealand's economic and social wellbeing depends on the productivity and competitiveness of our economy and the knowledge we have to make informed decisions as a society. Science provides that knowledge and informs those decisions" (4). This assessment has been replicated in policy documents trying to imagine and generate a certain kind of knowledge economy in New Zealand for at least two decades regardless of the political disposition of the government, as has the local obstacle facing scientific and technological R&D:

> New Zealand is a small, geographically isolated economy. This limits access to physical markets, scale of industry, and the financial and human resources we have available. […] New Zealand's economy is characterised by having a comparatively small number of large firms. Both domestically and internationally, larger firms have access to the scale, capital, and ability to manage risk that enables them to invest proportionally greater amounts in R&D. New

> Zealand is also the location for relatively few multi-national companies, which tend to be the largest investors in R&D. Finally, New Zealand also lacks at significant scale the sectors that tend to invest most in R&D, such as defence and pharmaceuticals (11, 20).

Put another way, the evidence offered overall by the *Draft National Statement* (but not, of course, discussed in this way) is that the policies of the past twenty years have not made the positive difference claimed for them (there is no doubt that they have worsened the situation of a large portion of New Zealand's population, as in most other democracies), but our policy makers have no way of thinking differently in public (whatever might be available to them within the privacy of thought and conversation within governmental organisations). There is little evidence in New Zealand of official thinking that does not simply replicate downloaded models from northern countries with powerful financial, industrial and technoscientific infrastructures, in relation to which the defects in this country's performance can be measured and policy and funding remedies proposed. Even when the examples are smaller nations within Europe, the contrast between the intensity of relations between European countries and New Zealand's relation with the Pacific Ocean is stark.

The presence of Creative Commons, mātauranga Māori and the humanities in the *Draft National Statement* cannot be taken as indicative of a shift in thinking about knowledge policy and its embeddedness in the technoscience system; like references to culture and society, they have the effect of the accidental revealing of fossils by a flood. Their absence from and lack of modifying effect on the core components constituting a national policy for knowledge as this is set out in the *Draft National Statement* and its companion document, *Tertiary Education Strategy 2014-19*, is both startling and yet the current culmination of a two-decades long process, with no obvious end in sight.

Both documents, in other words, show that conditions militating against policy strategies are in effect unchanged from those identified two decades ago, with the effect of locking the country for another decade into more of the same failure. The only apparently conceivable response is more restructuring, more pressure to achieve conformity to international

comparative measures, more degrading of the role of public sector agencies, more public investment in the science-technology-business nexus, more concentration on the role of education for approved kinds of employment; in other words, a command economy which is supposed to be driven by creativity and innovation. A valuable counter to this way of thinking is offered by Stehr (2005: 194-195), who observes what is also the case in New Zealand and has been most recently foregrounded in the controversies over the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA):

> Market economies evolved in different times and in different places within contexts of different national laws and policy styles, cultures and social structures, constitutions and policies. Whether these diverse patterns are bound to surrender to a common global logic of capitalist production and exchange is therefore a contentious assertion. […] economic transformations cannot easily be uncoupled from cultural and political contingencies and traditions. […] Existing disciplinary divisions with the social sciences contribute to masking the significance of the interdependence of cultural, political and economic forces […] Disputes that involve the cultural impact and consequences of globalization remain the most intense and bitter controversies.

One would think that the fact that "New Zealand faces unique challenges" (20) would be an incentive to develop unique solutions. Instead, to take one example from the period of intensive reform of tertiary education (discussed in Opie, 2004, 2009a), a 2006 report produced by the New Zealand Vice Chancellors' Committee (NZVCC). Throughout the reform process, the NZVCC made determined representations to the government concerning the threats to the integrity of the university as a distinctive component of the New Zealand knowledge production system from the changes being made to the funding and administration of tertiary education. Central to the NZVCC's conception of the issues was the shift of a significant proportion of the funding for tertiary education from the universities to the polytechnic sector and private training institutions, and the need to reverse it. The document which marks the success of the universities' argument is *An Investment Approach to Public Support of New Zealand's Universities*. This submission to the review of tertiary funding benchmarked the funding of New

Zealand's universities against other OECD countries. The picture it painted was stark: one table showed that total income per EFTS in New Zealand universities in 2004 was US$11,690 in comparison to US$21,490 for the United Kingdom. Another compared total income per EFTS among some *Universitas 21* members and New Zealand universities in 2003-4. Auckland University of Technology was lowest at US$8,060, followed by Victoria University of Wellington at US$9,069, with Lincoln University at the top of the New Zealand group with US$15,065. The top United Kingdom member, the University of Edinburgh, was on US$29,137 and the only United States member, the University of Virginia, was on $US49,410. The submission eloquently enforced the point that New Zealand universities could not compete internationally if that competition were determined by funding levels. The disparities were great on every measure, which reinforced the NZVCC case that much more of the available tertiary funding should be allocated to the universities over the polytechnics, specifically for research. In a moment of disarming wish-fulfillment, the NZVCC went to the heart of the contradictions in knowledge policy and its implementation in New Zealand by asking rhetorically: "what could be achieved by New Zealand universities, and by the nation, if the level of investment was increased to something approaching international norms?" (13).

2.1 Modes 1-3

One particularly important source of analysis which informed the knowledge policy work of HUMANZ was a work on science policy by Michael Gibbons et al., *The New Production of Knowledge. The Dynamics of Science and Research in Contemporary Societies,* published in 1994). This book offered a very timely analysis of deep changes in the conception of knowledge creation, and was also a powerful challenge to the conventions underpinning policy formation for knowledge creation. While primarily addressing science policy, in arguing for a fundamental shift of mode, from discipline-based (Mode 1) to problem-based (Mode 2) research, the writers placed the humanities in an intriguing perspective. Unlike most analyses of the knowledge society, they argued that the humanities have, in some respects, always possessed the characteristics of problem-based research, which they defined as transdisciplinary, heterogeneous, and reflexive. Furthermore, "In terms of […] other Mode 2 characteristics - the generation

of knowledge within a context of social application, greater social accountability, and quality control no longer determined by scientific quality alone but including wider criteria - the humanities have always been forerunners. Rather than the humanities being pre-scientific, it is the natural sciences which until very recently have been pre-social" (99). This contrast is a good example of how the humanities and cultural knowledge production more generally are considered by Gibbons et al in the context of recent and major changes to conceptions of and demands upon scientific and technological knowledge. At the heart of the matter is the view that "The current postindustrial transformation of the economy is also echoed by what has been labelled postmodernism in culture and the humanities [although] cultural activity gives rise to very different visions and responses" (108). Given their anxiety about "demoralising relativism" (102) as an outcome of postmodern critique, and a sense that the humanities are "quizzical commentators who offer […] a diversion from threatening complexity and volatility" (110), Gibbons et al nonetheless place the critical theory work and cultural production of the humanities of the past five decades in their proper context, as signs and consequences (like Mode 2 knowledge production in the sciences) of "the emergence of a radical new socio-economic order" (110).

It is worth listing the main factors connecting the humanities to Mode 2 knowledge production as Gibbons et al define them because, together, they constitute a heuristic and therefore provide a strong means of further demonstrating how knowledge work in arts, culture, and humanities differs from that in the sciences and why policies towards research and innovation are seriously compromised by adopting an account which takes only technoscientific knowledge creation as its model[27]. These factors are:

- in the humanities and social sciences ideas and social practices have always been intimately related (99);
- the intellectual values [of the humanities] are inevitably shaped by their social context and application (99);
- the separation from politics which the natural sciences strove to maintain over centuries and which the humanities and social sciences were never able to enjoy (100);

- arts disciplines have always lacked the robust construction typical of the sciences. […] Philosophy, history, literature and the others are much more loosely organised, professional microcultures held together by intellectual affinity but also marked by contradictory, even conflicting, interpretative communities (100);
- reflexivity has always been a traditional characteristic of the humanities in the sense that their intellectual energy comes from the ceaseless interrogation of the past by the present (100); and,
- reflexivity [in the humanities] is expected to carry meaning for the entire human experience, to enrich the domain of signification (105).

These factors, taken together, substantiate a view that the modern humanities, however they have been defined to themselves or to others, have inherently always already been postmodern - in Barnett's terms, characterised by uncertainty, unpredictability, challengeability, and contestability. It is to claim and give a positive valuation to these attributes that a new humanities is needed.

Gibbons et al's analysis of the humanities is powerful because the factors they adduce capture the multiple double binds in which the modern academic humanities are entangled. To assert the right to be considered disciplines in the Mode 1 sense of the modern university, the humanities adopted the methodological values of scientific research even though that did not persuade scientists or governments that the humanities were sciences in some form, a process of misrecognition which Gibbons et al describe as "scientification" and which is well understood otherwise in colonisation studies as mimicry. It is then more than ironical that the rejection of postmodern humanities by much of the established academic humanities workforce has had the double effect of blocking the evolution of the humanities as a form of postmodern knowledge and of entrenching their defensive claim to value as Mode I-type disciplines. The adoption of the terminology of scientific research by the humanities is the most evident sign and effect of knowledge politics in the modern university. But it is accompanied by the irony, marked most obviously during the reform of public sector research and research funding in the 1990s, of the common cause established between scientists whose research was "pure", that is, did not easily fit into a framework of commercial application or strategic

priorities, and humanities academics whose work did not fit into any government or scientific view of economic priorities or social value. Hence it can be hardly surprising in New Zealand that the only administrative space to which the humanities has gained access for external research funding is the Marsden Fund, the selection principle for which is research excellence.

Gibbons et al account for the interrelationship between the humanities and cultural production by defining the humanities as the "intellectual representation" of culture. The analysis in the chapter, 'The Case of the Humanities", points to a highly interactive account of the relations between creation and interpretation as modes of knowledge production, especially in the attribution to the humanities of reflexivity and immersion in "the creation of values and signification" (93, 105), and the role of cultural production in the economy:

> There are two reasons why this rapid growth of cultural production is a less celebrated phenomenon than the parallel explosion of scientific knowledge. First, it is assumed, wrongly, that its connection to wealth creation is much weaker. In societies where basic material needs have been largely satisfied, cultural consumption, and so production, have become increasingly significant forms of economic activity. The cultural services sector is an especially dynamic component of the modern economy […]. Second, cultural production is apparently less costly, certainly in the restricted form of scholarship in the humanities.

But Gibbons et al go on to argue that, even if one focuses on mass media cultural production, "the economy of culture […] is distinct from those of leading-edge scientific and high-technology industry"; taken as a whole, the knowledge created in cultural production is diverse and heterogeneous, a characteristic reflected in another way in the fact that humanities disciplines "have always lacked the robust construction typical of the sciences. […] disciplinary frontiers have always been more permeable in the humanities." They note that it has been "a tempting option" for humanities practitioners to make the humanities and cultural production more generally fit the criteria for discipline formation and knowledge production legitimated by the academic sciences. The effects of this misdirection are magnified at a time when the

shift from material to cultural production necessitates a quite different account of the work of knowledge producers whose materials and contexts of production are social and cultural.

A decade later, Gibbons observed that "a new language is required to make sense of what is going on in the research context" (Gibbons, 2004: 111) – but such a language is still not evident in New Zealand policy documents. He also drew a conclusion about postmodern knowledge which is directly relevant to the fundamental principle of quality assessment which officially justifies research assessment exercises. One of the other features of Mode 2 is a change in the methods used for quality control in knowledge work, which is required because "clear and unchallengeable criteria to determine quality may not be available. Instead, we must learn to live with multiple definitions of quality, which seriously complicates (even compromises) the processes of discrimination, prioritisation and selectivity on which policymakers and funding agencies increasingly rely" (99). One of the most important criteria currently employed to assess quality in research assessment exercises is the form of publication or dissemination of research, and especially the ranking of journals, a criterion challenged by arts and humanities representatives because it privileges the modes of science publication (Arts and Humanities Research Board, 2003: 10; Council for Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences, 2005: 68-69). Gibbons et al suggest a positioning for this discussion which goes to the heart of the issue of the relationship between writing (the formation and publication of thought), purpose and social transformation when they identify the essay as the distinctive form in which humanities knowledge work has traditionally been carried out: "Essays [the preferred genre of the humanities] – one of the oldest forms of Mode 2 production – roam freely in the territories seemingly held by the specialisms, link together what would otherwise remain fragmented analyses; they are, at their best, an art form highly conducive to the construction and dissemination of meaning" (106) - but not currently to success in research assessment rankings.[28]

Gibbons et al's analysis has been considerably extended by Caravannis and Campbell (2012) with the concept of Mode 3. In its full development, this conception of a knowledge system producing innovation through the complex interaction of heterogeneous agencies and actors opens out the discussion of

the nature of knowledge societies in directions which are consistent with my argument for the role of the humanities in such social formations. By insisting that an adequate analysis of innovation must include democracy, culture, media, civil society and the environment, Caravannis and Campbell go a long way towards shifting the discussion of innovation away from its currently privileged locations in science, technology, finance and the economy. However, although the humanities are included as a conventional component of academic knowledge work (15), the context for this acknowledgment is a discussion of the critical role of creativity in advanced knowledge societies, for which the arts are the example, and artistic research is proposed as the complement to research in the sciences, even though the relationship is not worked out. In a phrase which points towards my later discussion, especially in Chapter 4, but also maintains the current equation of science with knowledge, they write that "The sciences are a manifestation of knowledge, but also the arts, *at least partially, can be understood* as a manifestation of knowledge" (15, my emphasis). The awkward placing of the arts, and the effective absence of the humanities, in the reconceptualisation of the fields of postmodern knowledge, the knowledge work of universities, and policies for innovation is identified by that italicised phrase.

2.2 Positioning Critique

The documentation on the evolution of public policies for knowledge and critical responses to them is enormous, part of the multiplication being the consequence of the formation of national policies which have tended to obscure the common structure informing them. But to engage with knowledge policy formation on behalf of the humanities requires engaging with the forms of discourse in which this policy work is conducted, and with the politics and ideologies framing knowledge policy. It requires a productive estrangement from the aims, purposes and discourses of modern academic humanities. As Douzinas (2010: 71) has argued, "The stakes are no longer or exclusively the development of the delicacy of discernment, the sharpening of hermeneutical aptitude, or even moral edification"; a new humanities must include in its discursive repertoire familiarity with the discourses of government and the critical discourses capable of analysing and interpreting them.

I will refer here only to four critiques related specifically to the modern Western university which can stand for my own positioning in what is a highly politicised situation. The first, Slaughter and Leslie's *Academic Capitalism*, provided a deeply thoughtful and early warning of what was to come in the reshaping of universities according to neoliberal principles. This study analysed developments in four nations, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States and, presciently, does not reference the humanities in the index. But one of its conclusions precisely defines the basic shift in resource allocations on which everything else has depended: "technoscience fields gained resource shares while fields that were not close to the market, such as philosophy and religion, foreign languages, letters and performing arts, or fields that served the social welfare functions of the state, such as education or home economics, lost shares" (1997: 211). In this situation of arm's length manipulation of the value of different kinds of knowledge through funding criteria and quantified methods of evaluating research productivity, the struggle between winners and losers became intra-institutional, and the meaning of the term "university" increasingly became the property of the central administration and its public relations section, rather than its academic workforce.

The second, Max Haiven's, is an impassioned confirmation of that analysis from the experience of one who has graduated into the tainted opportunities offered to the most advanced minds in the humanities by the neoliberal version of the postmodern university. He describes himself in a chapter on the edu-factory as "a precarious academic worker, which means that, though I have a Ph.D. and a reasonably good record of publications and academic accomplishments, I am unlikely to get a permanent academic job that would afford me some measure of job security, let alone safety from disciplinary measures should I say or write something that offends the powers that be" (2014: 134). He points up the deep irony in a situation where governments have proclaimed the advent of the knowledge society and yet their policies serve to devalue knowledge work, tying the most highly educated segment of their population into debt and insecurity.[29] In his account, the university is "not merely an example of new forms of discipline and exploitation; it is a laboratory. […] While the best aspects of university curricula try to radicalize our idea of responsibility (how are we responsible to one another? to society? to the earth? to the public? to the commons? to our

privilege? to our community? to animals, plants and the climate? to power and to resistance?), these efforts run up against and fly in the face of a broader economic agenda through which the university becomes a factory for producing austere subjects: individuals whose sense of self and of possibility is finely calibrated to the capitalist values of accumulation, competition and individualism " (140, 148-9). For Haiven, hope in this situation lies in our collective ability to imagine differently, "to dream of and build towards different social horizons […] based on the (always provisional and negotiable) values of solidarity, equality, individuality, empowerment and peace" (257-8). His book deliberately refuses to be judged according to the criteria for advanced academic work in the humanities; as Haiven puts it, "It is not an attempt to offer a systematic theory, only to present my own fractured, incomplete, idiosyncratic thinking to the common imagination" (27). A text of the new humanities, in other words, the means by which a singular mind addresses other minds wherever they are located in a process of thinking through to new orders of social life.

For New Zealand, a politically consistent and discursively evolving critique can be tracked through the work of Michael Peters in authored and edited analyses of the complex issues in public policies for knowledge and their wide implications for society as a whole. His writing exemplifies the interpenetration of knowledges required in new humanities work, the theoretical grounding and inherently political character of critique, and the formation through conferences, meetings and publication of a globally distributed community of enquiry which is attentive to the specifics of local contexts. Consistently, his work returns to education as the critical social institution through which a society's new citizens are disciplined to satisfy the requirements of the neoliberal economy, but where they might also learn how to imagine themselves and their world differently. Latterly, together with others he has challenged cognitive capitalism by propounding the concept of the creative university as a means of locating an alternative set of values for higher education.[30]

Each of these analyses of the profound changes undertaken in and by Western universities during the past three decades emphasises how the Western university is being reshaped by imperatives over which it has little or no control. To reverse this state of affairs requires that universities (being, as I

have proposed, first and foremost local institutions) redefine what makes them distinctive as public institutions in a democratic society, and give value to the multiplicity of social environments in which their knowledge work plays a significant role. A new humanities is clearly one consequence of such an approach, since it is not possible to reintegrate the university without rethinking the diverse kinds of knowledge it professes and what brings them together in this institutional formation. A compelling analysis of what is at stake here is offered by Barnett who argues in *The University in an Age of Supercomplexity* that "The new university that is not doomed to repeat the past (viz., the modern university) and not committed to making the mistakes of the present (viz., the neoliberal university), might be called, for lack of a better term, the 'postmodern' university" (2000: 22). The basis for this renaming is four concepts which he takes to characterise postmodern societies and therefore the conditions under which individual subjectivity is formed, institutions now operate and knowledge work is carried out: uncertainty, unpredictability, challengeability, and contestability (68). Supercomplexity is the combined effect of these qualities, in all domains of life, exemplified by what he calls the "discursive maze" of postmodern knowledge: "The global age spawns continuous reframing in culture, work and life more generally. It is this continuous reframing that produces supercomplexity in which all our frames of understanding are challengeable" (144).[31] For Barnett, the postmodern university will become a "pivotal institution precisely through its insight into the character of this world and through the human capacities it will sponsor to confront that world […] creativity accompanied by critique" (69). I have analysed the conception of research which has informed New Zealand government policy papers (Opie, 2009b) and its focus on and promotion of research-led innovation as new (scientific) knowledge leading to new products of economic value, which fails to account for humanistic knowledge and therefore to give it value. Barnett argues that this kind of discrimination is political (148), and proposes instead that the most important distinction within knowledge work is whether the outcomes are paradigm-endorsing or revolutionary (145); the former he regards as the common mode of academic work, whereas the latter is the now necessary mode, with continuous reframing both of expert knowledge and public understanding as the principal outcome. On the basis of this distinction he repositions scholarship, meaning the reviewing and re-interpreting of existing knowledge, which is not conventionally thought to

create new knowledge (although this is how most new knowledge is created in the humanities). The university "has a role to shed light on the manifold accounts that exist. This role has tended to be known as scholarship, an activity that becomes crucial in offering us new interpretations of the already existing accounts" (70). For it to become crucial, scholarship must escape introversion – the university's tendency to "conduct inner conversations of the elect" (71). The possibility of new forms of knowing exists as much in the heterogeneity of the records of human thought as it does in the hypotheses and methods of scientific research.

The question, as Deputy Prime Minister Michael Cullen framed it at the launch of the Humanities Trust in 2005, is "whether society exists to serve our economy, or our economy exists to serve society." Replace "society" with "university" and the deep challenge to the role of the university as the institution charged to carry out professional knowledge work on society's behalf is not the economy, but society. Not only is it necessary to challenge existing paradigms of thought framing advanced research, but there must be a full engagement with the public, offering interpretations of the significance of new knowledge so that the members of society as a whole can purposefully and constructively reframe their understanding of the world in which they are living. "Research-led teaching" could be one example of this work of critique and dissemination, one mode of the democratisation of knowledge, but not if most research endorses rather than challenges current paradigms, so that teaching is the transmission of what is already known rather than an opening on to what is yet to be known. The work of independent scholars is another. Just as the arts and humanities are in effect positioned outside research in knowledge society policies, so is much knowledge creation across the disciplines accomplished in formal and informal spaces outside the university by people with varying degrees of formal research training (from doctorate to amateur). There is a strong case (Finnegan, 2005) for public policies for knowledge creation to recognise this aspect of "socially distributed knowledge production" (Gibbons, 2004: 99) because it plays a critical role in the elaboration and circulation of a democratic society's resources of knowledge. It is axiomatic to my conception of a new humanities that innovation draws fundamentally from the open circulation of knowledge throughout a society, and it is therefore necessary to recognise the contribution of non-academic organisations (think-tanks, NGOs, professional

bodies, churches, government agencies, community groups) and non-institutional knowledge workers (independent scholars and researchers) to the advancing of knowledge, as well as to engage academic humanities fully across this spectrum of modes of dissemination, communication, and use of knowledge. A helpful term for such knowledge work is "public scholarship" (Cummings, 2005: 176), much of which is distinguished from academic research in the modern university by being produced in public spaces and for public use and which bears the marks of the postmodern knowledge order – "fluidity and contestation, […] plurality and dissolving identities" (Barnett, 2000: 273). This socially dispersed rather than institutionally concentrated research capability needs particular attention in public policy; it may be a distinguishing aspect of New Zealand's knowledge society, especially when considered in the light of Gross's statement that "A society based on brain power, on good new ideas, no longer can rely on one sector (academe) or on a specialized subunit (the R&D divisions of companies) to produce new knowledge. It can and must harness the intellectual capacities of a far wider section of its highly educated and mentally adventurous work force" (Gross, 1982). While the internet is promoted as the democratic medium of knowledge exchange, and is contributing to the enlargement of the scope and character of public scholarship, there is a countervailing tendency, which is that access to resources for advanced research is increasingly closed to those lacking formal institutional affiliation because of the ownership rules governing the use of digitised knowledge and the costs of access to it, even when that knowledge is publicly funded (Finnegan, 2005: 15; National Library of New Zealand, 2007: 27, 30). Educational institutions have a crucial role to play in sustaining this public component of a society's capability for knowledge creation.

3. A New Humanities Research System

From the beginning of the effort to establish HUMANZ, the issue of the lack of representation of humanities knowledge work in official statistics, together with the distribution of public sector agencies across the knowledge field, was a critical stumbling block when addressing government and seeking to influence policy. The idea that there could be a humanities research *system* integrating the creation and application of humanities knowledge throughout

society was simply absent. In a time when quantification is a fundamental aspect of public discourse, it is impossible to give an adequate account of the importance of humanities knowledge when aspects of the economy and society in which this knowledge has value and effects are not counted together. Some examples are publishing, education, tourism, government, diplomacy, trade, design, fashion and entertainment. What they have in common is heterogeneity, of languages, methodologies, locales, cultures, histories, institutions, media, ways of thinking; new ways of accounting for them have to be devised [Hunter et al, 1991; Bennett, 2013). The concepts of cultural and public value (Holden, 2004; Bennington and Moore, 2011) point in a productive direction.

3.1 In the International Domain

In countries with established national organisations set up to represent the humanities (unlike New Zealand), governments have been required to attend to very articulate and well-researched reports on the value of the humanities which reflect the particular policy pressures of the time in which they were written. While the rhetorical skill and conviction of these reports is impressive, they were clearly insufficient to turn public knowledge policies from technoscience, business and their incessant public promotion towards a more balanced conception of the cultural, social and economic roles of knowledge. It is more likely that these organisations will have seen their claims to value undermined, but they have been defending a position already established rather than, as in New Zealand, attempting to modify policies developed without a tradition of representation and advocacy from outside the university system.

Many very substantial studies of the status and role of the arts, humanities and social sciences have been made during the past two decades by organizations representing these fields of knowledge, under pressure from the same ensemble of policies which have been articulated in New Zealand and the conceptual framework which informs them. These studies (for example, American Council of Learned Societies, 2006; Arts and Humanities Research Council. 2013; British Academy, 2004, 2005, 2008; Canadian Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences, 2005; Council for Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences, 2005; Hassan et al, 2008; Matthae

and Birzer, 2004; Turner and Brass, 2014; UNESCO, 2014; Harvard Faculty Working Group, 2013; Working Group on the Future of the Humanities, 2001) have been occasioned by declines in funding, the relentless marginalising of the humanities in government policies for knowledge, the exclusion of these fields from the official accounts of innovation and knowledge of economic value, and by the dominance of technoscientific conceptions of knowledge work in the design and functionality of digital ICTs, most especially now in the area of research using high performance computing.

All of these texts seek to reassert the proper claims of the humanities (and arts, education and social sciences) to having social and economic value, in ways appropriate to them and the kinds of work they perform in and for society. They are also strongly marked by the informing assumption of government policies, that research is typically scientific and the value it produces is achieved through industrial and technological applications. Each text can be analysed closely for the different balance of forces and interests which provide national contexts for their composition and audiences. All I will do here is to identify several positions which these texts share, in order to indicate that the matters of concern to me are being fully engaged in other similar jurisdictions.

The British Academy (2004) report directly takes on the question of the economic value of knowledge in its title while challenging a narrow interpretation of the term:

> The arts, humanities and social sciences also make key (and as yet underappreciated) contributions to the economy, and facilitate wealth creation in a wide range of tangible and intangible ways. Moreover, research findings have shown that capitalist economies function best and with greatest stability under certain political and cultural conditions, and it is to the provision of these conditions that arts, humanities and social science teaching and research markedly contribute (62).

It is repeatedly critical of government policies for knowledge, stating, for example, that “The language and concepts used by government to encourage the development of research and innovation are often derived unthinkingly from now outdated assumptions that seriously impeded the full exploitation

of the arts, humanities and social sciences, and the information they yield" (ix, 65) – even while itself using a key term for corporate and state appropriation of natural and human resources. All of these reports make positive claims about the modes of knowledge work which are characteristic of the humanities, like this from the Canadian Working Group: "The actual social, cultural and intellectual relevance of work in the humanities, as in many of the social sciences, lies […] in an ability to articulate the significance of cultural and historical events. Humanities research does not, generally, produce quantifiable results. What it does produce is explanatory models and rich and nuanced interpretations of complex questions. Unlike the experimental scientist in the laboratory, the humanist cannot isolate a single variable: he or she must take into account and endeavour to make sense of the awesomely complex and splendidly messy facts of human existence" (18-19; American Council of Learned Societies, 2006: 8). All of these reports emphasis the effects of underinvestment. The particular importance in respect of the on-going development of the digital informational and communicational infrastructure on the basis of a partial (that is, technoscientific) model of knowledge work is brought out in the ACLS report, where it is affirmed that "the online world is a new cultural commonwealth in which knowledge, learning, and discovery can flourish" but only if it develops as "an online environment that cultivates the richness of human experience, the diversity of human languages and cultures, and the full range of human creativity. Such an environment will best emerge if its design can benefit from the strengths of the humanities and social sciences: clarity of expression, the ability to uncover meaning in even scattered or garbled information, and centuries of experience in organizing knowledge" (American Council of Learned Societies, 2006: 2).

There was one very significant (and, in the event, poignant) parallel to our situation in New Zealand. During the 1990s, when those involved with HUMANZ were trying to establish a national humanities organisation and gain government (and sectoral) recognition for it, the British Academy was trying to gain government agreement to the establishment of a Research Council for the Arts and Humanities, the missing segment of academic knowledge in the United Kingdom's research councils' structure and funding. The first attempt failed, but led to the establishment of The United Kingdom Arts and Humanities Research Board (AHRB), which subsequently wrote

The Arts and Humanities: Understanding the Research Landscape following the successful establishment of a research council for the arts and humanities in 2003. This report was initially directed to the other research councils, all of which were science-based. Its premise was that "research in the arts and humanities has tended to become marginalised in national debate [over the past fifty years], and its character and importance only partly understood outside its own domain." The report also observed that

> the arrival of the arts and humanities within the structure of the research councils and the OST [Office of Science and Technology] must not imply that research in these disciplines should be supported only insofar as it engages with current science agendas, though it clearly has the capacity to do that. The enlargement of the research councils and of the OST's domain means that these must now embrace and support the wider range of subjects and imperatives which constitute the arts and humanities research. It is not a matter of the arts and humanities simply fitting into the existing research landscape, but about reconfiguring the research landscape to include the distinctive concerns and priorities of the arts and humanities as well as those which they share with the disciplines currently within the OST.

In striking contrast to traditionalist views which regard the introduction of theory into postmodern humanities (aka the culture wars) as having damaged the reputation of the humanities within and outside the universities, the AHRB placed theory work at the heart of humanities research, affirming that "theoretical and conceptual approaches […] are themselves a contested terrain. Such contests are in many disciplines the core mode of intellectual engagement and discourse, and they constitute a key engine for analytical creativity and for advancing knowledge" (2.2; Matthae and Brizer, 2004: 4; Delanty, 2001: 147-150).

I have commented elsewhere {Opie, 2009b: 179-182) on the relative richness of subject specification in the PBRF panels for the sciences, and the meagre representation of the humanities. Another way of underlining this point, which exemplifies the presence to the policy mind of the organisation and elaboration of the sciences and the corresponding absence of the

humanities from that mind, is to quote in full a list given by the authors of the AHRB report which set out "a range of subjects and themes of research [which] lie within and across disciplinary boundaries, and […] are reconfigured and renewed in just the same way as within any areas of science research, as the analytical problems and the theoretical and methodological approaches change." The list deliberately challenges the conventions of academic description by discipline and points compellingly towards a framework for a new humanities:

> Organisation of knowledge
> Epistemology and evidence
> Language and the character of expression, translation and communication
> Media and communications
> Cognition, perception and understanding
> Consciousness
> Ideas, thoughts and beliefs
> Subjectivity
> Reading texts and images
> Narrative and discourse
> Representation
> Transmission, reception and appropriation
> The present as process
> Institutions and the construction of power
> Culture and identities
> Mobility, exile and diasporas
> Humans and the historic environment
> Creativity, expression and composition

While recognising the lack of an adequate infrastructure for arts and humanities (5.4) which "have not benefited from the increasingly important role of the research councils and the associated expansion of research activity which have been characteristic of the sciences" (1.1), this report took the commendably strong position that the work of the arts and humanities is of equal importance to that of any other research domain because of its "distinctive modes of access to and understanding of human experience and activity" (2.3).

The terms through which a powerful set of policy positions relevant to the large fraction of knowledge work in New Zealand which is unaccounted for in current technoscience-based policy statements could be articulated are set out here. But the first step that is required in order to engage with the current set of cognitive and social practices shaping knowledge policy and begin the process of repositioning it is to specify the terms of "the multiple definitions of quality", which in New Zealand would include at least those locating the distinctive characteristics of knowledge creation in matauranga Māori, the arts, culture, education and humanities. In other words, what is needed is a conceptual grounding for knowledge creation as the collective work of a whole society and as a public good. What follows here will attempt to identify the components of such a grounding.

3.2 Configuring Knowledge Creation in a New Humanities

I have already discussed in Chapter One the definitions set out in *The HUMANZ Research Policy* (1996) and employed by HUMANZ when representing the case for humanities research to the New Zealand government. A key point to recollect is that, following the post-colonial turn in Aotearoa New Zealand's constitutional thinking, the recovery of the Treaty of Waitangi (which formalised the relation between the Māori people and the British Crown in 1840) reframed this nation as bi-cultural and bi-lingual. This meant, in principle if not in practice, that "New Zealand humanities" could no longer be only "settler humanities". The name given to this hybrid was humanities-aronui: "The humanities-aronui are that body of knowledge and those modes of enquiry and reflection which concern what it is to be human[32], including our inhumanity and our relation to the non-human," with the qualities of being diffusive, accumulative, and value-laden. The aim was to delineate the features of a distinctive mode of thinking and knowing which extended throughout society and culture and was not located only in universities or defined by specific discipline formations. It was also designed to make it absolutely clear that attempting to conceive of the humanities-aronui in policy (research, knowledge, economic, educational, cultural) by analogy with the technosciences was unfeasible. Appropriate conceiving of the purposes and scope of public sector and media

organisations, and cultural and memory institutions, the role of the humanities-aronui in society and the economy, the nature of the productivity of knowledge in the humanities-aronui and its relation to the arts, the law and the technosciences, would depend upon a multi-dimensioned, not unitary, approach to the generation, circulation, use and value of different kinds of knowledge.

Re-thinking the position of the humanities in the postmodern knowledge order requires a category capable of including all those objects (linguistic, mathematical, graphic, imagistic, musical, performative, architectural, technological) which are marked by signs and can communicate information, knowledge and meaning to (some or many) interlocutors and interpreters. It also requires a conception of the humanities as a mode of knowing active throughout a society, not only in its current disciplinary form of the academic humanities. I will draw on a number of exemplary studies in order to establish the parameters of the "space of the new humanities". These will provide terms for the modes of knowing constitutive of the humanities, the objects studied in the humanities and what is characteristic of the space these objects and the work done with them occupy, and defining features of the objects making up the resource for humanities enquiry. As Chartier so succinctly put it, knowledge creation in the humanities follows a common path "which leads from the archive to the text, from the text to writing, and from writing to knowledge" (10) and, he might have added, back to the archive again, which now expands to include a new text and so is no longer the same.

3.3 Conceiving Worlds of Knowledge

In *Paradise Lost* Milton linked the invention of technology directly to the challenge posed to intelligent beings by a world of inorganic or lifeless matter (now the problem posed by the worlds of the other planets in our solar system), in contrast to human residence in knowledgeable harmony with all other living things in the biosphere of the Garden of Eden. Each world generated its specific kinds of power/knowledge, a situation strongly marked in the postmodern as life sciences and ecological thinking now propose alternative conceptualisations of the world we live in and our human place in it to those formative in modern science.

3.3.1 Signing Thought

A work which provides a most helpful account of the nature and evolution of knowledge pertinent to thinking about the new humanities is Søren Brier's *Cybersemiotics*, in which the life and information sciences are the principal resource for a theory of knowledge grounded by a strong conception of what it means to be human and an integral part of the spectrum of life on Earth.[33] Brier observes "the modern humanities in their divided specializations and often highly refined aestheticism [to be] standing in weak opposition to financial power joined with a scientific–technological system. The humanities have difficulty finding a common ground on which to formulate their value assumptions, since they wish neither to make ethics into religion or science, nor to define human nature beyond socio-linguistic material consciousness" (2008: 82). He also observes that "The natural sciences […] work towards making one grand historical explanation from matter over life to consciousness and cultural meaning", but argues instead for a "new paradigmatic foundation that would enable us to integrate the knowledge of the study of embodied consciousness from the exact, as well as the life sciences, the social sciences and the humanities, without reducing one set of results to another" (2013: 230). While cybersemiotics might not immediately recommend itself to academic humanists as providing a common ground on which the weakness of the humanities in relation to the sciences could be addressed, Brier's argument for the necessary existence of multiple and incommensurate modes of knowledge and his founding of a general theory of knowledge on a theory of the sign provides a powerful incentive to consider it closely.

This is even more so when he affirms that "culture, mind, meaning, consciousness and ethics […] are all natural phenomena inside nature", invoking Merleau-Ponty in support (2013: 238), and that "we must look for a theory that allows evolution and mind to be parts of foundational reality" (2008: 433). As with other writers whose thought I am engaging to my purposes, Brier is impressive for his perception of connectedness among very different domains of knowledge, and the principles according to which he interprets his findings. He, too, is working with a belief that humanity is in a period of fundamental change, and this provides a generous motive for his work:

> I believe in the need to consciously construct and discuss basic philosophical perspectives, and to contemplate the limits and possibilities of human knowledge and the place of the sciences in it, as a means to develop and optimize the common good in civilizations […] to expand the dialogue between sciences, the humanities, the social sciences, philosophy, and the existential quest to broaden our concept of reason in accordance with my stance towards making common frames for the open and systematic pursuits of knowledge and meaning. […] we stand at the threshold of a new Enlightenment. […] to meet the needs of a new global society […] we need to make the leap to a new *level* of knowledge and *understanding* of knowledge (2008: 13, author's emphasis).

I will comment further on the positioning of the humanities in his transdisciplinary theory of knowledge; but first I will consider his account of knowledge as a human achievement within (and for) our universe. Rather than attempt a summary, I will locate his approach through several substantial quotations which expand the implications of his starting point, which is not with the most advanced or specialised forms of knowledge, but with a universal human capability: "It is the human perceptive and cognitive ability to gain knowledge and communicate this in dialogue with others in a common language that is the foundations of science. An awareness of this will lead one to start in the middle instead of at extremes, to start not with either subject or object, but rather with the process of knowing in living systems" (2008: 83-84). Besides the fact that "the middle" could be exemplified by documentary or fictional narrative, the very carefully formulated first sentence binds together as mutually constitutive knowledge, language and the human as a specific form of life. Instead of foregrounding rationality and objectivity as the criteria for thinking about knowledge, Brier affirms "the non-reductionist view that knowledge always originates from feeling – that is, from a volitional signifying living system with an inner experiential world and with, as well, a body relating to and distinguishing itself from both a natural world and a cultural environment by means of social communication" (2008: 147). What it has been usual to keep apart, Brier puts together without qualification, so that many of the characteristics of human knowing important to humanities thought – will, emotion, memory, individual experience as intrinsically embodied, identity, intersubjectivity, moral concepts and ethical

practice, aesthetics, languages and cultures, time and place – are placed at the foundations of the human project of acquiring knowledge, not as sources of distraction or confusion. He writes that

> It is important to acknowledge our existing ignorance regarding what it is to know and how knowledge comes about. We must also acknowledge that we are observers coexisting in language with other humans in culture and society. Our living in nature and in the social world is based on our biological existence as embodied beings with inner conscious worlds – that is, our psyches, in which volition, emotions, and (pre-linguistic) thought are born. […] All kinds of knowledge, such as scientific, phenomenological, and practical knowledge, are specializations of human knowledge and are based on the ability to make distinctions (and interpret them as meaningful signs) and to communicate them through everyday language. […] We awaken to a world situated in language with other humans, to a world or our own feelings and tendencies (will, affections, and drives) and to some non-human surroundings: the environment or nature […] The systematic expansion of knowledge generates three major and qualitatively different knowledge approaches: the sciences, the arts and humanities, and the social sciences. In most cultures each of these subdivisions entails an authorized system of knowledge. (119-120)

The final phrase completes the steps from the moment when we each "awaken to a world" through pre-linguistic thought, to learning our culture's knowledge in its diverse kinds and to working with formal and objectified knowledge[34] which has been determined according to socially agreed methods, principles, and forms of record. At the opposite extreme there is the reality which this objectified knowledge is a society's "knowledge of" and which is only very partly comprehended by it, which Brier describes as "randomness or chaos […] a hypercomplexity of potential structures and potential information in an infinite, living dynamic" (2008: 201). Hypercomplexity is a characteristic of reality perceived to be positive in its implications, and it is not only experienced as external to consciousness. Brier expresses this in a way which brings some of the most fundamental aspects of inquiry in the humanities into the foreground when he writes that

> It is not only the 'outside' world that persistently surprises us with its complexity and spontaneity, but also our 'inner' world, the 'subconscious' complexity and spontaneity behind our behaviour, including communication. […] This basic incompleteness of our knowledge of ourselves, the unknown reasons for our behaviour, and our lack of absolute conscious control over speech, are at the same time prerequisites for our ability to say and cognize something new (2008: 118).

Amongst all that Brier draws out from the work of Charles Sanders Pierce, there is one term which extends this notion of incompleteness in a way which is constructive for thinking about the forms of interpretation and argument by which humanities knowledge is created. He offers two explanations of Pierce's term abduction, which adds a third term to the traditional logical pair of induction and deduction: firstly, abduction is "the ability to produce meaningful interpretations from a variety of experiences based on a mixture of perceptions and memories" (2008: 114); and, secondly, "Abduction is crucial to signification. It is the capacity to see something as a sign for something else, which is the deep wonder of consciousness and human intentionality and linguistic interpretation and understanding" (2008: 439). The interpretive and sense-making process[35] which abduction identifies is common in ordinary reflection on experience and the double process of finding and making meaning, just as narrative is a "fundamental part of the communicative competence of modern man, *homo sapiens sapiens"* (2013: 231). Abduction offers a much better way of accounting for the lack of finality in humanities knowledge than the appeal to the individuality of the interpreter alone, because it integrates an openness to the multiple possibilities for knowledge in or among situations or texts with a will to find patterns and relationships linking what is otherwise disparate in knowledge and experience. It also gives a positive value, rather than regarding it as a distraction or source of error, to the grounding in time, place, inheritance and experience of each interpreter. Rather than produce exact knowledge (although some knowledge in the humanities is exact, for example, in bibliography), the work of the academic humanities is, through theory development and reflexive critique, to make expert an inherently human practice, that is, to "reduce complexity through meaning" (2008: 50). Knowledge work in the humanities reaches out towards universals, but these

are always formulated as principles and values, meanings and interpretations. The individual mind persists as a critical variable in this work. Thinking and writing in the humanities is always conducted by a person or persons, positioned in culture, language, geography and history, drawing on a corpus of texts selected from the totality of texts, and directed to an audience, with the aim of affecting that audience's thinking about what it means to be human – whether the audience is small or large, specialist or general, local or international.

Brier's theory of knowledge, and the cluster of terms – emergence, complexity, autopoiesis, semiosis – which inform it opens thought on to a way of conceiving of creativity and innovation which challenges the present policy model and which I will take up below. But it also opens more generally on to the space of the new humanities because thought in that space is engaged with reality conceived in these terms, (see for example the work of N. Katherine Hayles, Alan Liu and Jerome McGann), because Brier grounds his theory of knowledge in the human individual embedded in language, society, culture and nature, and because the artifacts, practices, conventions, and technologies of communication are integral to the existence of the humanities.

However, there is a significant hesitation in Brier's placing of the humanities in his overall conception of knowledge. While he identifies the humanities as the name for the modern Western knowledge culture which is the other to the sciences, and presents them as having a common project, "to produce as much consistency and coherence in our thinking about ourselves and the world as possible" (2008: 13), his overall conception of the parts of knowledge, as signified in the evolving diagrammatic representations in *Cybersemiotics,* (figs 2.5-2.15) which culminate in the Cybersemiotic Star (2013: 224), seem to require only the sciences, the social sciences and philosophy. The issue is, I think, similar to that arising from Badiou's conception of the parts of knowledge perceived as a totality from within philosophy (discussed below in Chapter Five) but without adducing a term for the whole including philosophy. Brier (like Badiou) is oriented towards the sciences, and it is not his task to propose what might be the implications for the modern humanities of his thinking and the disciplinary fields on which he draws. But this absence from another perspective points to the failure of

the modern humanities to articulate a strong conception of what is distinctive in their work of knowledge creation; to do that now requires, as Derrida affirmed, the reconstruction of the space of the humanities from within.[36]

3.3.2 The Semiosphere

Brier's critique of information science brings him close to the foundations of the academic humanities, through his discussion of the problems encountered in the development of information retrieval systems in Library and Information Science. I intend to consider the role of the library together with other cultural memory institutions in Chapter Four; but the problem which concerns him, the adequate description of objects recording knowledge so that they are accessible to any user, points directly not only to the work of archivists and librarians, but also to humanities researchers. He observes that the materials librarians and archivists work with "can include recorded measurements and observations, theoretical knowledge, and meanings and visions or experiences, through media such as documents, books, records, tapes, programs, floppy disks, hypertext, compact discs, pictures, films, and videograms. These mediating forms (and future ones) can be summarized under the general LIS concept of a 'document' […] I will define a document as a human work with communicative intent directed towards other human beings and that is recorded in a material way" (2008: 45). The wider context, in which traditionally humanists, librarians and archivists were co-dependent, even if the humanist assumed that the librarian was only a service worker, is the literate learning required for the conservation, management and on-going interpretation of a society's documentary inheritance.

The shift from oral to written memory created a new class of material objects, texts or semiotic objects, the recorded expressions of human thought. They are distinctively human additions to the objects of the given world, individually and collectively authored, conserved by law and convention as the collective memory [37] of humanity, testimony to the potentials and limitations of human knowledge (moral, religious, legal, political, scientific, technological and artistic), and the fundamental resource for social, economic and cultural (re) invention. It is this class of objects, which constitutes the distinctive field of inquiry of the humanities, and, as Brier has argued for the mind and its products, they are in reality and participate in its

ongoing formation. Hence, like physical objects in the space and time of the given world, semiotic objects also occupy space and time, but in a distinctive manner; they combine in themselves the cultural, the virtual and the actual.[38]

One helpful term for that dimension of space, which immediately also applies to the space occupied by the university, is Lotman's term "semiosphere". He defines '"the intellectual world in which humanity and human society are enfolded and which is in constant interaction with the individual intellectual world of human beings" as "the semiosphere, that synchronic semiotic space which fills the borders of culture." He writes that "The semiosphere, the space of culture, is not something that acts according to mapped out and pre-calculated plans. It seethes like the sun, centres of activity boil up in different places, in the depths and on the surface, irradiating relatively peaceful areas with its immense energy. But unlike that of the sun, the energy of the semiosphere is the energy of information, the energy of Thought" (1990: 3, 150).

Among the many important implications of this view is that it, like Brier's, locates the order of information in culture at large rather than in the more restricted domains of research, new information and communications technologies, and the economy, with the consequence that these domains can be understood as special cases within a particular cultural formation. Lotman does not need the terms creativity or innovation to identify a specific but not necessarily constant feature of "the space of culture", the formation of the new in whatever form, because he attributes an inherently dynamic character to the engagement of minds with information, the latter "enfolding" but not the possession of individuals, groups or institutions. The semiosphere as a concept accounts for how attempts to discipline information and knowledge must always fail, however powerful they may be for periods of time, as cultural agents explore the potentials of accumulated human knowledge, in Derrida's phrase, "without condition". Another important implication is that the contents of the semiosphere are in principle totally inclusive; nothing once thought (and transmitted to another) may be finally lost, everything that has been thought (and recorded) may be thought again in the new context of another human mind active in another specific time and place. Crucially, of course, if societies do not conserve the knowledge they create, or make it

publicly accessible, it is lost to the collective memory. In short form, the semiosphere is a name for the real world of the materials used in the knowledge work of the humanities. It has no inherent order but is heterogeneous in its accumulated and contested presentations of humanity's knowledge and of what it means to be human, that is, while each text is culturally, temporally and spatially conditioned, the totality of texts is "without condition". It also identifies, in the attribution of energy to information, how differently the work of the university can be conceived if it is understood to derive its character and function from the inclusiveness of the semiosphere while, within the general human activity of "Thought", having responsibility for the highest levels of abstraction and formalisation of knowledge.

To accept that "the semiosphere" gives a name to that "world" in relation to which the humanities came into existence, its work and purpose shaped by the nature of the semiotic objects which constitute it, is to accept that a much wider conception of the humanities than that formed in relation to manuscript and print culture is needed. Brier's conception of the document includes all present and future media technologies, just as a new humanities must. But at present the semiosphere is divided in one way by the territorial boundaries set in place by the disciplinary organisation of the modern university, in which the humanities are supposed to occupy a small and contracting corner, and the historical evolution of information and communication or media technologies is crystallised into separate disciplines, typically in the social sciences. As the new field of digital humanities demonstrates, this process of specialisation based on the continuing invention of media technologies continues to fracture the humanities as a coherent project of knowledge formation.

3.3.3 The I-space, or Mapping the Semiosphere

The other term I wish to insert into this discussion is a conceptualisation of information developed from the analysis of the role of information in business organisations. Boisot has developed a concept, the I[nformation]-space which, while applied specifically to understanding the evolution of the firm, extends in its most general form to a conceptualisation of the dynamic social space of cultural knowledge and cultural production and

reproduction.[39] If Lotman's semiosphere is a universe studded with galaxies and constellations[40] of texts, Boisot's I-space represents the manifold organisational forms and contexts in which knowledge is created, controlled and put to work. As Boisot (1998: 55) defines it, the I-space is "a conceptual framework within which the behaviour of information flows can be explored and, through these, the creation and diffusion of knowledge within selected populations can be understood." It is a dynamic space constituted by three dimensions represented as a cube: concrete-abstract; undiffused-diffused; uncodified-codified.[41]



FIG. 3.2 The Movement of Knowledge in the I-Space

Illustration 2: Boisot, 1998: 59.

Boisot understands knowledge creation as a human activity shaping and shaped by individual, institutional, social, cultural and ideological factors operating in dynamic relations with one another and exemplifying Lotman's conception of "the energy of Thought". The I-Space is, therefore, an

inherently political domain, but it has no single reference point (unlike, for example, the world of the *Leviathan* title page[42]); the contents of the semiosphere can be classified and assembled (and declassified and re-assembled) by human action over time into textual communities, textual institutions, textual nation states, textual public spheres, but they always exceed any classification.

Two visualisations of moments in the formulation and diffusion of knowledge are also highly relevant to a broad conception of the multiple social functions of education as a knowledge institution. His Figure 3.2 (Illustration 2 above) focuses on stages in the formulation of knowledge and its diffusion through a population: new knowledge begins as "highly idiosyncratic knowledge of particular events"; as knowledge becomes increasingly abstracted from specific situations, it becomes more widely sharable and applicable; as a result of its increasingly wide diffusion through society, using all the means of socially available communication, it can over time become generally taken for granted. Figure 3.3 (Illustration 3 below) identifies phases in the processing of information, which Boisot calls the Social Learning Cycle (SLC). It is important to emphasise Boisot's double conception, that new knowledge can surface anywhere and its acquisition by a society's members is a learning process requiring means for the new to become widely disseminated and habitual while new knowledge is continually being generated. In respect of the directional arrows in Fig 3.2 and numbered phases in Fig. 3.3, Boisot affirms that they schematically represent a tendency in the creation and diffusion of new knowledge; data is "constantly on the move" and individuals and organisations interact with it in highly contextual ways (58-61)[43].



FIG. 3.3 The Social Learning Cycle (SLC)

Illustration 3: Boisot, 1998: 60

Three critical and related parameters in Boisot's overall analysis are: the conception of knowledge substrates in which knowledge assets are embedded, categorised as heads, documents, and objects (1998: 154-157); the conception of three distinct kinds of information environment or regime - ordered, complex and chaotic - in which relationships are more or less structured in the I-space (67-69, 202-205); and the categorisation of social processes in the I-space as team, networking, organisational, and community (1998: 226-228). It can be readily imagined how knowledge creation in the university as it is now and as it could be in the future can be analysed through this set of parameters, although this is not Boisot's aim. He does, however, in a chapter entitled "Culture as a Knowledge Asset", open up a field of enquiry which is suggestive for a conception of knowledge work broader than that defined by economic considerations. His purpose in this chapter is to demonstrate that "it does not make much sense to talk of knowledge assets independently of the cultures in which they are embedded". He observes that "Only a small part of what we call cultural knowledge gets itself embedded in technologies and artefacts. A large part is embodied in social processes, institutional practices, and traditions, many of which are carried around in people's heads. For this reason cultural knowledge has been taken for granted […] At best, it is perceived to be behaviourally useful knowledge" (Boisot, 1998: 119, 117). Boisot builds on these points with a definition of cultural knowledge which provides a strong, fundamental basis on which to reposition knowledge creation as grounded in and driven by cultural rather than economic imperatives. He writes that

> Culture operates at many levels of aggregation. We can talk of the culture of a group, of a firm, of an industry or a profession, of a region, of a country, or even of a group of countries. Yet at whatever level we choose to define it - national, regional, industrial, or corporate - culture remains the means by which non-genetic information is transmitted either within a given generation or from one generation to the next. Technological practice forms an integral part of such cultural transmission. But technological practice usually combines theoretical knowledge that may itself be pretty well

> universal in scope with more practical knowledge that is much more local and culture-specific in its application (Boisot, 1998: 118).

Although cultural knowledge is typically associated with the local, the particularistic and the contextual in Boisot's account, it can manifest any combination of the dimensions which constitute the I-space. By describing it as "non-genetic", he emphasises its non-natural origin and its humanly invented modes of representation and transmission, of which the Internet is the latest development. He notes that "An item of knowledge has to be internalised by contemporaries as well as by descendants before it can be properly considered cultural"; culture can be thought of as "a kind of collective memory whose spatio-temporal reach is determined by that of its biological and physical substrates" (120). Furthermore, "individual agents typically have multiple affiliations […] and are therefore subject to multiple cultural influences that interact and overlie each other. […] Thus, the cultural influences that bear down on a given data-processing agent - whether the agent be an individual human being, a small group, or a firm - are often superimposed on each other in overlapping layers" (136). For these reasons, in his account languages are one of a number of "discontinuities", like laws and traditions, which nation-states can use to "foster a sense of cultural identity among their citizens" (123). As Kuokkanen demonstrates, they can also serve to maintain cultural differences against the impositions of dominant cultures.

This opening beyond the economic is characteristic of Boisot's overall approach. One other set of connections which he draws (particularly significant for my later discussion of the gift and open access) is his distinction between contract and gift structures within the I-space (140-141). He shows that the culture of "more contract-oriented firms {…] confines them to the upper reaches of the I-space", whereas a "different cultural logic" is at work in firms which can operate in the lower reaches of the I-space. This is the logic of the gift relationship, which is "far more open-ended and uncertain than the contract. […] It operates at a much lower level of codification and abstraction than contract-oriented exchange. Gift-based transactions not only require trust for their consummation, they create it as well." He observes that national values and beliefs exercise considerable influence on forms of knowledge exchange and the demarcation of the

boundaries of the firm, giving as an example the "strong preference for competitively determined contractual relations" characteristic of US culture. But in the case for a new humanities which I am developing, the most important level of social interaction and circulation of thought is the lower level, where metaphors like well-spring and seed-bed capture the generativity of thought in open exchange and shared learning.

Boisot does not apply his analysis to the university as, for example, a bureaucratic organisation or a firm, but it is clear that it is immediately possible to plot positions for various modalities of the university in the I-space. The critical value of his analysis is that it exposes the profound implications for the university of being an organisation the principal work of which is carried out in the space of information, and for the humanities of being a mode of knowledge in which the objects of its investigations are already present in the I-space. In particular, different modes of the humanities can be located at different points in the I-space, depending on whether their methods and theories emphasise order and continuity in knowledge and practice, or disruption and discontinuity.

Furthermore, their materials can also find locations in this space, regardless of whether they are narratively or analytically structured. As with Lotman's semiosphere, this conception does not invoke creativity as a necessary explanatory term for discovery and innovation in knowledge work, partly because it assumes a dynamic informational, institutional and cultural environment within which individual agents produce and circulate meaning and knowledge, rather than locating that dynamic only or primarily in the individual. The modern university reaches its bureaucratic limit in the on-going fracturing of traditional disciplines and the fuzziness of their administrative borders through alternative forms of relationship signified by terms like multidisciplinarity or interdisciplinarity. It can make more sense in respect of humanistic knowledge to think of groupings of kinds of non-genetic knowledge as evolving cultural fields, so making accessible the dynamic relations between different kinds of knowledge as these are shaped by local conditions, histories and inherited and new values. To locate the postmodern university, conceived of as Derrida's "university without condition", in the I-space requires imagining a border state in which abstract and highly codified knowledge in the humanities is formed from chaotic[44] semiotic materials

encountered and interactive in cultural fields. The proper effect of such a process is that the humanities themselves become chaotic in relation to existing institutions and disciplines. This is the condition of the humanities in their encounter with poetry, to be discussed in Chapter Five.

3.3.4 Creativity and innovation

The dynamic terms used of the information order by Lotman and Boisot, energy and flow, are also conventional attributes of creativity, as is Derrida's term "without condition", since the association between creativity as the name for a human disposition and capability and the work of bringing the new, the possible, the potential into existence is strong. But the term's relation to the work of the modern university is ambiguous, especially when it has been historically attributed to kinds of object and modes of work which are informational and aesthetic in origin, and for which the term fiction marks a decisive attribute. Furthermore, since mental work in itself does not necessarily produce the new, but much is directed towards preserving or extending the already known, what characteristics of the terms creativity and innovation need to be identified when the full range of the real objects filling the semiosphere or the I-space is considered, rather than only the set of objects constituting technoscientific knowledge? And what characteristics of the objects comprising the semiosphere are of decisive important in determining how creativity and innovation can occur in the knowledge work of a new humanities, and therefore contribute to bringing into existence a new conception of the university?

At the heart of my approach to these questions from a perspective in the humanities is Brier's inclusive conception of "our ability to say and cognize something new" (2008: 118). A study of innovation conducted through the disciplines of psychology and anthropology in the 1950s is refreshing because of its differently organised frame of enquiry, in which neither government nor the corporation is of particular significance. In his study *Innovation. The basis of cultural change*, H. G. Barnett is interested in a general theory of innovation, and he grounds it in a set of basic concepts of particular relevance to my interests.

His initial point is two-fold, and is resonant with Brier's conception of the origin of meaning and knowledge. As the title of the book makes clear, it is cultural change which Barnett takes to be the proper or full context for understanding innovation; in this context, "Everyone is an innovator, whether popular definitions allow him that recognition or not (1953: 9)." From a university or governmental perspective, adopting such a basis for trying to establish an innovation policy or direct academic development could seem hopelessly inclusive and incapable of providing the categories needed for defining strategies and priorities (a "chaotic" conception, in other words). However, by locating the discussion in a proposition that, in effect, claims that the ability to innovate is a human characteristic, and is not restricted to a specific domain of knowledge, a kind of institution, or a market, Barnett provides an opening for the view that a knowledge policy and a new humanities must be grounded in a democratic conception of creativity and innovation. This argument has been fully extended into the early twenty-first century by Hartley (2012: 47), who describes conceiving of creativity as a "population-wide attribute [which] requires social networks, and its 'product' is the growth of knowledge," as a "radically democratic move."[45]

Barnett defines an innovation as "any thought, behaviour or thing that is new because it is qualitatively different from existing forms. […] 'Innovation' is therefore a comprehensive term covering all kinds of mental constructs, whether they can be given sensible representation or not" (1953: 7). He notes that, "Because man-made objects have an extramental existence, it is deceptively easy to formulate a theory of innovation which will purport to describe their conception. It is much easier to explain them as things than as ideas" (3). This special case in his general theory is in effect the exemplary case on which much current innovation strategy is built. By contrast, he affirms that "Every innovation is a combination of ideas. The only bonds between its parts in a cultural setting are mental connections" (16). Furthermore, "the size and complexity of the cultural inventory that is available to an innovator establishes limits within which he must function. […] A sizable inventory allows for more new combinations and permits more differences of approach in problem solution than does a small one. […] facility and extent of communication influences the communication of ideas" (40). The domain of innovation is thus the domain identified by Lotman's semiosphere and Boisot's I-space, as indicated by Barnett's focus on "mental

constructs", the "cultural setting" and the "cultural inventory", and the intersections between this collective inheritance and the mental work of individuals as these are particularly facilitated (or obstructed) by the available communications and institutional infrastructure.

The implications of emphasising creativity and innovation as fundamentally cultural processes involving individuals' mental work are extended by an essay considering a performance of Shakespeare's *Othello*, in which the ability of a theatrical event to reframe human experience for its audience and so release the new in the experience of the audience is considered. Hastrup introduces another key term into the consideration of creativity when she argues that "Creative agency in my view is a capacity to bring the as yet unknown to effect by way of imaginative power" and through offering access to "the potentiality of the moment" (2011: 40, 43). Imagination is critical because "Understanding is an *event*. We 'intimate' unprecedented incidents or other worlds by means of imaginative projections from previous experience. […] The logic of imaginative creativity is not distinct from the logic of reasoning; they are aspects of the same capacity for intimation, which is part of our being 'cultural'" (40-41). Hastrup's argument is based on a distinction between discovery and invention, in which discovery is the outcome of a prior conceptualisation, whereas invention produces the ontologically new. Creativity is, as a mode of invention, "not only to discover or innovate […]. It is to reach a new potentiality by finding the ontologically new" (31-32). The play is a fictional vehicle engaging its audience in the kinds of mental work which can open out on to the state of being "without condition", engaging with the "what if?" in an environment which can displace the familiar and conventional with mental events making what is potential in knowledge and experience accessible to thought. The play, in this way, facilitates what Derrida describes as "an experience [which] is a traversal, something that *traverses* and travels toward a destination for which it finds the appropriate passage" (1992: 16; author's emphasis) – a mental event which can accomplish a qualitative transformation in collective knowledge. The play externalises and makes what is normal in human mental activity, that is, the private projection of ideas, scenarios, narratives on the screen of the mind, the means of a collective experience.

In Barnett's and Hastrup's accounts, creativity and innovation refer to a mode of mental work which produces something others will perceive as new. That the outcome could be a commercial product is only a special instance of a general process, not the end-point; the context of evaluation is cultural, not scientific or commercial, and no particular kind of knowledge is privileged as a source of the new. It is particularly important to underline what is at stake in Hastrup's argument: a old fictional text generates a new event by combining with cultural elements contemporary with the modern performance and not available to Shakespeare in the same way that human memory combines knowledge and experience from different times and places, personal and social, in the on-going process of sense-making, a process which is anchored in subjectivity and to inherited knowledge.

It is, however, worth being reminded at this point that the shift towards a technoscientific conception of innovation was observed by William Kingston in the 1970s. In his study of innovation, *Innovation: The Creative Impulse in Human Progress: Industry, Art, Science*, he wrote that "innovation is simply one way in which human creative energy is expressed, but it has been characteristic of recent stages in the culture of the West that this particular type of energy has tended to run into technological and technical innovation, rather than into survival or liturgy or art or literature" (1975: 7). He marked a critical factor in this social evolution, which is acknowledged by Boisot's later focussing of his analysis on the firm, in proposing that business culture should be added to the two cultures of art and science discussed by C. P. Snow (he noted that a fourth, government, should be added as well). It is also the case, of course, that the texts of science, policy, technology and commerce constitute increasingly substantial sectors in the semiosphere.

Two extensions of Brier's and Barnett's emphasis upon a democratic conception of creativity and innovation and the multiple worlds of knowledge-making are important at this point, because they take us further into the implications of making the semiosphere and the scope of the humanities in the university co-extensive, in respect of what humanity knows (as distinct from what humanity may come to know). One is the standing in the university and elsewhere of indigenous or traditional knowledge; the other is open access to knowledge and information.

3.3.5 Indigenous knowledge

At least in nation states like New Zealand which were formed as European imperial colonies, postmodernity has come to include the need to reset the common colonial history of cultural, linguistic and economic oppression of indigenous peoples. At its core, this resetting requires the recognition that there is more than one kind of true knowledge, one version of human history, one conception of the economy, or one way of thinking about what it means to be human in the world in which humanity finds itself. It installs at the centre of discussions about knowledge, truth and innovation the multiplicity of knowledges, their origins, their terms of reference, and their methods of validation, and hence a politics of knowledges, because productive relations between them can only be negotiated, not authoritatively determined. In whatever domains of society these negotiations take place, from negotiations between individuals to groups and institutions and nations, the guarantor of them in a democratic society must be the law and Parliament. In New Zealand, the creation of the Waitangi Tribunal, to provide a formal means of hearing and resolving historical grievances and claims resulting from colonisation, has also served to foreground the relation between culture, land and knowledge. This relation has been powerfully elaborated in a report *Ko Aotearoa tēnei* (2011), which looks beyond the claims process to the form of future relations between different conceptions of knowledge in the postmodern world order.

As the role of the arts and humanities has diminished in modern Western universities, so has the fundamental role of traditional or inherited knowledge in the sustaining of societies and their citizens through time diminished in general understanding as well as in policy thinking. Science developed as a knowledge system through its challenge to inherited authoritative knowledge about the natural order and through a positive and progressive relation to the formation of new knowledge, encouraging as it did so a future-oriented culture (marked, for example, by the development in the late nineteenth century of science fiction as a new narrative genre) based in universally valid rather than locally specific knowledge. Technoscientific knowledge is now assumed to be the defining attribute of culture in a progressive society like New Zealand. However, as a result of the recovery of the Treaty of Waitangi and its reassertion as a foundational element of

New Zealand's unwritten constitution, another body of traditional knowledge has been reaffirmed – matauranga Māori. As indigenous knowledge, in the context of the partnership between Māori and Pakeha cultures affirmed through the Treaty, traditional knowledge persists in the negotiations of knowledge policy (Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, (2014: 23) "Vision matauranga") like grit in the gears and draws attention to the politics embedded in the assumption that Western scientific knowledge is principally (if not exclusively) the knowledge of social and economic value.[4] [6] It is at the least a matter for ironical reflection that an endangered knowledge and the language in which it is properly known, that of the indigenous peoples of Aotearoa New Zealand, should be the means of keeping the importance of inherited knowledge and the institutions supporting its conservation, transmission and transformation in place in government policies, even if the traditional knowledge of European settlers is otherwise practically absent from the nation's research and innovation policies. It is primarily through teaching and scholarship (inside and outside the university) that the meaning and value of this knowledge is reconsidered and re-evaluated for each new generation.

Although there are governmental spaces for Pakeha traditional knowledge – heritage (artistic, historical, architectural and scenic) is probably the most inclusive concept, but New Zealanders' participation in the major wars of the twentieth century provides currently the most culturally unifying theme – this knowledge is allocated in the current government's priorities to national identity, not to economic transformation, a split characteristic of neoliberal social theory and the knowledge rankings which follow from it. In claiming a similarity between indigenous and settler knowledge traditions, I am nonetheless aware that such a claim is unlikely to be readily accepted. European culture in its imperial form, of which British settler culture is an instance, has typically asserted its superiority over indigenous cultures (including folk cultures in Europe) and has based that assertion on the combined outcomes of developments in the scientific, historical, aesthetic and moral dimensions of knowledge, collectively represented in the term civilisation and its technological enforcer. However, the drastic reduction in the later twentieth century of the grounds of this assertion to technoscientific knowledge, and the retreat of the academic version of inherited European

knowledge out of policy discourse and into the universities, makes another view worth entertaining.

The terms of such view are insightfully argued by Kuokkanen ((2007); see also White and Grice (2008) and essays in Bakker et al (2006), Smith and Jesson (2005)) in her eloquent case for a new settlement in the relations between Western and indigenous knowledges as those relations are currently represented in modern universities (a case which extends to governments as well). At first glance, her arguments are unhelpful because they include a trenchant case against liberal humanism as "complicit in the processes of colonisation" (19). By so firmly locating the humanities together with the rest of the knowledges which constitute the modern university and have participated in the European imperial project, Kuokkanen makes from another perspective a judgment similar to that made by Gibbons' et al in their succinct summation of the accommodation of the academic humanities to the scientific paradigm in the term scientification. In particular, her argument exposes the very difficult question whether there are knowledge universals deriving from enquiry into human cultures, as there are from scientific enquiry into nature. Her position, as that of postcolonial theory, is that cultural universals are a component in the claim to dominance of one group over another, a function of power relations, not of truth. She observes that the values of liberal humanism " - equity, individualism, rationalism, progress and democracy – are inherently problematic in that they run squarely counter to key principles of indigenous philosophies and world-views" (19). The terms of her argument which point in a direction pertinent to my analysis of the situation of the humanities derive from the striking conjunction which is established by two ratios: as Western knowledge is to indigenous knowledge, so science is to the humanities. The way in which she positions her argument is of particular importance, because she rejects a "return to precolonial indigenous practices [or] formulating action plans grounded in cultural authenticity, nationalism, or separatism" (24) as the basis for her case for a new relationship, just as I reject the possibility of achieving recognition by government of the critical role of the humanities in the postmodern knowledge society through a reassertion of traditional humanities disciplines. Instead, she argues that "the academy must [reconsider] the epistemological and ontological assumptions, structures and prejudices on which it has been founded" (125), if indigenous epistemes are to participate equally in the

work of the university through the "convergence of different epistemes" in a process of "conceptual transformation and ongoing epistemic engagement" (120). Engagement is premised on "the logic of the gift, which is characterized by commitment to and participation in reciprocal responsibilities. […] One is given a gift, which comes with a responsibility to recognize it – that is, not take it for granted – and to receive it according to certain responsibilities. When we understand the gift as an expression of responsibility towards the 'other', we foreground the law of hospitality" (127). Recognising the gift of indigenous knowledge requires recognising that "The world is not an abstraction or a location 'out there'; it is the concrete environment in which we find ourselves in our everyday lives and in whose processes we participate […] concepts can be understood in multiple, significantly different ways, depending on the lens through which we interpret them and on how we relate ourselves to the world" (119-120). By adopting the concept of the gift as the anchoring principle of a theory of knowledge relations, Kuokkanen inverts the current dominant paradigm[47] (which fully informs every aspect of current knowledge policy), which she describes as the "exchange paradigm, which is fuelled by self-interest, possessive individualism, and accumulation of profit (one form of which is cultural and intellectual capital). […] Today's logic of exchange is affecting the entire culture of learning, education, and academic freedom by limiting the possibility of engaging in the pursuit of knowledge. […] we should call the academy what it is: a corporation inhabited by privatised academics who manufacture a commodity called knowledge" (89). By locating her analysis in a theory of social relations in which the logic of the gift is the fundamental premise, Kuokkanen establishes the basis for a theory of knowledge work in which human purposes, values and differences, not the universals of nature, are the most important defining characteristic, and for a theory of knowledge institutions which is grounded in discursive equality, not the hegemony of one part of knowledge over all its other parts. The current academy as Kuokkanen perceives it from a position both inside and outside the institution is unsparingly condemned: "Academic discourses and practices are exploitative, hegemonic, asymmetrical, and patriarchal. […] Before indigenous epistemes can ever be recognized as an invaluable gift to intellectual inquiry and knowledge production, there will have to be nothing less than an overhaul of the value system that underpins today's academic structures and discourses" (88-89). The rigour of her critique is both

necessary and invigorating because it seeks to restore to knowledge work the values which liberal humanism espouses but which she sees, from her position in indigenous knowledge, to be complicit with a "dominant neo-colonial and neoliberal paradigm" (88).

However complicated the evolution of the relationship between the humanities and indigenous knowledges, it is clear that the sciences' break with traditional European knowledge was also a break with the humanities, and that in fundamental respects indigenous knowledge and the humanities are closely aligned. The ultimate source of the vitality of the humanities is local, from the deep well of human experience and embodied living in a specific place and time made conscious in thought and available to others through shared systems of representation. The most universal system is languages; the invention of writing brought about the invention of institutions for accumulating and storing objectified and depersonalised knowledge and disseminating it across time and space. Put another way, the embodied mind is a singular intersection of collective human knowledge, shaped by local social and personal memory, the grounding of identity in the local specifics of land(scape), built environment, familial relationships, life history, social and economic status, education, dominant institutions, ideologies, and modes of social and political governance. The invention of new knowledge is a collective, profoundly complex process in which no kind of knowledge, no social group, no intellectual system, should have any inherent priority.

3.3.6 The Commons of the Mind

Re-thinking the position of the humanities in the postmodern knowledge order requires a category/conception inclusive of all those objects (linguistic, mathematical, graphic, imagistic, musical, performative, architectural, technological) which are marked by signs and can communicate to (some) human interlocutors/interpreters. If the concepts of the semiosphere and I-space perform this inclusive function for thought, the most important division of semiotic space, its Mason and Dixon line, is now the division between private and public ownership of knowledge.

The social theory and value spectrum which derives from substituting the contemporary Western economy for a more complex account of human

societies places science, industry, and business into the category of private ownership, and the arts, humanities and education into the category of public ownership. While there is a large grey area where this distribution is ambiguous, for example, scientific research as a public good, the art market, cultural creation defined as creative industries, private education, media systems as channels for public communication and education, the present default model in Western (shareholder) societies is private ownership. The gift relationship argued for by Kuokkanen proposes, like analyses of the knowledge society proceeding from civil society or public good perspectives, to advance a model of knowledge creation and dissemination which is grounded in a social theory more inclusive than neoliberalism because it focuses on collective social interests which may have economic implications or effects but where this is not their main purpose. For the purposes of this study, it is education (as a social institution, a learned profession, a public responsibility, a transmitter of civic values across generations, and an area of enquiry) and not the economy which is taken to be the primary location of the knowledge work accomplished by the arts and humanities. The extension of this work into the political and values domain of social action is accomplished, on the one hand, by the media, and on the other, by civil society organisations.

The promotion of the concept of the knowledge economy as the core of a new, post-industrial economy occurred in step with the rapid deployment of digital and networked information and communications technologies, in the last two decades of the twentieth century. This development was complemented by the transfer of the ownership of media and telecommunications systems from the public to the private sector. As many writers have recognised (but many politicians have not), making information the new material for economic production in a context of increasing private control over access to information may serve private interests but has profoundly negative implications for the wider public interest, especially in all those aspects of democratic social and institutional development which are not contained within the bounds of the market economy, but on which the market economy depends for its vitality.

Consistent with the position that the medium is an integral component of a text, not a neutral vehicle for its content, and participates in meaning-

generation, the complex medium shift from print to digital information and communications technologies focused sharply many of the issues of concern to the humanities. As Lawrence Lessig (2001: 23) has noted, for example, the Internet is not just a technological product; it is an artefact informed by a design philosophy with the original aim of making possible "an innovation commons." Lessig's alarm at the erosion of open access to information on the Internet led him and others to an important invention, Creative Commons, an alternative to copyright which recognises and seeks to oppose a predominant political and institutional tendency towards the control of information (86), which is especially evident in the evolution and management of new information and communications technologies.[48] Against this tendency he affirmed the principle of open access, based on a conception of creativity and innovation which reflects the historical role of information in social development as a cultural resource: "in the digital world, all the stuff protected by copyright law is in one sense the same: It all depends fundamentally upon a rich and diverse public domain. Free content, in other words, is crucial to building and supporting new content" (50).

While this principle is gaining significant support among academics, researchers and research funders, research publications based on open access principles have been established[49], and procedures for open access to government information have been instituted[50], its implications for universities as publicly funded knowledge creators, and the modes of publication and distribution of their work, have yet to be fully addressed. Notably, the marginalizing of the humanities (because of their dependence on public research funding, and their exclusion from the science-technology-business nexus) is itself direct evidence of the recent shift in government policy both to limited economic conceptions of what constitutes knowledge of value and to the downgrading of the public domain in relation to the private sector. The traditional concern of the humanities with education for democratic citizenship, conservation and analysis of the contents of humanity's collective memory, and interpretation of aesthetic texts, are all functions of a mode of knowing which focuses on a society's self-understanding and the complex, public and open conversation by which this understanding is revised and elaborated.[51]

An early and very important instance of this challenge was the National Scholarly Communications Forum, a project led by the Australian Academy of the Humanities in collaboration with the National Library of Australia and Australian research libraries and involving all four Learned Academies, academics, publishers, and specialists in copyright and in digital technologies. Its first Roundtable was held in 1994, and it has continued to the present.[52] It exemplified Kranich's view that the "collaboration of institutions like libraries and universities remain[s] so vital to protecting, promoting, sustaining, and preserving newly emergent knowledge commons" (2007: 95) by providing a site where key institutions in the nation's knowledge system could challenge the business model of information as a profitable resource. A key text was John Houghton's "The Economics of Scholarly Communication"[53], which provided a powerful demonstration of the new imperialism of global media corporations and their appropriation of national and publicly funded knowledge assets through the acquisition of academic journal titles (Kranich, 2007: 88). It also illustrated the ease with which universities could become co-opted to serve these interests through the academic promotion system.

The term scholarly communication has become a key term in the development of knowledge commons concepts and practices in part because universities remain in a state of conflicted goals and purposes. On the one hand, they are still primarily publicly funded knowledge creating and transmitting institutions; on the other, they are under enormous pressure to conform to political and corporate conceptions of the economic value of (specific kinds of) knowledge. The communicational circuits within which new academic knowledge is formulated and exchanged, the forces which shape and prioritise them and the conflicting forms of valuation of knowledge work, reveal a great deal about the ways in which the meaning and purpose of research as the generation of new knowledge in all domains is being directed by private interests through public policies. But the same is true, of course, of the communicational circuits through which public knowledge of all kinds is disseminated. At its most general, the myriad conversations between members of a society, on which the very possibility of any society depends, and the openness of which is fundamental to the maintenance of a democratic society, have also become captured by the technological systems which facilitate their global circulation. Social media is now only the most obvious

example of this capture for corporate purposes; the surveillance state is another. While each new information and communications technology (ICT) providing a distance communication capability and therefore creating a record of the communication has generated new forms of surveillance and censorship in states troubled by the potential for innovation offered by communications technologies and free thought, digital networked technologies have made possible by democratic as well as authoritarian states the previously unimaginable global screening of human communication. Here, one might say, is the evil twin of the (digital) humanities; (machinic) analysis and interpretation of human communication and thought is conducted with the end of political and social control rather than the expansion of our knowledge and understanding of who and why we are as a species in this world.

The view in HUMANZ that the humanities function primarily as public good knowledge was a strong motive for taking the opportunity to lead the development of the Creative Commons Aotearoa New Zealand (CCANZ) licences. CCANZ has since become a focal point for creative work, notably in music and digital arts, the development of educational materials by teachers, access to cultural collections, and access to academic research through universities' digital repositories. But a critical, cultural question which this development raised was, Could these licences be applied to indigenous cultural and intellectual property? The then Ministry of Economic Development had published a report in 2007 aimed at providing advice to Māori about intellectual property law, but the writers also acknowledged the "inability of conventional IP rights systems to provide adequate protection for traditional knowledge, or to limit the use of traditional knowledge to the appropriate holders of that knowledge only" (2). Reports written by Terri Janke in Australia offered a very thorough investigation of the issues.[54] Just as the writing of the CCANZ licences had required confronting the embeddedness of the CC International licences in the culture and language of American law, so the core conceptions in New Zealand as in American IP law of originality and the individual property owner imposed a fundamental barrier to any simple adaptation of the CCANZ licences.[55] The fact that collective ownership of knowledge makes it very difficult to distinguish between cultural heritage and intellectual property points back to the inadequacy of Western conceptions[56], especially when the issue of public

ownership and the role of heritage institutions (to be discussed in Chapter 3) is considered. A full survey and consideration of the issues in an Aotearoa New Zealand context has been recently published as Chapter 1 of the report, *Ko Aotearoa Tenēi* by the Waitangi Tribunal[57], a report the significance of which for the future evolution of culture, research and knowledge creation in this country cannot be underestimated. An important framing of the discussion at this time in relation to creative arts was given by a Māori filmmaker, Barry Barclay, in his book on the concept of mana tuturu: "I felt it was important to have a Māori marker stone established in the English-language landscape, something which spoke up for another world. […] The mana tuturu principle will mean 'Māori spiritual guardianship'" (2005: 113-114). His emphasis on the gift relationship effected by a cultural object invokes the principles also advanced by Kuokkainen, acknowledging that the dominant culture's legal system and conceptions of ownership are not those of the indigenous culture occupying the same land: "We necessarily talk of rights, but the spirit of the mana tuturu agreement has much to do with generosity, with dignity for all parties, with sharing, and, yes, if you like, with exuberance and confidence" (135). Barclay contrasts this conception of an on-going connection between cultural works and persons who care for and about them, which sustains the gift relationship, with the situation of such works when the copyright term has expired; he thinks of "film images of individuals and their families" as then entering "that bleak hinterland called public domain" (116). By insisting that the vitality and value of a culture's knowledge is a function of its intimate and continuing connection with those who were its source, Barclay demonstrates how reductive it is to conceive of the work of knowledge creation as commodity production. He connects instead with a humanistic conception of the dependence of a culture's knowledge inheritance on the will and ability of its people to maintain its vitality by respectfully conserving, curating, re-experiencing and re-interpreting its texts.

The implicit value opposition in copyright is between new and old knowledge, respectively commercially valuable and commercially worthless, which can be made to, but does not properly, apply either in the humanities or in indigenous cultures. A different conception of the public domain to Barclay's has been advanced by Christopher Moore, but by way of declining this way of valuing out-of-copyright texts:

> The public domain is at its greatest potential when considered, not as the retirement home or dumping ground for old material, but as the raw resource for future productions. […] As the ability to access the public domain is removed by longer copyright duration, people lose access to their cultural heritage, both to works from the past and to those works to come in the future. […] A growing public domain not only increases the amount of uncontrolled and unregulated information that educators, scientists, creative artists and policy-makers can draw from and innovate on, it also reduces development costs and increases productivity. The strengths of the public domain are exponentially increased by digital and communications technologies, yet diminished by the extension of copyright. Without fixed and stable limits on copyright, costs to use copyrighted material will preclude the majority of innovative activity, and people are thus denied unrestricted access to the materials formed as part of their common culture (2005: 75).

The usual binary pair of time-delimited intellectual property and its ultimate residence in the public domain as either a wasteland or the repository of cultural heritage, the "negative of the private domain", (Dusollier, 2009: 7) is less helpful than it might seem, as Dusollier argues in a critique of the metaphor of the public domain by demonstrating that the boundaries between the realm of intellectual property and copyright, and the public domain, are not sharply demarcated; resources in the public domain can easily become intellectual property, and resources covered by an intellectual property right may also be freely usable in specific circumstances. Her concern, like Moore's, is the need "to counteract the pervasive diminution of the publicly available intellectual commons" (7), but to do this by understanding that "The evolution of the intellectual property regime shows that the public domain is not as much as [sic] an open territory from which some limited lands are grabbed to form islands of exclusivity than a way to allocate rights of access to intellectual resources, whether in the form of exclusive property or in the form of non-exclusive liberties" (14)[58]. This line of thought opens out on to an issue of considerable significance for much of my case for the humanities as knowledge perceived to lack economic value in current government policies. To turn this apparent negative to a positive by arguing that humanistic knowledge properly belongs to the public domain and is a

public good does not alter the balance of power because, as Dusollier argues, in this Western and not indigenous structure of relations, "nature, or the public domain, [is] private property to be" (11). Furthermore, traditional knowledge, the whole matter of *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei*, is particularly vulnerable to use (and abuse) because it falls outside the legal conventions governing intellectual property regimes. Dusollier concludes that "the (now global) regime of intellectual property denies the exclusivity to other forms of intellectual production, knowledge or cultural expression, not to promote a vibrant cultural, scientific and knowledge public domain, but to empower Western entrepreneurs to benefit from monopolies based on such primary materials, which they do not own originally" (14-15).[59]

Seen from the perspective of collective ownership and the conception of knowledge as heritage, the inadequacy of Western conceptions of intellectual property for understanding the work of knowledge in culture and the humanities as it is grounded in access to the past (which begins a nanosecond ago) is underlined, and the link with conceptions of indigenous knowledge is made more firmly. From the perspective of culture, the fundamental role of creativity and innovation is to bring the future into consciousness, which means placing a human direction on the course of time and human evolution, that is, continually creating history and society and, in the process, revealing more of humanity to-come. Because there are many knowledge cultures (not only in the form of academic discipline groupings within the expert system of the university but in communities based on shared knowledge in all reaches of society, local and global) a public policy for knowledge needs to provide an account of the diverse ways in which knowledge of all kinds is socially generative as it is diffused through a society by means of all the communication channels available to it.

4. Semiotic Objects and the Space of the Humanities

How many-dimensioned is the space of the humanities? A succinct idea was given in 2013 with the publication of four studies of the humanities. Rens Bod's *A New History of the Humanities. The Search for Principles and*

Patterns from Antiquity to the Present, provides an anchor for the others which at the same time confirms their difference of orientation and permits a larger point to be made about the critical importance of locality in the creation of thought in the humanities. Bod claims that his study is the first general history of the humanities while observing that, unlike the sciences, "there is no central humanities discipline on which all the other disciplines can be modelled." Furthermore, considering these disciplines across regions and in different periods (across cultures and languages, as well as times and places) leads to the recognition that "The contexts of these disciplines, as well as their concepts, can differ endlessly [but] there appear to be deep commonalities at the level of principles used and patterns found " (4-5). For this reason, Bod's history searches for these commonalities, also observing that actual interactions in humanistic thought between regions and periods are obscured both by confining analysis to the Western tradition, and the unavailability of many texts because they cannot be accessed or have not been translated. While he concludes that "The quest for principles and patterns in language, texts, music, art, and literature is of all times and places" (361), and that this should be the motive for a universal history, he also discovers that a pattern-rejecting tradition is ancient and widely distributed. This diversity, marked for example, by the "coexistence of mathematical modelling […] and subjective narration […] makes the humanities the most unlikely of all human doings" (362-363).

The framing perspective of Bod's work is European[60]. The other three studies which I will briefly notice confirm his core perception of the shaping importance of the different contexts (temporal, geopolitical, linguistic and cultural) in which academic work in the humanities is carried out. They are all written and published in Anglo-American jurisdictions (the United Kingdom – by a New Zealander, the United States of America, and Australia), and this fact of the authors' locations and their multi-national experience makes a real difference to the concerns and outcomes of each study. They instance the diversity of thinking which is generated by trying to face the problem presented by the utter marginalising of humanistic knowledge in democratic societies; taken together they provide a helpful contextualisation for my argument in this book.

Helen Small, *The Value of the Humanities*

The immediate context for this study is the requirement placed on the humanities by United Kingdom's government policies and university administrations to justify their continued funding by demonstrating their public value. Her book tests and seeks to clarify the arguments which can be used in "situations in which it is, obviously, necessary to respond to demands from government, and from university administrators who have to answer to government, that those who study and teach the humanities should be able to articulate the public value of their work: giving reasons why their subject area matters comparatively with other subject areas, and why it matters in its own right" (2). To do this, Small isolates five claims which are adduced commonly to make the case for the humanities: their mode of knowledge work is distinctive; their value should not be measured by their utility; they contribute to happiness; they underpin democracy; and they have value for their own sake. Her approach is based on identifying "genealogies of argument" and engages the work of English writers principally from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries who have mounted defences of humane letters. While significant changes in context for this defence have occurred – a good example is her recovery of a defence based on the humanities' contribution to happiness – there is also a strong sense of continuity which is manifested in both the book's mode of literate conversation and a sense that the humanities disciplines are stable, any case for "the humanities" in general being academically evaluated from a disciplinary perspective. She notes that the "democracy" claim is currently prominent but needs to be carefully qualified; on the positive side, the humanities contribution derives from being centrally concerned with "the cultural practices of reflection, argument, criticism, and speculative testing of ideas" (7). She concludes that this distinctive kind of intellectual labour does have public value even if it is currently unacknowledged in "the public conversation about matters of common interest" (174) and the "government-imposed requirements that public money should promote 'knowledge transfer', 'economic relevance', and 'impact' or social benefit" (15). This distinctive character is qualified by discipline differences, on one the hand, and national differences, on the other. Because of the single honours system in English universities, the term humanities "remains more of an American than an English term" (14) and traditions of defence in the two university systems, embedded as they are in different systems of government and funding, and different histories, are significantly different in orientation and emphasis (17-18)[61]. As well, "few

of us working in humanities departments seem to identify closely with the term 'humanist'" (24). Among all the issues Small considers, I was particularly interested in her treatment of the "two cultures" debates, which take the form of a binary opposition from classical times. The late phase is marked by a shift in the latter half of the twentieth century from social and class contexts for humanities scholarship (Leavis and Snow) to a professional context (Sokal and the *Social Text* collective) and an intemperate tone to the exchanges between the disputants. Rather than change anything, the debates' value lay in their engaging a wider public in matters of academic interest (36-38). For Small, advancing a case for the humanities based on a sharp distinction between two intellectual cultures would not be satisfactory because it would make antagonists of the social sciences (4), even though they are presented as having a "scientific wing" (57). Nonetheless, a claim for the distinctiveness of the humanities needs to be made and the most general form which it can take is: "The humanities study the meaning-making practices of human culture, past and present, focusing on interpretation and critical evaluation, primarily in terms of the individual response and with an ineliminable element of subjectivity" (57). This work is a "cultural good" (176) which must be preserved.

Toby Miller, *Blow Up the Humanities*

Miller's vigorous anatomising of the state of the humanities in the United States in the context of profound shifts in societies and economies globally leads to his proposing a new formation, a third humanities, which is to displace what he describes as the "banal Arnoldian training of Humanities One and the supine vocational training of Humanities Two" (a result of the massification of higher education and its class division between acquiring civilisation or employability) with "a blend of political economy, textual analysis, ethnography, and environmental studies such that students learn the materiality of how meaning is made, conveyed, and discarded" (105). The force of this argument derives from the double significance of modern media technologies: understanding the significance of the culturally productive relations between author, text, and reader has become much more complex with the development of new media technologies and their integration in digitally networked media; and the rapidly expanding economic role of cultural production in the creative industries, together with the cultural diversification of nation-states under economic globalisation, has utterly

changed the conditions for humanities knowledge work. This line of thought leads Miller to two conclusions: that the humanities must engage with the world in which their materials and students circulate, and that this engagement is necessarily political. Cultural studies as a "tendency" rather than a discipline (107-108), and media studies rather than history or literature as the core of humanities study, locate the constituent parts of a third humanities. As he writes in conclusion, "Here is the future for the humanities: comprehensive, omnibus survey courses about how meaning is made, circulated and received in all media – running across science, capital, fiction, sport, news, history and politics" (122).

Challenging (the) Humanities ed Tony Bennett Australian Academy for the Humanities Occasional Paper No.? (Canberra, 2013)

In his introduction to this collection of papers given at the 2012 Symposium of the Australian Academy of the Humanities, Tony Bennett defines the focus of the Symposium as "a set of issues which […] have their origin in debates that are likely to have longer term consequences in reconfiguring the intellectual landscapes both within humanities disciplines, and between those disciplines and other knowledge clusters" (xi). Its most immediate point of local reference is the 1991 Symposium, *Beyond the Disciplines. The New Humanities*, which provides a means by which the developing challenge of new intellectual formations to the foundational conceptions of the humanities can be identified. These challenges are "presented by the posthuman and material 'turns' that are now in evidence across the social sciences and the humanities" (xii). A striking consequence of this double perspective – a previous Australian symposium, and intellectual formations which, if they do not typically have an (inter)national origin, are not specific either to the humanities or to Australian intellectual culture – is a volume in which groups of papers consider conceptual problems generated by these "turns" using typically Australian settings and problems. Two concerning indigeneity are located with some symbolic force at the centre of the collection, marking how concepts formed internationally are contextualised and their significance elaborated by their passage through local settings and specific histories. In principle, nothing at either end of this interchange remains unaffected by it; and, as Bennett observes, not least the "values and dispositions" which inform the practices and subject formation of academic humanists (xxv).

Each of these studies sought to understand the present complexities facing the humanities by providing ways of thinking which locate the issues in national or regional contexts and as they are shaped by cultural and historical differences. My own argument to this point has sought to establish some parameters for defining the scope of the domain of a new humanities as constituted by a particular kind of objects which are in themselves worlds, are multiply linked to other worlds, and move through social space in unpredictable ways, from the most public and open to the most specialised and closed institutional and personal contexts of interaction. If the objects of scientific enquiry are everything that makes up the physical or given world, about and from which knowledge is derived (and including human modifications of and additions to that world), the objects of humanities enquiry are semiotic objects composed with any sign system, form and media technology or any combination of them and in their totality constituting the semiosphere. If the given world is not unique to humanity, the semiosphere is: as Brier affirms, among humans, "signs are organized into language through social self-conscious communication. Accordingly, our social universe is organized as and through texts" (2008: 100).

It has become conventional to equate the humanities with academic humanities, because it is only in the university that this form of knowledge is now readily distinguishable. But it is important to recollect the distinguishing qualities of humanistic knowledge in the world at large: diffusive and accumulative, as the HUMANZ Research Policy 1996 defined them, and made of the same stuff as the objects providing the material for thought. It is also important to be more specific about some of the critical features of semiotic objects in order to clarify the implications of the difference of the humanities to the technosciences in the universal human process of knowledge creation, and to transcend the limits of the account offered by implication by the conventional disciplinary array of kinds of knowledge currently representing the work of the academic humanities. The terms to be discussed further here are Text, Languages and Translation, Medium, Writing, and Reading.

4.1 Text

Texts are artefacts, intentional, social and technological objects composed from the matter of sign systems and media forms and shaped by their institutional and cultural context of composition and their communicative purpose. Brier puts the issue in a way which emphasises their human origin: "Manifest cultural objects are not real in the way natural objects are – they are fictional. This goes for works of art and the architecture of buildings and machines, although the parts they consist of are natural objects or 'matter'" (Brier, 2008: 139). Because the term text is still generally associated with print forms and their virtual instantiations, on the one hand, and with texts having a primary reference to actuality (a legal or historical document, a documentary film, etc.) I am using the term text as the most inclusive term for all the kinds of semiotic objects (the material objects constituting the semiosphere), whatever the medium, language or system of signs in which they are composed and disseminated and whatever their purpose.[62] Not that the term is uncomplicated; in its conventional use it refers to the primarily alphanumeric component of a semiotic object, its "content". What is at stake here is nothing less than a very long tradition in Western thought, in which truth, to be mentally apprehended as such, had to be separated from its material vehicle. Furthermore, what particularly matters here is the recognition that the medium in which information is instantiated is not a neutral channel but is intrinsic to the meaning of that information.[63] To regard the vehicle as an integral or formative component of the knowledge/truth it conveys transforms the significance of the medium in thinking about the creation and circulation of knowledge, notably because it recognises that there is no access to or conservation of knowledge except by means of a media technology, a human invention the design of which is infused with human characteristics, qualities and values. This position includes science, in the texts of which the multiple meanings and forms characteristic of the social uses of communicational media have to be rigorously suppressed if the exactness of scientific knowledge is to be preserved.

Each text occurs at a multi-dimensional intersection: there is the totality of the semiosphere; the totality of the given world; the time-space specifics (historical, cultural, geo-political, socio-economic) of the locality in which the text is composed; the singularity of the person or collectivity writing or reading it. McGann thinks in terms of the textual field; textual space is characterised as n-dimensional, a "multivariate manifold" (2001, 179):

“although the formal structure of pagespace is planar and two-dimensional, the forms of pagespace can be made to generate themselves through n-dimensional orders” (149). What a new text instantiates extends the boundaries of the semiosphere in however imperceptible a way; it may configure relations between elements of the given world such that their meaning in culture is modified or disrupted; it may alter the possibilities for thought in a specific time and place, or in many disjoined times and places; it may alter how the singularity of the person or collectivity composing it is conceived by them and/or by those encountering the text.

Each text is, to some degree and unpredictably, an agent of change. As a new object in the semiosphere, a text may be the means to generate new physical objects, whether in nature (for example, biotechnology, nanotechnology) or in society (for example, architecture, media technology, fashion). But, of course, a text may also serve a conservative purpose, aiming to reproduce, entrench or highlight valued components of existing knowledge. Even with this deliberate purpose, however, such a text will still be marked by the temporal, locational, cultural and personal contexts of its composition, all of which will be modified as it enters the different situations of its readers.

Lotman defines a text as “an isolated, self-contained semiotic function, with its integral indivisible meaning and its integral indivisible function” (47) and identifies three functions of texts: a creative function; meaning-generation; and recollection[64]. The second refers to the inseparability of language from the content it expresses, language being both medium and sign, so that meaning is not just transferred from writer to reader in the process of communication but is actively generated in that process; the first understands a creative act through the instance of translation, in which the many versions of a translated text are possible interpretations of it and not precise equivalents, so that the translation is a new text generating new meanings as a consequence of its asymmetry with its original; and, a text is a conserver of some part of a culture’s collective memory: “the sum of the contexts in which a text acquires interpretation and which are in a way incorporated into it may be termed a text’s memory” (13-18). Lotman offers a brilliant metaphor summarising this conception of a text: “a text, like a grain of wheat which contains within itself the programme of its future development, is not something given once and for all and never changing. The inner and as yet

unfinalized determinacy of its structure provides a reservoir of dynamism when influenced by contacts with new contents" (2008: 18). Another metaphor, from the beginnings of the modern period, uses the same instance of the seed, but also makes explicit both the aspect of the medium and the text's existence through time as integral to its cultural function. In *The Advancement of Learning* (1604), Bacon brings into the foreground the profound alteration of time-space relations which is accomplished by the preservation of books, comparing printed thought to seeds and printing to a transport technology:

> The images of men's wits and knowledges remain in books, exempted from the wrong of time and capable of perpetual renovation. Neither are they fitly to be called images, because they generate still, and cast their seeds in the mind of others, provoking and causing infinite actions and opinions in succeeding ages. So that if the invention of the ship was thought so noble, which carrieth riches and commodities from place to place, and consociateth the most remote regions in participation of their fruits, how much more are letters to be magnified, which as ships pass though the vast seas of time, and make ages so distant to participate in the wisdom, illuminations, and inventions, the one of the other? (1974: 58-59 (I. viii. 6)).

While thinking about texts is likely to bring with it implicitly the mental model of a print book, because that has been the most intensively evolved form for the communication of formal knowledge since print technology was invented[65], it is important to have in mind the generality of Lotman's definition quoted above. Every semiotic object in the semiosphere, using whatever combination of sign systems and media forms, is a text. It is only recently that texts produced outside of elite culture and in twentieth century mass media, and texts disruptive of established conventions of textuality, have become objects of analysis in the humanities, and it is even more recently that the new media forms of digitally networked communication (including txts, blogs, social media, e-literature, massively multiplayer on-line games, wikipedia) have become recognised not only as generative components of the semiosphere but as objects for investigation by humanists. The social sciences have typically led the way in the analysis of mass and

new media, as witnessed by the development of Communication and Media Studies, and have in the process widened the terms of thought about the complexity of factors bearing upon the analysis and interpretation of texts, and hence upon any enquiry into what it means to be human, or the idea of humanity. Here, in a nutshell, is the reason why the space of the humanities has expanded enormously, and why a new humanities capable of engaging analytically with this extraordinary efflorescence of textuality is needed.

The humanities come into existence together with the development of textual objects for objectively recording knowledge otherwise recorded by individual memories and collectively in a spoken language and cultural artefacts. It is only when that knowledge can be fixed in a material form that the humanities, as knowledge created from the deliberated analysis and interpretation of humanity's accumulated learning about themselves and their world, can begin to develop.

4.2 Languages and Translation

I propose to take as axioms two statements by Brier about language: "Language is at the very core of human existence" (2008: 50); and, more contentiously because of its metaphor, "Human beings are linguistic cyborgs, in that we are natural beings programmed by culture through language and therefore very much cultural products" (408). In order to fill out the implications of these propositions, I will quote a later formulation which brings together succinctly and in one place the relations in thought which go to the heart of the enterprise of the humanities:

> As human observers we find ourselves in language and therefore in intersubjectivity with other linguistic beings. We do not have to postulate the other(s) after becoming aware of ourselves, because they are prerequisites for our becoming aware as linguistic self-conscious beings. We live in language, so to speak, and take it with us wherever we go. We cannot speak of being without knowing: if we exist but don't know, our existence doesn't matter. When becoming becomes aware in language it reflects on what it itself is and it realizes that it never becomes aware alone but only as a process embodied in flesh and language with others; this is

> fundamental to the definition of what it means to be human. Reality in the form of semiotic objects such as the other, language, culture and society, is established in the process of becoming aware (2013: 247).

One might say that every text in the semiosphere, however canonical or mundane, truth-claiming or self-presenting, is an instance of this human process of establishing reality from a position in language, society and culture. This unequivocally human ground of knowing and the kinds of expertise proper to its investigation is what authorises a claim in the humanities to create knowledge of value from the objects of the semiosphere (including the sciences as one domain), knowledge aimed at enlarging humanity's idea of itself.

Creating such knowledge does not resolve the unresolvable plurality of human individuals, texts, languages, and cultures, which is the ground for the possibility of on-going innovations in thought and in reality. For this reason, taking as axiomatic the foundational importance of language to the formation of knowledge means also highlighting the importance of translation as an integral function in humanities knowledge work in two respects: the ability of an interpreter to read among texts in different languages, and the status of a text read in translation.

Lotman's reference to the asymmetry between versions of a text in translation implies that, at least in a university context, the plurality of languages must be as much emphasised in the constitution of the postmodern university's work as the plurality of cultures must be. Kuokkanen's critique of the modern Western university from the marginal position of indigenous knowledge also points clearly in this direction, as does the globally important case for language as a taonga (treasure) of a culture and its people which is made in relation, for example, to the Māori language in *Ko Aotearoa Tenei* (Vol.2, Ch. 5).

The ancient story of the Tower of Babel provides a succinct entry into this fundamental question of the multiplicity of languages, since it usually sustains the moral that the multiplicity of languages is a punishment for pride in the power of the human mind and the knowledge it can create, and brings disorder and confusion into knowledge work. To multiply languages is to

frustrate communication and hence limit human power. A different conception of linguistic diversity, directly challenging this interpretation, is offered in a UNESCO report which focuses on the intimate relation between languages in their cultural environments and local contexts and emphasises the importance of "the tendency of languages to split into dialects. […] they evolve ceaselessly and constantly adapt to their environments", affirming that "no language is inherently 'superior' to another; each performs its role in a specific cultural, economic, social, ecological and political context and each describes in its own particular way a different environment" (Mayor, 2001: 341, 339-40, 342). Another interpretation of the Tower of Babel, in Neal Stephenson's novel *Snow Crash*, argues that the outcome of the judgment is positive because a multiplicity of languages prevents anyone (notably, in this novel, a media corporation) from achieving total control over human communication and information (1992: 202-203, 369-376). A third interpretation is offered by Terry Cutler: "An unintended consequence of the destruction of the Tower of Babel is the creation of diversity. And diversity is widely recognised as a pre-condition for creativity and innovation" (2008: 28).

There are many examples of the fact of linguistic diversity and its social and cultural implications, including the need for translation, but I will give several here because it is important to underline the claim that just as the search for a common language is complementary to pursuit of universally true knowledge (as suppression of minority languages is complementary to most imperial regimes and nation states controlled by a dominant ethnic group), so the link between locality and language evolution is, like the link between locality and biodiversity, critical to the generativity and adaptability of cultures and societies.

I have previously referred to the Treaty of Waitangi. This document, accepted as establishing the basis on which indigenous and settler populations in the territory of Aotearoa New Zealand can conduct their relations with one another, exists in two languages, Māori and English. All interpretation of the document in law and politics has to deal with the always incommensurate nature of the two texts, a situation which requires political negotiation over the meaning of this founding document because translation by itself does not remove the difference in fundamental concepts informing the customary and

common law systems, the cultural principles which they enshrine, and hence its interpretation, especially in contexts remote from its composition. The point is made succinctly at the beginning of *Ko Aotearoa Tenei*. The Letter communicating the report to the relevant Minsters of the Crown from the Presiding Officer, Justice J. V. Williams, states that "We have called this report Ko Aotearoa Tenei – meaning either 'This is Aotearoa' or 'This is New Zealand', or both. The ambiguity is intentional: a reminder, if one is needed, that Aotearoa and New Zealand must be able to co-exist in the same space" (xxiii). As the report notes, the extent to which this co-existence is a reality is a direct function of the relation between the two founding languages: "Fundamentally, there is a need for a mindset shift away from the pervasive assumption that the Crown is Pākehā, English-speaking, and distinct from Māori rather than representative of them. Increasingly, in the twenty-first century, the Crown is also Māori. […] The idea of the Crown speaking Māori is of course not novel; by necessity, this was the status quo for a large proportion of New Zealand's colonial past" (Vol. 1, 451). Another elaborated example of the real implications of translation in the context of asymmetry in cultures and histories is the discussion of rights over knowledge (Vol. 2, 78-79), which extends my earlier discussion of indigenous knowledge and the commons.

Another perspective on the linguistic and cultural interface between colonised and coloniser is given by Charles Bernstein, whose work *The Attack of the Difficult Poem*s I will take up in Chapter Five. He refers at one point to a translation into English from Spanish of Mapuche poetry, the original language of which is Mapudungun, and regards the volume, which presents the poems in all three languages, as an example of a crossroads, a place of encounter between different languages, cultures and histories out of which the "always plural" and syncretic identity of the Americas is continuously created, no one language being able to claim or being granted sovereignty over the others (2011: 68-70). A complementary example is Hofstadter's and Sander's study, *Surfaces and Essences. Analogy as the Fuel and Fire of Thinking*. This collaborative project about analogy as "thought's core" (2013: 18) was realised in two original texts, one in French and one in English, the result of "back-and-forth exchanges between two languages", otherwise expressed as going "around the bilingual, bicultural, bicerebral loop" (x). An extended discussion of translation in Chapter 6

demonstrates the general proposition that "*Genuine* translation – translation that merits the label 'translation' – is indeed about analogy-making at all levels imaginable, from the most miniscule grammatical ending of a word to the entire overarching cultural context in which the text and events and notions of which it speaks are embedded" (376). One example discussed in detail is the use of a reference to the Paris Metro in the first chapter, intended to locate the text in a familiar setting for a French reader; to create the same sense of familiarity for an American reader, the English version refers to an airport, not to the New York subway. So, reading one version of the book is to read the outcome of a study which could not only not avoid the differences carried by the two primary languages and cultural locations of the authors, but is enlarged by them. For a reader fluent in both languages, the outcome of this project will be richer than for a reader able to access only one of the versions; however much each version works to keep its reader in mind of the bi-lingual and bi-cultural context of the study, it will inevitably communicate its results within the terms of the cultural and knowledge framing brought to it by its reader. This does not falsify or render the work in either version less true or valid, just different. The same point is relevant to my later use of Badiou's writings, the translation of which is extensively discussed in forewords to the translations. Like any reading, the result is both a translation and an interpretation of his texts, a process which extends and modifies their possible meanings as they travel from their context of composition to their contexts of reception. A particular instance from his work is his use of his own translations of Greek originals.[66] One further perspective is offered by *Le Monde Diplomatique,* which is now published in 20 languages. In one respect, this is a remarkable recognition of some facts of globalisation: that "the news" and news media are global in scope and dissemination but there is not one common language in which the news can be disseminated to everyone. As I have noted above, the news in each edition cannot be "the same" since it will be interpreted into the cultural framing of the world each language effects.

In each of the instances I have mentioned, the linguistically complex and hybrid situation of the majority of the world's population who are not native speakers of a world language like English, and who are required to be linguistically mobile if they wish to relocate outside their native language domain, is normally disguised from native speakers of a world language.

Ironically, an article on translation, acknowledging the now common use of machine-assisted translation, in the context of a review of the *Dictionary of Untranslatables: a Philosophical Lexicon* (2004, English trans. 2014), includes a quotation from an Oxford Professor of Philosophy of Argentinian origin arguing that "All research in philosophy should be published in English, even research in philosophical traditions that are not represented in English. […] having a unique philosophy language (English) will make it easier for a fertile interaction between different philosophical traditions" (Miller, 2014: 16). A new humanities riposte might be that accepting the difference of different languages and thinking and writing with and between them would be the more fertile approach.

4.3 Medium and Materiality

The field of enquiry we know as the (modern) humanities came into existence together with the invention of printing as a new ICT, and has evolved in association with the techniques of printing, the design of print objects, new conceptions of authorship and the invention of institutions established to manage the productivity of printing and the creation of knowledge. Among the most highly evolved print forms are the scholarly monograph (the mind of the author shaping a diversity of interpretations and evidence in a field of enquiry into a large-scale, internally coherent argument and making that field present to the reader through footnotes and bibliography), and the novel (a large scale narrative generating an imagined world).

The difference the medium makes is succinctly defined by Mark Poster: "Each method of preserving and transmitting information profoundly intervenes in the network of relations that constitute a society" (1990: 7). His point is that everything to do with how we understand ourselves, how we relate to others in society, how we think about knowledge, how we design our institutions, is disrupted and reframed when a new information and communications technology is introduced. With respect to digital media technologies, David Porush (2007: 151-152) argues that "if humans have evolved at all since we have been aware of ourselves as humans, it is largely because of the development of communications media and technologies: language itself, then writing, the printing press, telegraph, telephone, the networked computer, immersive 3D sensory simulation, the consensual

hallucination predicted in William Gibson's 1984 nightmare of cyberspace *Neuromancer*. […] the most dramatic evolutionary push comes [from] the cybernetic gear that alter our cognition, namely, the communications technologies that mediate and activate the feedback loop between culture and cognition, moulding the plastic human brain to our artificial information environments: the 3Cs loop among Culture, Cognition, and Communications Technologies." Both of these writers understand information and communications technologies as active agents in human evolution, without arguing that they necessarily determine that evolution. Technologies are, after all, designed by humans according to human purposes and conceptions; their effects are a consequence of human agency even if it is concealed by the apparent independence of the machine, and unintended or unanticipated by their designers.[67]

Digital and networked ICTs produce new kinds of text, as did the analogue media of the first half of the twentieth century. Photography, radio, recorded music, film, and television developed their own disciplines and archival institutions which were functionally related to the media technologies and business models which enabled the production and distribution of their texts, partly because the traditional humanities were slow to recognise the new kinds of texts as just as integral to their work as the print texts on which they were founded. With digital ICTs the challenge to the traditional humanities becomes even greater. To state the obvious, every kind of text in any medium is capable of digital representation.

It is only with the arrival of a new cognitive technology that what has become habitual and taken for granted in the use of a predecessor technology becomes apparent. Hence, several hundred years of increasingly extensive habituation to informational objects produced by print technology, from the earliest childhood literacy to the most sophisticated intellectual work, served to render the technological aspect invisible, so completely naturalised or internalised in cognitive behaviour did its defining features become (at least for those who achieved some mastery). As Silvio Gaggi (1997: 111) has written, "A conventional book creates the illusion that at the moment of its being read a single author addresses a single reader. In electronic networks no single author addresses any single reader, or, if one does, their exchange emerges from and immediately re-enters a broader context of multiple

speakers and listeners. There is a polyphony of voices, and the authority of each of them is continually qualified by their mutually commenting on one another."[68] National histories of the book or, more inclusively, the history of print culture, are recent new fields of enquiry in the history of media technologies, made inevitable (even if still on the margins of humanistic scholarship), by the advent of digital ICTs. But there is also the question of humanities scholarship itself. What happens to literary interpretation, historical and philosophical analysis, conventions of evidence and conduct of argument, forms of scholarly dissemination, and modes of engagement with readers, when its digital medium uses a different rhetoric than the work of reason as it is represented by the traditional scholarly monograph?[69] New media forms also challenge readers' expectation of how a novel or a work of humanities scholarship may be written and published, when these expectations have been formed in accordance with the cultural and intellectual purposes served by the traditional format.

A good example is provided by the most rigorous field in the modern humanities, bibliography. By bringing the science of the description and classification of manuscript and print texts into contact with the business of printing and then media evolution, D F McKenzie extended bibliography at first into the social and institutional practices of printing and publishing (the "mechanisms" of the printing house and the market) and then to the inclusion of post-print media texts, on the one hand, and the relation between performed and print versions of texts composed for the theatre, on the other. In the latter case, consideration of the different textual identities of a play as staged, as a printed script, and as a work in a collection of an author's works, opens on to a conception of the difference of versions as a function of the social context of performance or publication. In his 1985 Panizzi lectures, McKenzie argued for a radical extension of the discipline from its foundations in print textuality to embrace the whole spectrum of media forms, complementary to the development of cultural history and of critical changes in the work of libraries and archives in response to new media technologies, analogue and digital.[70] His most radical extension, that "the land – not even its representation on a map, but the land itself - might be a text" (1986: 31) was more fully worked out in his paper on the Treaty of Waitangi and the significance of the signatures of Māori chiefs to that document.[71]

In order to bring this widened scope within a disciplined concept, McKenzie offered the following definition: "bibliography is the discipline that studies texts as recorded forms, and the processes of their transmission, including their production and reception" (4). Bibliography, understood in this way, is clearly the name for the fundamental theory and method of the new humanities, since it concerns everything that has been comprehended by the traditional humanities disciplines, and is now by media and cultural studies. It is founded on a theory of the text as a physical object (45), inclusive of all media forms and hence embracing the totality of the semiosphere: it is "committed to the description of all recorded texts. In principle, it is comprehensive, and indiscriminate" (51), and therefore concerns itself with the founding evidence for any discipline analysing and interpreting a society's cultural production. It requires a conception of both the uniqueness of each text as a function of the specifics of its origin – author, time, place, media technology, institution, audience – and its evolutionary relationship to other texts, those preceding it, those providing its immediate context, and those with which it will engage through future readers and writers. This double conception is critical for grounding the cultural historical work of investigating meaning: as a "locatable, describable, attributable, datable and explicable object, the text as a recorded form is, pre-eminently, a bibliographical fact"; but also, a text is "always incomplete, and therefore open, unstable, subject to a perpetual re-making by its readers, performers, or audience" (45). Put more strongly, "the ostensible unity of any one 'contained' text – be it in the shape of a manuscript, book, map, film, or computer-stored file – is an illusion" (50), the theatre providing a specific instance which supports the view that "texts are perhaps best seen, not as fixed, determined artefacts in a specific medium, but as potential" (41).

Although the textual examples McKenzie discusses to support his claims for bibliography are taken mostly from literature, and hence have authors, there is nothing in his general theory which requires a single author origin for a text, or that a text should have high cultural value. As he observed, addressing bibliographically the diversity of textual objects produced by printing exposes one to "the full range of social realities which the medium of print had to serve, from receipt blanks to bibles" and requires consideration of "the human motives and intentions which texts involve at every stage of their production, transmission and consumption. It alerts us to

the role of institutions, and their own complex structures, in affecting the forms of social discourse, past and present" (6-7).

McKenzie's expansion of the scope of bibliography to include all text objects, whether those of interest to the traditional academic humanities, or media studies, or the totality of cultural production which in principle is the scope of cultural studies, has been further elaborated with the publication of Kirschenbaum's *Mechanisms. New Media and the Forensic Imagination* which reframes bibliography as a science of the digital or electronic text. If one of McKenzie's achievements was to analyse the complex role of the printing house in the final form of a print text, Kirschenbaum does the same for the role of the computer in text production. In his preface to his book he refers to "the complex nature of transmission and inscription in digital settings […] our current theories and points of reference for reckoning with electronic textuality were inadequate when parsed against what I had come to understand as the material matrix governing writing and inscription in all forms: erasure, variability, repeatability, and survivability" (2008: xii-xiii). It is hard to underestimate the importance of this conception of the "material matrix"; within the axes of the I-space the four terms constituting the matrix magnify the variable effects of time on any text and provide analytical concepts precisely adjusted to the distinctive characteristics of texts as physical objects existing in and through material and social spaces and times.

While "textual studies should be regarded as among the most sophisticated branches of media studies we have evolved", he notes that "textual critics have tended to treat the computer mainly as a platform-independent venue for studying the artifacts of *other* media" (16). By contrast, he affirms that, in general, "All media are bound to the materialities of their particular forms […] all media remain part of a social, political, and economic landscape whose shifting contours resist any attempt at erosion through the mere rhetorical invocation of homogenous zones of ones and zeroes" (106).[72] For an electronic text, these materialities include the recording medium, software, and its screen representation (3), and the need to engage with these aspects of a digital text is fully explored in case studies of three texts, including Michael Joyce's *Afternoon* and its complex version history, and William Gibson's poem *Agrippa*.

Kirschenbaum proposes two analytical dimensions for text analysis, which roughly parallel McKenzie's pair of medium and form, forensic and formal materiality. He locates his introduction of the term "forensic" in a cultural and technological history, on the grounds that "as a legal and scientific enterprise forensic examination has its origins in the same nineteenth-century era that produced the great inscribing engines of modernity – the gramophone, film, and the typewriter among them". Forensics is "a signature discourse network of modernity at the juncture of instrumentation, inscription, and identification" (250), and it "rests upon the principle of individuation […] the idea that no two things in the physical world are ever exactly alike" (10). Furthermore, "electronic textuality is almost always automated textuality – which is to say that most of the textual events in a modern operating system, or network, occur without the impetus of human agency" (83).

A fundamental strand in the development of thinking about textuality indicated here is emphasis upon the materiality of a text as a source of its difference from other texts, including from itself when "it" is published in more than one medium, and the increasing mechanising of writing and transmission processes. Instead of separating content from vehicle, as though the medium were only a neutral channel or surface by means of which informational content is transported to a recipient, and so replicating the traditional mind/body distinction in conceptions of the human, bibliographical theory and practice as exemplified here by McKenzie and Kirschenbaum provides for a much fuller and more responsive account of the generation of the momentary meaning of a text by taking into account as constituent factors in its potential meaning the technological, cultural, social, ideological, economic, institutional, political, and media contexts of its production and reception. However widely the boundaries of the term bibliography may be extended, it still turns back to its origin in the medium of printing and the form of the book; a new humanities needs a new term for its foundational theory.

Humanities scholars who have addressed the implications of medium shifts have produced powerful insights into the relation between knowledge creation, media forms and institutional practices. A directly relevant instance is the work of David Jay Bolter and others in both theorising the implications

of digital technologies for knowledge work and the new kinds of text which the new technologies could make possible, and creating software which enabled their theorising to be explored in practice. Out of this work came innovative authoring software, Storyspace, for the writing and reading of e-literature, with a full historical and theoretical context in *Writing Space* and a publishing enterprise, Eastgate Systems[73], which made available new literary compositions to a readership interested in the potential for literature of the new digital technologies as writing and reading machines.

To digitise a print text and re-present it on a computer screen is not just a different instantiation of the same text, but it is a process of translation for which Bolter and Grusin invented the term remediation. It was formulated to account for the persistence of previous media forms in new media environments, one example being the creation of digital editions of print texts. It is not that one medium simply replaces another, the medium being an indifferent factor; instead, what needs to be attended to is "the cycling of different media through one another" (1999: 5). Hayles states succinctly a critical consequence of interaction between media forms: "To change the material artifact is to transform the context and circumstances for interacting with the words, which inevitably changes the meaning of the words as well" (2002: 23-24). The most important differences are the ways in which information (that is, semiotic materials) can be structured and combined digitally and texts in different media can be brought into close association in a computing environment, which Gaggi describes as "a horizonless conceptual space" (1997: 111) in which "small t" texts are nodes in a network or "capital T" Text and relations between texts and readers are constituted as much or more by the characteristics of the network as they are by the writer's intention to create and communicate meaning and the formal structuring and categorising of a particular text.

The concept of remediation does not only apply to the shift from print to digital; it also highlights aspects of print texts which have been previously overlooked. As Hayles argues, "By and large literary critics have been content to see literature as immaterial verbal constructions, relegating to the specialized fields of bibliography, manuscript culture, and book production the rigorous study of the materiality of literary artifacts." (2002: 19). A striking example is a text book in media philosophy by Mark Taylor and Esa

Saarinen, *Imagologies*. This extraordinary book materialised an experiment in distance teaching between Finland and the United States, in which the media of communication, representation and instruction were analysed by engaging theory with textual and communicational practice. At the heart of the experiment were the screen and the sign, the page openings of the book being treated as white screen spaces (interfaces) inscribed with black verbal and visual signs, using font variations, unusual alignments of words and paragraphs in the page space, and shifts in register from theory to conversational exchange.[74] Each opening presented a challenge to its readers to make sense of arrays of signs whose unconventional arrangements themselves were a critique of modern academic conventions of argumentative form and rational enquiry, as they were of televisual and computational screen conventions of representation and narration. A crucial concept in the book's creation was the importance of design in visual and digital media; the book was designed by a designer for Marimekko, Marjaana Verta.



Dear Esa,

A significant shift occurred in today's seminar. With their effort to enact telewriting, Dana and Joel entered the space of performance. In the exchange they staged, writing became speech as speech became writing. The result was a performative utterance completely different from what past philosophers have envisioned. The classical constantive/performative distinction, which reflects print technology, collapses in telewriting. In cyberspace, performance becomes unavoidable and constantive reference impossible. What Dana and Joel were saying without knowing it is that speech act theory is over.

November 4, 1992

Post-hermeneutical reading shifts from an economy of production (author) to an economy of consumption (reader). In simcult, the challenge of writing is to write a consumable text. Such a work is not simply a repackaging of an older commodity but is the creation of a different kind of text. In this new writing space, the author is not the sole producer, for the consumer becomes a co-author whose reading is a rewriting.

A book

for the media age must be written to be read in a way similar to the manner in which we listen. Writing, therefore, must become sampling and reading lip-syncing.

In the space of telewriting, every reader is a flaneur who is free to explore in a peripatetic fashion. Walter Benjamin would have felt at home in the hypertext precisely because in this medium, he could never feel at home.

Unlike print technology, telewriting discourages uniformity: letters, pages, columns, spacing can be changed and modified ad infinitum. Writing and design are no longer separate activities but become different moments in a single creative process. Grapheme and icon enter into an entirely new relationship. In textual play, writing becomes drawing and painting, and drawing and painting become scripture.

I fantasize about writing an essay on the changing technology of erasing. As writing instruments change from chisel, stylus, pen and pencil to typewriter, punch card, word processor and "mystic" pad, the means of erasing are transformed. In this case, "progress" is easy to chart. As technology improves, the trace of erasure becomes even more invisible. What is left when electronic writing is erased? It is precisely the perfection of electronic erasure that makes this form of script so unsettling.

Illustration 4: Taylor and Saarinen, 1994: telewriting, 10.

If *Imagologies* remediates the form and purpose of the academic book in the context of twentieth century media technological evolution and the challenges to media conventions in twentieth century art and philosophy, to follow the publishing history of an electronic novel like Joyce's *Afternoon* (1989 –) is to follow the various materialisations of digital technology as its publication media (which were also storage devices) evolved from disks to the web.[75] As Kirschenbaum demonstrates in his discussion of *Afternoon*, software as well as hardware are significant factors. Joyce was a co-author of the authoring software, Storyspace, with which he wrote *Afternoon*: "Storyspace has its own version history, separate and distinct from that of *Afternoon*. Its stability in turn depends upon that of the Macintosh operating system" (2008: 162). The work of cultural and textual theorists like N Katherine Hayles, Alan Liu, Jerome McGann and Joseph Tabbi (a practical expression of which is the development of the Electronic Literature Organisation), and the formation of a field of theory and practice under the term digital humanities (see below) all testify to the extraordinary potential for knowledge work and artistic practice of the new medium, and for its critical importance in the formation of a new humanities.

4.4 "Writing is a technology of the mind"

This aphorism[76] located the core principle of the writing movement as it began in the 1970s and evolved through the 1980s and 1990s, mostly in the United States, into a new discipline typically formed out of English Literature programmes where the teaching of Freshman Composition was located. It grew out of a critique of introductory writing courses, perceived as creating the impression that writing is a skill which could be learned in a dedicated, one-off course, like any other practical skill – riding a bicycle, for instance. I think it is also fair to say that it was part of the 1960s and 70s challenge to Cold War authoritarianism, in which subjects of the disciplinary orders of society (readers) were encouraged to become creators of a new society (writers). Writing was reconceptualised as a cognitive technology and complex social practice, especially across academic disciplines and among professions. It drew on the theorising of writers such as Derrida, Barthes, Foucault, Ellis, Ong, Goody and Finnegan, and its many branches came to include writing across the curriculum, writing for the disciplines,

graduate writing and document design. It is important to emphasise that this movement grew in and out of educational contexts, both school and university, and it quickly came to intersect with another new cognitive technology, computing, and to be informed by another strand of historical and cultural enquiry initiated at the same time, the role of print technology in cultural, intellectual and economic development.[77]

A powerful edge to the movement was given by the recognition that historically, and still in many ways in the present, the teaching of reading and writing had been disjoined, and that states where citizen literacy was important as a means of distance communication and social administration were more interested in having their citizens as recipients capable only of one-way communication, that is, as readers rather than writers. Hence state control of the uses of the early printing press, which was otherwise just as capable of being used by individuals to publish their views to a wider public as networked personal computers are. The force of this perception was underlined by the development of mass communications in the twentieth century, and particularly the aggregation into both public and private media systems of visual and electronic media, by which citizens were positioned as consumers (readers) of media texts (commodities) without the means to use these mass media communication technologies as producers (writers). None of these developments were technologically determined; just as with print technology in the centuries following its invention, the application of these new technologies was ideologically and culturally shaped, whether by democratic capitalism and communism culminating in the period of the Cold War or, later, by the social and economic theories underpinning neoliberalism. But an important effect of thinking of writing as a cognitive technology was to extend the scope of the term from alphanumeric literacy to multi-media literacy; in other words, to the ability in principle if not in practice to use any of the semiotic and media systems which had evolved for the conservation and communication of knowledge and meaning. The more recent advocacy for information literacy in this context only appears new because the business interests producing digital technologies realised that the large-scale adoption of this new information and communications technology was dependent upon a population able to use it. And the core competence, as with print, was alphanumeric literacy; the critical difference (social and political) was that the new machines were both transmitters and receivers,

decentralising the production process of twentieth century mass media and potentially equalising the roles of reader and writer, but also requiring the internalisation of machinic procedures and forms previously outsourced to the publisher and the printing house.

If a new humanities is intrinsically linked to current and evolving cognitive technologies, the longer historical point is that this has always been the case. The humanities as a distinctive body of knowledge and a set of practices for creating that knowledge have their origin in the interactive formation of two technologies – of cities as machines for generating knowledge, meaning and value, and of writing as the means of recording and hence objectifying, collecting and exposing to critique over time a society's knowledge. The past century in particular has seen an extraordinary evolution in the information and communication technologies fundamental to the operation of modern and now postmodern societies and nations in a globalising world order: the same issues of control over and freedom in their use which surfaced at the beginning of printing and were focussed for that phase by Milton's *Areopagitica* have both continued and in many ways become more intense in this latest phase of their evolution. And so it is by observing the double character of citizens as readers and writers, recipients of the information flows of their society and contributors to those flows, especially in the political domain of democratic governance, that expanding and regrounding the scope of the humanities must be attempted. If literacy, the fundamental cognitive and technical competence required for humanities knowledge work, requires semiotic fluency (initially alphanumeric, ideographic or hieroglyphic handwriting on clay, papyrus, paper or stone), then postmodern humanities knowledge work requires semiotic fluency in the variety of sign systems, media forms and media technologies now commonly used to formulate, communicate and conserve thought in postmodern societies. It is only in the universities that this thought is carried on in its administered form inherited from the print history of discipline formation, with the effect that new media disciplines have evolved on the margins of the now traditional humanities or in social sciences (just as Writing as a distinct field of theory and practice grew up in Literature programmes and then departed, often into a closer association with Linguistics).

Writing must be now understood, as a result of the development of mass media and digital ICTs, to embrace composition and expression of thought in any system of signs and media, or combination of them, whether alphanumeric, audio, visual (pictorial, graphic, video), or gestural (sculptural, theatrical).[78] This list is deliberately presented on an axis from most to least abstract, most symbolic to most embodied; but there are clearly other axes which would modify the arrangement. All writing is visual in that it requires inscription on a surface of some kind in order to communicate at a distance, or to be recovered as a record, whether or not its primary modality is computer code or print or performance (music and dance notation). All writing produces texts (the objects making up the semiosphere), which can be classified in many different ways, for example, by knowledge field and institution, genre and medium, art form, social purpose, history, geography, natural languages. Another spectrum by which texts can be related to one another in their relation to the work of knowledge production is constituted by the terms creative and expository. The former typically signifies the opening of new possibilities of knowledge, and the latter the clear and validated, impersonal presentation of what is currently known and knowable.[79] But this distinction, like that between academic and popular, typically entrenches a value distinction between the new and the second-hand which misrepresents knowledge creation in the humanities. Of course, any text at the creative end of the spectrum will employ existing knowledge, just as any expository text may open a previously unconsidered possibility within its field, or in another when read in that context. The diversity of possible categories itself manifests the complexity of human societies and cultures, and the way in which each text acquires its uniqueness from its selection from and combination of the semiotic and media resources available to writers and their readers in a specific time and place.

In its modality as document design, writing theory and practice demonstrates another decisive aspect of postmodern ICT development, whether the text is a web page, a print book, a news item accessed through a television channel, a legal or administrative document, an advertisement, an email. All of these texts can be now digitally mediated, but they remediate earlier, pre-digital forms in their design, and they communicate effectively in so far as all of their components are intentionally combined to shape a reader's or viewer's thought and response. The shift to the individual as the producer of texts

which are self-published and can be globally disseminated requires either the ability to employ both knowledge and form in the composition of a text, even when the form is provided by a template, as in email or word processing. For the humanities as a critical textual practice, this requires understanding cultural assumptions, meanings and constraints which are embedded (usually invisibly) in the design of a form. Document design demonstrated that designing a form was as much an authorial process as writing a play or a technical manual, since all authorial processes depend for their success or failure on the ability of the written text to address its recipient at a distance from its origin and accomplish the purpose it is intended to serve. And critical to that success is the ability of the text, through its design, to lead its reader into a full comprehension of its purpose. Like literature, a successful manual seeks to model imaginatively actual or possible real-world situations and behaviour with which the reader may not have had any prior acquaintance. As the guide in a learning situation, it has a close similarity to education in that the skill of the manual writer, as with the teacher, consists in allowing the reader to internalise the writer/teacher's knowledge and replicate (and modify) it in practice. Computer and other digital device manuals were (and are) exemplary of this problem, failing to the extent that their writers fail to objectify their own expert and tacit knowledge and how-to learning.

4.5 Reading as Understanding and Interpreting

At a late point in Roberto Savioni's powerful analysis of narco-trafficking, he unexpectedly affirms the importance of reading:

> Nothing is more powerful than reading, no-one is a greater liar than he who holds that reading a book is a passive gesture. To read, hear, study and understand – these are the only ways to construct a life beyond life, life alongside of life. Reading is a dangerous act, because it gives shape and dimensions to words, it incarnates and disperses them in all directions. It turns everything upside down and makes change and tickets and lint fall out of the pockets of the world. To get to know narco-trafficking, to get to know the rationality of evil and money, to rip open the veil that obscures the

> supposed familiarity with the world. To know is the first step towards change. (2015: 375)

The reader (viewer, hearer) occupies the other human position in the communicative exchange mediated by a text, a position multiplied as often as the means for dissemination permit. With the advent of reception theory in the late 1960s, the author ceased being taken to be the sole determinant of a text's meaning; the reader became an active participant whose interpretive work could extend, revise or challenge the claims to knowledge and meaning made by the text. One of the ways by which texts open possibilities for new knowledge is through the intersection between them and a reader's stock of knowledge (thought of as an individual selection from the contents of the semiosphere, modified by experience; a cultural inventory) and the interpretive relationship which this conjunction of textual and experiential knowledge sets up. In the theory of knowledge put forward by Brier, knowledge held by a text remains only a potential of the text until it is engaged by a reader's mind, where it is inevitably modified by its contact with the reader's own stock of knowledge.[80] The point to be taken here is that the process of thinking typically generated by a momentary conjunction between objectified knowledge (a text) and an individual subject should be understood to be interpretive and evaluative, not passively receptive, and hence potentially generative and open, meaning forming rather than meaning finalising in unpredictable ways. Gaggi compares the interactivity of reading and writing in a hypertextual environment with conversation, noting that "Hypertext – like a conversation – encourages a value system that emphasises the solving of problems and the growth of learning to and for the good of the community as a whole, rather than one that insists individuals must be recognized and rewarded for the exact part they have played in that communal endeavour" (1997: 106-107). I will later make the case that this value system is intrinsic to any conception of a new humanities.

The conception of what constitutes literate competence in post-print textuality has to include both reading and writing in the diversity of media forms and technologies now woven into ordinary social life in democratic societies (a more complex conception of information literacy than the ability to use a networked computer). Having argued that creativity needs to be thought of as a population-wide quality, Hartley points out that the recent and

dramatic expansion of the semiosphere has meant that the print era's association between access to literacy and to information as the mark of a democratic society is no longer sufficient. No longer, he argues, are we

> in a cultural universe where individual access to creative culture – that is, literacy - can be seen as emancipationist in itself […] Now, the information universe is too large – or in economic terms transaction costs are too high – for mere access to ensure intellectual freedom; organizational forms and interactions also determine how individual agency operates in practice. New attention is needed to trace and understand the role of *selection, management, order, and redaction* (creative editing of existing material) in networks and archives even as they continue to expand faster than exponentially (2012: 54, author's emphasis).

Systems and institutions are integral components of social networks, and their enabling and coordinating functions in the work of creating and exchanging information and knowledge need to be fully understood by and in the new humanities. Knowledge about them clearly also needs to inform the literacy that underpins the possibility of knowledgable citizen participation in the on-going production and reproduction of democratic societies.

Reading, writing and interpretation (the work practices of humanities enquiry) are the result of what Derrida (1992: 16) describes as "an experience [which] is a traversal, something that *traverses* and travels toward a destination for which it finds the appropriate passage" – but not the inevitable or only passage to a pre-determined meaning. In another context, discussing the question of "The Book to Come", Derrida refers to "*the tension between gathering and dispersion*" as characterising "the new space of writing and reading in electronic writing, travelling at top speed from one spot on the globe to another, and linking together, beyond frontiers and copyrights, not only citizens of the world on the universal network of a potential *universitas*, but also any reader as a writer, potential or virtual or whatever" (2005: 13, 15, author's emphasis). Here electronic writing links citizen minds across the I-space, throughout the semiosphere, and engages the whole spectrum of possibilities from closed/gathered to chaotic/dispersed in

the generation of new meaning. This new space is the space in which the productivity of new humanities knowledge work is to be located.

If texts in a digital environment can be multi-lingual, multi-medial, multi-generic, and the traditional boundary between creative and critical writing is blurred, then extensions of what is understood by literacy in the humanities are necessary, most especially at the advanced professional level of humanities scholarship and its associated professions. It is no longer enough for the academic humanities to be grounded in sophisticated print literacy, symbolised by the scholarly monograph, or in separate disciplines based on expertise in reading and writing in one or more of the new media forms of the twentieth century. As a reading and writing machine, the networked computer does not inherently differentiate between media forms, privilege some over others, or respect modern discipline boundaries. In this way it exemplifies the conditions of post-modern knowledge, including the conditions for a new humanities.

4.6 Design

There is one domain of expert knowledge and practice which brings together the features of the semiosphere which I have identified as constitutive, and which can provide a relevant perspective for thinking about the scope and nature of a new humanities, as well as a dimension of expert knowledge directly implicated in the interpretive work of the humanities and its social applications. Semiotic objects are designed objects, and it has been conventional in the period of print to regard the technological expertise required to publish intellectual work as secondary to the work itself, even if production values defined claims to significance, market value, or access by particular groups of readers (as in fine printing or artist's books). This distinction was repeated in the distinction between the fine and applied arts. But the advent of digital technologies as multimedia writing and publishing machines (now also as 3-D printers) and the role of design in discriminating between versions of the same object in consumer markets, has collapsed the distinction between fine and applied arts and foregrounded the way in which all artefacts are inherently communicative of values aesthetically by design.

As a field of expert knowledge, design can also be considered as an integral dimension of the I-space, and the way that design knowledge works in the world can be seen to be exactly comparable to the way humanities knowledge works. In their study, *The Design Way,* Nelson and Stolterman make a foundational claim, that "Outside of nature, [designers] are the prime creators of our experienced reality" (2003: 9). They are concerned to overturn an ancient structure of value which has placed design knowledge outside formal knowledge, a situation aggravated by the intense focus in Western societies on science and technology and the modes of thought required by those fields of enquiry and application of knowledge. Their study is directly aimed at recovering an integrated and historically grounded conception of design: "it is now critical that we pick up these frayed design threads, and weave them into new patterns, integrating their wisdom into a more holistic fabric of life" (23). This is not to disparage science, but to determine just what part technoscientific knowledge properly plays in the design process and its outcomes. With respect to my interests, every page of this book resonates with the conception of the work of humanities knowledge, its origins, its purposes and its embeddedness in our humanity, which I am advancing. One consequence of thinking about design holistically is the judgment that "Science cannot provide insight into what *should* be brought into existence, through intention, imagination and innovation. It can only assist" (31). By placing their argument in the inclusive and heterogeneous context of the "fabric of life", they locate exactly the context which also frames the work of the humanities and, at the same time, challenges assumptions within the academic humanities about disciplined knowledge work and its purpose. To overwrite "design" with "humanities" in the following quotation is to bring to bear, in one place, all the critical parameters for thinking about the work humanities knowledge does in our world:

> Design is about evoking, or creating, the real. […] The scientific and analytic tools available to us are not designed to handle the real: at least not in any holistic sense, because, from a design perspective, the real is a whole. Any new design is therefore, something that is both real and whole. As such, that new design is, by definition, too complex and rich to be completely understood during the process of creation. We cannot predict with accuracy how

> any design will serve the world and, in turn, how it will change it (45).

At the heart of this conception of knowledge lies a relationship between actual people (not abstractions) brought together to realise a desire or address a human problem by making something new, thus modifying "experienced reality". This qualification to the term reality is crucial for marking the ways in which humanly created things both exist materially in the world and gain their identity, purpose and functionality from the ideas which inform their creation. "Experienced reality" and its textual modification are also integral to the new knowledge work of the humanities as well. Writer and reader constitute a relationship of meaningfulness through a real world object, a text, intended to have real world effects, but effects which cannot be definitively predicted not least because of the designed object's ability to be present in times and places removed from that of its origin. I intend to draw more on this study. The force of its case has been subtly imagined by William Gibson in his short story, 'The Gernsback Continuum", in which the 1930s are identified (from the perspective of their urban remnants in the 1970s) as the period in which people started to desire the future (1986/7: 26).

Two examples will serve to show how the convergence of print, computing and design makes possible further developments in writing and new kinds of text and extends the space of the new humanities.

The first is provided by Nick Bantock. His fictional books are written by him in the double sense that he creates both a verbal narrative and painterly images, and the books' designer Barbara Hodgson clearly plays a major role in the integration of the diverse materials which constitute the text. Books like *The Venetian's Wife* (1996) and *The Forgetting Room* (1997) represent an extraordinary response to the virtual realism characteristic of the design conventions governing television and computing displays. They are superbly produced compositions of image fragments and verbal narrative or exposition, the fragments often being objects, or representations of objects, which are named in or have some analogical relation to narrated events or the exposition of a topic.

Two aspects of their composition as books are closely related: the artistic practice of collage and the treatment of the page as if it were a computer

screen have in common the combining of discrete graphical objects in one writing space. In contrast to the normal visual and audio noise and activity of websites, Bantock's page arrays work aesthetically to encourage "committed inspection" (2004: 111) by the reader of what each page displays. To take two examples from *The Venetian's Wife.* A museum curator, Sarah Wolfe, buys a set of nineteenth-century encyclopedias at an auction which she describes as "full of illustrations that I can scan into my computer and use with my diary entries." Four beautifully detailed images of insects take up the middle third of the page following this comment, and one sits like a marginal note adjacent to it (49). The verbal narrative is carried forward through emails between Sarah and Nicolo Conti, who has employed her to locate four sculptures missing from his art collection, and Sarah's updating of her computer diary, as well as through copies of pages from a damaged nineteenth century diary, the catalogue of an exhibition of collages by Alexander Lorac from a gallery in New Orleans, and a diversity of images. Just as verbal, visual and graphic signs interact on each page and opening (roughly the area of an iMac 17 inch screen), so they do in the collages, which are composed of images and image fragments of objects, languages, texts. In a later reflection on the process of collage composition, *Urgent 2nd Class* (2004), Bantock adopts what I would call a democratic position on the making of art works, seeking to develop "a strong sense of aesthetic within the everyday" (5). He is also concerned to challenge "a society where cold, hard and shiny are often highly valued" (1). By taking ephemera as the materials to compose with, Bantock argues that the textual object (a fact) is combined by the artist with other semiotic objects, bringing into existence a fiction, a "fascinating world […] that never quite was but almost might have been. A place of visual poetry […]" (2). Another way of putting this creative outcome is to be found in a comment on Lorac's work; with no experience of Asia, he employs examples of its "ephemeral cultural remains" to "create a world suffused in the light of his own mind's eye" (37). Not just the real thing, but the real as experienced and objectified in a work of art.


PAGE 535. SARA. COMPUTER DIARY
Awoke at four-thirty. Clearly my lack of money worries is not going to improve my sleep pattern.
Seems a bit early to be nostalgic about the museum, especially as yesterday was my last day, but I'm missing the place already. The mustiness, the light pouring in through the lovely high windows, the infuriating gurgling coming from the ancient plumbing system, sketching in quiet corners when there's a lull, Christine (sometimes), the Shiva, and Marco.
I really blew it by not overcoming my shyness with Marco. I like him a lot. When he said good-bye to me he shook my hand with great gentleness, like it was a delicate paw.
From: Mr. N. Conti contifnd@secset.com
To: Sara Wolfe swintrw@adl.com
Sara,
Have a look at the catalogue that's going to come up on your screen. It's from a small gallery in New Orleans.
I've indicated the significant area in the relevant painting. I can't be certain, but this could be my Ganesha.
I'd like you to go to New Orleans and see the painter, Alexander Lorac. I understand he lives only a few houses from the Simenon. Find out where he obtained those Ganesha images.
I've booked your flight for 2:30 tomorrow afternoon. You can pick up your tickets from the United desk at S.F. Airport.
Expenses all covered, have fun.
N. Conti
34
SIMENON GALLERY
ALEXANDER LORAC
RECENT WORKS

Illustration 5: Bantock, *The Venetian's Wife,* 14-15.

The second example comes from an instance of new humanities literary criticism. In 2002 N. Katherine Hayles published a small book, *Writing Machines*, which elaborated her thinking about digital writing and (like *Imagologies*) advertised its difference from traditional humanities academic book publication through its design. Because such a project typically requires collaboration, the creation of the book as a textual object was shared between her and the text's designer, Anne Burdick. Burdick describes the print book as "a tool for storage and retrieval, as the first home of Literature, as a navigational device, a writing space, and a representation of knowledge", thus marking its remediation from the perspective of computing. One example of the many ways in which *Writing Machines* rethinks the communicative work of the book as a visual and material form is its use of three fonts to represent different "voices", one for each of the personal and the theoretical and a melding of the two for the personal-theoretical (141-142). The print version followed the text's initial digital publication in an electronic or web format, and both versions in content and presentation manifest new thinking in the literary and critical dimensions of the humanities. A new kind of publisher was also needed to make these new

modalities of writing accessible, exemplified by Peter Lunenfeld, the Editorial Director of MediaWorks, when he refers in the Endtroduction to mutations in "this world of multi-, trans-, inter-, and re-mediation" (138) and by Hayles's intimate involvement in the formation of the Electronic Literature Organisation.



130 House of Leaves

In these posthuman days, *House of Leaves* demonstrates that technologies do not simply inscribe preexisting thoughts. Rather, artifacts such as this book serve as noisy channels of communication in which messages are transformed and enfolded together as they are encoded and decoded, mediated and remediated. *House of Leaves* implicitly refutes the position Claude Shannon assigns to humans in his famous communication diagram, in which they are positioned outside the channel and labeled "sender" and "receiver." As readers enmeshed in the book, we find ourselves positioned, like Will Navidson, *inside* the book we read, receiving messages to be sure but also constituted by the messages that percolate through the intersecting circulatory pathways of the book called *House of Leaves*.

The implication for studies of technology and literature is that the materiality of inscription thoroughly interpenetrates the represented world. Even when technology does not appear as a theme, it is woven into the fictional world through the processes that produce the literary work as a material artifact. House of Leaves provides a powerful example showing why a fully adequate theory of semiotics must take into account the materiality of inscription technologies as well as a material understanding of the signifier. Technological effects can no more be separated from literary effects than characters can be separated from the writings that contain and are contained by them. Through its material metaphors, *House of Leaves* suggests that the appropriate model for subjectivity is a communication circuit rather than discrete individualism, for narration remediation rather than representation, and for reading and writing inscription technology fused with consciousness rather than a mind conveying its thoughts directly to the reader.

Focusing on materiality allows us to see the dynamic interactivity

through which a literary work mobilizes its physical embodiment in conjunction with its verbal signifiers to construct meanings in ways that implicitly *construct the user/reader* as well. It is no accident that electronic texts such as *Lexia to Perplexia*, artists' books like *A Humument*, and print novels like *House of Leaves* envision subjects who are formed through and with the inscription technologies these works employ. The writing machines that physically create fictional subjects through inscriptions also connect us as readers to the interfaces, print and electronic, that transform us by reconfiguring our interactions with their materialities. Inscribing consequential fictions, writing machines reach through the inscriptions they write and that write them to re-define what it means to write, to read, and to be human.

131 Inhabiting *House of Leaves*

143 Author's Acknowledgements

Illustration 6: Hayles, *Writing Machines,* 130-131.

4.7 Digital Humanities

"The Internet is the largest information space in human history and it is quite literally uncharted and unchartered territory" (Deegan and Sutherland, 2009: 174).

If the humanities as a scholarly, knowledge-creating enterprise developed in step with the evolution of writing and print, the genealogical line of the most important development in cognitive technologies in the past half-century -

networked computing or digital information and communications technologies (ICTs) - finds its ancestral roots in the cultures and professions of science and technology, war and intelligence. This dramatically different line of cultural/technological evolution in the media for creating, recording and disseminating knowledge is one critical factor in the displacement of the humanities as the exemplary knowledge of modern and now postmodern societies, and of print information and communications technologies (print ICTs) as the normative medium for knowledge work.. We have never spoken of print humanities; to invent the term digital humanities is to recognize a rupture and to acknowledge the belated engagement of the humanities as a field of learning (as distinct from individual humanities scholars) with this transformational shift in the methods and modes of knowledge creation, transmission, and conservation. A recent exploration of the rapidly evolving scope and characteristics of humanities work in the digital environment is Burdick et al's *Digital_humanities* (2012). By using a symbol derived specifically from digital discourse, the underscore, to connect the two terms, the authors directly point to the need to bridge the gap between the two words and the domains they represent.

The advent of digital ICTs and their role as transmitters of non-genetic information between human agents and across time and space focuses unequivocally the role and scope of the new humanities. Just as digital ICTs link extraordinary diversity – of languages, peoples, histories, institutions, from the most global to the most local – so must a new humanities perceive its scope and purpose in these terms. The advent of born digital texts draws attention to the conventional segregation of enquiry in modern humanities (and social sciences) based on the evolution of different kinds of media – art, theatre, literature, music, news, photography, film, television – by offering a new kind of semiotic object composed from any combination of these media forms and therefore generating the need for new kinds of critical and interpretive theory and practice. But recognizing this need is a characteristic of postmodernity at large, the digital humanities being one manifestation.

The I-space is especially valuable for conceptualising and understanding the new kinds of professional, organisational and institutional forms and relationships which are evolving in relation to digital ICTs. In the humanities the knowledge creating dynamics of the I-space are evident in

- unstable disciplinary boundaries
- new conceptions of scholarly research: distant reading, big humanities, crowd sourcing
- email, blogs, wikis and lists are new sites for scholarly communication, intellectual collaboration and public engagement
- centres for research emphasising research and development in digital technology applications for the humanities
- collaborations between academic, computing and curatorial professionals in cultural research and development projects
- new modes of scholarly publication and publication titles
- conferences and sessions on digital humanities in traditional discipline conferences
- agitation for the definition of new academic career paths
- new associations: my "local" example is the Australasian Association for Digital Humanities (2011)
- new agencies, grant and fellowship programmes, for example, the NEH Office of Digital Humanities

One area of instability of particular importance is apparent in the rhetoric associated with the promotion of digital humanities, where the term empirical is used to emphasise a kinship with the research practices of the technosciences in advanced computing. Burdick et al describe the tension between quantitative methods and qualitative analyses as possibly productive of a generative synthesis, but emphasise that "at stake is the humanities' unique commitment to wrestle with uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity; to model incommensurate temporalities and ontologies; to explore not just geographies but psychogeographies and the dark recesses of the self; to attend to the non-repeatable and nonstandard phenomena" (2012: 108). Another is the shift from "closed- to open-source cultural production. Open-source culture possesses a multitude of facets and definitions: […] collaborative authoring, multiple versioning, flexible attitudes towards intellectual property, peer contributions, access to multiple communities, and overall patterns of distributed knowledge production, review and use" (77), aspects of which I have raised above in 3.3.6 Commons of the mind.

By being capable of representing, composing with and analysing, and communicating all kinds of discourse in a diversity of media forms and

languages, from the most abbreviated (a text message, an advertisement) to the most complex (scientific data, mathematical and philosophical enquiry, virtual worlds, historical and fictional narrative in print, film and television, performance art), networked computing remediates the whole history of media evolution and knowledge creation. It therefore massively enlarges the territory in which the edifice of the humanities has been built. Undoubtedly, once the newness of the new technologies has faded, as with print, the descriptor "digital" will disappear. But, for now, it marks a complex and many-aspected difference introduced into the work of the humanities and the modern conception of what it means to be a professional in the humanities. One fundamentally important factor is the way in which a scholarly digital document, found through a web search, may address a much wider readership than a traditional scholarly edition in print. The loss of monumentality associated with scholarly editions is replaced by a potentially more eclectic range of readings in many different cultural locations.[81]

5. A New Humanities in the University To-Come

Just as the university is the proper site of the most rigorous and systematic/methodological application of intellect to the understanding of the given world, so it is the proper site of the most rigorous and systematic/methodological application of intellect to the understanding of the cultural worlds invented by humanity. Granted this fundamental division in the objects of enquiry, it is not possible simply to allocate the first to the sciences, and the second to the humanities. But, by granting equality to both modes of enquiry and knowledge creation, the whole of reality enters the mind of the university as it is constituted outside the university by the interaction of culture with the given world through the medium of language (but also other media) and collective human action. Derrida (2005: 24) makes this point in a way which opens on to a critical factor in a conception of creativity in knowledge work in the humanities when he writes that "The limit of the impossible, the 'perhaps,' and the 'if,' this is the place where the university is exposed to reality, to the forces from without (be they cultural, ideological, political, economic, or other). It is there that the university is in

the world that it is attempting to think." This limit or border zone has a double aspect, since it represents both the ambiguous area at the limit to thought marked out by each discipline and the excess in the object of enquiry which is not encompassed by the theories, rules, methods and conventions governing knowledge work in specific institutional settings like modern universities.

From this perspective, the field of the academic humanities ceases to be a marginal domain and historically evolved array of disciplines within the Western print-based system of knowledge, the residue of its pre-scientific form. It can instead be understood as constituted by a distinctive mode of cognition and knowledge creation appropriate to the heterogeneous nature of textuality and pursued through the analysis and interpretation of the global contents of the informational world, the semiosphere. A new humanities which is anticipated in the various meanings of "digital humanities" and in the textual diversity of the Web, formally and in association with the cultural institutions responsible for maintaining humanity's collective memory, must embrace the textual sphere of global cultural production as its defining scope. Furthermore, the movement of peoples, their cultures and languages from their lands of origin to other places creates local mixes of this global heterogeneity. The multiplicity of cultural forms, languages and media in themselves and as remediated by networked computing must become normative for its theory of knowledge work, and the always yet-to-be answered question, What does it mean to be human?, must define the horizon of its enquiries.

But for the university to locate itself fully in the semiotic space of culture it must widen its scope and restrain the social forces internal and external to it which would seek to control and delimit its engagements within the I-space as it is constituted at any given moment of time in any society. It must recognise that human development is a cultural process enabled by fiction in the imaginative creation of possible worlds and by memory in the re-interpretation of inherited knowledge in new cultural settings. It must repay public and personal investment by rendering its knowledge work publicly accessible and by defining the ground on which knowledge policies are formed and knowledge politics are played out. It must understand itself before claiming to understand the worlds we live in.

In order for modern science to exist, the rigorous suppression of all but the denotative capabilities of language has been undertaken. This in itself is not the problem. It lies instead in the hegemonic claim based on that suppression, that only scientific method is capable of generating true knowledge, and in the formation of the science-technology-business nexus which has brought about a drastically narrowed use of the terms creativity and innovation, confusing discovery with creativity and invention, and new product development with innovation. As Foucault, for example, has shown with force and clarity, knowledge creation is a textual and an institutional practice, and dominant institutions and discourses substantially determine what kinds of knowledge are valued in particular societies at particular times. It is only when all that modern science must exclude in human knowledge formation in order to understand the given or natural world exactly is brought back into the discussion that a fuller conception of creativity and innovation can be recovered, and a conception of the postmodern university informed by a new humanities can be articulated.

How could the postmodern university define itself in relation to a democratic imperative which links a free society and creativity to openly accessible resources or an economy of the gift, and which grants equal status to fiction and its interpretation as a source of knowledge? How could the postmodern democratic state formulate policies for knowledge which would support such a self-definition? Currently the commons, indigenous knowledge and fiction do not figure centrally in Western universities' self-concepts, or in public policies for knowledge. But everything about the activity associated with creativity and innovation emphasises a discontinuity or rupture with the known, the customary, the repeated in knowledge and experience, in any domain of culture and society. When Derrida relates deconstruction to "the question of […]", or thinks of an institution or a quality of society (the university or democracy) in the aspect of the to-come, he is inviting engagement in creative, innovative mental work which will give expression to that which is as yet potential and of the future within a culture's resources of knowledge. His call for a new humanities is a call to forge a humanities to-come which is capable of performing knowledge work according to these principles.[82]

Conceiving of the position of the postmodern university in the social process of knowledge creation and exchange from a perspective in indigenous knowledge complements arguments based on a commons of the mind, since both place knowledge creation and exchange in the framework of the gift economy. Kuokannen's argument that equality in the relation between Western and indigenous knowledges in the postmodern university can be attained only if the latter are able to participate equally in the work of the university through the "convergence of different epistemes" in a process of "conceptual transformation and ongoing epistemic engagement" (2007: 120) applies as well to the relations between the new humanities, the creative arts and the sciences just as much as to the relations between formal, informal and tacit knowledges, the relations between bureaucratic, commercial and academic knowledges, or the relations between cultures and their inherited knowledges. The postmodern university as a public institution must be open to and permeated by the diversity of ways of knowing which constitute the complex society in which it is located, a locus of and focus for the intellectual and cultural energies animating social action towards enabling the coming into being of a society's best future. Inevitably, since all conceptions of the future are politicised conceptions, such an institution will be a site for the engagement and negotiation of politicised thinking. This engagement would be premised, as Haiven argues (2014: 151), on a belief that knowledge work is a common pursuit characterized by commitment to and participation in reciprocal responsibilities. The concept of the gift and the concept of the commons anchor a theory and practice of knowledge relations governed by an ethic of mutual responsibility in which the asymmetry of cultures, languages, human purposes and values is the most important defining characteristic; they also anchor a theory of knowledge institutions which is grounded in discursive equality, not in the hegemony of one part of knowledge over all its other parts.

Understanding a society and its cultures, and positing its possible futures, is based on the diversity of texts which represent and record its collective effort over time at self-comprehension. Nation-states which are not imperial nations will depend largely upon their own citizens for the writing of their history and imagining the nation to-come, the analysis of the distinctive evolution of their languages in all of the unique environments in which human cultures evolve, the creation of their arts and their mass media systems, the

conversations about themselves which pass through local media, public and political discourse, education, religion, and so on. Each human mind is like a star in the night sky, radiating its light without knowing who sees it, or where and when it might be seen.

The humanities cannot become a truth-generating knowledge system in competition with the technoscience system. It cannot erase, but must instead foreground, the specifics of context in which the work of postmodern humanists is carried out. The specifics include plural local and national contexts of the work - languages, histories, cultures, knowledge systems, politics, economies – and a conception of its public role and accountability, affirmed by its participation in an on-going, open and democratic conversation about the values on which human societies are founded and shape their futures. The enormous power humanity has acquired by advances in technoscientific knowledge to shape human and natural evolution must be balanced by a culturally and ecologically sensitive learning process with its roots in collective memory and inherited knowledge. Reading and writing humanistically is now to read and write from a position in time, space and value, but oriented towards the future and essaying what it is possible to think. A new humanities is imagined in the vision of law advanced by Sarat et al when they refer to law as "a moral achievement that emerges from rich traditions of rhetoric, textual interpretation, and ethical and philosophical argument, and institutional practice – traditions that are at the heart of humanistic inquiry" (2010: 44). It is also imagined by Bonneuil and Fressoz in their analysis of the transformations in thinking and action required by the period of the Anthropocene, where they foresee an environmental humanities integrating society and environment "in a dialogue with the sciences of nature" (2016: 33).

What is an available model for the kind of mental work which I am arguing is to be performed by a new humanities, and can give a name to the postmodern university? To estrange the future as much as possible, and to reorient the university from the ground of a new humanities as the coordinates of this domain of advanced enquiry have been sketched in this chapter, my proposal, which will be justified in Chapter 5, is to conceptualise the postmodern university as the Poetic University.[83] Such a university, which would seek to place creativity and innovation in thinking at its foundations, must not only

admit an equal claim to new knowledge creation from the humanities; it must grant that singular thought, founded axiomatically, theorised and informed by immersion in some aspect of humanity's collective knowledge, can generate new possible truths. Implicit in the terms creativity and innovation, as terms for poetic thought exploratory of the resources and boundaries of the semiosphere, there are also Derrida's phrase "without condition", the term "fiction", and the "to-come" of humanity and of democracy.

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[1] The Crying of Lot 49. Philip K. Dick in his novel The Simulacra (1964) and the TV series Max Headroom (1987) explore this proposition by envisaging a society governed secretly by a corporate elite through control over the mass media.

[2] Erasmus's Praise of Folly is a satirical anatomy of society, including its academics, based on a principle which remains fundamental even if it has to be rediscovered generation by generation. Folly speaks throughout in her own praise, naming her father as "Plutus, Riches; that only he, that is, […] the father of gods and men, at whose single beck, as heretofore, so at present, all things sacred and profane are turned topsy-turvy. According to whose pleasure war, peace, empire, counsels, judgments, assemblies, wedlocks, bargains, leagues, laws, arts, all things light or serious – I want breath – in short, all the public and private business of mankind is governed (1958: 12).

[3] Chartier's statement that "it is still essential that history remain among the social sciences" (19} makes explicit the complex disruption of the humanities by the invention of the social sciences, and the need for a new humanities to embrace all methodologies and theories which enable its interpretive work to be most fully accomplished.

[4] I will use the term technoscience and its cognates to refer to the science/technology/industry nexus, the complex interrelation of scientific and technological research and its application for social and economic benefit through industry and commerce. I use the term technocratic to refer to the application of scientific and technical knowledge, and scientific conventions of rationality and objectivity, to the work of government.

[5] Richardson (2001: 135) argues that this position is cultural: "As the dominant culture in which we live assumes a notion of rationality, so it also takes the reality of the universe as empirical fact. […] Realism […] is as central to our cultural assumptions as is rationalism."

[6] Benkler (2006) provides a wide-ranging analysis of the complexity of issues raised by new forms of information and communications technologies, in whch the concept of enclosure plays a critical part, and sees the struggle over extensions of copyright and private control of the channels of communication as "moves in a large-scale battle over the institutional ecology of the digital environment" (381).

[7] In Eikonklastes he refers to the "human right, which commands that every Author should have the property of his own work reservd to him after death as well as living" (1962: 365), but could not have anticipated the exploitative extension of that "human right" to the corporate rights owner.

[8] It is worth noting that the Puritan sermon was the leading edge of cognitive evolution in the late sixteenth century, establishing the logical structure for analytical discourse. It is pleasant being reminded that, at the point where I was writing my doctoral thesis in Edinburgh on this topic, I was also trying to understand texts modeling a further stage in this evolution, as writings by Barthes and Foucault began appearing in English translation.

[9] Deibert (1997: 214) argues that "the creation of a new vocabulary or paradigm cannot be reached by following a set of a priori axiomms formulated in the old vocabulary, nor can it be seen as finally hitting on the correct represnetation of 'reality'. Rather, it occurs in a much less 'rational', more poetic way, thrugh the creative use of metaphors and analogies that help us see the world around us in a new and interesting light." The example here is clearly the term "staple'.

[10] Agnew (1986).

[11] In a study which, like Liu's, places the global present in a long temporal perspective, Bonneuil and Fressoz (2016: 283) describe the struggles over the exploitation of the planet as "cultural war".

[12] Martin (1994: 8, 37).

[13] Brier (2008) posits the development of a Third Culture "in which art and science work together to create knowledge, a culture beyond the dichotomy separating Snow's […] cultures of science, technology, power, and money, on the one hand, and the humanities, the arts, the social sciences, ethics, and aesthetics on the other" (142). He introduces an important caveat to the concept in commenting that "how the inner connections among the diverse – but probably all necessary – knowledge-producing systems in our culture could complement our search for understanding and control [needs to be

understood, but] in a way that does not reduce those systems to one foundational knowledge type" (143).

[14] Derrida writes that "The humanities (language and the book; works or philosophy, literature and the arts, etc.) remain the last place where the principle of free thought can still be presented as such" (2005a: 107).

[15] Patton (2013: 159-160) argues, in relation to the critical philosophical work of Foucault, Derrida, and Deleuze and Guattari, that "In all cases, there is a concern with the emergence of the new, with going beyond the limits of the present, whether in a social, philosphical or experiential sense of the term. [...] after critique comes the construction of something new. [...] In the case of new ways of being, acting and living together in societies, this calls for the elaboration of moral and political norms."

[16] Mowitt (1992: 216), argues for a reversal of conventional conceptions of research in the humanities in a way which is appropriate to the objects of enquiry: "Antidisciplinary research requires that readings reach from within artifacts to the paradigms that govern their interpretation and beyond these paradigms to the structures of disciplinary power that support them."

[17] In the Plan of the work, Bacon describes the transition from the first book, a summary of the knowledge humanity has so far acquired, to his account of the new science, in a metaphor undoubtedly informing the title page: "After coasting by the ancient arts, we will next equip the human understanding to set out on the ocean" (Bacon, 2000: 13).

[18] Jameson (2005: xvi, n.12) discusses this space in his consideration of Utopia, "which combines the not-yet-being of the future with a textual existence in the present." It is notable that, in his analysis, the genre of literature most fully engaged with this space is science fiction.

[19] Fuller (2011: 44-45) asks why writers like Snow and Orwell are not normally considered writers of sociology. His answer is that "there is a lack of appropiate accountability [...] the enterprise has no collective direction". However, "if we were to treat science-fictional propositions as revisable hypotheses rather than stand-alone fantadsy worlds, then they could quite quickly form a kind of sociology."

[20] One possible form of this new university is the Creative University. See Peters and Besley (2013).

[21] See Chapter Five.

[22] See Lee and Wallerstein (2004).

[23] Badiou (2005: 39) makes a trenchant statement: "there is no chance that the human sciences will replace philosophy […[since the human sciences have become the home of the statistical sciences. The human sciences are therefore themselves caught up in the circulation of meaning and its polyvalence, because they measure rates of circulation. […] But this statistical and numerical information has nothing to do with what humanity, nor what each absolutely singular being, is about." By contrast, see Hartley below, n.25.

[24] While noting the "crucial generic distinction" (author's emphasis) between the "two great genres" of informational and poetic texts, McGann (2001) argues also for a convergence as twentieth century scientific discourse got to grips with "a world marked by same kind of ambiguities, transformations, and incommensurable features that we take for granted" in literary texts, and in his argument for a quantum poetics (150, 228, 163-166).

[25] Hartley (2012), in his proposal to practitioners of Cultural Studies and the humanities for what he calls Cultural Science 2.0, provides a valuable historical and contextual analysis of developments in cultural studies, noting that the field arose in the United Kingdom out of English as a field perceived to be exhausted, as he perceives Cultural Studies now to be. He refers to "disciplinary migrations" from the humanities to the sciences, arguing that, like Fuller, "the computational and evolutionary sciences are becoming ever more confident about explainig culure" (38-39).

[26] http://www.msi.govt.nz/assets/MSI/Update-me/News/draft-NSSI-statement-consultation.pdf

[27] See also O'Brien, Opie and Wallace (2000: 3).

[28] It is worth emphasising how distant from now conventional modes of academic argument and analysis in the humanities is the essay, and why this form could be recovered as the exemplary mode of exploratory writing in a new humanities. To go back to the origin, Montaigne's Essais. Sarah Bakewell's study of the book is both a fine instance of humanistic reading and writing and a sensitive appreciation of the power and attraction of Montaigne's writing. She describes the book as "a centuries-long conversation between Montaigne and all those who have got to know him: a conversation which changes through history." She refers to a contenporary source for a metaphor for the essay as Montaigne creates it: "To essay something is to test or taste it, to give it a whirl. One seventeeth century

Montaignist defined it as firing a pistol to see if it shoots straight, or trying out a horse to see if it handles well." She quotes Montaigne observing self-reflectively: "If my mind could gain a firm footing, I would not make essays. I would make decisions; but it is always in apprenticeship and in trial" (2011; 9, 8, 16). For a fine contemporary example of the essay in humanistic knowledge work using the blog form, see Giovanni Tiso.https://bat-bean-beam.blogspot.com/. "This is a golden age for the essay" is the title of an interview with Rebecca Solnit published in The Guardian Weekly (Cooke, 2017: 37).

[29] See Ross (2000), for a comparison between performing artists and academics, "whose labor has been degraded and deprofessionalized in recent years. […] artistic and academic traditions extol sacrificial concepts of mental or cultural labor that are increasingly vital to newly important sectors of the knowledge industries. No longer on the margins of society, in Bohemia or the Ivory Tower, they are providing a rationale for the latest model of labor exploitation in core sectors of the new industrial order, and pioneering the workplace of tomorrow" (2).

[30] The titles listed under his name in the bibliography are just a relevant sample. For a full listing, see Lăzăroiu (2014).

[31] A good recent example of the application of this conception of the university is Jeffrey R. Di Leo (2013: 33): 'The modern university as we know it is outdated and broken, and the only way to respond to it is through the creation of a postmodern one."

[32] I have quoted the text as published, but a key phrase, "what it is to be human", was subsequently corrected in the Research Policy 2007 to read "what it means to be human".

[33] Further development of the thinking elaborated in this work has been brought together in Brier (2013).

[34] I owe this formulation to Niko Stehr (1994: 14).

[35] Brier defines sense as follows: "Sense is not simply logical thinking: it is a mixture of rationality, instinct, feelings, ethics, and aesthetics" (2008: 68).

[36] This issue is highighted by Fuller (2011: 3), who sees his work as "engaged in redefining the foundations of the social sciences in the face of a pincer attack from biology and theology."

[37] Gross (2010, 418) states that Maurice Halbwachs coined the term collective memory "to emphasize the way even individual memories are

formed socially, through families, religious communities, and even social classes. Most scholars who have taken Halbwach's conception as a starting point define collective memories as 'collectively shared representations of the past.' The social science of collective memory and cultural trauma shows the centrality of collective memory to the reproduction of society and the formation of identity."

[38] A powerful theorisation of this tripartite formation is Soja's conception of Thirdspace, which he defines as "a limitless composition of of lifeworlds that are radically open and openly radicalizable; that are inclusive and transdisciplinary in scope yet politically focused and susceptible to strategic choice; that are never completely knowable but whose knowledge nonetheless guides our search for emancipatory change and freedom from domination. Trilectical thinking is difficult, for it challenges all conventional modes of thought and taken-for-granted epistemologies. It is disorderly, unruly, constantly evolving, unfixed, never presentable in permanent constructions" (1996: 79). Spatiality, historicity and sociality are the key coordinates for this way of thinking, the exemplary site for which is the "real-and imagined" form of the city. Soja's analysis, while of great significance for my argument, does not consider the humanities as a distinctive mode of knowledge formation, a further incentive to my focus on the semiosphere. Trilectical thinking is clearly integral to my case for a new humanities.

[39] Edquist affirms that, while the objectives of innovation policy "have normally been economic ones - like economic growth, productivity growth, increased employment and competitiveness [- it] can also have non-economic objectives, such as social, military or environmental ones. There may be conflicts between the objectives when several are being pursued at the same time.[…] These objectives are, of course, determined in a political process" (2001: 47). Furthermore, "Systems of innovation can be quite different from each other, e.g. with regard to specialisation of production, resources spent on R&D, etc. […] Institutions such as laws, norms, and values also differ considerably between national systems" (55). See Edquist and Hommen (2008) for a large-scale enquiry into the significance of national differences. A contrasting position is taken by Jon Sundbo, whose analysis of innovation is "restricted to innovations in the formal economy. One could argue that innovations outside the formal economy, for example in the leisure sphere or the informal social system, can be of great importance

to our lives. […] But the point of departure for this analysis is economic development and the forms of behaviour which lie behind it. It would be beyond the scope of this analysis to consider these other processes of cultural change. They may well be of importance to the innovation processes in the longer view but they have no current importance for the innovation process in existing companies" (1998: 20).

[40] Bernstein (2011: 69) writes that "A constellation is an alternative model for understanding what is often characterized as fragmentation, parataxis, isolation, insularity, atomization, and separate development. Hypertextulity maps a syncretic space that articulates points of contact and that potentiates both spatial connections among discrepant parts and temporal overlays that merge or melt into one another."

[41] Boisot, MacMillan and Han (2007) further develops and applies the concept of the I-space, and includes an essay by Boisot which raises challenging questions about the relation between knowledge flows, the effect of ICTs, and the future of state and corporate bureaucracies.

[42] See Chapter Four, Illus. 2.

[43] Stehr (2005) argues that the pace and extent of new knowledge creation in the techno-sciences is challenging existing conceptions of regulation, and that a new form of politics – knowledge politics – is developing: "The essence of knowledge politics consists of strategic efforts to move new scientific and technical knowledge, and thereby the future, into the center of the cultural, economic, and political matrix of society. [...] The worry that our conduct persistently lags behind the developmnt of knowledge has been replaced by concerns about the accumulation of novel knowledge that appears to have questionable social and cultural consequences" (6, 8).

[44] Bod (2013: 362) with more restraint refers to the "multicoloured palette" of the humanities.

[45] In the form of "universally distributed intelligence", this democratic conception of fundamental human capabilities is a key factor in Levy's (1997) development of the concept of collective intelligence. He writes that "While we are increaingly concerned with economic and ecological waste, it seems as if we are willing to squander our mot precious resourceby refusing to acknowledge it, develop it, or even use it where it is found. From a school report to a corporate job profile, from archaic management methods to social exclusion through unemployment, we are currently witnessing the deliberate

organization of ignorance concerning the extent of intelligence around us, a terrifying waste of experience, skill, and human wealth" (14-15).

[46] The final version of this policy statement (Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment 2015) retains a modified version of the section "Continued Focus on Vision Matauranga" and adds a new paragraph: "Given the increasingly prominent role Māori organisations are playing in the primary industries and other commercial sectors, we can also consider opportunities to work with these organisations to determine how appropriate research at the interface between Māori knowledge and R&D can contribute to growing our economy in an environmentally sustainable manner" (61). "Research" here clearly means modern Western scientific research.

[47] An important step in this direction is Creative Commons, introduced to New Zealand through the Digital Content Strategy and the Humanities Trust. See http://www.creativecommons.org.nz.

[48] See Kelty (2008) for an informative account of the beginnings of Creative Commons.

[49] An early and impressive NGO example, which also provides a fine model for new humanities intellectual work, is Demos: http://www.demos.co.uk/publications/generationcitizen

[50] The New Zealand Government instituted its Open Access to Government Information Policy using Creative Commons licences in 2010. An important resource for thinking about open access to public information was Van Eechoud and Van der Wal (2008).

[51] Many of these points, but not applied to the humanities, are taken up by David Bollier (2008) in his history of the development of conceptions of open access, the public domain and Creative Commons.

[52] The 2013 Forum theme was Open Access Research Issues in the Humanities and Social Sciences: https://aoasg.org.au/tag/humanities-and-social-sciences/. The 2015 theme was Unlocking the Future: Scholarly Communication & Publishing in a Global Research Environment: http://institutionsofknowledge.org/unlocking-the-future-scholarly-communication-publishing-in-a-global-research-environment/.

[53] For a full listing of Houghton's publications, see http://johnhoughtons.homeip.net/pub.html.

[54] Terri Janke (1998, 2003). A more recent report, demonstrating that the issues raised in the earlier ones are still current, is New Tracks (2012).

[55] See http://creativecommons.org.nz/indigenous-knowledge/.

[56] See Te Mana Taumaru Matauranga, Introduction: "the rights that indigenous people often assert may be collective, rather than individual, in nature with traditional knowledge and traditional knowledge-based innovations and practices possibly being developed incrementally over several generations." The view expressed in this report, that "There needs to be a careful balance between the protection of those who own IP rights and the wider need for society to encourage creativity, innovation and growth" (5), does not seem to have made much of an impression on the government, as negotiations like the Trans-Pacific Partnership Treaty demonstrate. But it is fully endorsed in a valuable study by Drahos and Frankl (2102). Although it is not part of the authors' intentions, Section 5 of their chapter in particular can be read against the humanities, beginning with the opening sentence, "Indigenous innovation is place-based innovation" (13).

[57] Waitangi Tribunal (2011). Ko Aotearoa Tenēi demonstrates the international scope of challenges to Western conceptions of intellectual and cultural property by indigenous peoples, the necessity of negotiation between the different cultural systems, laws and conventions, and the cultural specificity of the knowledge and practices of a particular people. Geismar (2013) offers an excellent discussion of its significance.

[58] The Waitangi Tribunal offers this account: "The public domain is generally defined as encompassing that vast body of information, knowledge, and creative or inventive works that has never been or is no longer protected by IP rights. It is freely available for the public to use as they wish. It is the flipside of the private rights created in the system of IP law, and its existence is essential to the proper functioning of that system. None of this is expressed in New Zealand law. Rather, it is implied in the statutory limits and exceptions to the private rights those Acts create" (2011: Vol 1, 63).

[59] OECD (2007, 15) proposes that "Openness means access on equal terms for the international research community at the lowest possible cost, preferably at no more than the marginal cost of dissemination. Open access to research data from public funding should be easy, timely, user-friendly and preferably Internet-based."

[60] Bod's approach to linguistic diversity is carefully documented. He explains that he was able to read sources in English and 6 European languages, and that he read sources originally written in other languages

where they had been translated into the languages familiar to him. In the latter case, he also consulted experts on the quality of the translations of those texts (2013: 10-11).

[61] A nuanced consideration of the question of usefulness in a United States context is Lepage et al. (2005).

[62] Brier has applied the same generality to the term document. He has put the point another way: "documents are complex semantic sign and language systems" (2008: 50}.

[63] Hayles (1997: 189): "For information to exist, it must always be instantiated in a medium."

[64] Lotman (1990: 47) defines a text as "an isolated, self-contained semiotic function, with its integral indivisible meaning and its integral indivisible function."

[65] A complex analysis of what is at stake in a medium shift is provided by Gaggi (1997). See also Tomlinson (1999, Ch.5, "Mediated Communication and Cultural Experience"): "The means of communication are never transparent but always intrinsically shape the communication" (155).

[66] Badiou (1998: 18-19; Edmond (2012) is written from a local example and rethinks comparative literature from a multi-lingual perspective in globalisation. Edmond's study, A Common Strangeness, of late-twentieth century intersections among poets with different linguistic and cultural origins is possible because of the linguistic fluency of its author. See in particular his discussion of Yang Lian, living in exile in Auckland, and the issue of the translation into English of Bei Dao's poetry.

[67] A provocative exploration of this point is William Gibson's and Bruce Sterling's novel, The Difference Engine (1990). Drucker (2011: 11) points to "the ways cultural value systems are expressed in web design" as an important and under-recognised dimension of interface environments.

[68] Twenty years on, while this statement remains important in contexts of open communication, the development of algorithms tailoring news to individual preferences is a powerful counter-use of networked communication systems.

[69] On the effect of hypertext on conceptions of authorship, see Gaggi (1997: 206-117).

[70] See Chartier's estimation of McKenzie's bibliographical thinking in "Texts, Forms, and Interpretations" (1997: 81-89). An insightful discussion

of different cultural-intellectual-locational formations in textual studies is given by Greetham (1999: 397-428) in his close comparison of the work of McKenzie and McGann.

[71] His bibliographical theorising in practice is exemplified in his Treaty paper, McKenzie (1985), his Panizzi lectures, McKenzie (1986), and in the establishment of Wai te ata Press, a project now carried on by Dr Sydney Shep and a local site of developments in digital humanities.

[72] Money has followed the same arc as other kinds of semiotic object, from physical inscription on metal or other kinds of material substrate to paper to computer screen. It is the lowest common denominator of writing, since it is provides the most reductive form of equivalence between unlike things, homogenising difference through a process of translation based on numerical signs.

[73] Mark Bernstein (2009), Eastgate Systems' chief scientist, identified in personal terms in his essay "Into the Weeds" the complexities attendant on moving from a traditional print to a hypertextual mode of reading and writing. The essay is presented as numbered paragraphs (lexias) with possible reading paths identified by selected paragraph numbers grouped at the end of each paragraph in addition to the linear sequencing required by the form of the print book.

[74] See Drucker (2011: 16-19) on the importance of a theory of the interface in humanities scholarship. Other valuable considerations of this issue can be found in Liu (2004: 158-173), who argues that the user-friendly Graphical User Interface both gives effect to and symbolizes "corporate culture as the generalized interface of culture"; Ulmer (1994: 28-31) enquires into the question of a rhetoric appropriate to the new writing made possible by hypermedia and sees interface design as giving form to such a rhetoric because the role of the interface, as of rhetoric, is to faciltate communication. He sees book and office metaphors - the desktop – as a limited beginning, with filmaking providng a more complete metaphor for writing in hypermedia (145).

[75] A valuable demonstration of the interrelationship between textual and software evolution is provided by David Ciccoricco in his discussion of Joyce's hypertext fiction, Twilight, a Symphony (2009: 176-179). For a discussion of the evolution of the novel as a genre through the shift from print to digital media, see Payam (2014).

[76] The source of this aphorism was, as best as I can recollect, a publication of the Bay Area Writing Project in the late 1970s. But its likely context is the work of Walter J. Ong, for example, Ong (1977: 42, 46): "Since writing came into existence, the evolution of the word and the evolution of consciousness have been intimtely tied in with technologies and technological developments. Indeed, all major advances in consciousness depend on technological transformations and implementations of the word. [...] Writing and print and the computer enable the mind to constitute wirthin itself - not just on the inscribed surface or on the computer programs – new ways of thinking, previously inconceivable questions, and new ways of searching for responses."

[77] Elizabeth Eisenstein's *The Printing Press as an Agent of Change* (1979) is generally regarded as the inaugural text in this field, which led to many national histories of the book and/or print culture as the extraordinarily rapid shift to digital information and communications technologies got under way in the later decades of the twentieth century.

[78] See, for example, Ulmer (1994), who affirms that "Writing as technology is a memory machine, with each apparatus finding different means to collect, store, and retrieve information" (16). Ulmer is a theorist of the cognitive technology shift from print to electronic technologies and its implications for cultural invention, and he is specifically interested in "the new possibilities of thought manifested in electronic technology" (17). His book as a whole enacts a "generative experiment. Based on a given theory, how might another text be composed?" (5); it is based on the principle that "[not] just one politics or aesthetics or pedagogy [is] available in a theory but many, depending on who is doing the inventing and within the practices of what institution" (5).

[79] McGann (2001: 199) writes that "A page of printed or scripted text should thus be understood as a certain kind of graphic interface. […] a broad heuristic distinction separates informational from imaginative texts. The former aspire to transparency, the latter to noise, redundancy, repetition. One is vehicular, the other, iconic."

[80] See Brier (2008: 262) for his conception of the signification sphere and (2013: 256, 225) for its elaboration into individual and intersubjective forms ("that we call cultures")S.

[81] See my e-edition (Golder, 2004-) of The Poetry of William Golder, 1810-1876. http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/tei-corpus-golder.html. For an account of the issues raised in the development of this digital edition, see Opie (2009). Among other matters of interest, should the "the work" as a collection of digital objects be described as a gallery or as an exhibition, given that they are encountered in a display space and the reader is free to walk virtually among them.

[82] A particularly fine, singular example of knowledge creation in a new humanities, which also demonstrates how the space of the humanities is being modified insightfully from within the humanities, is the body of cultural-historical-theoretical-interpretive work created by N Katherine Hayles.

[83] For related conceptualisations, see Peters (2013), the creative university, and Haiven (2014: 150-152), the university of the commons.

3. The education state and the centrality of policy for arts, culture and heritage

‘those unwritt’n, or at least unconstraining laws of vertuous education, religious and civill nurture […] the bonds and ligaments of the Commonwealth, the pillars and sustainers of every writt’n Statute’ (Milton, 1644/1974: 219)

We humans live within complex networks of exchange and transmission, which include many kinds of economy and forms of society. If Western governments currently understand these networks from within an economic frame of reference, with the effect that “society exists to serve our economy”, understanding them from the perspective of the humanities is based on the opposing position, that “our economy exists to serve our society.” While humanities knowledge has economic effects and value (even if uncounted), its proper role is to maintain, refresh and re-think a society’s founding principles, beliefs, laws, customs and values, the position affirmed by Milton when he places culture at the foundations of the formal ordering and regulation of society and economy. This placing of knowledge identifies what has to change for humanities knowledge to be perceived as relevant to democratic governments and societies in the twenty-first century. This chapter and the next will propose that a postmodern state operating on a democratic premise must give priority to functions, structures and institutions which sustain the cultural foundations of democratic participation, life-long learning and creative practice, and which provide public access to means of understanding the complexities of social, economic and cultural evolution. Rethinking the positioning of cultural, media and educational institutions in government policies for knowledge and innovation, and rethinking the term humanities as inclusive of all knowledge and enquiry related to the question, What does it mean to be human?, or to the idea of humanity, is fundamental to accomplishing a fully human-focussed rather than a reductively economy-focussed democratic society. Such a review would leave no component of these institutional relationships, least of all the modern humanities, unchanged. But the compelling motive would be to entrench a conception of

the role and core responsibilities of the state derived from the creative and innovative citizen, not the market, and to open an opportunity for the humanities and the cultural agencies of the state and civil society to assert and redefine their intrinsic value to society, which are currently suppressed by the dominance of business conceptions of value and the conventions of knowledge creation and validation derived from modern science and its technocratic and bureaucratic extensions.

The previous chapter sought to locate the parameters according to which a new humanities as an evolving body of expert knowledge would both shape and be shaped by the conditions for creating knowledge in postmodernity, and would contribute to the reconceptualising of the university as a critical component in humanity's evolved systems for creating and evaluating knowledge. Rather than being thought of as two opposing cultures, the sciences and the humanities were presented as complementary modes of acquiring knowledge, based on the distinctive differences of their objects of study and analysis, and the methods and outcomes of that intellectual work. At the most advanced levels of humanistic enquiry into the meaning of texts, theoretical difficulty is one index of the conceptual complexity required to understand and interpret as fully as possible the real complexity of a culture's texts. In other words, textual complexity (of the texts studied and the texts produced from that study) is the most complete expression and index of human complexity.

Reciprocally, how does this advanced and highly sophisticated textual/intellectual work move and have effects in the world beyond the institutional site of its creation, most typically the university, but also cultural institutions, research centres and the private spaces of the independent scholar/thinker? How should those effects be valued? The humanities lack the shortcut through the economy to estimates of value which is available to scientific and technological knowledge (even though this lack is principally a matter of how contributions to the economy have historically been counted[1]). For knowledge of any kind to have public value it must be disseminated throughout the I-space, and ultimately to individuals wherever they might be located in a specific relation to humanity's collective knowledge. Expert knowledge participates in social flows of knowledge of all kinds, and is modified and put to unexpected uses in social spaces remote from its origin.

But because the fundamental work performed by humanities knowledge is the transformation through learning of singular minds, modes and sites of dissemination are of critical importance. For the former, the expert work of a new humanities must be able to speak in diverse registers, languages and media. A point made by Sarat about the education of lawyers, that it "should include the cultivation of a meaningful appreciation of the law as a rhetorical practice – not just as an art of persuasion, but as a disciplined, textured, self-directed habit of reading, speaking and, above all, writing, that has at its root a critical understanding of the links among language, consciousness, and power" (2010: 4), needs to be extended to all those acquiring advanced knowledge in the humanities. Dissemination from this perspective is not popularisation if thought of as "dumbing down", but a matter of employing appropriate rhetorics and media channels so that the meaning and value of expert knowledge can be rendered accessible to the diverse publics constituting a democratic society, and can participate in the universal project of enlarging human knowledge as a public project to which all can contribute.[2] Sites of dissemination are the myriad settings where minds educated humanistically are engaged in interpretive work, and where humanistic knowledge informs decision-making and social action. The public sphere (however compromised by corporate control of communications media) is therefore the primary domain of circulation for humanities knowledge, with readers and writers connecting in many different permutations of affiliations, interests, orientations, educational experience, media forms and public involvement. Most experts can only be experts in a small area of knowledge, and otherwise are like any other member of the public, afloat in the I-space.

But, specifically, how can humanists communicate with government, when the discourse of government is technocratic while humanist discourse emphasises principles, histories, singular minds and cultural identities? Treating the problem as rhetorical requires the humanist to know how to interpret and use the objectivist and quantitative conventions for representing knowledge shared by government officials and scientists without being bound by those conventions. Miller and Judice (2002: 3) make the latter point explicit when they set out the terms on which their analysis of cultural policy is undertaken: "Whereas our project is concerned with transforming the social order, the alternative seeks to replicate it – a struggle between cultural

policy as transformative versus a functionalist sphere. Our starting points are therefore theory, history and politics, rather than efficiency, effectiveness, and description." Having to be explicit is in its own way confirmation of the dominant paradigm for cultural policy formation and its exemplification in public sector discourse. Public sector technocratic discourse is itself an acculturated discourse with an embedded value system and modes of subject construction, and its political function is to serve as a means for negotiating with apparent neutrality among competing interests. Of course, understanding what is at stake for public sector workers does not necessarily remove the discursive barrier, since it has two sides.

It is instructive to consider a perspective on the manifold difficulties in managing a crossing of domains between academic research and (cultural) policy formation from a position in the social sciences. As Belfiore (2009) argues, even if the discourse conventions are similar, the political dimension remains problematic. Her essay on the topic of bullshit (taken to mean indifference to how things really are and the cultivation of vested interests (343)) locates many aspects of the power relations which largely determine the nature and content of the flows of knowledge from research agencies to government and business, including the way research agendas and outcomes are influenced by government policy and bureaucratic technologies ("the set of rules and regulations that are in force for […] the public sector" (351). Her clear distinction between research and advocacy ("advocacy [is] a fully legitimate enterprise, but one completely distinct and, ideally, separate from genuinely explorative research" (354)), is a corollary of the position that social research can and should be fully distanced from political entanglements, whether disciplinary or governmental, and that it is the different discursive and rhetorical requirements for formulating and disseminating knowledge (at bottom, knowing how to lie) in policy domains which present the core problem. Genuine research is to be identified by language which "describes reality correctly" (349), in contrast, for example, not only to politicised discourse but also to "the intentional obscurity and impenetrability of a certain portion of academic writing" (352). Here the multiple exclusions of the humanities as a source of expert knowledge appear; the humanities discipline which is typically taken to meet the discursive requirement to describe reality correctly is history, but even that is now flawed by conceptual terminologies which, in Belfiore's account, are

not required to penetrate and understand complexity but only serve to mystify. From the perspective of "the rules and regulations" governing thought in the public sector, the humanities can offer only positioned accounts of reality as perceived through the medium of texts and which therefore lack evidential force; they occupy the same semiotic space as culture, outside the current bureaucratic systems for measurement and attribution of value. The issue, then, is not how humanities knowledge can be applied to social purposes, that is, to understanding and advocacy, but what are the conditions required for such applications to be granted the same kind of evidential authority as is knowledge created within a system organised and formalised to "describe reality correctly", and what kinds of discourse can adequately mediate between research generating knowledge as such and the multiple social settings (including but not limited to the economy) where that knowledge may be of use?

Belfiore offers an answer of a kind to this question in a reference to (for me) a more constructive way of thinking about political speech, that it is "a proactive strategic communication, meant not to hide a truth or reality or to divert from a particular responsibility, but to create or manage an impression" (351). This seems to me an excellent account of the way in which discourses seeking to shape thought in relation to knowledge, values, histories and interests in a politicised society function constructively. It can also be taken as a statement about how an artist communicates, noting that key terms in the statement – proactive, strategic and impression - can together orient a conception of the purpose of communication not towards "truth or reality" directly but towards the new, the future, the "what if" or the "about-to-become", which are not yet states of reality but in the disposition of which collective and individual thinking play a crucial role.[3] In this way, the arts (and the humanities) are clearly more closely aligned to politics than to the empirical sciences in their relation to reality and truth. That this mode of relation is not valued in the conduct of democratic states says a very great deal about misrecognition in government and the political class about the kinds of work they do with knowledge. It also points to the failure of the modern humanities to formulate an evolving account of the functions of humanistic enquiry among the expanding and diverse kinds of knowledge active in industrial and now post-industrial, democratic societies, and a

portfolio of models of effective discursive engagement with diverse audiences and agencies of the state[4].

I have argued in Chapter Two that one of the critical parameters distinguishing humanities from scientific knowledge is its local origin; however much it would aim to address global conditions and issues, it remains marked by the territorial, historical, linguistic and cultural contexts of its production. The local is also the scene of ethnic and religious conflict, war, racism, economic oppression, crime, exploitation of socially powerless men, women and children, the scene of the worst that human beings (especially organised in groups) can do. And it is reproduced in the virtual locals constituted by networked communications systems. There is nothing inherently better or worse about the local in comparison to the national or the global dimensions of the life world. The difference is that developing an account of humanity in postmodernity, and therefore a new humanities which is capable of most completely articulating that account, must begin and end with the singular citizen mind in its knowledgable encounters with the given world, other minds and the social worlds humans have made. It must weave together the most local of times and places, the singular point of origin of each human person, the birth time and place, birth family and mother tongue, and the evolution of singular minds composing themselves from and being composed by the collectively conserved and reproduced systems of cultural knowledge in a life-long process of learning and creative thinking. It will be framed by history and the determining but not absolute power of social institutions, now especially the nation-state in the larger context of international structures of law, finance and telecommunications. I intend this emphasis on the origin and evolution of the singular mind to invert the current emphasis on the economy as the origin of everything human and social, even though it will undoubtedly seem counterintuitive and even simply counterfactual. To think and perceive from the perspective of the humanities is to regard the economy as a subset of the social[5], everywhere marked by cultural knowledge because every transaction classified as economic is embedded in ideologies, social rules, laws, conventions, institutions and inheritances, the most typical effect of which is, currently, to condemn a large part of the world's population to poverty so that some can enjoy excessive wealth. The human life world as perceived and experienced outside the reductive and globalised space and time of the international airport, the mall,

the techno-scientific research centre and the gated community[6], is a world circumscribed by the dense specifics of location and history while participating through communications media and the movement of peoples in the differences of elsewhere and the unpredictable imagining and thinking that awareness of elsewhere can generate.

1. Going Back to Go Forward

The counter claim to the dominance of techno-scientific knowledge in government policy has been made repeatedly by humanist organisations and humanistic thinkers as the technosciences have risen to their dominant position, and one of their branches, economics, has become the official discourse of democratic governments. One version of the counter claim will serve to stand for all. Deryck Schreuder (1995: xii-xiii), then President of the Australian Academy of the Humanities and on the occasion of the Academy's Silver Jubilee affirmed that, "for all their so-called irrelevance and lack of utility […] the humanities actually provide the possibility of renewing the very well-springs of our open society and culture." In its context, the Australian Academy of the Humanities' response to the Federal Government of Australia's publication of *Creative Nation,* this claim is part of a succinctly detailed summary of the ways in which humanities knowledge work makes a fundamental contribution to society and government. The Academy, like those in other democratic nations facing the force of the neoliberal storm, has done much to assist its professional cadre to think differently about the value of their knowledge work and its social applications, and to attempt to modify official thinking. But, as the Academy's symposia indicate, this has so far been a largely unrewarding and unrewarded struggle, as academics have been drawn into research assessment exercises and the criteria for measuring research impact have valued a scientific modality of research and the commercialisation/commodification of knowledge, and the humanities have remained on the margins in public policies for knowledge and innovation.

A moment's recollection. In 1976, the philosopher Stuart Hampshire gave the 22nd Fawley Foundation Lecture, *Knowledge and the Future*. It is worth noting that this lecture series at the University of Southampton was founded

by the Esso Petroleum Company in 1953 on the premise that "the future of this nation and of mankind is closely linked with the relationship between science and industry". As with H. G. Barnett's study of innovation discussed in Chapter Two, it is refreshing to be able to stand back from the clamour of present interests and to observe another way of thinking about the relation between knowledge creation and the future of humanity than that focussed on innovation in the context of economic policy-making.

For Hampshire, understanding knowledge and the purposes served by creating it is positioned historically: "after the three hundred years of scientific advance and historical scholarship [self-knowledge and self-understanding] are the condition of the development of the species. We have to plough back accumulated knowledge into the strengthening of intelligence in all its forms, into an assisted evolution of the species" (1976: 16). Knowledge creation is thus not the progressive displacement of the old by the new but the progressive accumulation (a semiosphere in Lotman's terms) by means of which humanity intervenes intentionally in the course of its own evolution. And all knowledge has potential for this purpose.

One could remark ironically that only some forms of intelligence have been massively strengthened in the 40 years since Hampshire gave this lecture. It is a clear marker of discursive change that he does not use the terms innovation or knowledge society or cultural policy; but he is deeply concerned about the critical role of knowledge in humanity's ability to chart its future and about what he perceived then as the imbalance or disproportion in public policies towards the sciences over the arts. His concern is not only about the high levels of investment in the sciences in contrast to the arts, but also about the degree of public recognition given to the respective contributions of the sciences and the arts to the ability of humanity to survive the conditions for planetary life which human actions have overwhelmingly brought about, in the name of the modern Western project for the rational management of nature (including human nature) for human betterment through science and technology.

He locates the ultimate origin of new knowledge in the "the perpetual restlessness of the mind, reviewing its own stocks of knowledge, and in the course of this, putting the stocks of knowledge in a new order, which opens

up new inquiries. This is the power of invention and discovery, also the power of the imagination" (4). This humanistic emphasis is not an argument for a romantic conception of individual genius, but instead accepts that there is a necessary tension between singularity and institutionality, the unpredictable and the governed, at the heart of modern knowledge creation, which he calls "the principal wound in modern culture" (6). While "new knowledge depends on ideas from different disciplines being connected within a single mind" (15), it is also the case that "of its nature, knowledge advances by the division of labour, by ever-increasing specialisation" (5), a wound already observed in Pynchon's *The Crying of Lot 49* (1965/2000: 61) as the "nightmare" of work in the new high-technology research and development firm where the singular, inventive mind is subordinated to corporate plans and project strategies. Supporting Pynchon's analysis, Hampshire writes that "We cannot plan invention […]. In so far as we could plan the work of the imagination, we should not think of it as the imagination; […] talent and genius, whether in the arts or sciences, are both unpredictable and uncontrollable" (6). He does not privilege a type of knowledge, but accepts that the knowledge spectrum represented by the terms science and arts demarcates the space within which the creation of new knowledge can occur. As I have already demonstrated, this is not the basic assumption of innovation policy thinking, even although "the work of the imagination" is now generally claimed under the term "creativity" for the sciences as well as the arts.[7]

For a government attempting to find its way to effective policies underpinning the development of an innovative knowledge society in New Zealand, Hampshire sets up a critical issue. There is a sense in which the fundamental terms on which such a knowledge society is to be premised are irrational, embedded in the contingencies of minds, histories and cultures, and human creative and sociable capabilities which are realised most extensively in the means and media of cultural formation and practice. An innovation policy which would seek to answer the question, what should the content of innovative thinking be?, will inevitably fail, for the simple reason that innovative thinking by definition takes a singular mind "beyond the information given" (to use the title of a book of essays by Jerome Bruner (1973) which captured my attention when it was first published), in directions the sources of which may be detectable retrospectively but cannot

be prescribed in advance. Much knowledge policy and administrative practice in effect attempts to anticipate the outcomes of thought, especially within disciplinary and institutional contexts; but this is because institutional, disciplinary and governmental objectives are now based on claims that their work in these fields is distinguished by being inherently innovative and because administering investment is manageable when the recipients are organisations rather than individuals. It is notorious that true innovation (making a difference in thought rather than making a different thing) is often unrecognisable to systems designed to manage the production of knowledge either as such, in research, or through the link between policy and the application of public funding. Put another way, outcomes of thought that might have market value are literally and metaphorically the business of the private sector to implement (but also the public sector where the public interest is so great that public funding, and even public management of that funding, can be justified). As I have already noted in discussing the issue of open access to knowledge, if public investment in knowledge returns a profit, then that profit should return to the public.

At its core innovation in knowledge is a direct function of the ability of each mind to work in combinatory and aleatory ways with the resources at its disposal. It is necessary to look beyond the institutional and political ordering of knowledge to the conditions required for minds to be "restless" and for the deliberated and designed evolution of humanity to be chosen rather than imposed. Whether knowledge is tacit, informal, or formal, expressed in practices, semiotic representations, or formally objectified records (databases, text books, disciplines, laws), its application requires imaginative engagement as the primary means of exploring and envisaging its extension from either its abstract formulation or its previous contexts of use.

The steps in the argument of this chapter and the next are focussed by the primary social institutions which provide the sites for the transmission of knowledge between generations and the learning necessary to sustain a democratic and innovative society. I will use "education" as a term locating the common work or function of this broad spectrum of institutions, only some of which are formally charged with educating, and "education state" as the term for a mode of government which derives its primary rationale from this social function. I will use "cultural policy" as the term for the

fundamental policy focus of such a state, and argue that a new humanities would provide the integrative framework of knowledge for such policy formation. Instead of the economy, the quality of the city as the most representative collective human creation, and the quality of Parliament as the representative site of public decision-making in a nation-state, would become the litmus tests of the democratic state's understanding of its responsibility to the public(s) of the nation it is established to govern.[8]

I have argued in Chapter Two that current academic divisions of humanities disciplines based on the traditional triad of literature, history, and philosophy, multiplied by national languages and cultures, and crossed by the nineteenth and twentieth centuries' evolution of media technologies, no longer serve as an adequate representation of either the expert work of the humanities or its social purposes, or how expertise in humanistic knowledge is to be developed. If a new (or re-constituted) humanities is needed in order that humanities knowledge can engage productively in the public interest with the conditions of postmodernity, so is a new (or re-constituted) conception of the state needed in order that this productivity can be recognised and put to collective use and benefit by the agencies of the state. A postmodern knowledge society must give priority to structures and institutions which provide for life-long learning and participatory citizenship. (Re)thinking cultural, media and educational institutions is fundamental to accomplishing a human-focussed rather than an economy-focussed democratic society, in which the distinctive role of democratic government is manifested in the way public policy formation is directed towards open thinking about the possibilities for society to-come and the complex of values underpinning it, and in the means available to citizens to acquire new knowledge and participate in that enquiry into the future through accessible channels of communication and manifold forms of collective action.

2. An education state

What kind of a democratic state would be needed to make cultural policy foundational, rather than marginal, to fulfilling its core responsibilities to the people it governs? Recovery of the idea of democratic governance and its more complete implementation depends upon a profound shift in the centre of

gravity in nation states now claiming to be democracies, away from the economy and the cluster of interests it brings together and towards educating and learning as the primary focus of public policy. This does not mean that the human interests and needs ideally satisfied by the economy are not of primary concern to most citizens; it does mean that a government responsible for the health and well-being of a whole society needs to ground its policy-making in an integrated conception of the human person in sociable relations with others. Such a conception cannot be unitary or universal, since it must accommodate human diversity in its local and global manifestations, not least the ancient diversity of the life stages of the human being (the "seven ages of man").[9] There is as profound a disjunction between the long developmental time-frame of the human person and the short policy time-frame of the economy as there is between the institutions focussed on the care of the person in society and those focussed only on economic transactions in a market.[10] The restriction of focus in the latter both concentrates social, political and money power in them and, in so far as institutions which care for society's dependents (children, the poor, the sick and the aged) have to participate in the economy, imposes the cultural formation of organisations in business and industry (and especially the profit motive) on them.

Formal education is responsible for transmitting the common stock of knowledge as a particular society defines it at a particular time, and is the means by which a society provides, beyond the family, for the core learning and experiences needed for its new generations to carry out personally and collectively the reproduction and adaptive transformation of their society. Because of the mix and diversity of values, belief systems, histories, and moralities in any postmodern society, there is an inevitably political dimension to education, a dimension disguised by the present technocratic approach to curriculum content, policy and administration and the dominant influence of business interests in the name of the economy. Any approach to education which begins with the singular person (initially as a child in their local context of a place and its history and their inheritance of familial values and social positioning) has to incorporate a framework for negotiating diversity that is both collectively agreed and aware of internationally formulated expectations for the conduct of democratic societies. The state is, in this respect, crucially important not only for implementing such expectations to which it accedes on behalf of its citizens, but also for

ensuring that they understand the meaning and purpose of these expectations as they are expressed, for example, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

Learning about what is known and creating new knowledge, reading and writing in any medium and language, valuing and evaluating, experiencing, deciding and acting are primary characteristics of a humanistic relation to knowledge, which is progressive (if it is) by being recursive, and dependent for its scope on the extent and quality of access to the contents of the semiosphere. Knowledge known like this constitutes common sense as well as academic humanities; it is tested experientially with and against others, and it participates in the governing of society by its members through the myriad of fora, formal and informal groupings, and media systems which sustain discursive variety and facilitate collective action. Humanistic knowledge is the outcome of singular minds engaged in the continuous (re)formulation and critique of norms, mores, laws, inherited and new knowledge and accumulated information, according to cultural, political and academic protocols.

From an economic perspective on policy, culture can be framed as entertainment (the arts, heritage, media content, sport, and tourism), media as technology, and education as a means of disciplining young people to accept the will of the market and those who control access to employment. By contrast, a humanistic perspective sees these three distinct policy domains as together critical in providing the means by which truly self-governing citizens generate the vitality and shape the direction of their society. There is nothing natural about the concept "self-governing citizen", just as there is nothing natural about the concept "democratic society". Both are cultural constructs,[11] formed and endlessly revised over time in social action and institutional change. From the perspective of the citizen, de Certeau defines a bottom line in reflecting on the events of May 1968: a democratic society "has to allow everyone to *exist*, to be different in his or her very relation with others, to be able to create (and to become other than oneself) in a collaboration defined as an inventive process" (1998: 46; author's emphasis). Reciprocally, for a democratic society to exist and persist, its citizens must be educated to understand their rights and responsibilities, freedoms and duties, as these are both protected and articulated by

democratic government through its public sector and parliamentary expressions, and by civil society, the intrinsic value of their cultural inheritances, and the use of information and communications media to engage in the conversation of society about itself, its pasts (actual and might have been), its present and its possible (and impossible) futures.

There are many different fields and flows of discussion and critique which bear upon these matters. One dimension is a complex politics of knowledge; just as the humanities are marginalised in current accounts of the value of knowledge in innovation and the governance of society, so public education is reduced to becoming a neocolonial domain of business and the market[12] with the misconceived principal roles of shaping people of all ages to meet the needs of rapidly and unpredictably changing work places[13] and of competing at the top end of the research-led knowledge economy.[14] In much official thinking, education is not conceived of as a fundamental social and cultural function, complementary to the family as the principal means by which society provides for its continuance and transformation through time and for the fundamental learning of its children and adults over the human life-span, but as fragments reconstituted as a system by their relation to the needs of the economy for labour and materials, the two now convergent in the figure of the knowledge worker.[15] Of course, "the needs of the economy" is a handy abstraction disguising the micro-level control exercised by the private sector over most citizens through access to paid work and therefore to the common means of life in post-industrial societies. A rebalancing of this now most unequal distribution of social power could begin with the introduction of a universal basic income. For all these reasons I will place at the heart of this discussion, not the economy, but the generative power of singular minds, cultures and languages and the human collectivities which create and are sustained by them.

The complexity of the issues linking education to economic development, on the one hand, and what could be called democratic development, on the other, is challenging, especially because neoliberalism, the dominant ideology still shaping conceptions of economy in government and business in democratic societies, is itself now fundamentally challenged both by alternative ways of thinking about society, economy, and humanity's place in the planet's ecosystem, and by its obvious failures for the majority of

humanity.[16] Nonetheless, neoliberalism's skeletal model of the state and the citizen continue to be entrenched in social thinking through government policies and legislation, media representation, the dominance of the business and finance sectors of society as political interest groups, and curriculum change in the formal education system (McCarthy, 2011). A striking, local example is the continuing failure of New Zealand governments to include economic, social and cultural rights in the New Zealand Bill of Rights (Opie, 2012).

Besley (2008: 4) observes that, in public policy discourse in the late 1990s, "Education is reconfigured as a massively undervalued form of knowledge capital that will determine the future of work, of knowledge institutions, the formulation of education policy and the shape of society in the years to come." That this reconfiguring is a political much more than an economic issue is implied in the reference to the future "shape of society", and is made explicit in her affirmation that

> the Left must customise or indigenise the concept of education for social democratic politics. To do this we must return to the history of education rights in the early documents of human rights and renew its ethos as a basis for the new society. […] Above all, we must re-establish education as a minimum welfare right and global public good. (7)

Against the abstract universalism of neoliberal economics, the market and technocratic social management, education is positioned, like citizens of a democracy, as an intersection between local, national and global forms of knowledge and experience, languages and ethnicities, histories and cultures, a social site in which exchanges and negotiations between values, traditions, beliefs, formal and informal knowledge, modes of learning and teaching, public and private purposes and goals, are carried on differently according to the specifics of the place in which educating and learning occur.

While any society will have an economy or economies (legitimate, black, and criminal), an economy does not as a reflex produce a just and humane society based on equality of the right to participate in its governance and equality of the responsibility to advance collective interests.[17] A telling

example is provided by William Gibson's stories of the future imagined from the 1980s, like "New Rose Hotel" (1987: 103-116), in which the state has disappeared, ruthless competition between high-tech corporations and policing by criminal organisations determine the conditions for social life, the elite live segregated from the rest of the population, and human relations are characterised by competitiveness, individualism, and mistrust.[18] As God in the late fifteenth-century morality play *Everyman* noted when surveying human society, "In worldely riches is all their mind: […] now one wolde by envy another up ete" (Coldewey, 1993: 46), a view which has recently been restated in films like *Fahrenheit 9/11*(2004), *Margin Call* (2011) and *The Big Short* (2015).

My argument is that the principal role of the state in a democratic society, the sustaining and advancing of its democratic qualities, can be better articulated from the perspective of education than the economy, in a nation-state or some equivalent territorial unit in which people are connected by histories, cultures and languages which have evolved together in that place over time. Democratic societies are remarkable social innovations, "complex mental ecologies" (Mulgan 1998: 113) realised through collaboration and contest, however imperfectly, in continuously evolving institutions and collective social action and dependent on the quality of their citizens' education for their ability to make actual the ideals and principles on which they are founded.

3. Becoming an education state

What if education rather than the economy or security provided the fundamental rationale of democratic government? What if the state were to become an education state at its core, in which educational rather than economic development were its primary function?

The concept of the education state has been advanced by Olssen, Codd and O'Neill in a wide-ranging study, *Education Policy: Globalization, Citizenship and Democracy* which was intended to critique the dominance of neoliberal economic theory in public policy and legislation and to reaffirm the fundamental importance of universal public education in the sustaining of

a democratic society in a globalising world order. The study adopts "a democratic model which, while it would seek to preserve and protect the important principles of liberal constitutionalism, locates these within a communitarian context, where they are allied to a concept of social inclusion and trust. Only such a model […] can support a conception of education as a public good. In its turn, education […] is seen as pivotal to the construction of a democratic society, and for the model of citizenship that such a conception implies" (Olssen et al. 2004: 15). Key components of the model of democratic and multicultural citizenship are interdependence, collective action based on reflective thought, mutual equal respect and open deliberation at local, regional, national, and global levels, and the existence of channels, mediums and forums facilitating discussion and conflict resolution. They argue that what "legitimizes the state's authority is its own subjection to the democratic principles that empower it to act", and that without "norms of trust and responsibility […] markets cannot prosper and democracy cannot survive" (275).

Reconceptualising the democratic state as an education state is necessary if democratic principles are to be taken as the fundamental directive of government policy in democratic societies. For a society to be democratic, all of its citizens must be knowledgable in democratic principles and active in their practice, qualities which are only acquired by education and experience. The formal curriculum must ensure that all citizens-to-be learn enough to know how to operate society's political, financial, economic and legal systems, and to assess expert opinion[19]. A state which does not ensure that all of its citizens have equal access to the opportunity to acquire these qualities, and to exercise them, has failed in its most fundamental responsibility. The social settings in which these learning opportunities are made available are communal, including all the sites of formal education, but they are most fully represented in the diversity of institutions and forms of social interaction provided by the city.[20] "Citizen" is a more expansive identity than "consumer" or "client" (Alford, 2011: 145), or "worker",[21] conferring the right and the responsibility to participate in the whole spectrum of activities and processes which enable a complex society to evolve, adapt to circumstance, and assist all its members to accomplish their goals (for themselves and for the society of which they are members) according to their cultural inheritance and in negotiation with others.[22] For

Cara, Landry and Lawson (1998: 33-35), "The learning city is a complex creation. It strives to develop new networks of co-operative working that will secure the place of learning at the centre of social and economic regeneration. [… Cities] are learning that only a more active democracy which enables citizens to make and remake the communities in which they live and work can sustain their future."[23]

How do citizens come to understand how to live humanely in a complex, postmodern society? If the family is the primary social institution for inducting new generations into society, it is clearly unable by itself to do more than initiate this process. That it matters so much is clear from the attempts to discipline families which, like failed states, are unable to fulfil the increasingly burdensome expectations of governments which are at the same time withdrawing from taking responsibility for social failure, even when that failure is a consequence of social histories of inequality perpetuated or intensified by laws and government actions which are beyond the ability of families (and now many states) to alter.

What do citizens in a postmodern, globalising democracy need to know – about themselves, the economic and political forces shaping their society, their rights and responsibilities as citizens, the shape(s) of the future available to thought and action - in order to realise the possibilities open (and closed) to them for humane living? To what extent can governments be expected to care at all about the circumstances of the singular citizen when, despite the premises on which democratic societies are ordered, it is those who can aggregate power (and especially money power) across nation state borders to whom democratic governments are currently most responsive? My argument throughout this book is that, from the perspective of the humanities, it is the situation of the singular and sovereign citizen (but perhaps especially the citizen who is also socially classified as a criminal) who provides the test of the democratic qualities of a particular society. And, high on the audit list is the education system as the primary source of knowledge and understanding about how to live humanely in the world as it is and as it could and should be. An education state is one committed to ensuring that its citizens have access to the knowledge they need to live well as citizens, knowledge which can only be acquired progressively as children become adults and assume adult responsibilities and roles. Such knowledge is finally

an account for that time and in that society of what it means to be human; it cannot be provided or acquired only through a formally constituted curriculum (although some agreement on knowledge all must have is needed in the public or formal education system), because all kinds of experiences and relationships contribute to each person's understanding of themselves and their world. But the state must take responsibility for ensuring that there is open access to knowledge about all aspects of the functioning of society, including its history (cultural, social, political, economic), its laws, its institutions, its media, how it is governed, its military and police functions, how its wealth is managed and distributed, how it changes over time and the role of citizens in this process of adaptation and innovation. Its citizens are the fundamental resource of a democratic state, not to be exploited for profit but through understanding to contribute in singular and collaborative ways to advancing the interests of society as a whole.

Democratic societies are formally based on the claim to sovereignty by each citizen and on the citizen's grant of the right to violence to the state in return for protection from violence by others – individuals or groups in the same society, or other states. But, as has been often observed, the state can use this grant of power to confer benefits and make laws which are against the greater public interest.[24] The (failed) war on drugs and the now vastly over-developed military, surveillance and penal apparatus maintained by democratic societies and justified by it are currently compelling examples of the failure of the short cut to solving complex social, political and economic problems which law-making and police systems have come to represent.

I am not so simple minded as to think that the myriad forms assumed by inequality and evil can ever be finally abolished. As Milton wrote, "Good and evill we know in the field of this World grow up together almost inseparably, and the knowledge of good is so involv'd and interwoven with the knowledge of evill, and in so many resemblances hardly to be discern'd" (1644/1974: 212). But a fundamental purpose of an education state must be to use its powers to create the conditions in which as much equality, and as much good, as is possible at a particular point in a society's democratic evolution can be realised. When the law-making function of government supersedes its educational function, when the belief becomes dominant in Parliament that all that is needed to bring about social change is to pass laws

to meet the requirements of powerful groups within society, the disciplinary aspect of the state's responsibilities and powers becomes increasingly dominant, distorted and compromised. Social order depends upon the perception of equality under the law. When the dependence of the state on an agreement with its citizens that the duty to pay tax is reciprocal with the duty to ensure access to universal public services is forgotten, the ability of the state to maintain the assent of its citizens to its decisions declines and the bonds between citizens and state which make democratic government possible, represented most directly by the rule of law, become increasingly fragile. The quality of the lives of citizens depends largely on the fair management and provision of collective public goods, which citizens alone cannot provide for themselves and among which social order sustained by law is fundamental.

It is worthwhile keeping in mind a comment by St Paul that "where there is no law, there is no transgression" (Romans 4.15). In the rush to make laws, especially laws undoing the legislation of a previous government and laws favouring a (powerful) segment of society, the political class threatens belief in the rule of law as the foundation for democratic social order. And, as Milton observed (in the epigraph to this chapter), the law can be effective only if it operates in a context of informed consent and self-discipline, which is acquired through education and experience. Consent becomes replaced by policing and coercion when the operation of the law is neither fair nor just, and when it is perceived to lack those qualities by the diverse publics which make up a postmodern democracy. Only an education state is capable of thinking insightfully through the issues raised by the problematic of social discipline in ways which foreground knowledge marked by culture and the singularity of each citizen; both sources of knowledge are subject to the law and yet exceed its scope, providing a principal source of critique of existing laws and innovation in law-making.

Ultimately the educational and police functions of the state are two sides of the same coin, either complementing and extending the function of the family or disciplining those who fail to meet society's expectations even when society is the source of the failure. In our present (dis)order, democratic societies have become increasingly punitive and controlling, the powers of the state used for surveillance and remote disciplining of its citizens in a

mirror image of the surveillance and disciplining of the consumer by business and finance.

The education state, then, takes education rather than the economy, democratic institutions and citizenship rather than the technoscience-business nexus, learning rather than policing, as the lens through which it views its field of action and values knowledge and learning. Because it governs a postmodern (knowledge) society, the education state concerns itself with much more than the provision of formal education in the policy present. It must think together all public institutions which make it possible for a citizen to acquire knowledge, the social institutions and technological infrastructures of society which facilitate the exchange and sharing of knowledge, the uses of knowledge in society and the economy, and the laws and decision-making processes required for citizens in their cultural and political diversity to participate productively in the governance of their society. The timeframe for policy formation is measured in terms both of responsibility to future generations and of the human life-span, rather than the nano-second timeframe of the financial markets.

Society continues because of the human capacity to educate and be educated throughout a life-time, the exchange and revisioning of knowledge and information of all kinds being the primary condition for social survival and adaptation. The more complex a society becomes, the more complex are its systems for conservation, exchange and review of what it knows collectively, and the more specialised is individual knowledge at the level of expert practice. The knowledge society conceived of in economic/commercial terms is a reductive representation of the I-space of postmodern societies, serving sectional purposes and locating a politics of knowledge at the heart of government. The policy question in the education state would not be, How can education more effectively produce workers and consumers?, but, How can education more effectively assist the growth of citizens of a democratic society in which work and consumption, like family life, health and well-being, access to knowledge and information, and the freedom to participate in that society's decision-making processes, are closely linked to its core values and their on-going evolution? How do citizens learn to participate deliberately in that evolution, facilitated in an education state through an open and unending public conversation and contest (a core value in itself)

over their understanding and application in the context of changing relations within that society and between it and other societies and the natural world?

It is not exaggerating to think of the situation of formal education over the past three decades as one of continual crisis, in which an education system is constrained to fit a model which conforms to the interests of a powerful segment of society but is incapable of accounting for the complex work a formal education system has to do on the behalf of society as a whole. It seems to be generally agreed that the recent period of drastic reform of New Zealand - socially, governmentally, economically – according to neoliberal principles has not produced the economic benefits (at least for the majority of the population) which were the proclaimed purpose of the reforms and were to provide compensation for the stress of structural change. The tensions within the nineteenth century concept of development - in which citizens of a young, recently colonial society are particularly embedded - between a singular focus on the exploitation of colonised territories for wealth and an inclusive conception of moral, social, intellectual and economic improvement (development as civilising) seem to have been currently if insecurely resolved internationally in favour of a singular focus on wealth-creation. Such a resolution, effected by the new imperialism of global financial institutions, places extraordinary pressures upon democratic governments in nations which continue to accept that they have responsibilities towards their citizens and their histories. In Aotearoa New Zealand, I would argue that it is the process, instituted in the mid-1970s, of acceptance by the state of responsibility for the effects of colonisation on the indigenous Māori people and the incorporation into New Zealand's (unwritten) constitution of the Treaty of Waitangi (signed between the Crown and Māori in 1840) as the founding document of modern Aotearoa New Zealand, which has brought into focus the local complexity of the global situation. Nation-building, one role of the modern democratic state, is, in this respect, a process of local cultural formation and intercultural negotiation, grounded in the specifics of histories and peoples. A perspective grounded in cultural knowledge provides a better conceptualisation of the role of education in an innovative society than does the current, much more limited perspective offered by technoscience, business and the economy.

If, as I am arguing, education is first and foremost the social process of transferring between generations non-genetic knowledge and information of fundamental importance to the maintenance and adaptive development of society (of which the economy is but a part), then it is an activity carried out by all social institutions concerned with the conservation, renewal, interpretation and dissemination of society's stocks of knowledge, and all citizens. While some institutions are privileged at present (those holding and generating intellectual property, for example), a model of a knowledge society which is also an innovative society and not just a profit-generating one must be grounded in a universal conception of knowledge creation and exchange as an intrinsic human activity. Having the ability and the means to communicate something one has thought or learned to someone who has not had that thought can have unpredictable and transformative consequences for the recipient and for society. It is the ground of cultural and social innovation, much broader processes than innovation for the economy but the seed-bed for innovation as product development. As Barnett wrote, the ground of innovation lies in an individual's cultural inventory, which grows by learning, observation, experience, analysis and reflection, and the mental work carried out both privately and in association with others. Because no-one can predict what might generate transformative thought, a society understanding the importance of new ways of thinking would ensure that access to the sources of thought in inherited and new knowledge were as open as possible – both in the sense of access to repositories and communications media, and of access to competent guides to the breadth and diversity of human knowledge. The richer the diversity of information and encounter, the richer the inventory and the potential for innovation.

A useful model of what is at stake here in the education of the citizen is provided by Gardner, who has identified five "minds" necessary for the sustainable evolution of humanity.[25] They locate aspects of the mental formation of the citizen of a democratic state at the same time as they offer a model of what it means to be human:

- the disciplined mind, which is schooled in basic subjects but also a master of a profession, vocation or craft
- the synthesising mind, which makes sense of disparate and complex information

- the creating mind, which asks new questions and finds imaginative answers
- the respectful mind, which appreciates and engages with different cultures
- the ethical mind, which enables responsible behaviour as a citizen.

While this list of qualities is admirably humanistic, the "five minds" need to be supplemented by adding two more: the political mind, which crosses this representation of the singular (good) citizen with the contest between groups holding or aspiring to hold social and economic power and organised around specific clusters of inherited principles, values and beliefs; and, what from Lotman I would call the multi-lingual mind, capable not only of appreciating but also inhabiting to an extent from inside different cultures and their world views, and different knowledge systems and their ways of making sense, as these are expressed in different languages. And such adult citizens grow from the potentials with which they are born, neatly summarised in the title of a publication about early childhood education, *Born Creative*.[26]

The human capacity for learning would become the focus of an education state's knowledge policies. It would not "pick winners" from the extraordinary diversity of human knowledge, but instead it would invest in ensuring that its citizens' capacity for learning was resourced in ways which would permit individuals to discover more of their unique qualities of mind and take responsibility for their development. This conception contrasts absolutely with the current view that, as a person advances through the formal education system, the benefits of their learning become increasingly private, and that extrapolations from current forms of employment should determine public investment in higher education. Instead, the most advanced and adventurous thinking depends upon the will of individuals to submit themselves to that intelligent work over increasingly long periods of time with fewer and fewer incentives (Haiven, 2014: ch.4), except for the conviction of a calling or vocation, a talent not to be hidden. This is not only about advanced degrees and research; it is about the application of intelligence by anyone to the complexities of living in the world (given and social) as they are manifested and encountered experientially, and the consequent possibility of innovation in knowledge and practice. As I will argue later in this chapter and in Chapter Five, the complexities of artistic and poetic composition bring these issues fully into view.

4. Cultural Policy in from the Margins?

The proposition to be investigated in this section is that the knowledge and innovation policies of an education state will be formed on a foundation of cultural policy. Limiting the possibilities for innovation to one type of knowledge is profoundly constraining of policy thinking on behalf of the public interest, and therefore on the ability of a society to do in a more considered way what its citizens have to do all the time, which is to work out viable solutions to the always new challenges presented to them by the world in which they find themselves and by them to that world.

"Innovation policy" and "cultural policy" are hardly self-explanatory terms. Each embeds in itself a history of cultural, economic, and organisational change which is embodied, for example, in the way in which different government agencies over time have identified their purposes with either term. It is unlikely that any two governments will distribute the activities and responsibilities associated with each term in the same way, although it would be fairly certain at present that innovation policy is usually associated with the politically powerful domains of the economy, industry, science and technology, and cultural policy with the politically disempowered domains of the arts, media, ethnic relations, and the conservation of the environment and the past, including inherited and traditional knowledge – except where aspects of them are perceived to have economic value, as in the creative economy and tourism.

In public discourse the terms science and technology have achieved freedom from any particular institutional affiliation, the complete contrary of the term humanities. They include social sciences within their range of reference, and also the human, so that there is, in effect, nothing left over which apparently cannot be brought within the scope of science.[27] This totalising claim to know truly is powerfully reinforced by the compelling ways in which the technological applications of scientific knowledge have demonstrable (in experience and through visual media) and material (especially economic) effects in all dimensions of human life and the given world. It cannot be surprising that the link between innovation and knowledge is now typically made through the competitive provision of goods and services in a market economy. It is harder to count or monetise innovations in thought, self-

conception, social practices or values; but not impossible, as social media organisations are demonstrating.

Knowledge and innovation policy in a democratic society must nonetheless be sensitive to the various types of knowledge which constitute its stocks of objectified knowledge. As Brier (2008: 116) observes, "The concept of 'paradigms of knowledge' – as opposed to paradigms of science – means that systematized, reflected and publicly communicated types of knowledge exist besides those normally referred to as science. […] much of the knowledge collected and systematized in the arts and humanities is qualitatively different from the knowledge produced in the sciences." Under the paradigm of science, quantitative methods of description and analysis link university, government, industry and business in a common discourse for the creation, evaluation, administration and use of knowledge; there is no paradigm under which qualitative and interpretive methods characteristic of the arts and humanities can at present achieve a comparable standing with government. Furthermore, the issue is broader than the relations between humanistic and scientific knowledge within Western knowledge traditions. Globalisation has served to advance further the claims to universality of science and technology; but it has also served to highlight the complex effects of location, social and political history, and cultural traditions on the reception of science and technology - in Western as well as other societies.

To establish a cultural paradigm for knowledge policy became a particular goal for HUMANZ; it was initiated by the adoption of the term cultural knowledge, which was to be understood to refer to

> a nation's whole stock of knowledge (including science and technology), as that knowledge is shaped by values, beliefs and traditions, as well as the knowledge created by artists and by people in the ordinary processes of social living.[28]

In one respect, this book is an extended consideration of that attempt at definition, which sought to establish an account of knowledge as it is marked by culture in its creation and application to social purposes. It located the process of knowledge formation in human perception, thought and action, but it did not claim a universal scope of application for such knowledge.

Cultural knowledge originates and is sustained in a locality, it is a communal possession which is revised over time by communal processes, it incorporates communal values and interprets communal history, and it orders and interprets human experience. Its multiple components include knowledge institutions which make and support truth claims, memory institutions for conserving what society collectively knows, political institutions for negotiating competing truth claims, social practices, and singular minds. Within the global dynamic of the semiosphere, cultural knowledge in any postmodern society is the product of interactions between the multiplicity of cultures, histories and languages inhabiting a particular locality or region, and those forms of knowledge which possess a universality of reference and application, like science and technology, or aspire to it, like human rights law.

A way of thinking about how to re-orient current assumptions about the value and use of different kinds of knowledge in policy formation by adopting a cultural paradigm is pointed to by Brier (2008: 140) when he writes that

> the emergence of different kinds of knowledge types [is] related to the kind of objects our culture defines in the world. All are necessary and irreducible. The sciences deal with the hidden order behind the dynamics of objects. Religion is concerned with hidden non-material forces and order, which some presume to govern our existence. Art includes the production of fictional objects. Politics is the creation of a non-material collective of fictional goals, such as democracy or a sustainable society.

Considering knowledge in relation to the ways a specific culture orders the world it inhabits and as always emergent in a specific cultural space repositions thinking about the interactivity of innovation and culture. Reciprocally, the four types of knowledge that Brier identifies are together constitutive of modern Western culture; the four types each have their own integrity and function within Western culture, and cannot be substituted for by any of the others. Even more important for my interests is Brier's structural pairing, in which two types share the function of making apparent what is hidden, and two share the materialisation of fictions. I have already argued for the inclusion of fiction as a source of valid knowledge, and I will extend

that discussion later. In effect, in Brier's account science, religion, art and politics provide the coordinates of the space of Western culture in the semiosphere, the space of thought in which innovation as emergent thought is as much a product of the human capacity for thinking fictionally as it is of thinking scientifically.

Working within a cultural paradigm embraces the widest spectrum of human knowledge creating activity. It is the responsibility of the democratic state in its role of representing and thinking with the whole of human knowledge (and not of enterprises with a very delimited focus, like firms) to frame its deliberations, calculations, and decisions to act within a cultural knowledge paradigm. Granting equality to quantitative and qualitative modes of knowing is one step, and another is accepting that scientific knowledge can only be put to work in contexts which are enmeshed in culture. Hence, if within science or any other form of systematic or formal knowledge it is methods and procedures which determine the validity of the knowledge produced, in government and society it is *the interpretation of that knowledge and its application through the lens of culture* which matters most. Currently in Aotearoa New Zealand this distinction is recognised through the claims for the distinctiveness of Māori culture which are embodied in the Treaty of Waitangi and have been most recently and brilliantly expressed in the Waitangi Tribunal's report *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei*. This document makes it clear that knowledge policies are cultural policies, and are intrinsically political in the values they entrench and promote. It exposes the silent subsumption of diverse modes of knowing in Pakeha culture by technocratic decision-making as a universal method substituted in policy development for negotiations foregrounding the local complexities of culturally and historically contextualised knowledge.

The scope of cultural policy for a postmodern innovation or knowledge society must be reconfigured so as to locate cultural knowledge at the core of innovation, even if present policy is oriented quite differently by a technoscientific conception of knowledge. Although creativity, once the distinguishing attribute of the romantic artist, is now taken to be a key factor in the operation of the technoscientific innovation economy, the hold on policy formation by the technosciences is only strengthened. The rest of this chapter will consider in what ways cultural policy development during the

past two decades has attempted to reposition itself and to widen its claim to value for government. The evidential texts are primarily those of the New Zealand government, but some Australian government documents will be consulted. While cultural knowledge originates locally, these texts represent national perspectives within a global flow of cultural policy thinking.

5. Culture in cultural policy

It is well recognised that there are two distinct conceptions of culture animating cultural policies. One is aesthetic, to do with the creative and performing arts, and the other is anthropological[29]; and it is the former which is dominant, increasingly so now that the economic value and potential of the arts have become more fully recognised and documented. But it is the latter which is the more important for my argument here, because my concern is with knowledge and the question of the relation of art works to knowledge is by-passed by the emphasis on the art work as a marketable product. This is one reason why it is conventional to speak of the arts and the humanities, affirming a complementary relationship but without clarifying the different relations to knowledge implicit in the link. I will take up this matter further below and in Chapter Five.

A very simple description of culture is given by Lotman when he refers to a "way of thinking" (1990: 239), a description the implications of which become more apparent when he writes that "The individual human intellect does not have a monopoly in the work of thinking. Semiotic systems, both separately and together as the integrated unity of the semiosphere, both synchronically and in all the depths of historical memory, carry out intellectual operations, preserve, rework and increase the store of information. Thought is within us, but we are within thought […] it is both something engendered by the human brain and something surrounding us without which intellectual generation would be impossible" (273). It takes the whole of his *Universe of the Mind* and concepts of language, text, history, memory, translation, collective consciousness, semiotic space and semiosphere to elaborate the meaning of this nexus of relations into his account of the complex and distinctive work of culture in the creation, conservation and dissemination of knowledge. To follow him in "this work

of thinking" is to discover the ground in culture of a new humanities and a transformed conception of cultural policy.

Another valuable angle on these basic issues is provided by Debray (2000) in his enquiry into the relations between technology and culture. I will take up his argument more fully in Chapter Four in a consideration of media policy; but his conception of culture is directly relevant here. He affirms that "Culture is on the side of the vital principle, whose nature is to be multiple, disruptive, and proliferous" (61), and he takes the term culture to denote "the system of practices, codes, rules, and expectations appertaining to a historically constituted group […] the repertory of forms, intuitive schemas, and corporealized memories every society makes available to its members. […] A *cultural system* ensures, for one given locality and only one, those coherences that are knitted between periods and generations" (50, 52). Just as Lotman demonstrates how the semiosphere is constituted by the diverse kinds of knowledge generated by people participating in different cultures distributed across time and space, and how interaction between these bodies of culturally inflected knowledge is the fundamental source of innovation, so Debray stresses the energetic, efflorescent and multiply inventive qualities of cultural knowledge, its capacity for generating multiplicities rather than unities, its defining of and by a specific time-place location which stretches across human generations. He also illustrates Lotman's account of thought in a way which makes some of its implications more explicit when he offers himself as a specific example of the transmission processes so integral to the formation and reformation of cultural knowledge over time:

> By materializing my experience, I detach it from myself and allow it to survive me. I extract it from its experiential context and thus make it available to others, infinitely usable and appropriable (by whoever possesses the code). I pass on the intransitive. I virtually make my singularity collective, enabling a future collective to make a return to the past and identify me now (then) as having been singular. I give power of attorney to others to live and think vicariously what I lived and thought. And I myself cannot internalize anything but what has been externalized before me, in such a manner that the link from within one person to the inwardness of another who is not yet born will be made via an outwardness, a crafted

> materiality, a witness to the great relay race of generations (2000: 72).

Culture is a property of all singular human beings as we are locally embodied in time and space, a birthright and an inheritance, the ground of meaning and purpose, a source of energy animating social action, as many-faceted and dynamic as human experience has been throughout time and in diverse places, a mode of knowing which can integrate all kinds of knowledge into livable hypotheses about our humanity and the universe we find ourselves in.[30] If culture is the principal human means of negotiating knowledgably with the unknown, the past and the future, each other, and the double fact of consciousness of the self and of the death of the self, and is the source of the often profound differences between people and communities demonstrated in the work required to formulate, enact and gain consent for collective social goals, it is also the means most used by authoritarian states and dominant groups to distinguish between citizens and aliens, reducing what is complex, emergent, open and multiple to a closed and exclusive unity. A fundamental role of the democratic state is to promote and protect what de Certeau (1997) called "culture in the plural", because that is the condition of culture amongst the publics of a democracy and it is from that plurality and the transformations of thought and experience which it makes possible that the capacity of that state to innovate derives.

In their study of cultural policy, Miller and Yudice (2002) make a compelling case for an intimate link between culture and citizenship, in which concepts of both culture and citizenship are mutually modified in historical developments that are centred on an on-going political contest over concepts of the state. As they observe, "in its role as custodian of nationalism, the idealized Western state endeavours to form cultural citizens who will be virtuous political participants through self-scrutiny and self-improvement. This pedagogic style may appeal to national objectives of economic or cultural growth, patriotism, educating populations into artistic appreciation, or 'unlocking' creative talent that awaits the opportunity to express itself" (25). In other words, ideally this work is accomplished through education, not coercion; but its postmodern context of the globalisation of labour and the inhabiting of the same territorial space by groups distinguished by history, language, religion, mores and social practices but linked globally and to a

different territorial origin has rendered the content of that education profoundly problematic. This is exactly why cultural policy is foundational, why it is intensely political, and why it must be integrated in government thinking so that the richness of potential in the interaction of citizens with quite incommensurate cultural inheritances can be foregrounded over the perceived threat to social order and national identity deriving from cultural differences. Miller and Yudice present their study of cultural policy under seven headings: "governmentality, taste, ethical incompleteness, alibis for funding, national and supranational projects, cultural citizenship and cultural policy studies" (3). The latter is the expert or disciplinary field framing but also challenged by their analysis, a field which, for them, raises a passing question about the relationship between the humanities and the social sciences – passing because they then position their approach against "value-free" conceptions of social scientific research and do not comment further on whether they would regard their value-laden approach as "in the humanities". This is important for any concern with a new humanities, because it is quite clear that the domains of social analysis embraced by the social sciences are also domains in which the humanities have a fundamental interest. Their seven headings inform a conclusion which it is one purpose of my study to foreground and claim for a new humanities: "Looking at cultural policy through the lens of cultural studies encourages us towards innovative ways of understanding the circulation of texts, how certain forms of cultural expression are privileged and with what effect, such that the systemic inequalities of a society can be both highlighted and countered. Ideally", they write, "citizenship can be more than a collection of rights (that are routinely denied to many subjects). Citizenship can be a site for empowering critique-in-principle of social arrangements, for transcending existing structures of economy and polity by connecting to social movements" (191). An effect of thinking this way is to bring into the foreground cultural differences as lenses through which collective or objectified knowledge may be interpretively (re)framed and so make possible productive ways of thinking which are not already inherent in or prescribed by that collective knowledge. Cultural differences, from this perspective, are integral to a conception of postmodern democratic citizenship and a complexly human resource from which new possibilities of social and economic innovation can be articulated.

It is culture as the sustaining fabric of meaningful social life over generations that has to provide the base for cultural policy formation, and not, as at present, the special case represented by the creative and performing arts. As a report to the European Union states, "culture is not only limited to the traditional fields of the arts and letters, but also encompasses science and the entire body of knowledge and experience which our human societies have been consolidating over the centuries" (European Commission, 2011: 2.5). Without a model of the cultural system and the forms of knowledge characteristic of it, policies concerning the role of culture in innovation in a democratic knowledge society cannot be adequately formulated.

6. Evolving Cultural Policy

Cultural policy, currently, is the name for that domain of governmental thought which, in respect of a society's resources of knowledge, refers to but does not necessarily gather together what is left over when techno-scientific knowledge and economic policies have been determined. Its potential is disabled by a practice which privileges only one part of the fundamental knowledge resources of a postmodern society. This is not to say that a remarkably evolved literature on the manifold dimensions of the world(s) of knowledge signified by the term culture is not available to policy makers, but this literature cannot be engaged in a coherent manner with the agencies of the neoliberal state and the dominant interests shaping the official thought of such a state.

This point can be illustrated by reference to any democratic system of governmental administration, in which the representation of the techno-scientific system is rendered coherent by the convergence in coordinated policy agencies of research institutes, production systems, business and employment, finance and markets which are all based on universalist scientific and technical knowledge and primarily located in the private sector. Within this framework for generating policy, culture can be absorbed in the form of another class of products with measurable and market-determined economic value. Cultural policy which focuses on the creative arts, design, performance in its various modalities, publishing in all media, tourism, traditional culture and heritage from the perspective of their

contribution to the economy adopts the same technocratic language but without achieving the same coherence of approach.

This form of inclusion in policy is highly reductive and does not overcome the contradictory and often marginal positioning of public sector cultural agencies in policy processes. An important difference is the effective disconnect in respect of cultural production between the products themselves, their creators, and the resources of knowledge which make their creation possible. The apparatus for arguing the importance of scientific knowledge to (innovative) product creation is intensively developed; it is difficult to find any conception in policy thinking of the knowledge base of cultural production (as distinct from the techné of each industry, craft, media form or technology) or that it is just as important (if not more important) for innovation than the more specialised science sector. By contrast to the science-technology-industry nexus, the domain of culture is rendered incoherent (or highly differentiated) by a variety of factors: the historical evolution of media systems and cultural institutions, their dispersal across public and private sectors, their embeddedness much more extensively in society than in the space demarcated by the market economy, their critical functions in the conservation and dissemination of cultural knowledge, and their local rather than universal reference; the development of product branding using cultural symbols; the interaction of indigenous and settler populations in the on-going formation and revision of concepts of national identity and law in post-colonial states; the determination of citizenship; the distinctive formation of the various institutions of the public, private and non-governmental sectors and the forms of relation established with citizens; political parties as cultural constructs; the special significance of cultural difference and self-awareness in the operation of the judicial and intelligence systems, including the legal profession, the courts, the prisons, and the police; the importance in local government of culturally coherent communities, urban and rural; the role of culture and history in architecture, design, fashion, tourism and public events.

A new approach to cultural policy must accept this diversity rather than attempt to rationalise it or prioritise its parts, and shift the focus of its work. One aspect of the meaning of the term culture as de Certeau analyses it is “Modes of behaviour, institutions, ideologies and myths that compose frames

of reference and whose totality, whether it is coherent or not, distinguishes one society from another" (1997: 103). Understanding these (multiple) frames of reference and their active components is a necessary first step in apprehending the energies and motives animating a society's citizens. As Ahearne writes in his consideration of de Certeau's enquiry into the foundations of cultural policy, "The intervention he posits is designed less to model society than to enable the individuals and groups that compose that society to intervene more forcefully in the shaping of their own social world" (2001: 456). For this to happen, it is necessary to maintain a plurality of interpretive systems, and to create conditions of possibility rather than to determine forms of development. In striking contrast to much policy work, Ahearne states that "Cultural policy, in de Certeau's account, must presuppose a disseminated creativity that exceeds it, and that it certainly cannot create" (460).

6.1 Recent (local) History

New designs for government agencies responsible for cultural policy have been introduced in recent decades, eg the Department of Culture, Media and Sport in the United Kingdom, the Department of Communication, IT and the Arts in Australia. These various arrangements of the cultural field seem to recognise that the modern conventions determining relations between culture and other spheres of the responsibilities of government have begun to break down in postmodern societies and new relationships and values are taking their place. A local version of these reformulations is to be found in cultural policy developments in New Zealand.

I will briefly consider several documents which I am taking to exemplify the processes shaping government thinking during the past three decades, as they have manifested themselves in Aotearoa New Zealand and demonstrate the changing position defined for culture and artistic work. As with every other topic requiring presence in this book, the bibliography is very extensive and the discourses influential in official thinking are international in origin and circulation, and I will only refer to a few examples. But with the hindsight of two decades of attention to knowledge and cultural policy formation in New Zealand, what is most striking is the increasing dominance, through various iterations, of the conception of the market economy and its corollary, that the

primary task of government is economic development. Key terms like research, innovation, globalisation, digitisation, information technology, intellectual property, trade and national identity were once exciting and through them it seemed possible to grasp the future; it is also the case that much of the excitement associated with them has dissipated and their usage has assumed such self-evidence that the line between policy discourse and ritual incantation has become hard to discern. This discourse determined what aspects of the arts, culture and the humanities could be visible to public policy formation; from the perspective of those domains internationally, it was as though a fog had descended, concealing their traditional and inherent qualities and social purposes. To become visible in the policy framework shaped by technoscience and neoliberalism required both new claims for value and reductive, market-based definitions of the role and work of public cultural and educational institutions.

Very well informed accounts of the cultural policy context for this period in Aotearoa New Zealand have been written by Michael Volkerling (2000) and Peter Skilling (2005, 2008, 2010), and I do not propose to repeat their work. Their conclusions, however, are important here because they confirm the general coordinates of my analysis of the situation of the humanities, without the humanities being a matter of specific concern to them. The reason for this is straightforward, and another dimension of the problem facing the humanities in claiming any role in relation to policy formation; the discipline contexts of Volkerling's (2000) and Skilling's work are social scientific and, even if apparently unable to influence policy thinking, they at least employ a discourse which is recognisable to the conventions of technocratic thought.

During the 1990s the Ministry which set the pace for innovation policy was the Ministry of Research, Science and Technology (MRST). Its most recent iteration is as part of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, the title of which adequately symbolises the actual priorities of the current government by subordinating knowledge policy to its business uses. MRST's establishment in 1991 at the same time as the Ministry of Cultural Affairs (MCA), both intended to act as policy ministries in a recollection of Snow's two cultures, is highly significant because of the subsequent histories of both. MRST rapidly evolved into the intellectual and policy leader for national knowledge policy formation (perhaps the nearest New Zealand has come to a

public research policy oriented think tank), assumed a central role in government, and brought increasing funding into the technoscientific domain, whereas MCA remained marginal, both incomplete – the Department of Internal Affairs retained Historical Publications until 2000 – and usually outside Cabinet, except for the period when Prime Minister Helen Clark was also Minister of Arts and Culture.

Could MCA have articulated a brief as wide as that developed in MRST, embracing potentially the whole knowledge field from a cultural perspective as MRST so effectively did from a science and technology perspective? The New Zealand government has partially moved beyond the categorisations of the early neoliberal period, in which cultural knowledge was belatedly categorised with education and social welfare as constituting, under the aegis of social capital, the integrating social framework within which the risk of social disintegration inherent in the operation of market forces was supposed to be contained, bringing the economic role of cultural production to the fore.[31] That MCA could not achieve a policy role comparable to MRST is itself a compelling marker of the profound imbalance in government policy formation in the 1980s and 1990s. One effect is the continuing fragmentation in policy of the cultural sector as it struggles to redress its long-term marginalisation by the economic and policy dominance of primary and manufacturing industry. The redefining of MCA as the Ministry for Culture and Heritage (MCH) in 2000 effectively rendered it as the visible part of an incomplete Ministry of Social Capital, an incomplete Ministry of Cultural Industry, and an unacknowledged Ministry for the Humanities.[32] As the Ministry's report *Cultural Policy in New Zealand* (2007) observed, "There is no single piece of legislation relating to cultural policy" (10). Subsequently, it has assumed responsibility for Sport and Recreation, following the lead of the United Kingdom Department of Culture, Media and Sport.

As Volkerling and Skilling demonstrate, culture and the arts came into the frame of knowledge-based economic development late in the process of knowledge policy development, following international models, especially that of the Blair Labour Government's discovery of the creative industries. Under the pressure of the demand to articulate the economic value of domains of traditionally publicly funded activity like the arts, culture and

heritage, and education, Western governments detached the term creative from the arts and applied it instead to industrial products employing twentieth century media technologies and culturally-derived content. The other important strand was the displacement of the welfare society by the risk society, and the belated discovery in the context of economic globalisation that social cohesion grounded in strong concepts of social identity – communal and national - were critical for a society to sustain individualism and the free market without imploding. As both Volkerling and Skilling point out, the concept of national identity served two otherwise distinct purposes in the context of globalisation: this of social cohesion, and the other of product branding as the means of gaining competitive advantage. The latter is especially important for its recognition that the work of creating and disseminating national identity is accomplished by media systems and sign values, a fiction-making process which, as a recent Prime Minister of New Zealand, John Key, has acknowledged with respect to the "100% pure New Zealand" brand, needs to have only an approximate connection to the actual condition of New Zealand's environment; what matters is the ability of brand imagery to connect international values to claims for the quality of the products marketed according to the meanings communicated and substantiated by imagery of the natural environment. The fact that Sir Peter Jackson's use of New Zealand settings in the Tolkien films has had the effect of product placement on a grand scale, including a stimulus to tourists wanting to visit the locations at which the films were made, is just the best New Zealand example of this process of value creation by media representation. The move to make fully the link between culture, heritage, the arts and the economy is succinctly demonstrated in the decision of Prime Minister Key to make himself the Minister, not of arts, culture and heritage, as his predecessor did, but of tourism. As a consistent extrapolation from this shift of orientation, Key's leadership of a project to design a new national flag (a project led by MCH) had apparently no constitutional significance, but was conceived as a branding exercise. Its failure demonstrated vividly how a multiplicity of divergent cultural values can coalesce in a semiotic object and frustrate an official attempt to determine the meanings attributed to it.

In part, since both MRST and MCA had mandates which emphasised national culture and identity, the critical difference between them was the conception

of culture informing the work of both. For MRST, it was the knowledge, systems of belief, traditions and myths which informed the thinking of New Zealanders about themselves as a nation, which could both support and impede the evolution of a science-based knowledge society and economy in New Zealand; for MCA it was primarily the traditions and practices of European literary, visual and performing arts and their evolution as the literature, music, painting, dance, sculpture, etc. of New Zealand which defined policy thinking. For both, the increasing presence in government and the public domain of Māori knowledge traditions and artistic practices posed difficult and important questions: Is there such a thing as Māori science or Māori mathematics? How can artistic achievement in Māori and European art be compared? Can the same criteria be used to allocate funding to research or artistic practice in both knowledge traditions? Who is qualified to decide?

The problems facing both Ministries in respect of knowledge policy were quite different. For MRST, the simple fact was that the knowledge of universal economic value was modern techno-scientific knowledge communicated globally in English and mathematics and created, disseminated and applied by means of a powerful and complex, international infrastructure of universities and other public and private research organisations, public and private research funding, and industry; the conception of modern societies and their economies as underpinned (or even defined) by techno-scientific knowledge was taken for granted. Furthermore, the epistemic shift characterising cultural change in the late twentieth century under the rubric of the knowledge society was most clearly exemplified by the invention and rapid evolution of digital ICTs, techno-scientific research and development in a very powerful form. For MCA/MCH, there was no equivalent simple fact: its policy field was divided by the historical formation and separate development of various art forms and cultural institutions, some of which (National Archives, the National Library, public broadcasting) were not within its scope, its role in innovation funding was carried out through the funding of new work in the creative arts, and it had no responsibility for research funding (in part because there were effectively no sources of public funding for research in the various fields associated with the arts and the humanities, other than the bulk funding of the universities). Unlike the United States of America, for example, there was no National

Endowment of the Humanities to lead in research policy formation and programme development in these knowledge domains with their roots in the arts, culture and the humanities; unlike the United Kingdom, there was no Arts and Humanities Research Council. When the Historical Publications Group moved from the Department of Internal Affairs to MCH in 2000, MCH became the home for the only national humanities research projects – The Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, the Historical Atlas of New Zealand, and Te Ara The On-line Encyclopedia of Aotearoa New Zealand – although MCH has never publicly acknowledged that that is what they are[33]. But the driving conception of the knowledge or innovation society informing government policy had no room for the fields linked to MCH, except for creative industries.

7. Innovation Policy: the Arts and Culture

In its present articulation in New Zealand, innovation is conceived as a function of economic globalisation; it is future oriented because it is the product of economic competition between firms seeking to establish new markets. Innovation in this mode becomes a matter of government policy formation because too many of the social, political and economic factors involved in innovation are beyond the capacity, competence and resources of business firms to manage. In this mode, one might argue that the balance of advantage in the policy process deriving from this arrangement is tilted very much towards firms and their shareholders, rather than towards the state and its citizens. This disparity is intensified because private investment in R & D in 2002 was only 28% of the total investment in New Zealand in contrast to the OECD average of 71%.[34] More than a decade later, The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2015) states that "New Zealand's investment in R&D is low compared to other small advanced economies, although public investment has grown significantly – by over 70 per cent – since 2007/08.14 New Zealand's level of business R&D, although also growing, remains particularly low" (50). The report provides significant information about the complex relations between the state, local and international business, and public institutions in producing research in a small nation, and at one point makes the following observation: "high-impact research cannot always be valued in economic terms alone. For example, the

impact of endangered species protection could be considered in terms of economic (tourism revenue), environmental (role in the ecosystem), and cultural or social (as taonga or public amenity) values" (11). What would result from reversing the order in this statement? An innovation policy driven by a conception of the state's responsibility for managing the future sustainably on behalf of its citizens would certainly involve business as a critical aspect of its implementation, but it would not be defined primarily by science and business interests. Innovation as a values-based and socially induced, managed, and purposeful mode of response to human needs, global economic competition and environmental challenges (mostly now produced by human action), should be shaped by public (cultural and local) imperatives and values.

7.1 Foresight

However, agenda setting was the task of MRST (together with the Ministry of Economic Development). As one mark of this process, the Ministry undertook the Foresight project, beginning in 1997, the aim of which was to explore and clarify a strategic vision for the future of New Zealand which could guide government policies and would assist those subject to these policies to be prepared for the introduction of new investment priorities in 2000.[35] Its principal outcome was *Building Tomorrow's Success: Guidelines for Thinking Beyond Today* (March 1998). The scenario methodology fundamental to Foresight was used by participants in the project from business and government to develop three "scenarios for New Zealand's future", mini-narratives which were entitled "Possum in the Glare", "Shark", and "Kahikatea". The larger purpose was educational, to accustom people in business, government and research to the use of scenario development for strategic thinking in their enterprises by providing practical experience and also by publishing an account modelling this approach to strategic planning. The focus was the knowledge revolution, and the social transformations projected to generate a post-industrial society. A paragraph headed "Knowledge and our Future" defined a knowledge society in terms which were new then but are taken for granted now (even if their achievement is still prospective rather than actual and the strategic goal is no longer a complex, new modality of society but a percentage of economic growth):

> In this type of society, individuals who are well-educated, self-motivated, and linked into information networks, are the most likely to live prosperous and fulfilling lives. Enterprises that are attuned to their customers' requirements, employ educated workers, encourage innovation through their workplace organisation, and know more and learn faster than their competitors, are the most likely to succeed and grow. At the national level, societies that maximise opportunities for individuals and enterprises to develop knowledge-age skills and access knowledge-age services, and that enable people to share a common sense of national identity and belonging, are the most likely to be cohesive (8).

While knowledge is defined inclusively as "information in any form, know-how and know-why" (8) innovation and growth in modern economies is understood to be based on science and technology knowledge.

As narratives, these scenarios stood aside from the normal mode of policy discourse, and fictionally integrated ideological, moral and cultural values with their primary focus on economic development. Even if the narratives remained highly conventional in their beginning-middle-end structure and their realism, and have no characters[36], they made the actual grounding of policy formation and choices in ideological positions and cultural values explicit. The first two were variations on the neoliberal risk economy; the third was a "green" and indigenous cultural conception in which New Zealand became a world leader in social and ecological innovation: New Zealand would become "the global centre of innovation in socio-technical systems – a new way of integrating individual and social needs with technology and science" (32). Ironically, this scenario in many ways recovered the mode of innovation by which New Zealand has historically made its mark internationally, in which knowledge was placed at the service of social democratic development, and which its various governments under the direction of neoliberalism and a commodity-based conception of globalisation have surrendered in the past three decades.

Foresight presents one of the more remarkable developments in public and disciplinary discourses, the adoption of the term narrative (but usually in its more demotic form of "story" or "stories") without adopting the traditional

humanities disciplines for which narrative was (and is) a fundamental concept and mode of organising and presenting knowledge.[37] Narrative, in this context, serves a double purpose. By presenting scientific and technical knowledge in the form of a realistic narrative, that knowledge is rendered more accessible to general comprehension without misrepresenting the rational, objective and methodological process by which that knowledge is formulated; and it provides the means by which the abstract discourses of technocratic policy formation and organisational management can appear to be sensitive to the individuals whose lives are shaped by the policy and management categories which represent them in government and organisational decision-making. The use in government reports of diverse images of the population, which imply stories of individual lives, and inset case studies, is a particularly significant instance of the humanising (and public relations) work narratives are intended to perform.[38] The two qualities which must be absent from narratives employed in these ways are fictionality and imaginativeness[39], a restriction observed as well in modern humanities disciplines when what is represented in narrative is presented as reality, as it is or was.

7.2 Growing an Innovative New Zealand

As one of its contributions to innovation policy after it came into office at the end of 1999, the Labour Government set up the Science and Innovation Advisory Council (SIAC). Its initial report on innovation, *An Innovation Framework for New Zealand* (2001a), followed by *New Zealanders: Innovators to the World* (2001b), contributed along with a number of others to *Growing an Innovative New Zealand* (2002). At the same time, a consultancy was commissioned to produce a strategic plan for the cultural sector with the double focus of cultural identity and creative industries. The result was *Heart of the Nation* (June, 2000).

The innovation reports exemplify the knowledge politics at work in these processes of policy formation. The second SIAC report aims for inclusiveness, both because "successful innovation can only happen when all aspects of our life and work are considered and all our people are able to contribute and participate", and by affirming that "Cultural practitioners are

pre-eminently innovators. Alongside our Nobel Prize winners Ernest Rutherford and Alan MacDiarmid stand creative artists like Janet Frame, Colin McCahon, and Len Lye" (2001b: 20). The report includes a quotation from what could be described as the brand leader of New Zealand poetry, Allen Curnow's "Landfall in Unknown Seas", as the epigraph to its section on the way to achieve economic transformation: "Simply by sailing in a new direction/ You could enlarge the world." The report readily interprets the lines figuratively to exemplify an entrepreneurial, economy-transforming attitude; what it overlooks, taking the lines literally, is the core problem animating SIAC's report, that is, that there is no longer any empty territorial/physical resource space for enterprise or government to expand into and exploit. The knowledge society can be thought of as the result of this impediment and the search for new kinds of exploitable resource from which economic value can be derived - the metaphor in a heading from the report, "Mine the global knowledge base", is a perfect example. Just as the classification of uncolonised space as empty has been discovered to have been an act of cultural imperialism and erasure, so the discovery of knowledge not as a background to economic production but as a key resource in it raises fundamental questions about knowledge as always already cultural knowledge, marked by cultural values, ownership and the historical and geographical contexts of cultural production. In respect of the knowledge commons, one might conclude that the terra nullius principle still applies.

The SIAC report adopts two key concepts of the period, firstly by linking enhancement of the New Zealand brand to the injunction "Leverage our cultural sector", and secondly by invoking arts-science convergence in the proposition that "Artists use science to inspire and inform their work; scientists and technologists use artists to image and explain their processes" (48). The secondary relation of the arts to techno-science described here has been recently affirmed by the mode of presence of the arts in the movie *Particle Fever* (2013) as ornaments to the real marvel, the Great Hadron Collider, as the materialisation of the most advanced techno-scientific knowledge and, in the original sense of the term, truly a work of art. I regard these inclusions as a mark of generosity, even if they betray at the same time incomprehension about the processes of artistic creativity and how that mode of thought and work and the knowledge deriving from it could be considered to have equality with technoscience in policies for innovation.[40]

More significantly, the official innovation report, while naming the SIAC report as a major resource, entirely omits all references to the arts. It defines innovation policy as having three branches: biotechnology, information technology, and creative industries, and makes the third in effect a subset of the second while precisely locating the origin of the concept of creative industries:

> Britain's Creative Task Force has defined the creative industries as 'those activities which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent, and which have the potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property.' The sector is very diverse, including industries such as Advertising, Architecture, Art, Design, Fashion, Film and Video, Music, Performing Arts, Publishing, and Television and Radio. (56)

The only reference to artists is to the graphic artists working for Weta Studios on *The Lord of the Rings* trilogy. Of the three priority areas identified in the innovation policy, it is the creative or cultural industries which apparently provide a link between culture and innovation. It is also the case that this area is the least developed in the policy paper; both there and in public commentary, the exemplary case is the film version of *The Lord of the Rings*, and what are seen to make it exemplary are its innovations in digital effects, which are taken to demonstrate (as is Design, the other most quoted field) a direct link between science, technology and creativity. It is not that these attributions are mistaken; but they effectively render the cultural as an extension of the science-industry nexus and make clear how the dominant discourse shaping government policy formation for innovation had no model available to it which could provide an account of the processes of cultural creation. They effectively block consideration of what could be radical about the inclusion of "the cultural" in a technoscientific conception of innovation. As critiques of this policy move show, its purpose and effect is to provide the means of commodifying and monetising culture. SIAC's imperative section headed "Leverage our cultural sector" (2001b: 45-46) makes this point with brutal simplicity. According to the final report, OPM (2002: 57) the Cultural Industries sector "leverages off New Zealand's unique culture and capabilities."

If the innovation policy had been conceptualised from a cultural perspective, that is, by foregrounding the characteristics of cultural knowledge production as its model - its resource base in symbolic objects and their capacity for reflexivity and recombination, its institutional configuration, its ecological character as the meanings produced from a group's engagement with its locality and with other groups over time - a more culturally responsive and hence productive innovation policy may have been the outcome. The policy fails to provide any clue about how cultural production could be a full partner with scientific research and technology development in an innovation system, an outcome confirmed by the sidelining of the *Heart of the Nation* report.

Debray (2000) wrote that "a lineage of cultural evolution singles out, from a complex of available innovations, the ones most meaningful to it and that it alone can best optimize" (50). Does knowledge or innovation policy produced in New Zealand pass this test? In one obvious sense it does, because it is a consistent (if always debatable) deduction from a local history of technoscience-based economic development, a distinguishing attribute of Pakeha culture with the political authority to impose its lineage. But, a more inclusive view of the national cultural knowledge-base, and a conception of the overview role of a democratic government with respect to the (im)balance of powers among groups and traditions and their local and global contexts, would require a knowledge policy, formulated as cultural policy, to adopt a view of national cultural evolution as the basis for identifying national priorities.

A good example of what this might require is provided by the branding of New Zealand as "100% pure New Zealand" and the refusal of government to accept that organics as a system of land management for food production could be more consistent with that branding than modern industrial agriculture. Although the three priority areas were based on domains of knowledge work (research and its application) in which New Zealand had demonstrated internationally recognised achievement, it is not the case that these areas were selected because they were identified from an assessment of "innovations […] that it alone can best optimize." They were chosen because they met the double requirement that they are fields of research and development of high economic value and in which New Zealand had already

developed expertise, infrastructure and investment. This does not mean, obviously, that they might not have been the right choices; the point is that the reasons why they were chosen have nothing to do with what is distinctive about New Zealand's "cultural evolution". That point is confirmed by the way in which culture is not at any point identified as a source of innovation (but is often represented as an obstacle to change) and is placed in the background as the local context, like the environment, in which knowledge work determined by international measures of value is done.

In an analysis seeking to explain the role in innovation of the United States Sunbelt, Suarez-Villa concluded that "Historical specificity and institutional context may play a more significant role than anyone so far has given them credit for."[41] The role of government is clearly critical to the evolution of knowledge societies because of its capacity to affect and its responsibilities towards the non-business sectors of society. Suarez-Villa (2001) observes that

> one of the most important factors contributing to the rise of the Sunbelt was public infrastructure. Massive amounts of public resources have been spent since the late 1940s to provide many Sunbelt states with the sort of infrastructure that could support human capital development, particularly in the areas of science and technology. [...] Much public spending also went to support infrastructure that is less directly related to invention, but which is nevertheless essential for building up and exchanging technological knowledge. Such infrastructure allowed communications to occur more efficiently, and it supported other public resources which had a more direct bearing on invention. [...] The rapid expansion of public educational infrastructure was particularly important. The *massification* of educational access played a crucial part in expanding the technological knowledge of the population. Since most new inventions arise out of existing technology, expanding access to science and technology fields was fundamental for enhancing the Sunbelt's technological human capital (175, 179).

In many respects, the strategy set out in 2002 represents a clear understanding that establishing an innovative society based on advanced technology is a

long-term process involving the whole of society, not just the science, technology and business sectors, and that the public sector has to carry a very large share of the burden. Tertiary education reform is an integral part of the strategy, as is IT infrastructure. However, the dominant goal is immediate and continuing economic growth, a goal which exerts enormous pressure on short-term policy making and which consequently becomes focused on and adopts as models those knowledge sectors already seen to provide the principal resources for economic activity.

A significant but only partial exception to this proposition is the inclusion of creative industries as one of the three priority areas. The opening to a revisioning of the innovation strategy in cultural terms was offered through the affirmation that "New Zealand can perform at world-class levels in [the creative industries] sector, because large parts of it are relatively independent of scale and distance. The sector also is able to leverage off New Zealand's unique culture and capabilities, which international competitors can't replicate." It is a long step from these claims to the focussing of government thinking about innovation policy on what Barnett calls the "cultural setting" and the "cultural inventory", and it is a step which has not been taken. In the terms in which the then Labour government expressed its commitment to sustainable development, which "hinges on the reality that economic development in the absence of social and environmental progress cannot be sustained" (OPM, 2002: 23), cultural policy remained off the map when it should provide the foundation for the formation of innovation and knowledge policy.

7.3 Creative Nation /Heart of the Nation

In October 1994, the Australian Federal Government published *Creative Nation. Commonwealth Cultural Policy*. This report, the first national cultural policy (5), seemed at the time to shine a very bright light on a complex set of public organisations, cultural traditions, artistic practices, media technology developments and public funding arrangements which were lost in the shadows cast by the dominance in public policy of the techno-scientific, industrial and business nexus. An expert panel which advised on the report wrote a preamble to it which affirmed, first of all, that "Democracy is the key to cultural value" and then that "cultural policy must

extend to all areas of government [… so] intricately is culture interwoven into the fabric of our life, so sensitive is it to government policies in all areas, so crucial is it to our national and personal sense of identity" (2). The Panel understood that culture "arises from the community [and] encompasses our entire mode of life, our ethics, our institutions, our manners and our routines, not only interpreting the world but shaping it", and that the arts and sciences are "the most highly developed and imaginative aspects of our culture" (1). They argued for a Ministry of Culture with a seat in Cabinet. The report itself maintained the Panel's conception of culture but focused on the government's role in supporting the principal art forms, indigenous culture, heritage, cultural institutions, broadcasting (including children's programming), tourism, and especially the new cultural (not yet creative) industries founded on digital multi-media technologies. The report affirmed that "This cultural policy is also an economic policy" (7), emphasised the government's role in copyright policy, and asserted in respect of new media technologies and their development that "content is absolutely critical" (55); not only the new media industries but also existing cultural institutions would be providing it (57). Furthermore, the Prime Minister, Paul Keating, referred to the "great ambition" of his government "to bring cultural issues into the mainstream of our national life […] the more we succeed in encouraging a creative spirit and the flow of ideas, the more we will succeed as an economy and society." These words are quoted by the then President of the Australian Academy of the Humanities, Deryck Schreuder, in his Foreword to the papers published after the1994 Silver Jubilee Symposium of the Academy, who registered his disappointment that "*Creative Nation* is almost silent on the specific role of the humanities" (Schreuder, 1995: ix).

Both *Heart of the Nation* and *Creative Nation* were commissioned by Labour Governments, and both reveal strong commitments to sustaining a multi-cultural conception of national identity in the face of informational globalisation, to which end the arts and media have a central role as content providers. They mark a shift which was most clearly formulated by the Blair Government's recognition of a new class of cultural/creative industries in the United Kingdom, signified by the "Cool Britannia" brand, and its flow-on importance in shaping conceptions of a digital media-based cultural and informational dimension to the economy. But a crucial difference is identified when both reports in their print forms are placed side-by-side. *Creative*

Nation is, like *Growing an Innovative New Zealand*, issued as an official report of the government, with appropriately high design and presentation values. The *Heart of the Nation* is, by contrast, a spiral bound report with a plasticised cover printed on one side of plain A4 paper and using a heavier quality buff-toned paper to carry the prefatory material. As a major attempt to reconceptualise the cultural sector in Aotearoa New Zealand, it symbolically and materially remains outside the domain of official publications, as its recommendations largely remained outside government policy (Volkerling 2001, 445-449).

Both reports are concerned to define the terms of a new strategy to replace what the *Heart of the Nation* refers to as a "traditional formulation" of the purposes of cultural policy which dated from the 1940s and was reaffirmed in *The Government's Role in the Cultural Sector* (1998) as conserving and making accessible New Zealand's cultural heritage, funding creative work, and providing training for the cultural professions through the education system (HoTN, 2000: 19). By contrast, Labour's 1999 pre-election manifesto emphasised the relation between "vibrant arts and cultural activities" and the emergence of a "strong and confident cultural identity", and the importance of cultural industries in economic growth and employment (20). *Heart of the Nation* refers to a transition from "the policy legacy of nineteenth century civic welfarism which has positioned cultural institutions and programmes as social services rather than economic assets" (103).

A strong conception of the policy moment informs both reports. In both cases the Prime Minister is the principal recipient, and not just as a formality; issues of the value of culture in the economy, for social cohesion and for shaping national identity (including for its brand value) in the context of globalising economic competition, are central themes. Furthermore, the case for elevating "Culture" to a central role in government (rather than the marginal, even outside-of-Cabinet, role common in recent decades) is focussed in the New Zealand report by proposing that culture is "the heart of the nation; an essential resource for our common future" (xvi) and that cultural policy and the range of agencies (new, reformed, and continuing) which should make up a re-visioned cultural sector should fall under the oversight of the Prime Minister. The preamble to the report notes that "Recognising that a vaster range of government departments and agencies

have more cultural inputs, impacts and outcomes than could ever be encompassed by a single ministry, this plan installs leadership and responsibility where it ought to be, at the very centre of government" (v). The report also notes that an earlier restructuring which created the Ministry of Research, Science and Technology and the Ministry of Cultural Affairs as apparently complementary policy ministries had not by 2000 (and has still not) served to equalise the power relations between these components of the nation's system for creating knowledge (100). The partial integration proposed by *Heart of the Nation* has not been accomplished in any form, whereas investment in and refocusing of the government's role in science and technology, research and development has been intensively investigated and acted upon through the decade following its publication.

Both of these policy documents attempt to look beyond their present political moment towards new conceptions of cultural policy and the role of national and local institutions; they are also, necessarily, written in response to the opportunities (and limits) presented by that moment as it is defined by the requirement that the policy case for culture should be made in terms of its role in the economy, and of the link forged in the 1990s between innovation and the advent of globalising and networked digital information and communications technologies. And, not surprisingly, the humanities are not considered to provide the fundamental knowledge out of which cultural policy could be formulated or artworks and media content created, even though, for example, *Heart of the Nation* affirms that "Culture is founded on deep knowledge" (86). The focus of both reports is on the machinery of government, recognising that redefining the roles of cultural knowledge in postmodern societies requires a "whole of society" perspective and responsibility which is only available to the state.

A fundamental issue for cultural policy concerns the role of the media system, and the responsibility of the state towards it. Both reports consider this matter closely, but the development of public media systems in Australia was already much more elaborated than in New Zealand, and the concerns expressed in *Heart of the Nation* in 2000 are simply now greater than they were for those who grasp the deep significance to cultural evolution and democratic participation of the systems of communication available to a society, and how the technologies enabling them are owned and their use

regulated. The report notes that the principles informing a public broadcasting system had been abandoned over the 15 years preceding its publication, in favour of a "deregulated, privatised, and commercially driven broadcasting environment" (30), and it is particularly critical of Television New Zealand (88-89). In the period following the report, the Labour Government did rewrite the charter of TVNZ to require the provision of a public television service, which led to the establishment of a new channel, TVNZ7. The return to power of a conservative government in 2008 led to the abandoning of the public charter and, after a major public campaign against the government's intention, the closure of TVNZ7 in 2012. Aotearoa New Zealand must be quite unique amongst Western democracies in the degree to which its media and communications systems are privately owned and serve commercial rather than public purposes.

There is another most important dimension to the *Heart of the Nation* which has fundamental implications for the consideration of cultural knowledge policy as local rather than universal in orientation, and that is the Treaty partnership based on two languages and two cultural inheritances, Māori and Pakeha, which is distinctive to Aotearoa New Zealand. The issues raised here are typically largely elided in science and technology policy, except now for the challenge offered by the Waitangi Tribunal report, *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei*. The position adopted in *Heart of the Nation* is based on affirming "the centrality of Treaty principles to the development of cultural policy and resourcing and the need for Māori sovereignty/rangatiratanga over the development of Māori cultural resources" (7), a position which is ultimately founded on the incommensurability of the two languages and cultural traditions and the effects of the cultural politics of colonisation on the culture and identity of the colonised people. A particularly significant effect is the disjunction between indigenous and western conceptions of property rights; it is in this context, which is closely linked to the role of traditional knowledge (heritage) and the conservation of the language, that the conception of cultural sovereignty and the need for institutions to sustain it gains its full force. No conception of universally true knowledge can inform policy in this context, however much terms like indigenous and Western have global application; equally, no culture can claim sovereignty over all cultures (even if that is what imperial cultures have typically sought to do), especially because cultures evolve in dynamic relations with one another and cultural

practitioners are amphibious in drawing upon local and global cultural materials in their work (81-87). It is worth noting that Māori broadcasting, now with English and Māori language television channels as well as radio, has (unlike TVNZ7) continued to develop and has achieved widespread recognition as the de facto public television service. It owes its existence to the force of the Treaty in political argument; without that it is inconceivable that the service would ever have been established.

The areas listed as components of creative industry in *Heart of the Nation* are: heritage, music, literature, urban design and architecture, design, visual arts, performing arts, digital interactive media, film and broadcasting (115). The context is the uneven provision of agencies charged with the strategic development of these components; at the time of publication, it is implied that only 3 of the 10 areas had such a function available to them. An overarching Creative Industries Development Agency was therefore proposed. As other components of the cultural field which enter the report from time to time, and which have expertise in some part of a field's content (the National Library, for example, or any university), demonstrate, lacking a core concept and public sector structure which enables sense-making in policy contexts is disabling. The concept of "the cultural field" provides a means for thinking the diversity of institutions and organisations (including the mix of for-profit and non-profit modalities), kinds of expertise, and sources of knowledge together in the formation of relevant public policy. Its scope, which is basically the creation, conservation and use of non-genetic information in local settings, needs to be clarified so that the work of culture in postmodern societies and the facilitating role of the state can be properly articulated in a reformed cultural policy.

There are good reasons, which are identified in the report's overview, why this development has not occurred. When brought together, they demonstrate that cultural policy, if attempted in a mindset framed by technoscientific research and development and the industrial and post-industrial economy as they have evolved together, must fail to address the core issues. The report provides a visual representation of "New Zealand's Cultural Sector Value Chain" (xv) which strikingly locates the origin in heritage as the primary resource, and the passage of heritage into cultural products through the medium of the individual creator whose identity is given definition by that

heritage: “If creative individuals are at the heart of the whole process, heritage and identity are the tap root and the foundation from which it grows” (vii). It notes the distinctive spread of organisational forms and modes of work in the cultural sector, from voluntary to non-profit and for-profit agencies, and from self-employment through what the report calls cultural enterprises to cultural industries. But an aim throughout the report, to provide certain quantitative evidence for the economic role of the cultural sector, is repeatedly frustrated because “The cultural sector, like the tourism sector it overlaps with, is not a sector that is readily identifiable and measurable using standard statistical industry classifications” (14). The point is dramatized by showing that in 2000, depending on how the sector is defined, its contribution to GNP was from 2-6%, and I will generalise the point by noting that it is impossible to offer a measure of the economic role of the humanities for the same reasons. Because government is by signs and numbers, for a sector to lack appropriate representation in the forms recognisable by government is fatal to its claims for its value and contribution to society, and therefore to a proper share of public investment. It is not surprising that the need for officially recognised forms of information about the sector is a continuing and high priority of the Ministry of Culture and Heritage.

Awareness of the dispersal of cultural work across government is fundamental to my argument for a new humanities. Both *Creative Nation* and *Heart of the Nation* envisage the possibility of coherence in cultural policy at a high level of government, but do not go further into the extra-governmental and public conditions required to achieve that coherence. In the case of *Heart of the Nation*, while its concern is to demonstrate how a new strategy could allow the cultural sector to become a more significant contributor to New Zealand’s economic and social well-being, it lacks an overarching conception of a cultural knowledge system on the basis of which its rethinking of New Zealand’s cultural infrastructure, its component parts and their cultural, social and economic roles could be fully integrated. Policy making and strategy design for the science and technology knowledge system faces no such difficulty, especially as the claim to be creative can be made as readily for practitioners in this knowledge system as it was traditionally made for artists (91). Volkerling underlines the deficiency and the obstacle to its remedy when, in his commentary on the reception of *Heart of the Nation*,

he quotes the Council of Europe's judgment that "Governments will not be able to realise their aims unless they create [structures] which match the reality of the way culture works in a society" (2000, 8).

My introduction of the term cultural field, initially into Boisot's diagramming of the I-space, is my attempt to ground thinking about fundamental knowledge creation in culture as a dynamic process constituted by changing local combinations of specific knowledges (content, institution and medium), in which fields overlap and differentiate from one another across many dimensions of time and space. So the obvious question follows: what, then, is the basis of theoretical and practical coherence of the cultural field as a source of fundamental knowledge? The metaphor of a well-spring[42], notably in this era of increasing anxiety about access to clean water as a necessary condition of human survival on the planet, can identify the nature of the coherence of the cultural field and its formal knowledge system, the academic humanities. It is precisely at this point that the challenge to, and the need for the formation of a new humanities which can fulfil this integrating function, becomes apparent.

7.4 Briefing the Incoming Minister (2014)

One direction in which to look for an answer is recent reports and documents published by the Ministry for Culture and Heritage (MCH) before and after the 2014 election. The principal paper, *Briefing to the Incoming Minister for Arts, Culture and Heritage: October 2014* (*Briefing*), is intended to inform a new Minister on the nature and scope of MCH's (and the Minister's) responsibilities in the portfolio; other documents provide various contexts for it.[43] What do they have to say about "deep knowledge" or the role of the arts, culture and the humanities in the national knowledge and innovation system and the policies directing it? As Schreuder noted 20 years ago in Australia in his response to *Creative Nation*, the dominant outcome of a reading with these questions in mind is disappointment, but primarily because cultural policy thinking as these documents represent it is constrained by a mode of discourse and official expectations which prevent the difference cultural policy could and should make in government from declaring itself.

The Ministry does make it clear that it is in transit from an earlier model which took culture to be equivalent to the European arts in traditional media and the institutions built to support them, to a new model based on a wider conception of culture, new media and the importance to New Zealand cultural identity of Māori culture. How that transition is understood is presented in the various reports and papers preceding the last election in 2014, in which co-ordination of policy among the various components of the cultural sector as currently defined, strategic development, and statistical description for the sector are given the highest priority. Nationhood and the economic contribution of cultural activity, especially that of the creative industries, are the twin poles around which the account of the cultural sector in government takes shape.

The documents (not surprisingly) are very focussed on describing the sector and the relations among its parts and identifying what knowledge (primarily economic and quantitative) about it is needed for the purposes of policy formation and argument internal to government concerning the relative importance of the sector in the whole spectrum of government activity. The force of the central agencies is most clearly seen in another document, the *Performance Improvement Framework*, which has much more to do with current discourses within government than it does with comprehending the public functions of culture in society, economy and the arts and the kinds of policies on behalf of the public interest which might be built on them (although that document is also interesting for making some of the more significant statements about the nature of the sector and how the term culture is understood).

What is striking to me is that, unlike any similar documents produced for the techno-science sector, these documents make no specific claims for the nature and value of the knowledge created and used by those active across the sector and, in so far as that is bounded by the scope of government, to those in the wider community who do not participate directly in the Ministry's funded programmes. The obvious exceptions are the work of the Heritage Branch and its publications, which is linked to the role of the Ministry in sustaining and enhancing concepts of national identity and democracy, and the conservation and development of Māori language and

culture, which is linked to nationhood, economic value, and the nation's obligations to Māori under the Treaty of Waitangi.

The words cognate with knowledge most often used are "evidence-based", "cultural material",[44] "information" or "content", as in this from *Briefing:*

> The Ministry aims to publish authoritative, accessible information to improve New Zealanders' understanding of their nation, history and identity; to stimulate debate and engagement; and to present information about New Zealand to international audiences (MCH, 2014b: 16).

There is a neat (poetic) slippage in another expression of this view, which blends the common practice in government publications of telling (factually true) stories with the disciplinary context of the Heritage Branch's work: "MCH has built expert capability in telling New Zealand histories for the general public and educational use" (MCH, 2014a: 18). One could infer that the implicit context here is social scientific, as in Belfiore's preference for language which "describes reality correctly". The effect is that knowledge is treated as (dark) matter for the creation of cultural texts/objects, as are the media technologies which give form, visibility and motion to that content. The only reference to universities as a source of knowledge is to an absence; the publishing activity of the Heritage Branch is justified as filling a gap not otherwise supplied by academic work. But there is also "culture", which locates a real disturbance in the Ministry's thought and in the implications of its responsibilities within the government. One of the fundamental challenges identified by the Ministry in the *Performance Improvement Framework* (PIF) reads as follows:

> communities and identities are more dynamic and changing faster than in the past. Culture has become much wider than the arts. The place of culture in society needs to be seen within the broad pattern of the community and as part of everyday life. Its role in shaping the nation has broadened and accelerated. At the same time some of our cultural institutions are still based on 19th Century operating models that focus on large physical institutions and museums. In the future culture will be driven much more directly by the interest of

> consumers and communities and this will require more rapid adaptation of suppliers and funders of cultural content (MCH, 2014a: 3).

This statement is very important for the way in which it incorporates the whole socpe of the Ministry's field of action in a set of steps in thought which begin with "culture" in its reference to a mode of knowledge and practice collocated with communities and extending well beyond the arts. In "has become" the process of a state agency's thinking its way from where it was, in the traditional arts, is signalled and confirmed by the reference to out-of-date institutions, even though Baumol is quoted in the Briefing paper to confirm that progress and media change is not as straightforward in the cultural domain as it might be in the domain of technoscientific production (MCH, 2014b: 36) and it is affirmed in the PIF paper that "New Zealand's cultural activity is sustained by an infrastructure of tangible and intangible cultural assets built over time" (MCH, 2014a: 6). The statement finishes in the present, with "cultural content" replacing culture and communities paired with consumers. It does not make sense to assume that the Ministry believes that culture will cease to be created by people in communities, and in future will be manufactured (driven) by creative industries; but the statement is an eloquent expression of the force of current official discourses in limiting the ways in which a cultural agency is able to formulate a strong conception of its scope and work founded in culture rather than the (cultural) economy.[45]

It is the concept of nationhood which further introduces clear evidence that "the arts" (even as new media arts) and cultural content cannot account for the actual scope of the Ministry's interests as these are located by the term culture. Besides the reference to the knowledge work of the Heritage Branch, the major commitments of MCH to the government's interest in national identity include Māori language and culture, the built heritage, the national flag, and national commemorations. One connection among them is the current focus on war history, and another is globalisation and national branding. But there is also another, much more fundamental orientation, which once again opens out on to culture as a foundational term for a society's accumulated stocks of knowledge. The areas of knowledge which come together in the official concept of nationhood are "New Zealand's history, heritage and constitutional foundations" (MCH, 2014b: 14). Here,

though, a real difficulty arises in the double affirmation that there is an inclusive national identity even while there are now inherent multi-cultural frames of reference, and that cultural production contributes to its formation/maintenance. Just as education in another context gets a mention under the heading of arts education, so it reappears in this context as civics.

It is important not to discount the effect of the different audiences for these documents on their composition, but the primary audience is clearly internal to government and it is that relation which defines their orientation, their mode of discourse, and helps explain the apparent inconsistencies in the case they make for the government's involvement in the cultural sector.

The signs that MCH has made a difference, according to the PIF, include public understanding of the importance of New Zealand culture:

> New Zealand culture is defined by us and defines us. It is the embodiment of the distinctive values, traditions, and beliefs that make being a Kiwi in the 21st century unique. While culture is expressed in many ways, it captures the New Zealand character in a distinctive way that others recognise.
>
> There is recognition that a strong, creative and inclusive culture strengthens our nation and is an essential component to being in charge of our own future; culture is an enabler of creativity, innovation, productivity and wellbeing (MCH, 2014a: 9).

But, what kind of testing do these propositions sustain? An inclusive and hence tolerant society is clearly critical, but "being a Kiwi" is now an on-going project of cultural engagement with cultural differences (and global political, economic and legal forces), in relation to which it is the rule of law which provides the anchor and Parliament the national forum. But innovation as the link term between creativity and productivity offers something quite different, "creative destruction", which can clearly be as readily produced in the domain of meaning by new art as in the domain of the economy in general by competition in the capitalist free market.[46] In its *Strategic Challenges* paper, MCH affirmed that

> Cultural expression is fundamental to our well-being and central to a healthy and vibrant democracy. Culture has inherent value in its own right.
>
> Culture is a mirror. It reflects what is happening in our society and plays a key role in forging our identity as New Zealanders. Culture makes our lives meaningful. Cultural participation offers people and society opportunites for improvement and growth.
>
> It is also important to recognise that the individual benefits gained through engagement with cultural activity have a 'spillover effect' into a public benefit (MCH, 2014c: 4).

Accepting that documents of this kind are composed as a mosaic of positive propositions rather than steps in an argument, the question these paragraphs taken together nonetheless raises is, What integrates these manifold perspectives on culture into a coherent set of policies for culture, as distinct from the special case of the arts as culture? The whole account is potentially turned on its head in the third paragraph when the individual (not the agency) is recognised the active location of the effects of cultural activity and the means by which that activity creates a public benefit. Why not reverse the current emphasis in policy on the economic value of culture, so that it is understood instead to be a "spillover effect" of its fundamental collective function of generating and conserving meaning (cultural knowledge), with each individual as the primary medium of this social process?

There is also the matter of public value. It really matters to find that this conception of how the work of public sector agencies, and most especially those in the cultural sector, may be more appropriately evaluated is present in the documents, but the use of the concept seems to have been overtaken by the official emphasis on economic value. The Ministry states that "The cultural agencies are working together to better understand the public value of cultural goods and services, including their economic and social benefits. This will assist decision-making to maximise public benefit from government investment in the sector" (MCH, 2014b: 29). The thinking about public value and cultural value expressed in several Demos reports from 2005-6[47] provides a useful perspective, since they do not discount the importance of

the economic contribution of the sector, in arts, creative industries and in the wider domain of culture as such, but they do offer substantial ways of making sense of a sector in government which exists in a fundamentally different relation to its publics, to knowledge, to the institutions and objects which locate it in the material real, and to society and the economy than do the now economically valuable knowledge sectors of the technosciences, business and the central agencies of government.

Accepting that no public agency can function without both policies and measures against which its work, and that of the organisations and people whose activities it supports, can be assessed, the validity of an economic measure of value as the primary (sole?) measure of value has been challenged by the Demos project. In its place, a concept of cultural value appropriate to the cultural field was formulated and its implications for the self-concept and work of public cultural agencies investigated. As Holden demonstrated in *Capturing Cultural Value*, to find appropriate concepts which both represent accurately the nature and work of culture in society and economy and can become the means of assessment for the purposes of government and the organisations composing the cultural field, it is necessary to look beyond the current economic value frameworks. Affirming the need for "a new language for culture" (2004: 35) in policy discourse, he stated that "Cultural value is generated and exists in a context: the space in which objects or performances appear, their critical reception and the climate of public and political opinion all affect cultural value" (36). He proposed that relevant concepts for defining it could be found in Anthropology and Environmentalism. Listed without his explanatory commentary, the dimensions of value for culture are:

> from Anthropology: Historial, social, symbolic, aesthetic and spiritual values; and
>
> from Environmentalism: duty of care, intergenerational equity, fairness of distribution of benefit, the precautionary principle, diversity.

It is important here to note that these values are general to culture, although they are also specific to the arts. I have no doubt that all of these aspects of culture, and their role in the arts and heritage, are quite familiar to MCH. But

the concept of cultural value is itself absent from the Ministry's published policy papers, and hence an important means for substantiating the larger case for arts, culture and heritage and formulating an integrated policy for the field is missing.

A good reason is to be found in the discursive environment in which cultural policy continues to be formulated. As noted recently in a reflection on the effect of the Demos papers on cultural value, Hewison (2012: 209-210) commented that "two concepts […] have a valid claim on the formation of cultural policy: Value for Money – and Money for Values. […] At the close of 2011, in spite of attempts to produce a nuanced resolution of the differences between these approaches, the Value for Money argument prevails." At the close of 2014, at least in New Zealand, the same can be said. A key heading in *Briefing* is "measuring and maximising public value" (MCH, 2014b: 29). I intend to consider the concept of public value in more detail below, but it is important here to acknowledge the presence of this concept in the MCH overview of its work, and its effective co-option to an economic context of application. In several paragraphs setting out the cultural policy research being undertaken, "public value" as a general concept becomes "public benefit", "the public value of culture", "the economic value of cultural activity." The general claim, "Through its refreshed cultural policy research programme, the Ministry is working to become a recognised leader in demonstrating the value of culture in its own right and as a contributor to wider social and economic goals", understandably collapses into a dominant focus on economic value; "culture in its own right" is supported by the concept of the innate (or inherent or intrinsic) value of culture, which can be easily affirmed by those who believe it to be true but which, as Holden pointed out, "When used as an argument for more funding, or for less restricted funding, 'inherent value' can appear as a form of defensiveness by cultural institutions and their leaders; an attempt to assert the value of their own judgement above that of others" (2004: 24). It is also an argument of much less policy value than an argument from economic value. An observation by MCH affirms that

> The portfolio may benefit from incentives, particularly for long-established arts organisations, to focus more on innovation and change, for example, exploring new types of content and different

> means of delivery which potentially would attract wider audiences and create new revenue streams. (MCH, 2014b: 39)

To turn the statement around would be to demonstrate how the creative industries are just the tip of the cultural iceberg, a new set of options in media and business which may remediate older media and the institutions built in relation to them but can neither supplant them nor become the dominant source of cultural knowledge.

Here a policy chasm opens up. Innovation and change in the domain of culture/the arts is linked to increased audiences and new sources of income, whereas innovation and change as "the new" (or avant garde) in culture/the arts would typically be unlikely to have either effect. But, if one emphasises the "means of delivery" then the whole process of repurposing or remediating already existing cultural objects, forms and genres in new media technologies becomes the proxy for innovation. This slippage is also familiar in the sciences, where "the new" is not necessarily (immediately or ever) a marketable product. As Holden observes, "The small, experimental, emergent practices that seem to lie at the margins of current concerns about culture needing to be economically and socially useful are vital for the sustenance of our cultural health" (2004: 38). Holden's emphasis here on the relation between emergence, margin, and innovation contrasts strongly with way in which creative industries are now located at the heart of cultural policy as economic policy.

7.5 Creative Industries

It is striking that the New Zealand documents to which I have referred in this chapter exclude any discussion of the knowledge embedded in and informing cultural production, as distinct from the forms of cultural expression in the arts and crafts, performance, media and heritage. The absence of any substantive consideration of knowledge in cultural policy (both the knowledge used and the knowledge created) underlines how the term creative industries can appear as apparently one of the same class in national innovation priorities in the early twenty-first century in Aotearoa New Zealand with biotechnology and information technology; it is the implicitly common term industry and the role of scientific and technological knowledge

in the development of new media forms and products which determines how it is understood[48]. What might have been the strategy if cultural processes and their distinctive resource base in inherited knowledge and modes of production had been foregrounded instead, and if media culture had been incorporated in the government's analysis of new knowledge production rather than rendered invisible? A provocative representation of this situation, but one which is entirely consistent with the dispersal of the term culture through the categories employed in documents concerned with knowledge policy, is provided by de Certeau when he writes that "Culture is the battlefield of a new colonialism; it is the colonized of the twentieth century. Contemporary technocracies install whole empires on it, in the same way that European nations occupied disarmed continents in the nineteenth century" (1997: 134). And, one might add, with "terra nullius" replacing the commons as an operational concept facilitating resource exploitation in the virtual as it once did in the physical world.

The story of the discovery of the cultural or creative industries as a new object of economic policy in the 1990s in the United Kingdom has been thoroughly told.[49] In order to fit the arts under the heading of innovation in knowledge society and economic policies and, reciprocally, to generalise the concept of creativity to all aspects of new product development and marketing, it was necessary to identify a common factor. This was not the work of art in itself, but the new twentieth-century industrial and techno-scientific means by which works of art along with texts of all kinds could be multiplied as copies of themselves or as representations of unique objects and widely distributed through markets for news, entertainment, research and development, lifestyle, and culture. Innovation and economic value were located much more in the new media technologies, especially digital networked media, than in the works themselves.[50]

It is clearly not possible to argue for a direct relation between creative industries and innovation by analogy with the concept of the art work, even though the conventional slippage between the art work as the original sign of the presence of creativity and the cultural products of the creative industries is one way of claiming creativity for them. As New Zealand innovation policy has demonstrated, the critical link with innovation claims is technological; it is the new technological forms and media of twentieth-

century ICTs in which the innovativeness of creative industries typically resides from a techno-scientific and economic policy perspective. If innovation depended upon unique aesthetic inventions, it would fail completely in policy based on the economic value of such products; creative industries depend on mass markets/multiple copies, or niche (but global) markets prepared to pay a high price for the distinction of ownership.

It is nonetheless important to be clear about the primarily imaginative quality of the predominant products of creative industries. They are either fictions in themselves (entertainment in the form of creative, visual and performing arts) or involve fictions (sports spectacles, the money markets, fashion shows, advertising, architecture, celebrity, politics, news). But it is not common to position this wide spectrum of cultural product creation under the term "fiction". Instead, the body of knowledge and skill which takes its place is classified in general as design or in particular by various forms of genre, performance or authorship (architect, artist, choreographer, composer, designer, dramatist, film-maker, journalist, novelist, photographer, poet, scriptwriter etc). A particular effect of the discovery of the creative industries is to bring the two terms, design and fiction, into direct contact, disturbing the conventional scope of each, because that scope has been used to secure the boundaries of two domains of creative work, namely, that related to industry and technology (systems for the collective or mass production of cultural objects of all kinds), and that related to the modern arts (systems for the production of singular cultural objects), despite the obvious fact that the creation and production of works of art has become increasingly embedded in technological apparatuses, and industrial production has become increasingly influenced by aesthetics.

If the concept of creative industries was primarily aimed at making cultural objects countable in economic policy, it nonetheless also highlighted the materiality of aesthetic objects and at least some of the costs associated with their production and circulation, a fact well known to artists but typically sidelined when it was the high culture values of a specific set of those objects, their meaning and significance, their "thought", which was the object of attention from within the humanities. A double shift is impending here: on the one hand, a reconceptualisation of cultural policy, in which the concept of

fiction plays a central role; on the other, a reconceptualization of the humanities, in which the materiality of the medium plays a central role.

7.6 The Role of the Artist

However conformant with the rhetoric of technocratic discourse, the cultural policy documents produced in Australia and New Zealand weave together threads of discordant colours and textures. If the concept of the scientist seems relatively stable in knowledge policy, the same could not be claimed for the concept of the artist. As I noted above, there are many specific titles for those engaged in cultural work of one kind and another, and the once privileged position of the artist has been undermined by the industrialisation of cultural production. For these reasons it is particularly interesting that the 2013 report *Creative Australia* included a section on the role of the artist, as follows:

> A democratic society seeks to unleash the creativity of all its citizens and to celebrate the extraordinary achievements of its most gifted and dedicated. The value of creativity is something that is increasingly recognised and valued. Creativity is an essential attribute in an increasing number of occupations.
>
> The most gifted artists, however, take the ability to imagine, adapt, empathise and collaborate to another level through training, practice, discipline and courage. The extraordinary achievements that come when the most gifted individuals combine capacity and skill is something we recognise.
>
> […] As with sport, the arts celebrate leadership, skill and brilliance. It also encourages legions of others to engage on their own terms. At the heart of our culture are people reading, writing, drawing, painting, singing, performing, designing, up-loading videos and tweeting—expressing what it is to be human through stories, music, pictures and performance (2013: 40-41).

How, in a small space and few words, to capture the complexity of relations, purposes and forms of evaluation which notions of democracy, the arts and

creativity raise when taken together? Creativity is a universal human attribute, but the artist, like any skilled performer, is recognised by success in public and competitive performance in a specific field of achievement. Does the democratic perspective mean that people show that creativity is a human universal by doing it in their own ways, or does "expressing what it is to be human" refer to the contents of their creative acts? What would change in policy thinking if the statement referred to "expressing what it *means* to be human"? Do these acts exemplify what is glossed as the work of the artist, and do they typically (or only rarely) "generate new ideas and ways of understanding the world" (41)?[51]

If "the arts" were to be replaced by "the sciences", and "the artist" by "the scientist", nothing in the democratic generosity of the statement and its attribution of creativity to everyone would change. The social spectacle of celebrity and competitive ranking applies across the whole spectrum of knowledge work, especially now between nation states and in the confusions between product branding and identity formation. But, in another context, *Creative Australia* observes that

> the cultural, social and economic benefits derived from arts and creativity are still not fully recognised politically. This is partly because the activities and modus operandi of the cultural sector is not easy to harness, and its capacity to inspire, innovate and provoke can make those with power wary. It is also because of the lack of sufficiently strong, comprehensive and comparable data about the sector and the economic and public value it creates. (32)

To put the distinction crudely, for science generating new ideas and ways of understanding is progressive, new knowledge replacing old; new ideas now become socially destabilising by means of the churn of competitive innovation in the commercial application of new knowledge, and provide a challenge to regulation, policy and morality in this way. For the arts, the challenge to government is more intimate; just as politicians and political parties build their claims to power on ideas about what it means to be human, so do artists. And, like politicians, artists seek to engage directly with individual minds through beliefs, values and inheritances. The double binds for policy are palpable, and underlined by the knowledge that *Creative*

Nation and *Creative Australia* were produced by Labour governments, and their recommendations were fated to be substantially ignored or revoked by subsequent Conservative governments[52]. Caust argues that arts and cultural policy in Australia as represented by *Creative Nation* and *Creative Australia* moves from a traditional art for art's sake conception to the economic value to the nation of the arts to a concept of general creativity, noting that there are "certainly some mixed messages in *Creative Australia* when it tries to connect different aspects of culture" (2015, 177). Her judgment succinctly points to the constraints on cultural policy formation as the term culture separates from the arts and the notion of moral and aesthetic cultivation to offer a potentially different ground for knowledge policy, but a ground which cannot yet be rendered or defined coherently. For policy and administration, perhaps the most succinct expressions of the bind are in the metaphors, unleash and harness, and the double concept of value, economic and public. But at least it was possible to point towards the profound political problem represented by culture and the arts, in which what can be counted – the cultural product in some media form – may also be socially, intellectually, politically and economically subversive in its "new ideas and ways of understanding the world".[53]

As with the New Zealand policy papers, the difficulty of making claims for innovation in respect of knowledge in the cultural sector is apparent, especially when the criterion of economic value is dominant and when "expressing what it is to be human" is a common characteristic. The first outcome of MCH's cultural policy research programme, *Value and culture: An economic framework*, is exemplary both for what it does, and what it cannot do.

The paper is a rigorously disciplined investigation, in which the scope of MCH is brought within economics; as the Executive Summary makes clear, "This paper outlines the concept of economic value within a cultural context. Culture is taken here to include all goods, services and activities in the broad arts, sports and heritage space" (7). But it is the concluding paragraph which reaches out towards the Demos analysis of cultural value, and which confirms Holden's view that cultural policy needs to adopt a new language and assert a different ground than the economic on which to build its self-representation to the public and to government:

> The (potential) failure of some of the economic assumptions suggests that economic valuation techniques, while valuable (and greatly superior to conventional impact analyses), should not be the sole method for determining funding allocations within the cultural sector. Individuals active within the cultural sector have in-depth knowledge about the values generated within their sector and tapping into this knowledge will be likely to improve the value for money from policy interventions within the sector. They will have deeper knowledge about what goods and services are likely to be valued in future, instrumental benefits which may arise from supporting certain goods or services and how best to compare the benefits associated with the variety of cultural goods and services which are on offer today. These more subjective, but in-depth, sector-specific contributions should therefore be used as complements to economic valuation techniques when determining priorities within the cultural sector (Allan et al, 2013: 39).

Put another way, one can see better where a spotlight is aimed than in the shadows outside its illumination. The evolution of the scope of cultural policy over the past twenty years, as signified by the Australasian examples I have discussed, points to the grey area which is both in and out of the policy process and is named as culture. The enlargement of scope is a consequence of the dominance of economic discourse in government and business in politics, both totalising forms of thought and social organisation, and new media technologies which, as crucial social infrastructure, have had their potentials largely shaped by economics and business. As Schultz (2013) argued in a paper reflecting on the formation of *Creative Australia,* cultural policy now has a "whole of government" reference: "Clearly there is a link between the institutional value of culture and foreign affairs, infrastructure, communications, tourism, even defence; the instrumental role intersects with education, health, welfare, community affairs, migration, Indigenous affairs; the industry sector intersects with trade, research, innovation, tourism, infrastructure, communications and so on" (15). It is, however, notorious that the whole of government, like a map of the world or the university's claim to embrace the whole of knowledge, breaks down into territories walled with varying degrees of permeability. At the level of thought, if not of practice, what is it about culture that creates interfaces between the departments of

state and could become the principal source of authorisation (as the economy is now) for the work of government? The incoherences in cultural policy point to a Kuhnian moment of impending paradigm shift, in which current knowledge is reconceptualised when too many exceptions to the structures formalising that knowledge accumulate, and raise the question of where the tipping point might be such that culture, not as the arts but as the primal scene of knowledge generation, becomes the engine driving cultural policy.

8. Turning (to) Cultural Policy for an Educatio n State

The preceding discussion of (local) policy documents has demonstrated how policy evolution as a process of reconceptualising a sector or function within government is a space of intersection between concepts circulating globally and local contexts of reception and application. Specifically, the documents reveal that the challenge to the traditional justifications for government involvement in the arts by the creative industries has occurred together with changing conceptions of democracy, the (creative) citizen, the role of media and communications in society, the globalisation of economies and societies, the nature and functions of culture and education. In particular, conceptions of postmodern democratic societies as innovative knowledge societies have not been extended from their normative techno-scientific origin to include an account of the role of knowledge generated by cultural processes. This section will begin to explore what is needed for this situation to be remedied and the "whole of knowledge" to provide the ground for thinking through the problematic of the innovative or knowledge society. It will consider four perspectives on culture and education: the art system, as theorised by Luhmann; the concepts of "culture in the plural" and the local as discussed by de Certeau; the global perspective of UNESCO; and a singular mind in civic engagement.

8.1 Arts and Culture

Creative Australia recognised that the arts provide a complicated set of challenges for policy making when that is based implicitly and explicitly on

the techno-scientific and industrial production of knowledge and objects of economic value. The arts (and the artist) as a now special (but previously the traditional) instance of cultural productivity and creativity remain central to this problematic, as do the humanities. To advance discussion of it in cultural policy requires a theory of the arts which can make sense of what is distinctive about them in postmodernity and is capable of providing an intellectual framework capable of thinking together the diversity of institutions and practices which are described and catalogued in the various policy papers.

There is little point in attempting to overcome the present marginality and incoherence of "the arts, culture and the humanities" in policy for knowledge and innovation by including those parts which are conformable to the current methods of valuation by quantification, technocratic discourse and the application of techno-scientific knowledge, and bracketing the rest. It is more productive to approach the problem by asking what other ways of thinking can discover the coherence of the spectrum of knowledgable work captured by "the arts, culture and the humanities", and bring them into the frame (by reframing it) of policy thinking.[54] A powerful theory of art which addresses key elements of this problem has been put forward by Niklas Luhmann in his *Art as a Social System* and I will briefly identify the relevant steps in his argument here before taking up other aspects below, in Chapter Four on communication, and in Chapter Five on the genesis of the art work.

An art work is a specific instance of what I have called semiotic objects, a class of objects distinguished by being formed in relation to and typically manifesting in some way meanings and values generated over time in the environment (cultural, social and natural) in which they are made. From a perspective in the postmodern, Luhmann argues for a conception of art as an historically evolved functional system of a postmodern society, like the economy, or science, or law, or communication. It is refreshing to begin with a premise, that humanly created objects exist, like given world objects; the intention is not to explain why they exist, but to observe the functions they perform in society as societies change over time. The term art refers, therefore, not just to the objects which from time to time are classified by that term and so distinguished from other kinds of objects, but also to the complex social apparatus which determines the classification of objects, produces

interpretation of such objects, makes claims for their value and meaning, trains artists and critics, establishes and maintains institutions for the collection and display of such objects, and enables a diversity of conversations about them by means of the media and education systems.

Luhmann acknowledges at the beginning that "it turned out to be difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the systematics of the system from the bare facts while bracketing historical analyses (as would have been feasible with the economic system, the system of science, and the legal system)" (2000a: 3), and his work persistently approaches the question of the attributes of an art system by identifying critical phases in European art history which mark evolutionary developments in the form of artworks.[55] It is also his concern throughout to show that these phases go together with widespread changes occurring in European society, for example, "art of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries reacted to a new social situation marked by the erosion of a unified religious world-view, a monetary crisis of the nobility, the imposition of order by the territorial state, and the new rationalism of mathematical-empirical science with its geometrical methods", but a later reaction is subsequently expressed in the important postulate which is further elaborated in the study, that "[modern] art projects a society as yet unable to experience and describe itself adequately" (144-145). Put later in another way, he proposes that "art tests arrangements that are at once fictional and real in order to show society, from a position within society, that things could be done differently" (313); or, in a word, the work of art is a provocation (22).

For Luhmann, all functional social systems in postmodernity develop by autopoesis, that is, recursively from within themselves, and influence other co-existing systems and are influenced by them in a process Luhmann calls "mutual irritability" (2). Throughout his analysis of the art system he confirms the present situation in policy thinking and the organisation of government, that the art system is an outlier to those dominant in official thinking: "Compared to other intersystemic relationships – between law and politics, for example, between the health system and the economy as an employment system, or between the economy and science – the art system is surprisingly isolated" (243). Because his analysis of the characteristics of the art system which make it distinctive from other social systems is

precisely elaborated, I will identify them with quotations from rather than by making summaries of his thinking.

He observes that "Art has very few direct effects on other functional systems, and this is why society rarely responds to the differentiation and autonomy of the art system" (181). From another perspective, he asks, "What happens to art if other social domains, such as the economy, politics, or science, establish themselves as functional systems? What happens when they focus more narrowly on a special problem, begin to see everything from this perspective, and eventually close themselves off with an eye toward this problem?" (137). In general terms, the consequence is reductiveness and the foreclosing of possibilities for thought and social action as formulation of the "special problem" assumes a totalising force if its knowledge domain becomes dominant in knowledge politics. Specifically in respect of my argument in this book, the humanities' exclusion as a means of formulating knowledge of value to society offers an elaborate example of this effect.

Lacking this tendency to a narrow focus is a key factor in the separation of art from other social systems such that "More than any other functional system – religion, politics, science, or law – the art system is able to accept multiple descriptions of complexity. More than any other functional system, it is in a position to demonstrate that modern society and, from its perspective, the world can be described only in poly-contextual terms" (306). Postmodern artworks do not, therefore, deliver truths or descriptions of reality; instead, as a medium of communication, they engage consciousness not with "unambiguous denotative meaning" (25) but with deliberate ambiguity and indeterminacy, creating a situation where "we find ourselves confronted by the hopelessly unending interpretability of 'finished' works" (12). This is clearly also the situation of policy work, even if it is not so radically expressed; but the unavailability of this comparison, and hence the exclusion of the art work as a potent source of new knowledge, is a clear sign of the way in which governments "close themselves off" from very important and locally available means for thinking innovatively, for achieving foresight. As Luhmann suggested, "all the problems to be solved in the system of society are directly or indirectly related to the structure of meaning" (139), which is fully realised and encountered in specific manifestations of "culture in the plural".

Time as history and the framing of experience by history are integral factors in the creation and experience of artworks, but in dynamic and formative ways which quite transcend the more static implications of the current cultural policy term heritage. From this perspective, any art work is new because it recollects but is not bound to repeat previous forms, and its freedom is magnified by "poly-contextuality". Art is understood by Luhmann to provide the clearest exemplification of a fundamental problem for postmodern societies and the autopoetic systems which constitute them, namely,

> the question of how to relate to the past within a system that has become autonomous, how to mediate between past and future, between memory and the freedom to change sides, in all of the system's distinctions. […] The art of the past has become history. This precludes the simple repetition of existing works or styles. By losing the self-evidence of its binding force, the art of the past relinquishes its forms and styles as material to be exploited. Museums (and, in a different way, libraries) now serve as a system-internal context against which the new can distinguish itself *and which is indispensable for this purpose*. […] Even if, under the signature 'postmodernism,' insistence on the novelty of the individual work has been replaced by the freedom to combine traditional forms, the self-historicization of art remains bound to the distinction between the new and the old. […] Art exemplifies a situation in which the future, no longer guaranteed by the past, has become unpredictable. Operative closure, the emancipation of contingency, self-organization, poly-contextuality, the hypercomplexity of self-descriptions, or, simpler and less accurately formulated, pluralism, relativism, historicism – all these trends offer no more than different cross sections of the structural fate of modernity. By suffering its own condition, art shows that's just how it is. (303, 309)

For Luhmann, art provides a strikingly different way by which postmodern societies can begin to comprehend their situation as it is captured by these concepts. Works of art perform these characteristics and create events because association with them takes time and engages the beholder with

meaning. But the manner of this engagement is also distinctive. As a new work open to the unpredictability of the future, each art work creates a new imaginative space by creating a real object drawing upon the history of such objects and oriented towards the future, in which what is potential comes into encounter with what is actual in the perception and experience of each beholder.

Even though each artwork is new, like singular minds it exists in a web of communicative dependencies with others like itself: "the artwork […] only comes into being by virtue of recursive networking with other works of art, with widely distributed verbal communications about art, with technically reproducible copies, exhibitions, museums, theatres, buildings, and so forth" (53). Here the full scope of the art system comes clearly into view: "the institutionalization of art and the establishment of supporting information (exhibitions and so on) require that works of art 'converse' with one another, that cite, copy, reject, renew, ironize art – that art is reproduced, no matter how, within a referential nexus that transcends the work. Today this is called 'intertextuality,' which is another way of saying that the art system must have a memory" (245). I am using the term semiosphere as the most inclusive term for this "referential nexus", understood as the location of meaning and as ordered by the "simpler" terms "pluralism, relativism, historicism", and the concept of the I-space to identify its social structural characteristics, comprising both institutions and forms of communication.

Here the complex issue of how art can be innovative, and what it means to refer to creativity as the motive power or source of the possibility of innovation, is made explicit. The art system is isolated in public policy formation (if not simply absent) because its characteristics, evolved as they are now through the constant re-formation of artworks and their interpretation, is rendered invisible to policy as a result of the political claim by the science system and the systems affiliated with it by method and truth procedure to provide the only valid source of (new) knowledge about reality relevant to government and society, and by the industrial and commercial models of production and innovation. A very different conception both of the grounds of decision-making and the kinds of knowledge relevant to understanding the situation of society in relation to its possible futures, and hence of modes of policy making, would result from taking seriously

Luhmann's account of the characteristics of the art system and applying it as a means of opening out government thinking to more than one modality of knowledge creation.

The immediate consequence is a claim for the possibility of coherence complementary to science at the level of expert knowledge and hence in policy formation for the cultural sector. Just as an artwork is an object supporting the creation of a diversity of expert knowledges – for example, in art history and philosophy (and the sub-disciplines formed in relation to each media technology involved in the making of artworks), archaeology, design, materials science and techniques of use, medium theory, curatorial theory and practice, arts policy and administration, the art economy – so by extension do all semiotic objects, as the most inclusive term for humanly created objects.

At almost every point in Luhmann's analysis, there is an incentive to extend his argument beyond art to the humanities, even if the term humanities appears only once in the whole book (212), whereas the term "science" appears many times, and he grants science the status of a system constituted by multiple disciplines but does not propose a similar status for the humanities. This difference indicates that his analytical project is located (with a touch of irony?) within the frame of science: "Science (*Wissenschaft*), here specifically sociological theory, must open itself to irritation through art. Science must be able to observe what is presented as art. In this basic sense, sociological theory is an empirical science (according to its own description, at any rate)" (7). But many important consequences for thinking about the humanities and cultural policy follow from his analysis, not least as a result of this discursive and methodological commitment to the creation of knowledge and its significance for the claim that cultural policy is the foundational policy of an education state.

This claim has its complement in the claim that the term the humanities signifies a coherent body of expert knowledge, however diverse its disciplinary and institutional components (and they are extremely diverse, such that practitioners in one domain may not now perceive themselves as participating in a more inclusive project of enquiry), and that the grounds of this coherence must be (like an evolving national identity) understood by those professing humanistic knowledge. What Luhmann has demonstrated as

the complex components of the art system and how they are held together by their self-description applies equally to any discipline or field of enquiry in the humanities, but especially to the whole, what I am calling the new or postmodern humanities. The new humanities becomes the expert dimension of the system of postmodern culture as that is made up of all the diverse forms of textual production characteristic of a postmodern, democratic society. It is founded on the existence of semiotic objects and their integral relation to their human creators and their beholders, the times, places and societies in which they find themselves at the time of their creation and subsequently, and the energetic sphere of meaning in which they are contained. The ever-changing composition of the semiosphere, and its inclusion of all kinds of textual production from all times and places, in all languages and media forms, is the ground of the vitality of humanistic knowledge and thought and the source of its capacity to engage the future on behalf of humanity. As Luhmann notes, "we must expand the notion of text to include every object in need of interpretation" (98), the textual productions of government being a notable example.[56]

8.2 Economy and Culture

It seems to be generally agreed that the recent period of drastic reform of New Zealand - socially, governmentally, economically – according to neo-liberal principles has not produced the economic benefits (at least for the majority of the population) which were the proclaimed purpose of the reforms and were to provide the compensation for the stress of structural change. The tensions within the nineteenth century concept of development - in which citizens of a young, recently colonial nation are particularly embedded - between the exploitation of colonised territories for wealth and an inclusive conception of moral, social, intellectual and economic improvement (development as civilising) seem to have been currently if insecurely resolved internationally in favour of a singular focus on wealth-creation under the increasingly thin pretence in Western countries of advancing democracy. Such a resolution, effected by the new imperialism of global financial institutions, places extraordinary pressures upon the governments of democratic nations which continue to accept that their first responsibility is to their citizens. In New Zealand, I would argue that it is the

process, instituted in the mid-1970s, of acceptance by the state of responsibility for the effects of colonisation on the indigenous Māori people and the incorporation into New Zealand's (unwritten) constitution of the Treaty of Waitangi (signed between the Crown and Māori in 1840) as the founding document of modern New Zealand, which has brought into focus the local complexity of a global situation. This act of government, setting in process a crucial and as yet incomplete rebalancing of relations between settler and indigenous peoples, is an exemplary act of cultural policy, one which could only be taken in Aotearoa New Zealand because it is only in the territorial and cultural space occupied by this nation state that such a foundational act can have meaning and purpose, including for new knowledge creation and economic development.[57] The analysis presented in *The Heart of the Nation* is an example of what it means to bring distinctive local cultural and historical factors to bear on global developments in public policy and institutional formation.

I have previously referred to de Certeau's conception of "culture in the plural", and I will now expand on its implications. The concept was formulated in response to an earlier crisis, the events of May 1968 in France, in a number of essays on the problematic of a cultural policy in which the role of the educational system is a central factor. In his analysis de Certeau sets up two contrasting domains of social action, one which links the institutions of disciplinary knowledge, the state, the media and the economy as aspects of a system owned and run by an elite, in which ideologies, politics and the exercise of power are disguised in a process which he describes as the "scientific and technical rationalization" of society. As with Brier, this domain is not outside of culture, but it is itself a mode of culture, what he terms "culture in the singular"; in research, it is identified in the "unitary interpretation [or] a totalizing vision" produced by investigators who share a "homogeneity of milieu". He perceives this rationalization to be exemplified by "the neutrality of scientific discourse", a discourse "held by 'anybody' but by no one in particular", a principal effect of which is to silence and render invisible the diversity of local languages (the relentless production of talk and images by the mass media is argued to have the same effect) and the heterogeneity of social practices which are produced by people in human relationships in specific times and places (1997: 105, 139, 127, 33, 136-7). This other, marginalised domain of social action de Certeau

calls “culture in the plural”, and it is on the basis of this distinction that he enquires into the possibility and sources of innovation and creativity in a society entering the global orders of postmodernity.

For de Certeau, “culture in the singular has become a political mystification. Furthermore, it is deadly. It menaces creativity itself.” The economy provides another example of what is at stake in this opposition: creativity is a function of “a plurality of cultures, that is, of systems of references and meanings that that are heterogeneous in relation to each other. To the homogenization of economic structures there must be a corresponding diversification of cultural expressions and institutions. The more the economy unifies, the more the culture must be variegated” (1997: 67-68). By moving thought about culture away from works and the “ideology of property” to multiple “systems of references and meanings”, de Certeau points to a fundamental contrast of critical importance to democratic governance in postmoderntiy, which is marked by crises of meanings, not facts or reasons. He formulates a striking axiom: “To innovate is, first of all, to betray oneself” (1998: 6).[58] Beyond meanings there is only a void, “opened up by a society that calls itself into question”; at its most fundamental, a process which “splinter{s] the continuous network of sentences and ideas” holding together a unified conception of society and subjectivity (1998: 5, 42). A potent instance of the co-existence of a unitary conception of society and of its splintering in the lived experience of individuals is to be found in the children of migrants, who he describes as “borderline types [for whom] living at the edge of two worlds, two languages, and two cultures has already trained them for these uncharted voyages between opposing codes and dialects, for multiple operations of translation” (1998: 113). Innovation and creativity in postmodernity are here the product of “uncharted voyages between opposing codes and dialects”, occurring anywhere in society where the plurality of cultures is experienced in practice by persons living in collectivities.

It is not that public documents in New Zealand lack references to cultural and linguistic differences; the point is rather that, when it comes to innovation and the economy, the dominant voice in public policy discourse is technocratic, a politics of knowledge in which the politics are disguised by “scientific and technical rationalization”. It would also be dominant in

formal education, the officially desired link between education, employment and economic development to be made by scientific and technological knowledge. There are obviously critical differences – theoretical, methodological, institutional, practical - between universalist and pluralist conceptions of knowledge; but an innovation theory and policy which is not culturally pluralistic in its fundamentals fails to comprehend the underpinning sources of creative energy and thought in a particular jurisdiction. It is in this context that the concept of nation building, which in recent public policy is aimed at providing a distinctive brand for otherwise similar products and at compensating for the loss of social cohesion generated by the risk economy, assumes a quite different value. Grounded in a conception of "culture in the plural", innovation policy (and hence economic policy) would become a branch of cultural policy, rather than the other way around. The differences of cultures and languages cannot be cancelled or reduced to a unity (except by force); their productivity lies in the unceasing negotiations, and thinking, which contact between them generates. A society, in the form of a nation-state, provides a framework of conventions and procedures, historically evolved in the territory of that state, for the peaceful conduct of this negotiation, in which the political and juridical organisation of that society at the national level is particularly important in formulating conceptions of national culture as a body of cogent beliefs and practices constituting a dimension (but not the totality) of each citizen's self-consciousness. It is not the content of these conceptions, but the process by which they are articulated, debated, and modified over time, which the democratic nation-state must guarantee. Becoming a global citizen is now a further possibility of citizenship, but the nation-state persists as the highest level of identity formation which remains intimately constituted by the local specifics of land, place, language, history and cultural practice.

The consequences of thinking in terms of "culture in the plural" can be briefly indicated by de Certeau's comments on two place-oriented terms which specify contrasting but related dimensions of embodied consciousness. The first is Europe, a term signifying a process of "nation-building", but in this case a supra-nation. De Certeau notes, first of all, that "In European nations, which in many respects are still traditional societies, the adaptations to technical requirements of labor leave intact or brutally cut through - even if superficially - the deeper structures of affective life and personal frames of

reference." He goes on to identify a "specifically Western tension: everyday life runs directly against the grain of a collective conviction that has been a typically Western structure for more than four centuries, namely, that a connection must exist between productive labor and personal development. […] This tension is especially felt in nations whose space tends to be more closed, whose history is longer, and whose coherence is stronger" (106). These differentiations have been enacted exactly in New Zealand, if not during the same long European time-frame; Māori are identified officially as a traditional society needing help for that reason to adapt to the requirements of technocratic society, and it is usual for Pakeha (normally British or other European settlers) to adopt or to be placed in the position of lacking a traditional culture, so that "traditional" is equated with "indigenous". But everyday life for Pakeha is similarly now based on a disconnect, since conceptions of New Zealand's cultural identity and its public institutions have been built from the beginning of European settlement on the premise of the link between "productive labor and personal development" and, more recently, on a post-colonial, bicultural conception signified by the name Aotearoa New Zealand.

Furthermore, de Certeau argues that "What really characterizes Europe […] are the cultural heteronomies between each of the countries which compose it: a difference of languages, traditions, and histories […] the elucidation of these divergences is the only possible way to discover a 'European' specificity" (130). Where these divergences are now the fact of localities and memories within new nations like New Zealand, de Certeau's point holds true: if, for an education state, postmodern nation-building is a matter of elucidating heteronomies, not prescriptions or unities, then engaging formally and publicly with these divergences, not to rationalise them but to install them as the complex and continuously evolving and negotiated content of the sign "Aotearoa New Zealand", must be a primary goal. This work is fundamentally educational, whether carried out by the government in policy work, or by the formal education system, or by the media, or by the multitude of forms of association linking people throughout the nation. In Aotearoa New Zealand, the kinds of principles which could be taken as indicating the terms on which this nation and its citizens mutually understand each other are those set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Universal Declaration on

Cultural Diversity. The principles identifying an Aotearoa New Zealand specificity among the world's nations have now been articulated in the Constitution of Aotearoa New Zealand proposed by Sir Geoffrey Palmer and Andrew Butler (Palmer and Butler, 2016: 34-35). It is here, rather than in the economy, that the work of cultural policy establishes the conditions by which innovativeness becomes a decisive characteristic of the national system for social and economic reproduction.

The other term is "local". As de Certeau notes, "International information does not prevent a group from being *locally* determined. The universality of information is relativized through a peculiar way of being treated" (129).[59] New Zealand Government documents recognise that most new (scientific and technological) knowledge is created elsewhere and emphasise that the education system must incorporate such universally valid knowledge into New Zealanders' learning and research, not least because this knowledge is the way into the global economy. But de Certeau points out that "Western economic reason works differently in countries whose sociocultural structures are different from those that, over the past three centuries in Europe, have fostered the growth of technology and science. Surprising combinations among the different systems are sketching out still unknown global hypotheses that might shift the general equilibrium of societies and ways of living and thinking that we have known" (130). Applied to New Zealand, this conception of the local modification of global hypotheses about the purposes and modes of operation of society as the source of innovation requires a much more complex account of the role of cultural history and difference and of modes of knowing other than science and technology. It is also a recognition that policies encouraging the immigration of already educated, skilled people from elsewhere (policies which short-cut the long-term and costly public commitment to educating a nation's young people), may have much greater local benefits in creating shifts in "ways of living and thinking" that are more likely to derive from the cultural pluralism which they enhance (or disrupt, depending on the cultural politics of the society in which they were brought up and educated) than their specific work-related knowledge. What distinguishes knowledge and innovation which is "made in New Zealand" is not the scientific discovery, the image added to a product, or a dominant western knowledge system maintaining a space for traditional Māori knowledge; it is what de Certeau refers to as "the peculiar way of

being treated", the complex interactivity between inherited and imported knowledge systems in this specific place producing new sociocultural forms and new possibilities for knowledge creation, as envisaged in the Kahikatea scenario of the Foresight project.

Bevir (2010) offers another conception, which elaborates de Certeau's concept of "culture in the plural" and provides a further demonstration of the value of approaching issues of creativity and innovation from a localist rather than a universalist perspective. He writes that "Reasoning is always local in that it occurs in the context of agents' existing webs of belief. […] To insist on the local nature of reasoning is thus to preclude an autonomous and universal concept of reasoning and subjectivity associated with much economic theorizing" (261-262). He distinguishes between local reasoning and local knowledge, the former involving a web of beliefs which is not spatially delimited, the latter involving knowledge created from embodied experience in a specific time and place. In this account expert knowledge is as much subject to local reasoning as is local knowledge, a position also affirmed in de Certeau's conception of the relativising of universal knowledge. A third distinction connects the concept of innovation and the creation of new knowledge and practice to the most general ground for innovation explored by H G Barnett, human creativity and the cultural inventory on which it depends. As Bevir writes, "Local reasoning operates through a capacity for creative if situated agency. Agency is creative in that there is no rule defining how people will modify their prior beliefs to make room for a newcomer. […] Situated agents engage in local reasoning whenever they accommodate a new belief in an existing web of beliefs" (263). This interpretation of the situatedness of knowledge and its creation, which includes tacit as well as expert and universal knowledge within its scope, like de Certeau's concept of culture in the plural, opens the door on to the proper consideration of the grounds of innovation in the interactivity of cultures and histories in local contexts. And now, because the infinitely many localities on the planet can re-present themselves in other places culturally through migration and virtually through global media as communities of difference within a nation-state, they have become prime sources of the mental energy for changes in thinking, both socially creative and socially destructive.

8.3 UNESCO

The international, governmental organisation most directly engaged with what it means to make education the ground on which the work and value of knowledge are conceived generally and specifically for innovation is UNESCO. As the locus of what Miller and Yudice (2002: 169) call "global cultural policy", its mission, structure, processes and history highlight the extraordinary complexities of trying to develop collective thinking about education, culture, human rights and the principles of good governance while keeping the diversity of languages, cultures and histories (including colonisation, war and the economic sources of conflict between and within nation states) in the foreground.

UNESCO's programmes and strategic themes offer an approach to globalisation which emphasises the interactivity of multiple cultures, histories, and languages within and among nation states. Its emphasis on local difference acted out locally and communally in education, social practices and cultural creativity stands starkly opposed to the universalism of economic globalisation, which nonetheless cannot be ignored. Economic development is placed within a framework of ethical and sustainable practices, in which life-long education, heritage and inherited knowledge play crucial roles.

In a recent publication, *Culture in the Post-2015 Development Agenda*, Alfredo Pérez de Armiñán, Assistant Deputy General, Culture Sector, UNESCO, has written that "Culture has an enormous potential to generate dialogue among members of society, to strengthen civil society and to promote democratic life, while encouraging the exercise of freedom, tolerance, understanding, peace and reconciliation" (2015: 7). It can "play a decisive role" in sustainable development, in "poverty eradication, quality education, sustainable environmental management, sustainable cities and social cohesion and inclusion" (5). But it is important to note the conditionals in this statement, reflecting the conclusions of a Culture and Development meeting among 18 states in 2014 which stressed the importance of including culture in the development agenda, implying that such an inclusion was not yet certain.

In the context of a different theme, "Protecting our heritage and fostering creativity", heritage and creativity are presented on the UNESCO website as a priori conditions for social and economic development: "Heritage constitutes a source of identity and cohesion for communities disrupted by bewildering change and economic instability. Creativity contributes to building open, inclusive and pluralistic societies. Both heritage and creativity lay the foundations for vibrant, innovative and prosperous knowledge societies."[60]

These propositions now figure in much cultural and educational policy in democratic societies, to the point of seeming self-evident. But actually trying to work out their implications for state insitutions and public policy is a much harder task, and UNESCO is one of the few institutional formations available with experience of the complexities of trying to think outwards from a foundation in cultural and educational policy which respects "culture in the plural". The difficult consequences of adopting this position are clearly marked in UNESCO's own history, which parallels the on-going disempowerment of humanities knowledge in Western democracies.[61] For this reason it is striking that the current Director-General, Irina Bokova, has recently proposed that UNESCO should give form to a new humanism, which she has defined as the means of refocusing the UNESCO mission for the twenty-first century. Her conception has been elaborated in a variety of meetings, the substance of which has been published in 2014 as *Envisioning a New Humanism for the 21st Century*.[62]

In one expression of it (UNESCO, 2014: 36) she writes that

> We need today a New Humanism rooted in a profound respect for human dignity, fundamental rights and the diversity of cultures. We need a new vision of development where every woman and man feels a sense of responsibility towards others and for the safeguarding of our planet.[…] We must ensure our social intelligence lives up to our scientific intelligence – to prevent conflicts, to eradicate poverty, to release the potential of every woman and man. From across the world, we hear appeals for more imagination, for greater justice and solidarity, for a new harmony

> with our world. This is not a philosophical debate – it is a policy issue.

The work to be performed by a new humanism is transformative, by changing minds through education and dialogue - as humanism has always sought to do, and which is the mode of work in the world of humanistic knowledge. It becomes a policy issue because enacting the principles involved is the responsibility of states and institutions as well as persons, and because it is only by understanding and enacting the principles individually and collectively that beneficial and sustainable change is possible. As Prof Delmas-Marty observed,

'Rather than repeatedly affirming principles, we need to try to reverse the movement towards dehumanization in reality" (2014: 58).

The key to this reversal is education, but of a kind not currently the centre of educational policy in regimes operating under neoliberalism. A good summary of what is at stake is given by Bokova in an address to the University of Malaya in 2013 (2014: 17):

> Education policy is the ultimate long-term policy – it must be visionary, it must be strategic. I believe we need to rethink the fundamentals of education at this time when the world is changing profoundly. We need to educate for a sustainable future. […] The future agenda must start with equity – to ensure everyone can exercise the right to education, to training, to learning opportunities. […] It must promote global citizenship – to strengthen peace and human rights education and shape new behaviours for sustainability, and to give cultural literacy that is so much needed. This requires a sharper focus on education for creativity, education for global solidarity, education for sustainable development.

Contributors to the various reports of meetings are also very clear that it is not possible to affirm the importance of dialogue, education or culture without engaging with the capacities and limitations of the internet as a new, global communications medium. If there is a kind of universalism in this technology, there is also a kind of universalism characteristic of the new humanism. A meeting organised by the Russian Centre for Science and

Culture in 2012 succinctly contrasted the scope of now traditional humanism which remains powerfully informative of thought and practice in the Western humanities, with that of the new humanism:

> While classical humanism sought to reconcile tradition with modernity, as well as the rights of individual with their duties as members of communities, the New Humanism will have to help reconcile the local with the global, and people with nature. A global awareness of life and a sense of compassion for people and nature must be acquired by each and every one.
>
> The universalism intrinsic to humanism is not static and inflexible. Rather, it is an evolving idea which different generations and nations adapt to their circumstances at a given point in time. No culture holds the monopoly to truth, justice, or universality, since all traditions, cultures and religions contain a humanist kernel. In this sense, humanism is not an ideology or a dogma, but an invitation to dialogue among equals. (UNESCO, 2014: 29)

In respect of my concerns, this is a very timely intervention into the problematic relations between knowledge, values, and power (political, social and economic) in a globalising world order, and a significant challenge to technocratic policy formation which brackets ethics, cultural histories and values as forms of knowledge outside its rational and objective scope. But this new humanism also confronts the modern Western humanities by omission with a profound challenge. What counts as modern knowledge in UNESCO thinking is the modern western sciences and social sciences; but their practitioners enjoy a freedom not available in research as such to employ their expertise in the UNESCO context in the service of humane values and social development. Culture in the sense of ways of thinking is typically associated with traditional and indigenous knowledge, which is displaced and superseded by modern knowledge or repurposed in new media technologies (but is conserved as heritage). The modern Western humanities, as literate traditional knowledge (principally European but including the texts of other cultures as these entered European awareness), fit neither category, which creates (for me) the ironical situation that the organisation which I would wish to regard as the international location of the work of the

postmodern humanities and a working model, however imperfect, of the education state, envisages a New Humanism without proposing a New Humanities.

There is one notable exception in this publication which is highly relevant to the case I have made for the humanities in Chapter Two, and which captures the whole reason for this chapter. Homi Bhabha (2014: 71-72), in a concluding response to Bokova's acceptance speech at the beginning of her second term as Director-General in 2013, observed that

> It is difficult to conceive of a flourishing of new humanism if the map of knowledge is itself deeply distorted. This age of the world-wide web is, in some ways, a narrow, parochial place. According to reliable sources, the US and the UK published more indexed journals than the rest of the world. There are remarkably more articles (7,800) written about Antarctica than any country in Africa or South America.
>
> In this map of 'educational un-sustainability' the humanistic disciplines are in a state of crisis. How can the new humanism take root if the soil of humanistic thought is left to wither? What is neglected in this era of Big Data is the remarkable integrative capabilities of the humanities. The integrative capability of the humanities has given rise to a number of hybrid disciplines – the digital humanities; the medical humanities; the legal humanities. Notice how such interdisciplinary formations display the extension of the humanities into areas of public policy and social ethics. Notice, too, how the 'integrative' impulse of the humanities is structured along the lines of inclusion and diversity, so that 'public reason' is accessible across all divisions. From this perspective, it becomes clear that the integrative humanities, in the company of scientific discoveries, can be preeminent in contributing to building a global civil society.

It is an open question, from which direction has the motive for integrative thinking and practice come, and what are the resources within the disciplines of the modern humanities for initiating integrative thinking and understanding, not only across disciplines in a university environment but across the borders

of discourse and purpose between institutions, especially those involved with learning and governing. What are the forms of "public reason" as the common factor in all kinds of humanistic knowledge as they are disseminated through all the communication networks of a postmodern democratic society? How should "public reason" be manifested in the work of the public sector of a postmodern democratic nation-state? The contemporary politics of knowledge are powerful and a prime source of the crisis to which Bhabha refers; they also explain why the promotion of a new humanism has recently become the mission of UNESCO as a supranational organisation founded on universally applicable ideas about what it means to be human which challenge neoliberal and autocratic settlements in policy, economy and law, put pressure on forming goals for social action leading to human betterment, and remain open to interpretation now in any culture, place and jurisdiction, and always open to the future.

8.4 A singular mind, publicly engaged

Another working example of the kinds of relation between knowledges and practices which would be distinctive of a new humanism and the cultural policy of an education state is the project *Imagining America: Artists and Scholars in Public Life*. Its mission, as defined on its website, is "[to create] democratic spaces to foster and advance publicly engaged scholarship that draws on arts, humanities, and design. We catalyze change in campus practices, structures, and policies that enables artists and scholars to thrive and contribute to community action and revitalization."[63] Established in 1999, it is a "national consortium of over ninety colleges, universities, and community-based cultural and arts organizations. It was born out of efforts to strengthen the significance of the cultural disciplines in both academic and civic life" (Peters and Eatman, 2014: 168). It is founded on a positive critique of the separation between academic work and the public value of knowledge and experience shared in civic and communal settings, and in collaborative projects with democratic renewal as a major goal. It proposes a revised conception of the civic responsibilities of academic training in the arts and humanities, in which what has been typically known as community service in New Zealand but is here defined as civic engagement is understood to be integral to professional identity and academic work. Its

purpose is to connect higher education, theory and practice with local populations across the boundaries of art forms and disciplines, performance spaces and the communities in which they are located, based on the conviction that social and personal development begins with people in their local communities. Knowledge and expertise which are internationally informed and nationally recognised must also be communicated and disseminated by practitioners in the local urban and rural settings in which artists and academics live and work. Cooper (2014: 161) describes this as "cultural work in the public interest", a conception of the ways in which knowledge in the arts and humanities needs to move and have effects in the world. Two of the values espoused by *Imagining America* identify what motivates and gives form to this cultural work:

> Critical and pluralistic approaches to ways of knowing about the world and acting in it;
> Creativity and innovation in developing and mobilizing theory and knowledge with communities.

These values are intended to position academic professionals at the interfaces between their expert knowledge and public applications of it, in many different social settings requiring the kind of rhetorical and discursive adaptability with which I began this chapter and with the expectation that learning is mutual and reciprocal.

The publication in which Peters' and Eatman's assessment of what is at stake in this revisioning of the purposes and uses of academic knowledge in arts and humanities is a collection of essays by David Cooper which reflect on his diverse roles as an academic in the humanities, writing instructor, editor, and proponent of change in the conception of professionalism in the cultural disciplines. The title of the collection, *Learning in the Plural*, happily echoes de Certeau's "culture in the plural"; the plural for Cooper, who describes himself as a "teaching humanist devoted to learning in community and community in learning"(2014: xx), refers to his experimenting with and applying a variety of engaged learning techniques focussed on civic engagement, the practice of public humanities scholarship, and reshaping the teaching mission of the humanities. As a kind of intellectual biography and statement of faith, the essays collected in *Learning in the Plural* are

unashamedly positioned against the current form of professionalism in the humanities, which he describes in one place as producing "hyperspecialized scholarship [which] is completely unintelligible to a literate public" (161). In their Afterword, Peters and Eatman qualify this account while supporting the principles on which it is based, in the process elaborating on the work of *Imagining America* and how that work of cultural and professional change might be advanced. They state that "It's not easy for academic humanists to speak and work in critically hopeful terms, to constructively, productively, and imaginatively connect and integrate hope and critique, and to do so off their campuses with diverse publics. Such work runs against the grain of academic culture" (170-171). But such work, grounded in the most advanced, theoretically sophisticated textual analysis, intellectually and rhetorically respectful of singular minds, diverse audiences and communities of endeavour, engaged in discovering the meanings and effects in local contexts of globally ranging enquiry, attentive to and participant in the manifold conversation of democratic societies, skilled in applying the power of media forms to shape public knowledge and cultural change, is the work required of the practitioners of a new humanities.

9. Conclusion

The singular professional life of a humanist which is documented in Cooper's essays reveals a person of principle and conviction adapting to local circumstance and institutional change and evolving through learning and action the meaning of what he has come to know and believe, both about the humanities and the democratic society in which humanistic knowledge is of fundamental importance. A succinct summary of his conception of a humanist's professional identity is given by the question which defines the relation of the public scholar to knowledge and the world: "How can the practices, methods and conventions of my disciplinary scholarship yield knowledge that contributes to public problem-solving and public creation?" (155). For Cooper, it is the failure to ask this question (or to provide answers through public action) which more than anything else accounts for the absence of the humanities from participation in discussions in the United States about nationally important issues like the future of higher education, citizenship, the public good and renewal of democracy. It is a question

which, like the new humanism proposed by the Director General of UNESCO, and the values and mission of *Imagining America*, point clearly towards constitutive features of a new humanities and the cultural policies of an education state.

But there is a more fundamental issue. As this chapter has argued, a new humanities capable of engaging fully and deeply with the processes of thought and action by which a society's possible futures come into existence requires a new settlement in democratic societies about the nature and purposes of knowledge creation. In particular, it requires that the tentative moves in cultural and educational policy away from fixation on the economy and the technosciences and towards the foundational roles of culture, the arts, life-long learning, innate human creativity, and a democratic conception of social and political relations should be vigorously advanced. In one respect, the evolution of the art system as analysed by Luhmann has captured cultural policy, whatever other non-industrial activities, like sport, have been added to the responsibilities of cultural ministries. It is, however, striking that little account in current cultural policy is given of the value (socially and economically) of the knowledge generated culturally and artisticly, as distinct from the knowledge required to produce art works, manage art enterprises, and use media technologies, especially digital networked technologies. This absence is consistent with the absence of the humanities from cultural policy and it succinctly locates many of the obstacles to claims for the value of arts and culture as sources of innovative knowledge, in contrast to the technosciences. Cultural policy, and therefore the humanities, can be repositioned only by shifting the ground of cultural policy thinking away from its now traditional preoccupations with art forms and modern cultural institutions and towards integration in policy and public sector institutional formation of the field of cultural knowledge creation. A theory of the arts and the humanities as together a fundamental source, like the sciences, of innovative knowledge of value must lie at the core of such an integration. The concept of the education state framed by cultural policy is integral to this transformation of the work of government and of the humanities.

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[1] See for example the Australian Academy of the Humanities' mapping project, Turner and Brass (2014); the ongoing Humanities Indicators project of the National Humanities Alliance. the American Council of Learned Societies and related organisations: American Academy of Arts and Sciences (1998-); the Arts and Humanities Research Council's Impact Reports, the most recent being AHRC (2017) but annually from 2007. The work on cultural statistics being done by Statistics NZ and the Ministry of Culture and Heritage (Corey et al., 2013) is just one example of an international programme of statistical definition of the cultural sector. From a different perspective, Gleeson-White (2011) analyses the history of the development of accounting and the specific weaknesses of GDP as a measure of economic and social development.

[2] Barnett (2000: 149-150) writes of "the discursive complexity of the research act [...] it involves projecting the research to multiple audiences in multiple media.' Researchers, therefore, need "to be able to handle mulptiple frames, not just of thought but of action, of self-understanding and of communications."

[3] Haiven's (2014) discussion of the role of the imagination provides a detailed and valuable elaboration of this point. See especially chs. 1 and 7.

[4] The Writing across the Curriculum movement in the United States demonstrated a particular awareness of this rhetorical issue, but had to evolve as a new academic discipline rather than as an integral component of all humanities disciplines.

[5] Sir Geoffrey Palmer states that "All economic institutions are created by society, and politics is the process whereby society chooses the rules that will govern it" (2013: 695).

[6] See J. G. Ballard's dystopian exploration of these globalised social spaces in their local settings in his quartet of novels, Cocaine Nights, Super-Cannes, Millennium People, and Kingdom Come.

[7] See Haiven (2014), ch. 6.

[8] Ranciere (2006) is an eloquent analysis of the counterforce to this approach.

[9] The Dunedin Multidisciplinary Health and Development Study is exemplary of how important a life-span orientation to understanding human development and human needs is to government: http://dunedinstudy.otago.ac.nz/

[10] Bonneuil and Fressoz (2016: 89) draw a similar contrast between "short-term economic profitbility [and] the long-term maintenance of the ecosystems that supplied resources." The notion that the elderly and the women who care for them now constitute an exploitable resource for private profit is only one repellent instance among many of the crude fact that human beings continue to be the most exploitable and exploited resource on the planet.

[11] Harari takes the capacity for fiction to be fundamental to his conception of human social evolution (2014: 20-39).

[12] Holmwood (2012); Simola et al (2002). The scope of the metaphor is appropriately widened by de Certeau (1997: 134): "Economic imperialism, a violent conquista of the cultural market, has a comic doublet: politics, which has become for us a decorum of former ideologies behind which are advancing new technocratic and managerial powers."

[13] Fryer (2011: 237): "For all of the good intentions and strenuous efforts of those seeking to uncouple learning from the wider and pervasive influences of class, status and power, learning obstinately remains not simply a key site for the manifestation of inequality; it also persists in being a core mechanism for both reproducing and reinforcing it."

[14] Brown et al (2008).

[15] Two startlingly different analyses of the significance of the knowledge worker are provided by Florida (2002) and Andrew Ross (2000). For Florida, the new 'creative class' is transforming society and the economy: its core includes 'people in science and engineering, architecture and design, education, arts, music and entertainment, whose economic function is to create new ideas, new technology and/or new creative content. . . [They] share a common creative ethos that values creativity, individuality, difference and merit. . . [The creative class] is dominant in terms of wealth and income" (8-9). Ross agrees that "a new labor landscape" is being drawn and that those who provide its model workers do share an ethos of the kind described by Florida. He argues that "the artisan-jazzman shares the same position and predicament as the professional academic whose labor has been degraded and deprofessionalized in recent years. What are the economic circumstances that have accelerated this degradation? . . . artistic and academic traditions extol sacrificial concepts of mental or cultural labor that are increasingly vital to newly important sectors of the knowledge industries. No longer on the margins of society, in Bohemia or the Ivory Tower, they are providing a

rationale for the latest model of labor exploitation in core sectors of the new industrial order, and pioneering the workplace of tomorrow." This workplace requires a worker who is "comfortable in an ever-changing environment that demands creative shifts in communication with different kinds of clients and partners; attitudinally geared towards production that requires long, and often unsocial, hours; and accustomed, in the sundry exercise of their mental labor, to a contingent, rather than a fixed, routine of self-application" (28, 2, 11). A useful critique (including a self-critique) of Florida's work can be found in UNDP and UNESCO (2013: 20-21).

[16] Lasn (2012); Ollsen et al (2004: chs. 7-10). Taubman (2011: 164-166) describes the new educational order in which "intellectual life appear[s] a shadow of itself" as a nightmare because of various factors including "penetration of education by the marketplace". See also Haiven (2014: ch. 6), "Within and Beyond the Edu-Factory" and Bonneuil and Frezzos (2016).

[17] Lasn (2012: n.p.) includes a vivid visualisation contrasting neoclassical and ecological paradigms of economic thinking, which makes this point at a glance. Rancière (2006: 96) describes democracy as "the action that constantly wrests the monopoly of public life from oligarchic governments, and the omnipotence over lives from the power of wealth. It is the power that, today, more than ever, has to struggle against the confusion of these powers, rolled into one and the same law of domination."

[18] Olssen et al (2004: 270) use these words to characterise neoliberalism.

[19] Macedo (2011: 48-53) analyses the requirement in the national curricular policies of Brazil for citizenship to be the "spinal column" of schooling, and characterizes the concept of citizenship informing the policies as "pluricultural national citizenship". She identifies the unspecified non-citizen in this regime as a person who is characterised by "non-mastery of basic knowledge required for the full exercise of plural national citizenship". A perfect example of the challenge to societies claiming to be democratic is the high correlation between illiteracy and imprisonment, a predominant mode of non-citizenship.

[20] Murphy (2009: 171-175); Murphy (2010: 42-47); Castells (1996: ch. 6), "The Space of Flows"; Martin (1994: 7-8, 511); Hassan et al (2007).

[21] Peters and Reverley (2012) provide an excellent example of how an education state might begin to reconceptualise work, its social and economic productivity.

[22] Mulgan (1998: 113) writes that "for societies to function harmoniously despite greater powers and increased reciprocal independence, they need people who are able to understand their effects on others, to perceive the nature of complex systems, and to empathise and communicate with strangers."

[23] An insightful exploration of the implications of this conception of the postmodern city can be found in Hassan et al (2007).

[24] Sidney includes in Book 3 of his Arcadia an eclogue (221-225) which tells of the animals' decision to create a king for themselves by combining all of their attributes in the figure of man and granting him this privilege, "That from henceforth to all eternity/No beast shall speak, but only he." Jove warns them that "rulers will think all things made them to please,/ And soon forget the swink due to their hire", but they proceed anyway. The outcome is tyranny and destruction.

[25] Gardner (2007: 148), quoted in Hassan et al (2007: 218).

[26] Tims (2010).

[27] Fuller's conception of Humanity 2.0 is developed without reference to the humanities, except as an other to the sciences in an account of the development of sociology (2011: 16-17).

[28] This wording was originally formulated by HUMANZ in an attempt to find a phrase to act as a shorthand for the knowledge represented by the phrase "arts, culture and humanities" and which would have the same inclusiveness and could achieve the same public recognition as "science and technology".

[29] See, for example, Miller and Yudice (2002: 1).

[30] The fertility of these ideas is also very clear in Levy (1997), in his concepts of collective intelligence and its reciprocal, knowledge space, and the implication in their development of a "new humanism that incorporates and enlarges the scope of self knowledge into a form of group knowledge and collective thought" (17).

[31] See Ben Fine (1999) for an assessment of the role played by the concept of "social capital" in economics.

[32] Before it was reconstituted as the Ministry of Culture and Heritage, the Ministry of Cultural Affairs published in 1998 an excellent survey and assessment of the evolution of the government's role in culture in New Zealand, The Government's Role in the Cultural Sector: A Survey of the Issues. Its concluding paragraph observes: "In 1998 the goal of greater co-

ordination of cultural policy, foreseen before the establishment of the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, remains to be accomplished. The fragmented nature of its involvement in the sector has discouraged government from undertaking any overall assessment of cultural policy, whether from an economic or any other perspective. Such an assessment is necessary if government is to address the successes and failure of its historical role and develop a coherent set of priorities, objectives and structures for its involvement in the cultural sector" (40).

[33] This silence is remarkably complete in Te Ara. The term "humanities" does not appear in the subsection listing for the section, Creative and Intellectual Life, and a search on the term produced only variations on the term 'human' on the first few screens.

[34] Growing an Innovative New Zealand (2002: 17).

[35] A valuable analysis of this project is given by Wallace (2011: 117-138).

[36] Users of the methodology were advised to use "the knowledge you have now to look imaginatively, but plausibly, into the future" (25). The collective authorial perspective on society was understandably from a position in business.

[37] Hayles (2012: 175-183) explores the differences between databases and narratives as modes of organising and representing knowledge. In sum, " The flip side of narrative's inability to tell the story is the proliferation of narratives as they transform to accommodate new data and to probe what lies beyond the exponentially expanding infosphere. No longer singular, narratives remain the necessary others to database's ontology, the perspectives that invest the formal logic of database operations with human meanings and gesture toward the unknown hovering beyond the brink of what can be classified and enumerated" (183). See also Hassan etal, (2007: 68): "But recently storytelling has been embraced and championed as the must-have tool in a wide range of fields, from savvy businesses to efficient medical practices. The rising stock of stories can be seen as a part of the shift away from the focus on logical, linear, computer-like capabilities and the metaphor of the machine as an agent of change. Instead there has been a growing interest in issues of meaning, values, ambiguity, fluidity and non-linear notions of thinking which give centre stage to subjectivity and context" (Hassan et al. 2007: 68). But power remains vested in abstraction, stories providing officials with a means of distracting attention from this fact while

apparently demonstrating how organisations are responsive to and aware of individuals.

[38] A more recent version of narrative applied to thinking about the future, but not prioritising any type of knowledge or organisation, was employed in the Dreaming City enquiry: "The concept of futures literacy is based on the premise that by enabling people to create and consider a range of alternative futures in a safe but challenging way, we can get ourselves 'unstuck' from the assumptions we hold about the present and find the confidence to act in the here and now. […] It is about democratising the present and the future through opening up authorship and assumptions about what kinds of futures are possible, probable and preferred" (Hassan et al, 2007: 80).

[39] See Milburn (2002: 266): "the scientific achievements of nanotechnology have been and will continue to be extraordinarily significant; but, without contradiction, nanotechnology is thoroughly science-fictional in imaginig its own future, and the future of the world, as the product of scientific advances that have not yet occurred."

[40] A very succinct statement of the view that science leads and culture (if it is properly constituted) follows and supports is given in the rubric to a 2002 conference, Being Human: Science, Culture and Fear, which was presented by the Royal Society of New Zealand in association with The Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa and the Stout Research Centre for New Zealand Studies at Victoria University of Wellington. The rubric affirmed that "As humans we have the capacity to transform the world. Science is one way we do this. Culture is how we understand what we have done. When science and culture move apart, fear and uncertainty enter the gap."

[41] Suarez Villa (2001: 180).

[42] Applied by the Governer General of Australia, Hon. Bill Hayden, to the social and cultural forces shaping human life, in his Opening Address to the 1994 AAH Symposium (Schreuder, 1995: 4). It is also the logo of the National Library of New Zealand.

[43] Since this section was written, a change of government has occurred. The Briefing for 2017 differs only in tone: 2014 is upbeat and expansive; 2017 is cool and brief.

[44] Ministry for Culture and Heritage (2014d: 13).

[45] See Bennett (2013: xix-xx), on the several current meanings of cultural economy.

[46] Baumol (2002: 136-138) opens his analysis of creative destruction and innovation by drawing an analogy between warfare and competition in a free market as creators of innovation, although he typically notes that actual warfare is socially and economically destructive. He argues that the growth record of capitalist economies can be largely explained by five elements: "oligopolistic competition that uses innovation as a weapon and engages in an innovation arms race, that routinizes the innovation arms race to reduce its uncertainties, and that engages in systematic innovation exchange and licensing for profit" (142). The problem for the New Zealand government of trying to apply innovation policies to a small economy based on small business is obvious, but the government still keeps trying. It would be more interesting in the domain of cultural policy to follow up the implications of a footnote reference to Baumol in MCH (2014b: 36), which points out that organisations like orchestras cannot have conventional efficiency requirements imposed on them.

[47] Holden (2004, 2006); Hewison (2006).

[48] A good example of an evolving policy discourse is the Tertiary Education Commission's Tertiary Education Strategy 2002/7, which can be read together with the innovation reports of 2000-2001. Of the then three national innovation priorities, reference to biotechnology or information technology is unproblematic. But the third term "creative industries" clearly poses a problem. Unlike the other terms, it is not used as such in TES, but phrasings like the following seem to take its place: "creative skills" underpin new industries (11); "a nation [with] a unique, complex, enduring identity" provides a focus for "creative knowledge industries and business" (12); "the areas Government has identified as critical to continued economic development, such as biotechnology, ICT and the creative disciplines" (49). This uncertainty is symptomatic of the knowledge paradigm on which innovation policy is based. A useful assessment of the issues raised by the shift from "cultural" to "creative" industries is made by Cunningham who notes that, at the time of writing, "creative industries are effectively being invented as a concept and a policy instrument" (2002: 55).

[49] For example, Cunningham (2002), Oakley (2009), Hartley (2012).

[50] See DeLillo's novel, *Mao II*, for a fascinating exploration of the relations between photography, novel writing on a type writer and political writing on a computer, art and the issue of multiple versions, and television news; and

Nichols (2000), rethinking Benjamin's "Work of Art in an Age of Mechanical Reproduction".

[51] De Certeau repositions this question when he asks, "What group has the right to define in the place of others what must have meaning for them? Surely culture is more than ever, in the hands of power, the means of granting, now as before shrouded under a "human meaning," a form of state reason. […] But is it possible otherwise to maintain that, in the last resort, the meaning of existence is identical to the many shapes that the risk of being human really requires? That is a signifying practice, a meaningful practice. It consists not in receiving, but in positing the act by which each individual marks what others furnish for the needs of living and thinking" (1997: 67).

[52] See Caust (2015) and the commentary by Ben Goldsmith on14 March 2013 following the release of Creative Australia in which he places the policy paper in its political context and cycle in comparison to Creative Nation: http://theconversation.com/national-cultural-policy-is-bold-but-vulnerable-12800

[53] The 2011 submission of the Australian Academy of the Humanities to the National Cultural Policy Discussion Paper made many of the points which concern me in this chapter. It is therefore worth noting that the final report, Creative Australia, includes only two references to the humanities, one in the context of curriculum content in education (41) and the other to the Australian Foundation for Culture & Humanities, the latter being the most perfect symptom of the problem now for the humanities of achieving official recognition; the organisation was abolished and replaced by the Australian Business Arts Foundation (59). See http://www.humanities.org.au/Portals/0/documents/Policy/Submissions/text/POL2011_6.pdf

[54] An excellent demonstration of the problem, and consideration of the possibility of achieving such a reframing, is provided by Kylie Message (2013) in her assessment of recent cultural policy discussions in Australia from a museum perspective.

[55] The most complete history supporting his account is to be found in Chapter 7, Self Description, which is an analysis of the "conceptual history" (261) or evolution of the autonomy of the art system, although each chapter includes historical considerations.

[56] Wallace, for example, analyses policy and planning texts and procedures to identify "the temporal prsuppositions built into the design of tools and

mechanisms for forecasting and shaping the future" (2011: 6).

[57] Whitmarsh argues in respect of relations between Rome and its peripheries that it "is not the dominance of either local culture or the Roman hub, but the significance of the act of transition, or translation, between the two" (12) which should be emphasised.

[58] His axiom is helpfully interpreted later when de Certeau states of a society that "this entire totality has to allow everyone to exist, to be different in his or her very relation with others, to be able to create (and to become other than oneself) in a collaboration defined as an inventive process" (1998: 46; emphasis in the original).

[59] Whitmarsh (2010: 3) makes a similar point with a different emphasis: "local identities are not static, 'authentic', immured against change, but in constant dialogue with the translocal." The humanities should be critical participants in this dialogue, as translators, interpreters, and analysts of the texts it produces.

[60] http://en.unesco.org/themes/protecting-our-heritage-and-fostering-creativity

[61] For a brief history, useful context, and somewhat disenchanted conclusion, see Miller and Yudice, 2002: 169-171.

[62] http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0022/002278/227855e.pdf

[63] http://imaginingamerica.org/about/our-mission/

4. A new paradigm: cultural policy, the education state, and the writing city

"this flowery crop of knowledge and new light sprung up and yet springing up daily in this City" (Milton, 1974: 240)

Bringing cultural policy into the foreground and locating it at the heart of government brings the multiple, the heterogeneous and the political into the foreground, in contrast to the present where it is the technoscientific mode of universal rationality and quantification distinctive to valuing knowledge in Western democracies which frames the knowledge work of government. I have argued in the previous chapter for the opening out of cultural policy as the framing policy for an education state. A claim which provides a proper perspective for this broadening of conception also locates key ideas and metaphors integral to the case I am building for a new humanities. In a 2001 UNESCO report Mayor and Bindé (2001: 293) represent the information society as a complex cultural construct, human collectivities building metaphorical cities from the materials of the semiosphere:

> At the close of the twentieth century the world is swimming in culture: it has both too much and not enough. Since the information society is building, far beyond all our concrete towns, 'cross-border, invisible towns' that extend through the whole planet, it seems to be putting into practice the dream of the blind Argentinian genius, Jorge Luis Borges: it is transforming the world into an infinite and immaterial library, which cannot be assimilated.

Quite clearly this world is not the given world of material reality, even though each interacts profoundly with the other. The challenge to cultural policy rests in the "too much and not enough" conundrum, in a situation where the total of knowledge created by humanity over time continues to expand at extraordinary rates while increasing heterogeneity and defeating any attempts at assimilation to a specific ideology or methodology. It also defines the challenge to the humanities as the system of knowledge creation most directly implicated in this transformation, and capable of giving form to

constellations of meaning which are potential in the semiosphere and which, in turn, can give form to the metaphorical cities being built from the circulation of information.

1. Widening the aperture of cultural policy

For Douzinas and Shoemaker, writing respectively from the United Kingdom and the United States of America and positioned in the law, the term Humanities is a neologism datable to the late nineteenth century, generally defined "negatively, in *opposition* to some other mode of enquiry – as not barbarous, not scholastic, not technical", (Shoemaker, 2010: 522); they are "as much the product of pedagogical and disciplinary concerns of American educationalists as of the Classics and Renaissance humanistic tradition" (Douzinas, 2010: 51). Like the term Māori which meant people until Europeans arrived and required a generic name for this non-European ethnic group (and the term Pakeha which Maori invented for the same reason), so "the humanities" only came into existence when the role and standing of the domains of traditional European academic learning were "othered", as indigenous peoples were othered during colonisation, by the new knowledge formation of science and technology. In the latter part of the twentieth century it became the business of non-governmental organisations representing the humanities (rather than academics in universities) to reframe this othering by articulating core values of the academic humanities in new policy contexts.

One of the consequences of the meetings between the various Anglo-American humanities organisations which began in 1996 was that they encouraged the thought that there could be a new set of possibilities for the humanities in public policy formation. The countries were linked by their (variously different) histories of development out of and then various degrees of separation from the United Kingdom, and more immediately by their responses to economic globalisation. But the measuring and grouping of nations on economic criteria had the effect of suppressing almost everything which carried value in a humanistic assessment of relations between individuals, nations and cultures. The meetings raised the question whether a common theme, a shared reactivity to the dominance of an economic model of society which further emphasised the marginality of the knowledge work

of the humanities in official thinking, also pointed the way towards a shared proactivity in cultural policy. What should be the principal terms of a cultural policy written from a position in a new humanities? Would those terms be sufficiently powerful to permit developing economic policy from within cultural policy and to position the humanities as a body of public knowledge and expertise relevant to the core concerns of a democratic state?

The apparent answer would be No, even though the publications of the various national humanities organisations during the period of the most aggressive implementation of neoliberal economic and social policies directly confronted the implications of these policies. In the process they demonstrated that a new humanities was in formation which extended in its forms of knowledge and practice beyond the current academic disciplines in order to engage with problems in public policy and which included new disciplines like Cultural and Media Studies and, more recently, Digital Humanities. In Milton's terms there were many "pens and heads there, sitting by their studious lamps, musing, searching, revolving new notions and idea's [sic]" (1974: 237), and the breadth of these enquiries is captured locally for New Zealand in the journal *Media Information Australia/Media International Australia* and the programme of Symposia and the subsequent publication of papers of the Australian Academy of the Humanities. I will instance here just four titles:

> *Beyond the Disciplines. The New Humanities*, ed K. K. Ruthven. Australian Academy for the Humanities Occasional Paper No.13 (Canberra, 1991).
> *Our Cultural Heritage,* ed John Bigelow, Australian Academy for the Humanities Occasional Paper No.20 (Canberra, 1998).
> *Creating Value: The Humanities and Their Publics* (2006).
> *Challenging (the) Humanities,* ed. Tony Bennett. Australian Academy for the Humanities (Canberra, 2013)

Looking at the full list reveals a consistency of focus and a determination to modify official conceptions of knowledge by the insertion of the humanities into public discourse. The same can be observed in the representational work carried out by the American Council of Learned Societies with related organisations, notably the Cyberinfrastructure Initiative, *Our Cultural*

Commonwealth, and with the Association of American Universities, *Reinvigorating the Humanities*: by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, *Alternative Wor[l]ds: The Humanities in 2010*; by the Canadian Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences, *Renewing Scholarly Associations: Knowledge Networks for the Next Generation*; by the British Academy in *'That full complement of riches': the contributions of the arts, humanities and social sciences to the nation's wealth*, *Punching our weight: the humanities and social sciences in public policy making,* and *Prospering Wisely: How the humanities and social sciences enrich our lives*; by the Arts and Humanities Research Board. *The Arts and Humanities: Understanding the Research Landscape*; and by the Arts and Humanities Research Council, Bakhshi et al, *Arts and Humanities Research and Innovation*, Crossick and Kaszynska, *Understanding the value of arts & culture: The AHRC Cultural Value Project*, and *The Human World: The Arts and Humanities in our Times*. A further notable grouping was the 10 essay collections on cultural relations published by the British Council to mark their 70th anniversary in 2004, among which were *Cultural diversity* and *Do human rights travel?*.

There are many more reports, submissions and events from these organisations which have sought to shift the centre of gravity of government policy making away from the economy in these democratic societies. Together, they mark out a new terrain for the humanities, but one which, in profoundly changed discursive terms, was also the focus of the critical humanists of the Reformation who employed the foundational texts of Western culture against cemented and traditional interpretations of them and the social and political order those interpretations supported. As with the present, the crucial public intervention of humanist expertise and knowledge was in thought, textually; to modify society (and especially the distribution of power) democratically, minds need to be changed through a public conversation which acknowledges all the differences of culture and history which now inform conceptions of the social future and the good life in postmodern societies. The simpler route, as neoliberalism has so powerfully demonstrated, is to change the minds of educated and powerful elites, and let their control of the financial, legal, police, media and political systems do the rest. This view is succinctly and uncompromisingly expressed by Wolfgang Streeck (2014: 46) when he observes that "The utopian ideal of

present-day crisis management is to complete, with political means, the already far-advanced depoliticization of the economy; anchored in reorganized nation-states under the control of international governmental and financial diplomacy insulated from democratic participation, with a population that would have learned, over years of hegemonic re-education, to regard the distributional outcomes of free markets as fair, or at least without alternative." As Streeck so precisely observes in the term hegemonic re-education, the crucial (and soft power) means to the end of political control by social elites in democratic societies is educational through all the media available to shape public thinking and understanding, and not only the formal education system even though it remains the principal arena for contest over the purposes of formal education.

It is worth emphasising that the process by which such substantive changes occur in society, if not by coercion and state violence, is first and foremost disseminative and educative, whether the changes are effected by an elite (as in Streeck's example) or by citizen action for change (as Castells has documented). Either way, democratic social change is founded in new understandings of self and society by individual citizens, achieved by participation in some of the many discourses circulating in society and by individual decision-making about meanings, values, and goals. It is important to underline the fact that such participation may involve decisions of a socially and politically conservative kind; substantive social change is not necessarily progressive, as the past three decades testify. An excellent example, and a clear reason why innovation in culture cannot be counted in the way that innovation in economic production can be, is the decision by many people following the 2015 shootings in South Carolina to cease to give public endorsement to the display of the Confederate flag. To make the point in the words of a *Dominion Post* editorial, "Politicians around the South have moved to drop it, large retailers have stopped selling it, and statues of southern heroes have been put away. It's a mysterious business, what finally makes social change happen. What seemed impossible for years can suddenly look inevitable. It's as if there's a tipping point, where certain people change their mind, legitimising a shift, and then many more jump on board" (27.6.2015: C4). I would argue that the mysterious part of the business is located in the processes whereby individuals change their thinking about some aspect of themselves and their society; it is only when

that has occurred that specific events can condense individual changes in understanding into collective action "legitimising a shift" (whether by popular pressure or political leadership) in public practice. The processes involved are humanistic and cultural, both in the kinds of knowledge needed for social innovation and the environments in which knowledge circulates and is interpreted into individual and collective world views. One momentary instance of this process is not just the content of the editorial, but its function as a medium for the interpretation (translation) of this off-shore event into a New Zealand context. It makes a point of critical importance to the evolution of society in New Zealand, that racism is a stain on any democratic society and the actions in the United States are "a *lesson* to all people about how to confront a history of violence" (my italics). The troubling fact is just how long it takes those with legislative and political authority to act for the good of the polity and not only for those interest groups with political and financial power. Democratic governance should be oriented in the name of all the people towards the potentials of the future, which means in part to lead by comprehending more of the always evolving meanings of "democracy to-come". It is in this work that cultural policy assumes its full character and most complex functions.

As I have argued in the discussion of cultural policy in Chapter Three, bringing it closer to what currently matters by demonstrating and calculating the economic value of cultural activity locks cultural policy into the same reductiveness in respect of understanding society that economic policy itself imposes. The fact that the term culture exists in those official documents as a term which will not simply conform to that reduction is a sign that culture is present in all domains of human activity and that social (re)formation, innovation and adaptation is generative of and requires knowledge quite exceeding the current dominant economistic discourse in Western governments. Culture, from this perspective, is the name for the whole of knowledge as it is given form and purpose in a particular jurisdiction or community. And, as the recurrence of the term political in the preceding paragraphs indicates, that whole of knowledge necessarily includes political values and ideologically shaped modes of thought. For this reason, cultural policy in the domain of the arts has to accept, and make overt, the inherent fact of contested values and ideas with which art works will engage their readers. Correspondingly, so do public institutions in which such works are

exhibited, not least because exhibitions constitute new contexts (social, cultural, political) for the works they display and therefore new possibilities for the communication or discovery of meaning. In his investigation of the politics of art exhibitions, Luke examines how "cultural mythologies and political power are expressed in the showing of art works by museums" and asks "how particular displays of art works can be seen as political texts rife with conflicted rhetoric about the ideologies of the present. Art exhibitions in the last analysis are elaborate and expensive works of educational theatre with their own special rhetorical agendas and peculiar political teachings." Luke explores through his analyses of specific exhibitions, and notably those concerned with representations of the American West, how art exhibitions "can create new currents of social, political, economic, and cultural meaning" (1992: 1, 2).

An example of cultural innovation which offers a succinct entry into the excess of culture which I am arguing should matter profoundly to the work of government is an exhibition of photographs created by Calum Colvin, *Ossian. Fragments of Ancient Poetry/ Oisein. Bloighean de Sheann Bardarchd* (2003), held in the Scottish National Portrait Gallery, Edinburgh.[1] The photographs were large scale compositions of fragments of architectural, verbal, inscribed, domestic and media objects, and images of famous Scottish poets transformed digitally through superimposition, lit to emphasise ruin and loss of order and meaning by drawing upon a visitor's repertoire of symbolic imagery (or, in Bartlett's terms, a visitor's cultural inventory). Understanding the meanings of what was displayed was the work to be done by any reader of the photographic images, which are not self-explanatory; one instance of this work is the bilingual catalogue essay by Tom Holland. But for me (by chance being in Edinburgh at the time), a detail drew me into Colvin's thought as expressed in the images which might not have literally caught the eye of many other visitors. A torn piece of paper lay amongst the dust and rubble in a number of the photographs; it was a picture of the tattooed head of a Māori man. Right from that moment of connection, I began a reading of the exhibition which linked the poetic culture and traditions of Scotland (Gaelic and Scots) to New Zealand and both to the shared post-colonial world of economic globalisation, the fragmenting of individual and national identity and the marginalising of poetry as the most powerful shaper of thought and origin of culture.[2] Returned to now (as I can do through both

the print copy of the Catalogue and by revisiting Colvin's website), what could the exhibition be said to have done then or to be doing now? As the editorialist noted above, "it's a mysterious business", not least because the Scots were a major component of the British settler colonisers of New Zealand. Did the exhibition so affect Scottish readers of it that their thinking about its implications led to the momentous change little more than a decade later whereby the Scottish Nationalist Party took almost all of the Scottish seats in the Parliament at Westminster? Has it been recollected since the exhibition closed, since it can be viewed (differently) on Colvin's website? What effects has it had in the many localities in which it has been subsequently exhibited? Of course, the answers to these questions have to be infinitely more complex and various than understanding the purpose of one man's thinking expressed in an art exhibition. But this location of singular thought is an event in this social and political transformation, as it is also an interpretive response to and condensation of deep currents of thought and feeling in Scottish culture; and in these ways it contributes to the articulation of a national conversation about the future of Scotland. To make this claim is also to identify the impossible complexity of the movement of events and thoughts in a population which can condense at a moment like an election and which "legitimises the shift" in cultural relations in the United Kingdom away from the settlement between England and Scotland in the Acts of Union in 1707. And the catalogue essay is a fine instance of the interpretive work carried on by the humanities in the form of the occasional essay, making the art work a means to knowledge through the provision of an informed (but also singular, not definitive) reading of the artist's shaping of perception and understanding through the skilled interplay of media forms, resonant imagery, and references to literate (Scottish) culture. Unlike innovation as new product development in a commercial environment, its effects cannot be measured and its value as an innovation in cultural thought may take generations to be recognised, if at all. But like the singularity of the mind which authored it, *Ossian* constitutes a singular event which continues to exist in its textual record and in the memories and conversation of those familiar with it. It continues to make other ideas accessible, other thinking, other events, possible.

What kind of innovation policy would a democratic government need if this exhibition were to be taken, not as a model instance of creativity in a

conventional cultural policy context, but as a model instance of innovation in the cultural (knowledge) policy of an education state? The exhibition itself is a monetised product, literally in the case of the catalogue but also if a charge were to be imposed on entry to the exhibition. In this respect, it would be accommodated within current cultural economy policy through measures of attendance numbers, catalogue sales, copies of exhibition objects, and so on. But as contributors to economic growth, the arts present an unusual problem, which is placed in the foreground of a report by the Warwick Commission on the Future of Cultural Value, *Enriching Britain: Culture, Creativity and Growth* (2015). While all products require some knowledge about their functions and qualities on the part of a consumer ("wanting" a product is a cognitive as well as a self-defining and an affective process, as automated profiling of consumers based on purchasing histories demonstrates), the creative arts present a distinctive obstacle; they require higher levels of education for their enjoyment, use and sale. Consequently, an unequal society drastically reduces the economic contribution of the arts because the population pool from which consumers can be drawn is very limited. As the Foreword states succinctly, 'This is bad for business and bad for society" (8), a point expanded on later by arguing that it is a mistake to think that under-representation of minorities and low income groups is "purely a social justice issue" (21). It is also a life-time matter; government must ensure that "all children up to the age of 16 receive a cultural education in order to ensure their life-long engagement and enjoyment as audiences and creators" (49). Presumably, this is not the kind of cultural education most children gain from their life experience.

Right at the core of this report is a critical intersection of perspectives on cculture. From a national perspective on research into participation in the arts, culture and heritage, "Children born into low-income families with low levels of educational qualifications are the least likely to: be employed and succeed in the Cultural and Creative Industries; engage with and appreciate the arts, culture and heritage in the curriculum; experience culture as part of their home education and have parents who value and identify with publicly funded arts and heritage" (47). But in the very next sentence, the perspective shifts from culture as art produced by experts trained to high levels of technical accomplishment and aesthetic perception and consumers educated to appreciate and enjoy such artistic work; instead, culture as local

inheritance shaping identity and the possibilities of experience is invoked: “This is not to suggest that these same children do not enjoy rich cultural lives and experiences, rather the goal is to ensure that those creative and cultural experiences and capabilities that are increasingly being limited to the wealthiest and least representative groups are also made available to all” (47). The strongest and most succinct statement of this egalitarian position is the concept of universal entitlements: to a rich cultural and expressive life (14); to a broad and balanced education that develops a wide range of ctreative professional pathways and an active cultural life (44); to arts and culture because they are “the foundation for developing the imagination, forms of cultural expression, and quality of life that are essentail for human development and well-being” (44); to a fused STEM + Arts curriculum, because “policymakers are obsessed with a siloed subject-based curriculum and early specialisation in Arts or Science disciplines that ignores and obscures discussion around the future need for all children to enjoy an education that encourages creativity, making and enterprise across the curriculum” (45) and because it is “exposure to the multi-disciplinary mix of science, technology, arts, humanities and enterprise that underpins creative success in the UK” (48); to graduate-level cultural and creative education (46); to vocational and work-place training (46).

The report demonstrates how completely orientation to the economy defines the presentation of its analysis, hardly surprising because it has to be addressed to a government which frames every aspect of policy formation in economic terms, and because public funding remains integral to the sustaining of the sector (Holden, 2007). A brief list of key issues identified in the report would be: economic importance of the cultural and creative industries as a sector of the economy; the importance of digital technologies and/in creativity; inequality; inadequate curricula in education and training; cultural education, or lack of it, determines cultural consumption patterns over a life-time; recognising the value to Britain of being a multi-cultural society; interactivity between the various components of the cultural sector, including internationally; focussing on cities and regions with low participation rates in cultural activities; the need for new sources of funding from private sector investors.

But what if all of this evidence were to be formulated into a cultural policy argument which began with the principle of equal access to learning, accepted that establishing and maintaining this principle and the institutions (educational and memorative) providing for it over time was a public responsibility at all levels of government in a democratic society? How else could the meaning of the statement in the Foreword - that "equal access for everyone to a rich cultural education and the opportunity to live a creative life [… should be] a universal human right" – be accomplished? I will quote a longer section from the report as a clear instance of the effects of limiting the implications of a line of thought by conceding the current discourse dominating Western governments:

> Within the Cultural and Creative Industries, sub-sectors such as Music, Performing and Visual Arts, Film and TV, and Museums, Libraries and Galleries are significant employers and contribute to the UK's reputation as a world leader in standards of cultural production and, more widely, to making the UK attractive internationally to tourists, students and investors.
>
> These sub-sectors have also traditionally relied on public investment to survive and flourish. In a time of austerity and diminishing public resources, it is important to stress the interdependence of the economically successful parts of the creative industries with these publicly supported sub-sectors. The Commission is particularly keen to raise awareness of the extent to which the success of the Cultural and Creative Industries as a whole is dependent on the talent development, R&D, networks and career opportunities that have been supported by public investment.
>
> In this context, the proportion of public spending on the arts, culture and heritage is infinitesimal compared to their GVA [Gross Value Added] and their contribution to the economic success of the broader Cultural and Creative Industries. The direct spend on arts, culture, museums and libraries, for instance, is only around 0.3% of the total public spend.
>
> It is therefore a grave mistake to think that any further reductions in levels of public investment will only affect the reach and impact of

> the arts, culture and heritage. They will also impact negatively on the quality and diversity of the content and talent that is the wellspring of the UK's Cultural and Creative Industries Ecosystem. (20)

These paragraphs affirm that sustaining the fundamentals of culture, the knowledges composing it in any time and place, the processes for acquiring cultural learning and expertise and their life-time extension, the institutions which hold the accumulated resources of a society's knowledge and make those resources universally available, is a public responsibility, and it is only when that responsibility is fully exercised that the specifically economic contribution of cultural production of all kinds can be developed. The term wellspring[3] is an excellent metaphor for this foundational position of culture in social evolution, conveying the view that the economy depends for its capacity to function on the pre-existence of collectively accumulated knowledge and the innate creativity of all people, just as it depends on the resources of the given world (which are only priced when power over access to them is appropriated). Another version of the metaphor is used later in the report, where the nationally distributed Cultural and Creative Industries Ecosystem is said to be sustained by a "broader ecology" (67) of local arts, culture and heritage. In this context, in which the locality – its governance, community development, arts and cultural heritage, access to employment and so on – is in every way dominated by national institutions and London as the capital city, the report argues for nothing less than "a mindset shift across our entire cultural and creative infrastructure that recognizes their responsibility to be more responsive to the needs of particular places and communities" (67). But as the report demonstrates at all the points where it looks beyond the economic framing of culture to larger contexts of explanation, this mindset shift is not limited to the cultural and creative sector. By taking history and inheritance, locality, human potential, social inequality, and culture as foundational factors in social and economic development, the report locates an outside to conventional policy formation even as it accepts that to argue for change requires the argument to be framed in economic terms. It is striking that the case for mitigating the inherited and increasing inequalities for life and opportunity in the United Kingdom is to be made by showing how their perpetuation limits economic growth and, in particular, the development of the Cultural and Creative Industries, defined

as an ecosystem. As the Commission affirms, "A successful economy and a healthy, creative, open and vibrant democratic society depend heavily on this flourishing Ecosystem. It is a condition for individual creativity, identity, expression and freedom. The Ecosystem is a superconductor of creative talent and ideas that benefit our society and enrich Britain socially and economically" (9). To think of this social ecosystem as a necessary condition for both a fully democratic society and its economy is to think in terms much broader, more principled, and more sensitive to local cultural actualities than that allowed to cultural policy as an arts policy and as a subset of a national economic policy.

It is indubitable that innovation in the comprehension of ourselves and our place in the given world is critical to humanity's survival. From this perspective, innovation is altogether to do with human adaptability, which renders product innovation a special case of a much more general phenomenon. But this is a drastically different issue from innovation as the means by which business corporations survive competition among themselves, a forced process deriving from the demands of capital and creating needs rather than responding to them. It would be quite a spectator sport, if it were possible to stand outside and watch the behemoths struggle to the death; but they implicate everyone in their struggles for dominance while robbing populations of their sovereignty by subverting the public representational functions of the parliamentary system. For all these reasons, to seek to transform the discourse of the state by engaging a new humanities with it requires reconceptualising the state as an education state and its core policy domain as cultural policy, from which all other policy domains would be derivative. This claim obviously turns on its head the current status quo.

But the current status quo in the conduct of democratic states, by being founded in the concept and practice of the market, offers a drastically curtailed account of the social life world which it is the responsibility of government in such states to nurture on behalf of and in conversation with their publics. An example is the dismantling of the public governance of key infrastructure, especially telecommunications, energy, transport and social and health services, and their transfer to the private sector, with the double effect of transforming citizens capable of setting the rules, defining the purposes to be served and determining the price of such systems into

consumers subject to commercial power, in-house decision-making based on calculations of market advantage and the profit motive rather than public value, and of appropriating public wealth to private uses. At stake is a well-known and simple substitution: for the diversity of human cultures and political governance deriving its legitimation from collective deliberation and agreements achieved by open and agreed means substitute Western corporate culture, the self-interest of the financial sector, and the atomistic and abstract governance of the market.

Just as the humanities, and cultural policy, are marginal to the market and to its social dynamics, so are the citizens of a democratic state. To assert, therefore, that such a state is founded in the citizen subject of the state in communication with other citizen subjects through a publicly governed infrastructure of institutions and technologies is to challenge the fundamentals of the neoliberal settlement in national and global governance. Considering the embeddedness of the citizen in culture, in contrast to the embeddedness of the consumer in the market, exemplifies the greater diversity of bodies of knowledge informing personal action in culture. This is emphatically the case when it is considered that a democratic society is a cultural and not an economic construct, there being many possible and actual economies as well as social and political formations within any specific democratic society. Because of this diversity of potentials, a fundamental role of a democratic state in acting in the collective interests of its publics is to delineate the multiple possible pathways into the future for that society, pathways which are culturally, historically, environmentally, legally and politically informed, and socially enacted in a process of on-going public discussion and citizen action. From a citizen perspective, the concepts making a democratic society possible are not originally economic, although versions of them reappear in the society of the market. Concepts of equality, justice and freedom produce in their interaction complex conceptions of the relation between citizens and others, citizens and the law, citizens and the state and other states, and of the uses and social management of the power created by organised collectivities of people and large accumulations of knowledge and wealth. Citizen sovereignty and political sovereignty are both undermined when the lowest common denominators of money and market power are able to determine the conduct and evolution of democratic societies.

2. Parameters of/for a new Cultural Policy

Cultures are gatherings of diverse kinds of knowledge by groups of people over time which are governed by sets of values and practices for their proper formation, interpretation and use; postmodern democratic cultures include science as one of their modes, the values informing scientific knowledge formation and practice being part of the larger set of values interacting in such cultures, just as they include the arts, economics, religion, law and other domains of expert and public knowledge. For a postmodern democratic state to be competently governed, the actual composition of its cultural foundations needs to be fully understood by those who would seek to govern it on behalf of its citizen members. It is fundamental to my argument that, however globally engaged and interpenetrated a democratic nation state may be, its foundations are still local to the territory of that state and the history of its human occupation.

To make this claim at a time of religious extremism and intensified ethnic nationalism would seem to be fatal to my argument. But it is in just such a time that this claim needs to be placed at the heart of policy formation in democratic states, because it is only in relation to that history that the commitment of a nation-state's citizens can be focused on the difficult and highly contestatory discussion of its future and the principles in relation to which that future can come into being. But this search for the forms of the future is the fundamental and political task of an open and consultative, representative government, out of which decisions about the management and direction of a society in all its aspects, and not only its economy, can be made. The reverse process, now dominant, defines the future of all states and their citizens in terms of the self-validating conceptions of a global new-style aristocracy. Undeniably, those conceptions also constitute a culture, but one which is a "culture of the singular" founded in the abstract space and time of global finance and universal resource exploitation and detached from the generative, public and local ground of diverse histories of value and belief, where people have to be governed by consent if they are to live together sociably. The outcome of not founding postmodern government on "culture in the plural" is the cycle of violence typically leading to autocratic control of nation-states sustained by military power, abuse of the law, control of the media, and suppression of human rights (and, as a corollary, terrorism). A

powerful statement of these relations was given by Zaid Ra'ad Al Hussein, the then United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, in his address on 20 June 2018 to the 37th session of the Human Rights Council, when he focussed his powerfully critical report on

> the deepest, core issue […] the most destructive force to imperil the world has been chauvinistic nationalism – when raised to feral extremes by self-serving, callous leaders, and amplified by mass ideologies which themselves repress freedom. The UN was conceived in order to prevent its rebirth. Chauvinistic nationalism is the polar opposite of the UN, its very antonym and enemy. So why are we so submissive to its return? Why are we in the UN so silent?
>
> The UN's *raison d'être* is the protection of peace, rights, justice and social progress. Its operating principle is therefore equally clear: only by pursuing the opposite to nationalism – only when States all work for each other, for everyone, for all people, for the human rights of all people – can peace be attainable.

A postmodern society is unequivocally a knowledge society, but one in which innovation needs to be understood as a cultural process driven by the energies of singular citizen minds and based in learning of all kinds, and not just in the current conventional kinds (summarised in the acronym STEM) seen from the perspective of business and the economy to be necessary for innovation. So, my argument affirms that cultural policy, as the foundational framework for innovation policy as knowledge policy, must find its primary terms of reference in the situation of the singular mind (which is not a solitary mind intellectually) as the fundamental source of innovative thinking. This singular mind is a universal attribute of humanity, and is not limited to the special case of the genius as the source of innovation or the techno-sciences as the knowledge base for innovation.

What, then, could the main co-ordinates for the cultural policy of an education state be, when conceived of as establishing the terms of engagement by which the conditions for innovation in and of a democratic knowledge society could be sustained effectively by its government? The anchoring principle must be that knowledge informing cultural policy, and

therefore all policies of a nation-state, should be humanistically formulated because the whole work of democratic government is to advance the understanding and social practice of "democracy to-come", which applies to the economy as much as to any other dimension of social action (but perhaps even more, given the force of money power as it is focussed in and through the economy). Scientific and technological rationality is extraordinarily productive of knowledge in its sphere, but as a "culture in the singular" it conceals the contest of values and beliefs endemic to the context of application of that knowledge to human uses. Exposing and facilitating that contest, and negotiating its terms on any specific issue of social regulation and development, is the task of politics and Parliament, the burden of the public sector, and one purpose of humanistic enquiry.

This account assumes an inclusive conception of knowledge (such as Brier's, or Stehr's concept of objectified knowledge) regarding the specific totality of knowledge which fills any local context as constituting the culture of that locality. Because the margin between that specific totality and the totality of the semiosphere is highly permeable (if not maintained by strict censorship or other controls over access to knowledge and surveillance of its use, including self-censorship), the possibilities for innovation in thought are in principle extraordinary. Obviously, the current conventional distinction between traditional and modern breaks down to the extent that all knowledge becomes simultaneously accessible and interactive, and diverse rather than unitary principles for deciding truth value become accepted; and so does the distinction between the arts and sciences, on the terms of which the work of art has provided the exemplary case for conventional cultural policy claims to contribute to innovation. Luhmann's delineation of the art system discussed in Chapter Three, and his account of the genesis of the work of art which will be taken up in Chapter Five, offer a quite different way of conceiving this aspect of cultural policy. Furthermore, since innovation is a social process, the degree of access to knowledge and to the means of disseminating thought, the degree of openness of institutions to thinking differently, the capacity of the system of government to re-think its relation to the democratic principles on which its work is founded, and the priorities adopted for the allocation of a nation's wealth, all influence the extent to which new thinking can exercise any deliberate influence on a society's evolution. And the most important common factor is the multiple sets of cultural values which bind individuals

into communicative relations with others and inflect thought with its local history and its possible futures in that place. These propositions point towards the issues which a cultural policy must resolve, always temporarily, by providing negotiated formulations assisting a people to make sense of their present and its possible futures. The resource question for a cultural policy is, What resources are needed for innovative thinking as a public and not a special interest activity? This is not only a financial matter, although no aspect of the answer at the level of government will be free of financial requirements. It can be approached by a more general question, *What general public conditions need to be established which will facilitate innovation?* This question, which shifts cultural policy and knowledge policy from the arts and the technosciences respectively to the general factors enabling public creativity in all fields, opens out onto the fundamentals of access to knowledge and the ability to communicate what one has come to know to others.

One perspective on this constitutive problem, how both public policy and a new humanities should be conceptually framed in order to undertake this revisioning of policy and practice in democratic governments, is offered by a modified heuristic from a research report, O'Brien, Opie and Wallace, (2000), *Knowledge, Innovation and Creativity: Designing a Knowledge Society for a Small, Democratic Country*, which sought to illustrate succinctly the key elements characterising a knowledge society as a distinctive early twenty-first century (postmodern) social and cultural formation. This heuristic also provides a cognitive map of the attributes intrinsic to formal education and cultural policy for a society oriented towards adaptive change (innovation)[4], and structural themes which would inform the work of a new humanities.

Singular minds
Embodied expertise
Past aware
Future directed
Generational time frames

Accessible knowledge
Collaborative learning

Local settings
Multiple intersections
Dense reciprocity
Networks of shared practice
Positive intervention
Increasing differentiation

Hybridising nature of knowledge	*Open systems*
Common languages	Public media
Translatability	Organizational fluidity
Shared values	Diverse political cultures
Symbolic production	Democratic institutions

This heuristic owes a great deal to Gibbons et als' analyses discussed in Chapter Two; it must also be apparent that it challenges the conventional ordering of humanities knowledge in academic discipline formations, and the ways in which that knowledge can circulate in the world. Taken together these attributes make possible properly complex thinking about the conditions required to establish and maintain the knowledge society as a postmodern **social** construction in which knowledgeable people interact productively with each other through various media and social systems in a variety of physical and organisational settings, including markets and work. The fundamental requirements for productive interaction are shared cultural knowledge and a common language (2000: 6). It is to state the obvious that many of these attributes can be found in non-state (criminal and revolutionary) as well as legitimate state and non-governmental organisations, in so far as they have adapted to postmodern conditions, and that they are particularly significant in the understanding of postmodern city formations.

It is significant that we talk of knowledge policy, or of a knowledge society, but we do not talk of meaning policy, or a meaning society. And yet, we find our humanity in our meanings much more than in our knowledge, because knowledge, value, belief, self-concepts and our embodied presence in the world interact in situated thought and are productive of meanings which are manifested in decision-making and social action. Meanings, like knowledge, circulate collectively and are modified in dissemination; but they are also much more fully inflected by the singularity of the minds which give form to them and the local specifics of time, place and culture than are the formal knowledge resources of a society. A phrase like "the meaning of knowledge" makes this point clearly; knowledge as such is always subject to interpretation and valuation, which is also a means of its adaptation in and to a specific cultural context. It is through meanings that tendencies in the present become available to consciousness, and the possible (and

impossible) forms of the future and the not-yet known can be apprehended (as with the example of Ossian). Without a coherent approach to the cultivation of new meaning, which is grounded in the specific situation of specific cultures, including their lineage and their orientation towards the future, it will be impossible to achieve the condition of innovativeness which has become the aim of public policy formation for postmodern knowledge societies. Present policy thinking substitutes techno-science and business and their specific cultural imperatives for the more challenging effort of focussing an innovation policy on nurturing the seed beds of emergent thought in the distinctive cultural environment of a nation state like Aotearoa New Zealand. To write this is not to deny that technological change is a very powerful and dynamic factor within the broader compass of cultural change, but it must be emphasised that it is not technologies as such which create change; they have agency as prosthetics (or machinic texts incorporating written instructions for their use) which participate in social action and change in ways conceived and enacted by their human users, which are notoriously divergent from the uses conceived by their designers.

3. Thinking towards a new humanities in a ne w cultural policy

My analysis in Chapter Three sought to show that official documents concerning cultural policy produced in Australasia from the 1990s to the present demonstrate a process of cracking open an inherited set of conceptions without resolving the consequences into a new synthesis. The boundaries of the field named by the phrase “cultural policy” with its emphasis on the canonical works of European art, music, literature and theatre and the new creative work building on and modifying those traditions in the present have shifted to accommodate new factors, notably media evolution and the economic valuation of the arts, culture and heritage as dimensions of economic policy, as in:

Mass media
New (digital) media
Indigenous arts

Economic value of arts and heritage
Fashion and design
Arts, heritage and national identity
Arts, heritage and urban and regional (re)development
Creativity and innovation

The decisive shift in these boundary changes for cultural policy is from the capacity of the traditional European arts to enlighten by pleasurably entertaining to the economic value of art works, like craft works, as commodities in a (global) market (still pleasurably entertaining, but to highly segmented groups of consumers) and then to the economic value of all kinds of inheritance – landscape, nature as wilderness, the remnants of past lives and places – experienced touristically as signs of human sameness and difference, a source of possible learning but not for that reason valued in economic policy. The reciprocal of these boundary changes for policy making in the domain of culture is the challenge to traditional discipline boundaries in the academic humanities and the advent of a new humanities able to speak through new media to the diversity of publics, and especially to the agencies of government, in a postmodern democratic nation-state enmeshed in global flows of knowledge, power and money.

As I have noted, *Creative Nation*'s publication at the moment of inception of HUMANZ was exciting in what it brought together under cultural policy, and inciting from a perspective in the humanities the question, just exactly what does this collocation of interests, histories, institutions and creative and communicational technologies and practices have to do with the modern humanities? In particular, it focussed a problem which had existed from the 1970s in my university, the unstable relation between the traditional, print-based humanities and the academic study of non-print media, in theatre, then film and art history, then television and digital technologies in communications studies, and then mass media - journalism, television, popular music, video games – in media studies, and digital media in fashion and architecture in the School of Design. The relationship was unstable precisely because the increasing diversity of media forms, the social, economic, intellectual and creative energies they focussed and released, and the role of the social sciences in their analysis evolved disciplinary formats which in effect located the dominant traditional humanities as the past of this

new present. By contrast, the humanities typically positioned manuscript and print media as normative in relation to which non-print media were secondary to or simply disconnected from their sphere of interest. Creative work in any medium was to be learned and practised in other places. In one respect, this elaboration of domains (media form-based disciplines) simply acknowledges the rapid expansion in the twentieth century of the semiosphere; but it clearly does not, as is the case in government as well, automatically provide a comprehensive framework of concepts which would allow a modern disposition of media forms and disciplines in the field of cultural production to be reconstituted as postmodern humanities. In Australia, a vigorous academic engagement with all of the complexities manifested by such epistemic change and concerned especially with the relation between the humanities and government provided a powerful and on-going source of encouragement and insight to those of us developing HUMANZ. I will instance three examples, which in effect demonstrate how the 1990s were a watershed in cultural policy development in Australasia. An issue of *Meanjin* in 1992, *Culture, Policy and Beyond,* captures much of the stress (intellectual, political and social) induced in the academic evolution of Cultural Studies by the claims made for Cultural Policy Studies in the context of changes in the relation between government agencies and the sources of knowledge to which they had recourse. Put another way, if humanists were to re-assert that part of their early modern role of advisers to the state, what formation (subjective, discursive, professional) could that role now require for its adequate performance? If this issue of *Meanjin* condensed out the importance of and the conflicts in this new engagement between academic critical thought and the uses of knowledge concerning the arts and culture in and by government, it was followed in 1994 by an issue of *Media Information Australia* (No 73) on "The Policy Moment", published in the context of the development of *Creative Nation.* A key issue in the academic debates over the relation between intellectual cultural work and its (re)formulation as policy was neatly visualised by the cover image of the paradisal moment when Eve hands Adam the apple of the knowledge of good and evil.

The issue was not only how intellectual and critical work could be applied to public policy formation, because there were multiple discursive mismatches between:

- the quantitative and bureaucratic orientation of policy;
- indigenous knowledge and conceptions of cultural property;
- the poststructuralist and Marxist philosophical framing of mass and new media studies;
- feminism;
- the modern social scientific and techno-scientific domain of communications studies;
- the dominance of history over literature in the post-colonial re-writing of national narratives; and
- the moral and aesthetic focus of modern humanities, in the arts and literature, on individual sensibility.

It is also worth noting that national histories of the book or print culture were being undertaken at the same time, marking both the profound significance of developments in information and communications technologies in the latter part of the twentieth century and the inseparability of media texts from the historical, social, political, economic, cultural and subjective contexts of their production and circulation.

To think of a new humanities and a new cultural policy was to envisage resolving the problem of establishing a set of discursive and conceptual parameters on the basis of which highly disciplined and convergent intellectual analysis on all aspects of the work of media texts and technologies in societies and cultures (traditional to postmodern) could be carried out and the diverse audiences (citizens, government, business, media, the NGO sector, other academic disciplines) for this analysis could be appropriately addressed. It must be obvious that any consideration of a new humanities must encompass this spectrum of issues and relationships, so that any claim for the value of knowledge generated in the humanities must be demonstrable in any of these contexts. And, as advanced intellectual work carried out on behalf of the societies which fund it, it is its practitioners, and not its recipients, who must bear the burden of making the meaning of their intellectual work apparent and adaptable to the public's interests, in whose name it is done. Speaking to government in a situation where most humanities practitioners believe that government cannot hear them requires finding a form of language which is audible; speaking to be heard in different territories of knowledge and practice now requires understanding of the

specialist languages which define cultural and intellectual practice in the diversified institutional apparatus and systems of postmodern democratic societies. John Hartley has explored this complex of issues and has proposed the development of an overarching discipline of Cultural Science, which would investigate "the population-wide propagation of ideas and the future possibilities of knowledge in the context of cultural and economic dynamic systems – the 'active audience' as socially networked and actively learning *agent* of the media's unintended consequences" (2012: 26, emphasis in the original). Hartley is very clear that any cultural policy or academic analysis must be based on a conception of creativity as an inherent human atttribute ("reflexive creativity is what enables human culture to adapt and change" (47)), on the critical role of institutions and organisations of all kinds in providing necessary conditions for the exercise of creativity, and on a much wider horizon of concern for the humanities, requiring an integrated theoretical framework capable of understanding postmodern societies and the ways they reproduce themselves through their citizens, their media systems, and their knowledge institutions. He affirms that "It is no good looking at creativity, culture, or knowledge as *professional or expert systems*, whether individualist or corporate […]. We need to understand cultural, creative, and knowledge systems *across whole populations*" (54, mphasis in the original). To conduct a new cultural policy, government needs the same understanding.

It is not that no efforts have been made to develop forms of the humanities which can directly address problems and issues requiring policy responses from governments. I think I am right that the term "applied humanities" was first claimed by The Hastings Center, established in 1969 to promote the concept of bioethics as an intersection between philosophy and the biological and medical sciences. Many other such intersections, like art and music therapy, medical humanities, story scenarios, design, new media content, and video games are applications drawing upon some aspect of the humanities but typically motivated from other disciplinary and technical fields. For me, such "appropriations" are evidence of both the actual scope and potential relevance of knowledge in the humanities, and of the effects of the decline of the humanities into an increasingly darkened corner of Western universities as other (scientific and social scientific) ways of framing their traditional interests have become dominant.[5] To claim that the humanities matter is to be able to demonstrate how the distinctive knowledge, methods

of inquiry and interests of the humanities can be productively applied in society, and to articulate the key, cross-sectoral and cross-institutional partnerships which are needed for those applications to occur. In particular, it is not enough to rest on the notion that students trained in the humanities but employed outside the university are the principal means by which the humanities are disseminated locally outside the academic disciplines and their international extensions; they are a critical component in the diffusion of humanistic knowledge, especially across generations, but a much better understanding of their role and of the kinds of discursive competence they need to give effect to it is required. A good example (discussed in Chapter Three) of a focussed and sustained attempt to apply academic knowledge in the arts and humanities to community development is *Imagining America*, in which traditional boundaries between disciplinary specialists and arts practitioners, universities' global orientation and the interests and needs of the communities in which they are located, are crossed with the aim of engaging diverse kinds of knowledge and experience in order to empower local agents through understanding, defining and forming solutions to local problems.

It is a truism to say that knowledge in the world moves in very different ways and forms from knowledge in the academic disciplines, traditional or new; but the fertility and active potential of knowledge is compromised if that complex motion does not constantly permeate and challenge the borders and contents of the disciplines, like air currents in dynamic weather systems as they flow over territorial boundaries. For that to happen, and hence for disciplinary renewal to occur, humanities practitioners must be open not only to the worlds of knowledge represented by the texts of their disciplines, but also to the worlds of knowledge which constitute the everyday dynamism of living in a specific time and place and in which the texts mediating that knowledge circulate. Practitioners of a new humanities must be discursively amphibious and its mode of enquiry, to use a distinction applied by Meaghan Morris to the then new discipline of Cultural Studies, must be "a question-driven, not a doctrine or answer-driven, practice" (Australian Academy of the Humanities, 1991: 145) in a social order of multiple authorities and complex networks of association.

The Australian Academy of the Humanities' response to *Creative Nation* was to present a carefully composed panorama of the scope of research in the humanities in Australia, at a moment marked by its 25th anniversary and the publication of *Creative Nation.* The President, Deryck Schreuder, placed the symposium in the wider context of Australia's "emergence as a post-colonial, independent society, strong in its identity and its public values." The"new" in the programme could be recognised, for example, in the form of computing in the context of authorship and the compiling of authoritative editions of Australian texts; in the acknowledgment of Cultural Studies, in the opening out of attention to cultural production of all kinds and soon (1997) to constitute a new section in the Fellowship structure of the Academy; and as the role of law and history in the Mabo case, establishing aboriginal land rights and contributing to the understanding of Australian history as a mosaic of many histories. An important context for this symposium was the one held in 1991, which openly signalled in its title, *Beyond the Disciplines. The New Humanities,* the conviction that fundamental change was taking place and that the modern humanities disciplines were unavoidably caught up in this process. Just as the relation between *Creative Nation* and *Creative Australia* offers an opportunity for fruitful critical enquiry into shifts in cultural policy, so the relation between *Beyond the Disciplines* and *Challenging (the) Humanities*, which is discussed in the latter's Introduction, makes apparent many of the components of a new humanities. Furthermore, each document points a subsequent reader to each formative and complex moment of composition and publication, and reading them together highlights shifts as well as continuities in public and academic discourse over three decades. Each text provides a position from which the others can be critiqued, revealing not only how new components of thought challenge for a place in a changing intellectual landscape but how changing priorities reveal the (more rapidly) shifting political and social environment of public decision-making.

4. Cultural policy and the mark of humanity

The education state is that iteration of the state the core institutions of which are founded upon, facilitate and respect the conversations flowing from the practice of citizenship along all the networks of communication a democratic society can provide for them. But, if citizens must be able to communicate

with each other, and to extend local conversations to national and global domains through digital networks, significant extensions of literacy and changed conceptions of the ownership and management of communications systems are required. Writers have provided many anticipations of what happens when special interests dominate access to and the circulation of knowledge and information in democratic societies. Ray Bradbury in the 1950s imagined a future in which total control of media and education content by the state and private interests had been achieved by democratic processes, with profoundly destructive personal and social consequences, not least in education[6]. Philip K Dick imagined in *The Simulacrum* (1964) a democratic society in which national public television was used by an industrial cartel to create an imaginary government using avatars and actors while running the nation in their interests in secret. It is not possible to believe that the increasing privatisation of all forms of communication infrastructure are in the interests of democratic development, no more than totalitarian state control could be. *Max Headroom* (1987) foresaw the intimate imbrication of corporate media, digital ICTs and politics for the purposes of corporate control of society, starkly imagined in a degraded city environment employing the imagery of cyberpunk fiction where television monitors were placed throughout the city, could not be turned off, and an illiterate population was subject to control by hidden elites represented by a media corporation. A more recent and trenchant expression of this consistent line of thought describes the notion of internet freedom as "a red herring. Calculatingly manipulative, it tells us to entrust a fundamental human right to a pair of powerfully self-interested social actors: corporations and states."[7]

The task of education has both an individual and a public dimension. For the individual, it involves:

- acquiring and retaining knowledge of all kinds (that is, building a cultural inventory) and learning how to apply it innovatively in specific but always new situations, practically, ethically and self-reflexively;
- developing competence in the languages used to represent and think about that knowledge (including self-knowledge); and,
- achieving mastery in the use of communication systems required for effective participation as a citizen in a particular society.

This learning is critical to becoming an adult and being able to play a substantive and life-long role in a democratic society. For this work to be accomplished, the education system must be supported and contextualised by public institutions tasked with conserving and providing access over the very long-term to a society's (and humanity's) stocks of knowledge and ensuring that the key elements of a communication system (like key elements of the life-world, for example, clean air and water) are universally available for use. A cultural policy is, then, first of all responsible for ensuring the continuance and evolution of these institutions, which can be understood to be prostheses extending singular minds beyond themselves into the complex flows of knowledge and networked interaction characteristic of postmodern societies. The task of government is to establish and maintain the conditions required for these institutions (at the heart of which is education) to provide a universally accessible means of acquiring knowledge, re-thinking it, and communicating that thought to others; it is not to privilege any one component of the knowledge field over others on the grounds that it has greater immediate importance, because that is to stay locked into the reasons why economic development (as more of what a nation already does and is familiar with) in practice takes the place of innovation (as the changing of paradigms in a nation's conception of itself and what it does). Converting the potential of the future into actuality is the collaborative work of singular minds immersed in some part of a society's resources of knowledge; creating and sustaining the best conditions for that work to happen is the work of government, carried out on behalf of the public.

Cultural policy is necessarily political because it concerns a multiple, the cultures which people a nation-state and the complex of values, principles, knowledge and beliefs which constitute a culture. There is no singular into which cultures can be resolved, except by the application of totalitarian force, and even then uniformity in a cultural nation is impossible to maintain. All groups, whether local, nation states or global communities, are marked by internal differences in values and beliefs, which are a primary source of their means of revitalisation and redefinition as times and missions change.

I have insisted that the singular citizen as a unique point of intersection for some part of the collective knowledge of humanity is the ultimate origin and medium of innovation, but that this extraordinary and universal capacity for

creativity depends for its widespread exercise and effects on a very particular kind of social order, which I have called the education state. From this perspective, the framing principles for governance of such a state and made manifest in cultural policy would need to foreground the following universal human attributes and the semiotic systems and social formations which continue to be built on them: language, perception, memory, and communication. They are foregrounded here because they constitute the content and possibility of thought and its dissemination and hence of new knowledge in culture. A consequence is to make innovation policy a derivative - the critical derivative - of cultural policy. Reciprocally, cultural policy would be oriented away from its conventional identification with aesthetic forms and economic outcomes towards meaning making as the typical instance of knowledge creation. The exemplary scene of new knowledge formation and economic activity and hence the focus of cultural policy would not be the firm but the city/region and the institutions which extend or supplement these human capabilities and provide structure for human engagement in the conduct and evolution of increasingly complex built environments.

Of course, the singular mind is also singularly embodied; so cultural policy as I am envisaging it would necessarily include precisely what neoliberalism has worked so hard to abolish, policies for what I would call the caring state. Democratic governance has become sharply divisive in the past three decades, manifested as a kind of "soft" civil war of the 1% against the 99% using the infrastructure and law-making capabilities of the state, and abusing the public consent on which democratic law-making depends; it is now engaged in law- and decision-making typically unrepresentative of the interests of the publics of a democracy. An education state would establish new rules for governance through a cultural policy based on publicly determined standards setting out the core requirements for sustaining a human life worth having in a specific postmodern, urbanised society – including a living wage (or, now that it is being more fully considered, a universal basic income), healthy food, shelter, health and well-being, security, education, access to information and communication media, public transport, a clean environment – so that each citizen could understand and exercise both the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. These requirements can be abstractly stated, but they are culturally practiced and their implementation is

never complete because it occurs in relation to an always receding horizon of social and economic change and the continual (re)defining of needs, rights and obligations in a specific nation-state, which continues to place under question the meaning and application of key principles, like equality and social justice.

The public institution which anchors all the rest in respect of the creation, dissemination, and evaluation of knowledge over a person's life-time is education in its various stages and modalities. It is through education democratically conceived and with citizenship as its focus that all members of a society can learn what they need to know and what their society needs them to know as a foundation on which to build understanding of themselves and the world they have been born into, and to enjoy the rights and fulfil the responsibilities of citizenship. There is no core curriculum for this purpose, only curricula which give access to the diversity of human knowledge and explicate the literacies required to find meaning in texts of all kinds; but there are also forms of social and institutional learning (to do, for example, with money, law, sex and parenting, citizenship, and government) which need to be encountered at appropriate times in a person's development because working knowledge of them is critical for effective participation in democratic processes and for the maintenance of society.

Postmodern democratic societies now evolve as a consequence of the dominance (however fragile) of knowledge over environment, exemplified by the scale of the semiosphere and the formation of global cities. From the perspective of humanity rather than nature, the semiosphere is an expanding universe of signifiers, always full and yet always growing, creating semiotic space as it expands and, in the process, creating and recreating the idea of humanity from the energies released by reflection, critique, interpretation, intuition and imagination. The fundamentals required to sustain the semiosphere are institutions which objectify, conserve, and disseminate the products of those human sensory and cognitive capabilities which create time and place, self-consciousness, meaning, societies, goods, and economies: observation and perception, memory, language and communication, conception and judgment.

The institutions built on the knowledge produced with these capabilities and constituting cultures can be summarily listed in respect of a dominant function:

observational: all those agencies recording information about the given world and human society evolving in time and space;
memorative: libraries, galleries, museums, archives and new kinds of digital repository;
disseminative: educational organisations of all kinds, from the family and pre-school to university and the professions, churches, work places, civil society, and media of all kinds;
analytical, interpretive, experimental, creative and critical: academic departments and research centres in all fields and sites of enquiry, think tanks, creative and performing arts, design, architecture, public sector agencies;
deliberative, regulatory and adjudicative: the law, the justice system, the financial system and Parliament.

All of these distinguishable organisational formations, materialising human cognitive and expressive capabilities in built/technological forms, perform all of these knowledge functions to varying degrees and in different situations, and their textual productions can have, like the knowledge on which they draw and for which they are guardians, conservative and innovative characteristics. They are enmeshed, in other words, in the ordinary complexities of human social living in the shadow of history, however much a society at any time, and/or its government, can will the suppression of its collective memory and therefore of the institutions which sustain it. This does not need to be only a consequence of the totalitarian state; a progressive, future-oriented ideology can also diminish the value of social memory and the retention and active recollection of the documentary record of the past. The apparently acultural nature of the postmodern economy, for example, conceals its role in the global transmission of cultural values and social forms distinctive to the United States.

These institutions (whether of the private or public sectors, but my principal concern is with the public sector) are necessarily cultural institutions because they cannot exist independently of the specific historical, geo-

political and economic dimensions of societies whose collective purposes they serve.[8] Because their socially underpinning role is memorative, that of guardianship of a society's resources of knowledge, they must also be publicly owned or regulated to ensure that the cultural and historical sources of a society's present can be investigated by any member of that society as a means to self-understanding and social and cultural evolution. But their continuance and ability to serve the full range of functions and responsibilities humanity over time has invested them with is profoundly threatened by the withdrawal of the state from full responsibility for them. At the core is collective memory, not the possession of any person or social grouping but the anchor of cultural identity in all its various formations, from individual self-awareness to local, ethnic and national identities and global citizenship. Societies outlive their governments, for better or worse, but cultural institutions can be hollowed out or destroyed by governments which fail to grasp their fundamental importance to democratic societies in particular. Cultural institutions should exist for and on behalf of the public, as should governments in democratic societies, however much in practice that belief is compromised; but this is why cultural policy is the real test of the quality of democratic governance, at least when that policy (as knowledge policy) is understood to be about the whole of culture, and not only the arts.

If the highest common factor linking human beings is the possession of culture, including a language, the lowest common denominator is a market economy, including some form of money. Because my focus is on the foundations of society in its accumulations of knowledge and their uses, I have not included the economy or business as a distinct institutional sector in my listing above, but I have included work as an integral human and social activity. Rather than being the generator of society, from this perspective an economy and its business organisations is one outcome of the application of a society's resources of knowledge to meeting the needs of a population, and of the systems of storage and exchange developed (like languages) to facilitate the sharing and distribution of a society's productivity. Because a market economy is the lowest common denominator of human interaction in society, it is easy to see why it has become the focus of government and the interests dominating and benefitting from it. But the starting point for public policy in a democratic state should be the generative ground (wellspring) from which everything else flows, and that is culture(s) evolving in the public space of a

nation-state in which the free engagement of minds is enabled to produce the knowledge necessary to the sustaining and adaptability of that state over time. The key issue here for government policy formation for culture and innovation is a relocation of business to its proper place as a component of society and a cultural agent which is no more (or less) important than a society's other major cultural agents like the family, education, the media, the arts and the nation's repositories of cultural memory.

What are the overarching principles or propositions which bind policies being formulated in different sectors of government to one another? Currently, the economy together with the political principles of the party or coalition of parties in power would provide them; but it is immediately clear that this is not enough to provide a framework for the whole work of government, as current cultural policy clearly demonstrates. As I am arguing, the source of overarching principles for the governance of a democratic society are the principles of democracy which, when articulated as such, provide an objectified standard against which the interpretation of those principles – their meaning - by an individual citizen, a group, a party, an institution, a people can be tested and evaluated. It is through cultural policy, attentive to local "culture in the plural" and its translocal contexts, including the nation-state and its global hinterlands, that a formal educational policy which opens out on to and is supported by the public institutions discussed above can be designed.

5 The Institutions and Settings of Cultural Poli cy for an Education State

5.1 Observation and Perception

A knowledge society objectifies ordinary cognitive and communicative capabilities in the formation of specialised institutions for creating various types of knowledge. As Brier puts it, "All these types of knowledge have their origin in our primary semiotic intersubjektive [sic] life world of observing" (2012: 16) On this ground he argues both that "It is the human perceptive and cognitive ability to gain knowledge and communicate this in

dialogue with others in a common language that is the foundation of science" (2008: 83) and that, as a consequence, "the methodological ideals of science, as well as the actual practise [sic] of science, are cultural products made by human minds linked by meaningful language communication in a society with a cultural horizon of meaning" (2010: 1904). Observation, and the technologies to record what is observed and to render it observable when unaided human senses are insufficient to perceive what is there to be observed (electron microscopes, the Hubble telescope, cameras, radar and so on), are fundamental to the growth of knowledge about ourselves and the world of which humanity is a part; but, as Brier observes, observation itself is a culturally framed activity, as are the institutions set up to regulate the creation of formal knowledge from it.

The work of the institutions of the state which command the high ground of policy is informed by knowledge derived by observation and perception of reality, natural and social, by members of those institutions but, even more, by others outside their borders who define the standards against which the truth value of such knowledge is assessed. An important effect of this orientation is to sustain the conviction that the work of Western governments is grounded in reality, even though much (most?) of that work is about hypothetical states of affairs, contingencies and potentials in that segment of reality which is the relations within and between states as the present moment transitions to its future form. Even if the administrative functions of the state continue to implement and enforce procedures which were developed in the past and have become (for good or ill) normalised as part of regulated social reality, its policy functions – confronted by hypotheses, contingencies, conflicting imperatives and imminent but indefinite futures – can only achieve a similar stability by imposing continuities on what is fundamentally discontinuous and heteronomous. If the condition of policy is also the condition of a culture when it is open to rather than reactive against or closed from its situation in the world of cultures and their impending futures, then cultural policy (with the arts as primary sources of observation and perception) becomes a powerful alternative basis for policy formation across the institutions of government.

In effect, all public institutions include within their scope observing ourselves and the given world from a specific position in it. Their potential

power and public value lies in the ways that they can extend a singular mind's perceptual processes for gaining information and producing knowledge by thought from it. Their unique responsibility, to observe what happens in all the dimensions of a nation's life, discovering patterns, and providing information to government and the public – factually or fictionally, scientifically or artistically, in print or digitally – is central to the competence of a postmodern state. It is also influenced by dominant ideologies, by the history of that state, and by its standing among the states of the world and global institutions.

But as institutions whose practices are currently governed formally by a universalist discourse and an ethic of seeing which is culturally neutral, they must diminish or suppress from consideration the local specifics which would otherwise give their policy work, advice and regulatory responsibilities its distinctive value locally, nationally, and in the international order by being marked by a distinctive, acculturated "way of thinking" which shapes perception. Public sector institutions can never be simply objective, whatever the claims for evidence-based policy and however they employ techno-scientific knowledge as the prime source of authoritative knowledge. They (and their officials who are their vital resource) observe the world through various lenses, all humanly designed. As Bevir has demonstrated in delineating the contribution of interpretive theory to new theories of governance, "Policy networks are seen as the contingent products of the actions of diverse individuals, where these individuals may act on very different beliefs and understandings formed by conflicting cultural traditions" (2010: 64), a position which adds another dimension to my argument for the primacy of cultural policy in the work of government.

5.1.1 Fiction at the Core of Policy

Placing art within the scope of institutions which conceive of their work as based solely on observation and perception of the real world makes possible a significant disruption of current conventions. Luhmann builds a fundamental part of his analysis of the art system on the position that "The work of art […] establishes a reality of its own that differs from ordinary reality. And yet, despite the work's perceptibility, despite its undeniable reality, it

simultaneously constitutes another reality, the meaning of which is imaginary or fictional. […] The function of art concerns the meaning of this split […] The imaginary world of art offers a position from which *something else* can be determined *as reality* – as do the world of language, with its potential for misuse, or the world of religion, albeit in different ways. Without such markings, the world would simply be the way it is. Only when a reality 'out there' is distinguished from fictional reality can one observe one side from the perspective of the other. Language and religion both accomplish such a doubling, which allows us to identify the given world *as real*" (2000a: 142). This double perspective is intrinsic to human thought; it is a specific kind of cultural and knowledge politics which would highly value knowledge derived from empirical reality and deny equivalent value to kowledge derived from fictional reality.

A table compiled to represent how the outcomes of a design process are dependent on the forms of enquiry being adopted is very helpful in this context for identifying the diversity of positions for thought which language makes available, and which collocate with fictionality. As Nelson and Stolterman observe, while change is a condition of life in the given world, designed change is a function of human intentionality, and consequently "the kinds of outcome available to a change process vary wildly" (2003: 43). Put another way, five of the six ends represent aspects of potentiality and emergence which are first realised in thought, imagined and objectified as texts (meeting reports, design briefs, plans, blueprints), before becoming new real things in the world.

	Designs of Inquiry and Action		
ends	the real	the true	the ideal
	that-which-is	that-which-can-be	that-which is-desired- to-be
		that-which-needs-to-be	that-which-should-be
			that-which-ought-to-be

The Design Way (2012: 39) Figure 1.6 Design Ends.

Mapping this table together with Brier's and Lotman's conceptions of the integral role of fiction in human thinking produces a critical conclusion: the scope of the domain of fiction in mental work, which is also the space of the imagination, is massively greater than the scope of the real. And it is not possible to have the one without the other. For Luhmann, fiction is that operation which inserts thought into the world as texts constructing and communicating manifold imaginable, and therefore possible, conceivable and enactable, forms of reality. Traditional literary studies, and most particularly the study of poetry, have inserted this mode of knowledge creation into a grid of disciplines and administrative arrangements which have increasingly drawn their logic from the organisation and application of modern scientific knowledge. As the variety of media in which fictional narrative informs the creation of content has multiplied during the twentieth century, so has the presence in the university of this principle of complexity potentially expanded. This field of semiotic objects, recently a space within an institution (otherwise dedicated officially to rationality) for the development of sensibility and moral values, and then for political and social critique (aka the culture wars) is now being shared with those who would place fiction within the rationality of industrial production as content for the creative industries and as blueprints and design concepts for utensils, machines, buildings, bodies and landscapes, and those who would aim to employ narrative fictional forms in any medium as potent means for thinking and creating new knowledge about the possible evolutions of humanity and human values in postmodern/twenty-first century societies.

Texts, and notably official texts, in so far as they claim to be governed by the real, are in fact governed by current conceptions of reality. In that respect, they largely diminish the possibility of significant innovation (in contrast to small variations on what is already the case) when written in conformity to current conceptions rather than by reaching forward into what is yet to be known. Policy work and those who commission it need to recognise the integral role played in it by fiction (as was recognised in a very limited way by Foresight discussed in Chapter Three), and to give high value to culturally inflected knowledge. This would permit, for example, a movement away from the attempt to bring traditional knowledge within the limits of Western

science by using a descriptor like “indigenous science”. Instead, attending to the distinctive ways the diverse modes of acculturated human perception have observed reality and conceptualised it can open possibilities for thinking which have become blocked by a particular acculturated conception of reality.

Humanity lives among possible worlds as well as on this planetary one. Critical to our species capability for survival in and modification of our given world is the objectification of possible worlds in ways which allow collectivities of minds to think, plan and act together in the implementation of originally singular new thinking. Exemplary forms of this process of textual objectification are the texts which provide the principal objects of enquiry in the fields of literature, media, and creative and performing arts, narrative fictions. Fictions as the product of the creative imagination, as the invention and re-presentation of worlds which never actually existed, and knowledge claims derived from the interpretation of such texts, are typically held to have no truth value by the technoscientific university or by the technocratic government which is one of its extensions into the world of contemporary societies. But narrative fictions are a significant component of the semiosphere and, to use Lotman’s term, the object of their representation is “the universe of mind”, in which the given (visible) world, now conventionally taken as the standard for determining the presence of the real, is but one dimension. Furthermore, as Hastrup (2011) argues in respect of theatre, narrative fiction can generate culturally transformative meanings from an asymmetrical relationship between the knowledge and experience of its readers/spectators and its representation of knowledge and experience in the world imaginatively realised from performing a theatre text. This capability of fiction, and the work of interpretation carried on in the humanities, are together crucial in giving effect to their joint role in the creation of new knowledge in culture. What would be the role attributed to fiction in a university, or the Treasury or the Parliament, of an education state? Would it be marginal, as at present, valued as creative writing and so adding the traditional lustre of the arts to the truth-creating work of the sciences, or would it become a core source of the energy and vitality of the knowledge work of a creative university or an innovative government, the work of fiction holding equal place with the work of science in new knowledge creation?

No government is wise enough to see into the future, except in the form of best guesses made on the basis of forward projections from the present; but these are usually defined by organisations with interests in the outcome.[9] What if speculative or future fiction became a basic source of cultural policy? The imperial expansion of the culture and methodologies of science has served to suspend or marginalise modes of thinking about complexity which have their basis in the human capacity to conceptualise complexity and to perceive it in social and cultural, rather than natural, terms[10]. Literary fictional forms are the exemplars of this situation. Currently, they are of no account in official thinking about knowledge, which is dominated by modernist scientific models. But they are the exemplars because the matter from which they are composed is language, spoken and written, that is, symbolic matter, and the forms in which they are composed are means by which the uncontrollability/heterogeneity of language, society, subjectivity, human time and space is brought momentarily into an order which is conceptual, psychodynamic, perceptual, cognitive, social, cultural. What distinguishes the human in nature, that is, societies and cultures linguistically articulated – in values, ideologies, beliefs, politics, fictions, difference of all kinds – are elements in the production of knowledge with a much longer history than science. This knowledge is governed by other rules than those which govern science: most particularly, textual interpretation, not research in the scientific sense of the term, is the method by which new knowledge is produced; and fictional texts cannot be contained within any fixed system or grid of truth but always exceed any such system, and are always productive of different interpretations as the context of their interpretation changes.

A compelling example, given the present trials and failures of democratic societies, is Ray Bradbury's *Fahrenheit 451*, with its anticipation of faceless control through self-surveillance by democratic election, warfare engaged in by invisible elites, and the role of mass media in achieving and maintaining this state of affairs through the control of information in education and entertainment. But democratic governments are charged with responsibility for guiding the evolution of society towards a better version of itself, its fictional or possible futures implied, but not described, in the democratic principles informing public thought and values. It is the possible worlds imaginable from these principles which an education state would employ its

resources to articulate in all their diversity in order to extend the boundaries of public knowledge, public thinking, public policy and decision-making.

5.2 Memory and the Renovation of Society and Culture

Debray (2000: 56) describes language as "the most tenacious of group memories", pointing to the ways that it conserves within its structures and vocabularies the history of social evolution, which can always be recovered even though that history is normally hidden from a language's users in everyday use and as they continue to extend its capacity to represent what is emergent in human experience. But the development of memory institutions represents a powerful and necessary augmentation of this power of language, objectifying knowledge as well as the past in collections of artifacts assembled partly by medium (manuscript, print, image, moving image, sound) and partly by institutional, material or aesthetic form (twentieth-century media archives, museums, art galleries, libraries, public record offices). These institutions, like churches, locate in the world and provide points of entry to that which is otherwise hidden and invisible, the semiosphere.

Without a memory, a human being has no identity; a society has no history; culture ceases to have any means of self-renewal or critique; innovation cannot occur. As Barnett (1953: 40) affirms, "A noticeable accumulation presupposes an interest in assembling and preserving ideas and things of the past. In societies wherein this interest is manifested the development of something new does not mean the elimination of something old; instead, it is added to the old as an alternative [...] Even if the old is no longer functional, it exists as a part of the inventory and may be revived. In short, accumulation results from a building of the past, not a discarding of it." In nation-states, governments have assumed a principal responsibility on behalf of the nation for conserving the collective memory. The fragmentation and marginal status of our cultural institutions, and the increasing need for them to sustain themselves as heritage organisations appealing where possible to tourists,[11] shows how little understood in government are the links between memory, knowledge and innovation. Our knowledge repositories operate with a generosity of understanding of their cultural roles that is remarkable given the

relative lack of priority they have in the economic agendas of Western governments. The transformation of communications and information media is a profound challenge for them - as repositories, as means of access to global information, and as key components in our processes of cultural production. A new cultural policy is needed to establish the means by which cultural institutions can be full partners in an integrated infrastructure of agencies informed by an appropriate re- conceptualisation of their roles in a postmodern knowledge society.

Thinking particularly of museums, David Carr (2011: xviii) asked, "What if our collections could be seen as structured situations, even maps, for finding our way together into the unknown and back, ways for sorting the contextual intangibles we all recognize in our lives, so we might imagine and understand the possible difference a single idea might make?" Such a question locates the purpose of a collecting institution in its ability, through its collections, the ways they are organised and from time to time exhibited, to bring diverse minds together in a collective enquiry into what is not now or not yet but could be energised by imaginative engagement with some aspect of the past. François Ost's (2001) demonstration of the fundamental importance of heritage to a full understanding of what it means to be human provides a valuable set of terms for such a conceptualisation. He opposes "the symbolic" to "the state of nature" in its contemporary form of "the violence of the market", and "transmission" to a "contractual conception of human exchanges" as the mode of exchange. Heritage is a "dual reality" because it belongs "not only to the tangible and material world but also to the realm of representation and meaning"; it is "a network of possibilities, a work of art awaiting a form, a text awaiting a meaning, a life awaiting a history. It is living material susceptible to regeneration, meaningful material susceptible to interpretation. It is also fragile, because subject to negligence, degradation and impairment." These observations are brought together in

> a strong hypothesis: without past and future generations, present generations are little or nothing. To deny our duty to remember the former and keep faith with the latter, to reduce the political community to the circle of our contemporaries, is quite simply to prevent ourselves from thinking in terms of the public realm. [...] What, on the contrary, resists and institutes, what confers identity on

> the subject and gives substance to the community, is the public realm in which speech circulates, accounts are transmitted, and common values tested (155-157).

In a contemporary situation in which it seems that "the future much more than the past [...] has to be safeguarded", the heritage is not only what is remembered but rather " - as its meaning is ahead rather than behind – the reformulation, the rewriting of an inheritance that is always pending, awaiting new witnesses for the redrafting of the will" (153). In this conception, a community's or nation's heritage is the recorded means by which that part of humanity can know itself, engaging the past, present and future in acts of new knowledge creation flowing from the unending reinterpretation of cultural objects and/as texts. In this view, heritage is not a collection of things which serve as reminders of the pastness of the past; it is an inherited public resource in engagement with which, through cultural work, the future possibilities of humanity can be articulated. As Barnett pointed out with respect to innovation, the quality and value of this cultural work depends profoundly on the scope of the cultural inventory available to individuals and hence on the institutions whose particular function is to conserve cultural heritage and make it accessible.

The recursive process of personal evolution – perceiving, learning, understanding, knowing, experiencing, reflecting, remembering, communicating - the foundation of cultural institutions and social adaptation, is also the focus of political and economic activity. To shape self-conceptions, values and desires is critical to the interests active in these dimensions of society, evidenced by the extraordinary investments of money and research time into human psychology and the means of effectively manipulating human action at a distance through techniques like advertising (and, of course, through the more coercive measures employed by police and military organisations). Here is one of the main sources of competition for the humanities, as they are now, and as a new humanities might evolve; all of these interests are concerned with how citizens think, about themselves and others, their society and government, the world at large, and all have investments in thought of a certain kind, enabling fulfilment of organisational purposes – brand recognition, successful competition in markets and politics,

implementation of new technologies and laws, public support for military action, self-preservation, and so on.

The problem for the humanities is that the ground from which the humanities grow is the totality of texts expressing the meanings which have become defining of a particular society throughout its history, in the context of other societies' interacting with one another over time through the circulation of texts. The work of interpretation, explication, and critique is embedded in these histories; it is not limited by any of the interests which from time to time dominate a particular state, but its goal is the same – to shape thought. The crucial difference is that the point of reference is not a specific organisation's interests (not even a university's, where much of this work is carried on) but as much of the totality of a society's thought as a humanist interpreter of it is capable of embracing. And unlike the universality sought by science, however global the reach of humanistic enquiry, it must always return to its locality as the source of its energy and purpose, and to the singular minds taking shape there and then. As Debray (2000: 11) puts it, "in order to bring off transmission across time, to *perpetuate* meaning, in my capacity as emitting Everyman I must both render messages material and convince others to form into a group" because, without an institution to conserve messages, they will disappear and their potential as part of a culture's inheritance from its past to contribute to its future will be lost. The memorative institution must not only conserve these records, but must also educate future readers in their use and interpretation because "Perpetuating meaning assigns an institution the dual mission of archival and pedagogical conservation." But, Debray affirms, "only the living can stir the embers of meaning that slumber in traces of the past"; for this reason, there are two kinds of memory, "a mortal, or objective, memory and a living, or innovative, memory" (10). It is in the living memory, in which the meanings conveyed by the traces of messages from the past combine with knowledge and experience in the present, that innovations in thought and cultural expression occur. And, for them to be of possible value in the future, their records also need to be conserved as a deliberate action of public institutions.

5.2.1 The Library

Of all the cultural memory institutions, it is the library which has evolved in the closest association with the evolution of thought and knowledge and their modes of objectification in semiotic objects, for which written language is the primary sign system. Changes in the dominant information and communications technologies, in the institutions established to review, create and disseminate a society's stock of knowledge, and in the demand for knowledge over time, can all be mapped from an historical perspective on the evolution of the library as an institution for the collecting and ordering of a society's resources of recorded knowledge. A critical disjunct in the library's institutional evolution occurred with the introduction of digital networked ICTs, because the genealogical line of these new devices was outside the established humanistic traditions of knowledge work, its publication and conservation, and the print and paper devices and cataloguing systems developed for those purposes. In effect, the institution of the library was initially marginalised rather than incorporated from the beginning in the conception of the new cognitive technologies. In particular, as is now widely recognised, the memorative functions of the systems of the library were overlooked, even though, as befits a cognitive machine, computers were given memories[12]. The problem was the collective memory, no IT developer's or private investor's responsibility, a problem magnified because of the enormous increase in the production of data, information and knowledge which itself became part of the evidence of qualitative change signified by the terms information or knowledge society, and because of the failure in the late twentieth century to appreciate how technological obsolescence would imperil the continuation of the collective memory of humanity. The marginalising of cultural and archival institutions established and managed according to the pre-digital forms of material record and classificatory criteria developed by professionals trained in the humanities, stand as a dramatic sign of the marginalising of the humanities as a body of knowledge and practices producing knowledge of value for postmodern democratic societies.

The semiosphere is a uniquely human, collective invention, and its continuance depends on collective action, through all the institutions which have been created to conserve humanity's collective memory. These institutions remain fundamental to the possibility of the arts and the humanities, and therefore to the possibility of creating new art and pursuing

new self-understanding. In respect of the former, Luhmann (2000a: 303) makes a point which is also relevant to fields like fashion and design:

> The art of the past has become history. This precludes the simple repetition of existing works or styles. By losing the self-evidence of its binding force, the art of the past relinquishes its forms and styles as material to be exploited. Museums (and, in a different way, libraries) now serve as a system-internal context against which the new can distinguish itself *and which is indispensable for this purpose*. […] Even if, under the signature 'postmodernism,' insistence on the novelty of the individual work has been replaced by the freedom to combine traditional forms, the self-historicization of art remains bound to the distinction between the new and the old (emphasis in the original).

This distinction opens the necessary space for new knowledge creation in the humanities altogether, deriving from the "freedom to combine" the results of a specific trajectory of reading and writing. While a university's map of learning is represented most obviously in discipline-defined schools, departments, and research centres, the place where the university is most properly itself is the university library, because there texts assume relations on the real and virtual shelves and in the now digital catalogue that they might never assume in any curriculum, and where texts unknown to specific disciplines and their expert representatives can be encountered by a seeking mind, opening mental doors to new worlds of thought. Collections, in this digitally networked context, are not necessarily held physically in the one place. A critical issue now is, who takes responsibility for ensuring that the relevant collection contents, wherever they might be located, remain accessible to users in a national domain, whether those users are physically located there, or somewhere else. My argument at this point is an extension of the print period argument for national public libraries. There can be no guarantee that private knowledge businesses, the obvious example being Google, can achieve the long term stability of public institutions which is required for the conservation of a society's knowledge assets, or exercise the quality of guardianship of those assets and open access to them which is required for sustaining the collective memory of humanity.[13]

Because of the agency attributed to digital ICTs (rather than to the companies which were impelling their development), libraries were left to catch up with this drastically different knowledge technology while society's resources were applied to purchasing and installing machines and infrastructure, the retraining of knowledge workers, and the education of new generations of post-print literates identified by the term information literacy (a term which characteristically meant the ability to use the new technologies, rather than signifying a move to a higher level of sophistication in the use of information). Library professionalism was redefined as information management, conceived as knowledge of systems rather than of the content of collections. Public libraries were recognised as portals to the "information super-highway" at a stage when the majority of people could not be expected to own a device themselves for connecting to the Internet. National Libraries have, in the public interest, led the way in shaping the evolution of the institution of the library in this new situation, by developing methods of collecting born-digital material (and especially websites as a new medium of publication), providing networked access to collections in all media forms, leading digitisation standards processes for digitising pre-digital texts, negotiating access to privately owned collections of research publications as global media companies acquired the rights to and established large stables of previously printed and publicly accessible academic journals, and attempting to shape public policies for the conservation of and access to knowledge. Furthermore, in a context of globalisation, and the impossibility of any library's achieving a comprehensive collection of the world's published knowledge, the importance of approaching collecting from a local perspective – the published knowledge produced in and about a locality, community, region or, in the case of national libraries, the nation as a historically constituted community of shared interests - has shaped policy and practice in respect not only of born digital objects, but of objects in any post-print medium. Librarians were, and remain in their new digital habits, the cartographers of the semiosphere.

The unresolvable diversity of their collections – containing texts in diverse languages, genres and media forms, composed in diverse historical, geographical and cultural settings – and hence of the semiosphere is now more completely represented by the Internet and the Web, not least because it

includes much that would not have been traditionally selected into a heritage collection, or studied by academic humanists. The Internet was conceived of by Neal Stephenson in his novel *Snow Crash* (1992) as a universal, and privatised, digital library, resulting from the merger of the Library of Congress and the CIA, a compelling fictional extrapolation from the double goal of reform in the 1990s, to reduce the role of the state in society and to privatise its functions. Despite the way in which the private sector continues to expand its interests over semiotic territory as though it were land held by customary title, libraries, archives, museums, and galleries remain fundamental cultural institutions; they survey, map, order and make accessible the information world for and on behalf of the public, because social and cultural evolution are, unlike the economy, dependent upon collective memory. The semiosphere has no inherent order or reflexivity; it is the special responsibility of cultural institutions and the humanities to ensure the ongoing conservation, public accessibility, circulation and interpretation of humanity's stores of non-genetic information in the long term. This work is educative, creates public value and requires public institutions.[14]

In a wide-ranging and deeply thoughtful meditation on the institution of the library, Alberto Manguel (2006) positions himself and his reader about as far as possible from the present dominant concern with the commercial value of knowledge by asking why we bother recording what we have come to know: "Outside theology and fantastic literature, few can doubt that the main features of our universe are its dearth of meaning and lack of discernible purpose. And yet, with bewildering optimism, we continue to assemble whatever scraps of information we can gather in scrolls and books and computer chips, on shelf after library shelf, whether material, virtual or otherwise, pathetically intent on lending the world a semblance of sense and order" (3). Manguel could be writing as the Librarian author of Borges' story, "The Library of Babel." Here the issue is neither the material forms nor the buildings used to make and keep these records, but the need for meaning and the pathos which so often accompanies it which motivates both the publication and conservation of what humanity has come to know and believe about our situation in the universe. In many ways, the particular examples of libraries which Manguel reflects upon, both his own and other personal and public libraries from the earliest known, dating from the third millennium BC in Mesopotamia (109), serve an allegorical function,

representing particular instantiations of the semiosphere as it condenses in the mind and around the person as a distinctive sample from its ever-expanding totality. Both the physical form of a library and its internal arrangement carry a weight of meaning. Of Michelangelo's Laurentian Library he writes that "the stern windows and recurrent volutes, and the complex and dynamic stairway perfectly illustrate the paradoxical nature of a library. The first suggests that it can be an ordered, contained place where our knowledge of the universe can be gracefully stored; the second implies that no order, no method, no elegant design can ever fully hold it" (160-161). Warburg's Library amplifies the second aspect of the paradox:

> Most libraries give an impression of systematic order, of an organization made manifest by themes or numbers or alphabetical sequences. Warburg's library shows no such system. When I visited the reconstructed reading room in Hamburg (which today holds only a small part of his volumes) and inspected the rounded shelves in the oval central chamber, the feeling I had was bewilderment; it was like standing in the midst of a foreign city whose signposts doubtlessly meant something but whose sense I couldn't fathom. The shelves suggested to the eye an uninterrupted association of titles, not a linear order with a beginning and an end. [...] Warburg's system was closer to that of poetic composition (204).

Brier notes that even the most experienced librarians agree no more than 75% of the time on how a book should be catalogued[15]. Warburg's library foregrounds the effectively unlimited potential for association between books, partly affected by their physical juxtaposition and partly by the sequence in which they are read by a particular reader. Manguel reflects that, "Perhaps every library is ultimately inconceivable, because, like the mind, it reflects upon itself, multiplying geometrically with each new reflection" (196).

Here is the essence of the humanities, old and new; a collection standing in for the totality of humanity's texts, generating in each singular mind by their association and through reflection multiple possibilities of meaning and new textual creation. Because the human mind, reading and thinking, is like that

when free: generative, expansive, a stranger to closure, an active node in the manifold networks linking minds and ideas in evolving cultural formations.

And here, too, is the ground of cultural policy as knowledge and innovation policy: to establish and maintain the conditions required for free minds to generate new meanings, communicate them to others, and have them remembered so that they are capable of (re)discovery in the future. As Debray wrote, "a lineage of cultural evolution singles out, from a complex of available innovations, the ones most meaningful to it and that it alone can best optimize" (2000, 50); no individual has the power to select from the new what matters collectively now, and no organisation operating on behalf of a sector or interest can make certain choices for a culture or nation. What Debray underlines here is that innovations become significant when they connect with and are shaped by meanings which are integral to the formation of a culture and persist over time, while themselves contributing to the evolution of that culture and the adaptation to new circumstances of its inherited stock of knowledge. The crucial work of cultural policy in innovation is therefore the understanding of those foundational meanings and their modulation over time as the principle informing the recognition and implementation of innovations. The key term is "optimize"; the potential of an innovation is accomplished when it is acculturated, not by force but by recognition of its cultural potential in a particular time and place.

5.3 Communication: Language, Conversation and Media Technologies

If a democratic society's institutions both anchor its foundational principles and help it to adapt effectively to new or changing circumstances and beliefs, their effectiveness depends upon a communication system comprising open networks enabling them to connect to one another and citizens to connect with them and to each other. Since, without a communication system, there can be no society, it is hardly surprising that an enormous body of analysis and commentary is directed towards this aspect of social organisation. But it is surprising, especially in a small democratic society like Aotearoa New Zealand, that the state should be so apparently casual about this complex function and so ready to treat it as the preserve of the private sector and the

market in communication products, whether technological, educational, cultural or recreational.

Rather than engaging here in the obvious political, economic and ideological critique of this situation, my intention is to set down a small number of key points derived from Luhmann on the basis of which the argument for the centrality of communications in cultural policy can be advanced. It is necessary to establish the most general position first so that the interests of every citizen in the effective functioning of communications (rather than the interests of elite and expert segments of the population) are placed in the foreground.

The current tendency is to assume that access to and use of media technologies constitute the critical dimension of communications, especially in public policy, education and telecommunications. But for Luhmann (2000a: 139) the enabling medium "not only of communication but also of consciousness" is meaning. He writes that "Communication can no longer be understood as a 'transmission' of information from an (operatively closed) living being or conscious system to any other such system. Communication is an independent type of formation in the medium of meaning [Sinn], an emergent reality that presupposes living beings capable of consciousness but is irreducible to any one of these beings, not even to all of them taken together" (8). This emphasis reorients thinking about communication away from the current technological infrastructure, which is where most of the economic value of communications is located, and towards its primary purpose, which is to link singular minds into the social collectivity of meaning and understanding as beneficiaries of the thought of others before them and as contributors to the on-going expansion of this primary social resource, which I am equating with cultural knowledge. Furthermore, by emphasising meaning rather than knowledge Luhmann shifts attention away from the kinds of knowledge which can circulate globally as universally true towards the kinds of embodied knowledge which are always already enveloping society, are positioned by and emergent in time and place, are constantly modified by their usage and circulation from person to person, and meld factual information, experience, values and beliefs. For this linking of minds to be possible, it is not enough to have access to technological networks. Because "Communication relies on the perception of signs" (16),

the ability to use the sign systems of society and acquisition of the knowledge common to members of a society is critical, and that means acquiring education and literacy. He does not assume that communication is inherently transparent or rational: "Communication can tolerate and even produce vagueness, incompletion, ambiguity, irony, and so forth" (11), qualities normally associated with deception, intellectual confusion, satire and poetry, the antithesis of formal knowledge and accurate information but socially purposeful. More importantly, communication typically requires judgment and decision-making in the process of understanding what is communicated.

Luhmann argues that all social functions "can be traced to problems of meaningful communication. Meaning serves as the medium not only of communication but also of consciousness. Because meaning is actualised "in an instant of experience or of communication […] any operation that is controlled by meaning must move beyond actuality toward what is otherwise possible. Something pertaining to the realm of potentiality must be actualized, which in turn requires that the difference between actuality and potentiality occur at the heart of experience and communication. [This] suggests that all the problems to be solved in the system of society are directly or indirectly related to the structure of meaning" (139). To point in this direction is to point beyond formal knowledge and its application to the envelope of culture within which ordinary living and thinking occurs and which makes communicating between minds possible. Comprehending this structure and discovering by attending to the conversation of society what are understood diversely to be the "problems to be solved" as this understanding is produced by experience and advanced by communication amongst the members of a society is a core task for cultural policy.

Although Luhmann focuses on the medium of meaning as the primary medium in communication, this should not exclude consideration of the role media technologies play. As Mark Poster (1990, 56) defines the issue, "Each method of preserving and transmitting information profoundly intervenes in the network of relations that constitute a society." The communication system of a society is not personally, socially and culturally neutral, but it defines in its design and its component parts the practices and terms of its use and therefore shapes its users to the purposes, self-conceptions and values which have been designed into its operation. Current discussions about the way in

which social media sites shape their users to the interests and culture of the owners and designers of a site while being deficient in the forms of social regulation all societies have to devise is just an immediate example of Poster's axiom.

At its most basic, then, the task of cultural policy is to comprehend the conversation being carried on by a nation's publics through that nation's communication system, and to resource that conversation through the cultural and media institutions tasked with preserving and transmitting information. This is not a matter of opinion polling, or of covert surveillance. It requires being able to recognise shifts in meaning as instances of what is potential becoming actualised, cultural evolution adapting through communication its lineages of meanings to newly perceived states of affairs while simultaneously giving specific shape and direction to those states of affairs as they are actualised in texts and events. It also requires attending to what it is possible for any person to know, in terms of training, education and experience and of means of access to a society's stocks of knowledge.

This is to say that an education state cannot have a serious cultural policy without having a communications policy which starts with language as the exemplary (and most complex) medium of cultural transmission, storage and knowledge formation, but also attends closely to the various means of expression, transmission and storage, including the institutions which sustain and regulate these social capabilities.

5.3.1 Language

The potential in innovation policy only becomes apparent when it develops within cultural policy, so that the four types of knowledge identified by Brier as constituting modern western culture are together active in policy formation, rather than the situation at present, where policy thinking is grounded solely in science and technology as the model of knowledge formation and transmission, where the discourse of science is its mode of formation and dissemination, and where business is its primary social site of application. As a universalist mode of knowing, (Western) science and technology is experienced by its practitioners as ideally expressed in a universal (transparent) language - which for practical purposes is English

(especially, that is, for first language English speakers).[16] The traditional Christian conception of language diversity as a divine punishment, the consequence of the hubristic abuse of scientific and technological knowledge represented in the building of the Tower of Babel, has played a critical role in establishing in the West the role of science as the means of recovering that original, uncorrupted language in which the truth can be truly expressed, and technology as the means of recovering humanity from the socially and environmentally destructive results of original sin.[17] In the postmodern era, however, this socially progressive conception of science has come under much criticism, as science and technology have entrenched their position, especially with governments, as the modern knowledges of overwhelming power and authority. In particular, in the context of postcolonial experience and the break down of the binary world order symbolised by the destruction of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the conception of the confusion of languages (as the dominant interpretation of linguistic diversity, a problem to be solved technologically) is being increasingly challenged by the view that cultural diversity as a foundational public good and a condition of human sociability is premised on the maintenance of linguistic diversity.

Given that one of the most ancient ways by which human beings have conceived of themselves as distinct within the orders of living species is the possession of language, it is remarkable that language has so slipped to the periphery of attention in government that one is hard pressed to find any attention being given to it as a domain of government responsibility except in the context of New Zealand's official languages (where it is Māori as a threatened language which is the focus of attention) or in concerns about literacy. Special forms of language, for example, literature, are formally included in arts policy and funding; but the cultural traditions and texts of European culture are as marginalised as the humanities in school and university curricula, and there is no government Ministry of the Humanities to recognise the role of advanced literacy in cultural production, critique and knowledge policy formation. As it is in normal social practice, language is simply invisible except when an intention to communicate fails. Suzette Haden Elgin argues in her discussion of the need for language policies which support multilingualism that, "If speaking a language were like brain surgery, learned only after many long years of difficult study and practiced only by a handful of remarkable individuals at great expense, we would view it with

similar respect and awe. But because almost every human being knows and uses one or more languages, we have let that miracle be trivialised into 'only talk.' We forget, or are unaware of, the power that language has over our minds and our lives" (2000: 239).[18] Luhmann distinguishes between the way language in art is used connotatively and ambiguously, in contrast to everyday communication which displaces these qualities with "unambiguous denotative meaning" (2000a: 25) and is "concerned with automating understanding" (40). Hampshire makes a complementary claim, that "The writing and speaking of English, and the language itself, are sustained by those who extend the resources of the language, and who refine upon its range and powers of expression, permanently, by their invention. These are the poets, dramatists and novelists of our time. We live and think in the language which their predecessors have gradually, over centuries, formed for us, and to which they are adding now" (1976: 15). The extraordinary multiplication of terms for things and concepts needed for naming the new objects in the world and for thought which technoscience has created must also be recognised here; but the work of artistic invention, which serves to extend over time the expressive capabilities of a society's language(s) for thought and its communication in ordinary use, must be recognised at the heart of innovation policy. Paradoxically, language's normal invisibility is also the sign of how absolutely constitutive of society in all its operations language is. It is equally a mark of the present location of value and policy formation that, if democratic governments were to be asked what is absolutely constitutive of society, the typical answer now would not be "language" but "the economy, stupid."

Lotman (2009: 134) states the key point with admirable succinctness: "For human thought all that exists is that which falls into any of its languages." Without granting the fundamental role of language in knowledge formation there can be no effective innovation policy. It is not enough to say that knowledge creation is carried out by artists as well as scientists; we need to know how new knowledge is produced and circulated in society (not only for or in the economy), and how it interacts with and modifies existing knowledge. A theory of the role of languages in the evolution of knowledge societies should lie at the heart of a foundational cultural policy; a powerful statement about the complex issues embedded in this position can be found in *The World Ahead: Our Future in the Making*, a UNESCO publication which

considered a spectrum of critical global issues in terms of four contracts: social, natural, cultural, and ethical. It is worth observing that, if a government were to organise itself on the basis of these four bonds between people and the world in which we live, it would have to substantially reconfigure its conception of its role; it would also challenge political parties to make the implications of the politics of their policy positions explicit. But this becomes another way of grasping why cultural policy is foundational. The natural and social worlds are apprehended and engaged with by the citizens of a nation state through the lens of culture, which is also the immediate source of ethical norms and the authority to enforce them. To govern a democratic and multi-cultural society with insight requires formal understanding of the complex forms of knowing and valuing which distinguish the various cultures composing a nation state from each other and the similarities which connect them.

The chapter on language in *The World Ahead* focuses on the issue of linguistic diversity, and notes that it is "still a long way from receiving the same kind of recognition as biodiversity" (Mayor and Bindé, 2001: 341). The writers foreground two aspects of language which are of fundamental importance to my argument: linguistic diversity is maintained by "the tendency of languages to split into dialects. [...] they evolve ceaselessly and constantly adapt to their environments"; and "no language is inherently 'superior' to another; each performs its role in a specific cultural, economic, social, ecological and political context and each describes in its own particular way a different environment" (339-40, 342). These conceptions of the nature and work of language point directly to the proposition that language should therefore be a primary source for, as well as a focus of, cultural policy: language is the most dynamic, sensitive and informative means available to humans to recognise and manage change as a deliberate process. This is, after all, what policy discourse aims to do. Cultural diversity - in Boisot's terms, the overlapping of fields of information - is the key requirement for innovation. Cultural and linguistic diversity are reciprocals.

A particularly strong statement of the position that language is the most significant cultural resource is made by Fern Johnson, in *Speaking Culturally.* What he calls the "Language-Centered Perspective on Culture" is

based on the affirmation that "The system of *language and communication* is the central resource used by human beings to create, maintain, and change culture" (Johnson, 2000: 58) and that the complexity of culture arises from "(a) the communication and intermingling of peoples with different origins, identities and allegiances and (b) the interplay of the real and imagined past, the perceived present, and the projected future, whether probable or fantasized" (48). Such an approach does not permit a distinction to be made between culturally laden and culturally free modes of language use; instead, for Johnson, "All communication bears cultural origins, conveys cultural meanings, and is interpreted through cultural frameworks. [...] human language [is] the cornerstone of cultural meaning within an interrelated set of systems for elaborating cultural resources that includes ideational patterns [...] and cultural products and events" (45). In taking this approach he is following a line of thought which has much in common with Barnett's conception of innovation as the mental work of combining ideas which are already in circulation within a society's communication system or to be found among its stocks of knowledge. The interactivity between culture and language provides the possibility for social change and adaptation: "Cultural frameworks give rise to particular languages, which in turn shape mental processes and the organization of reality, which in turn create cultural frameworks. Cultural frameworks can be renewed, refreshed, reformulated through ever-changing processes involving language" (51-52). In New Zealand, the case for language as a critical national issue is typically made in the context of the recovery of Māori language and Māori culture; it is not perceived generally to be a significant issue for Pākehā, except in the residual sense of "European heritage" and the more urgent problem of trade with countries for which English is not the first language. In many respects, however, Johnson's arguments have a special import for New Zealand English as a variety of world English, that is, as a means of cultural differentiation as well as a means of global communication. If we begin at the point that Johnson does, when he writes that "linguistic enculturation from within native speech communities provides the foundation from which all other discourse options become elaborated. […] Most people today are entailed in multiple cultures, offering multiple bases for identity" (53), then it is the speaking of a local language which initially anchors cultural identity and difference, and it is access to other cultures, languages and varieties of language which impels cultural change and innovation.

5.3.2 Conversation

To ask in what the power of conversation consists is to ask in what does democratic power consist, thought of as the heterogeneous flows of knowledge and understanding among collectivities distributed across the whole of a society (and now, the whole of humanity as "global society"). Opinion polling is a good example of how this knowledge and understanding is contextually modulated by individuals' shifting awareness of what is at stake at any moment (one increasingly potent input into which is media representation and media organisations' cultural-political investments), and how those shifts are nonetheless anchored in continuities of thought, as these are condensed over times and places in cultures composed of family histories, systems of law, belief and value, conceptions of reality, technologies, social, economic and governmental structures and institutions, customs and ideologies.

What, then, is the base condition which a new cultural policy should aim to establish if innovation is to be understood to be a cultural process dependent on individuals' access to a society's stock of knowledge and their integral role in its rethinking and circulation? Given the now widely investigated question of innovation in the economy, in the tight circuit of the science-technology-business-military nexus, the answer I propose will seem tinged with absurdity. But the issue for a postmodern democratic knowledge society is not about interests or hegemonic knowledges; it is about the public and most general resource of a society which is often invoked in innovation discussions, especially when considered in terms of deficits in intellectual and social capital, that is, the minds of its people and their generative powers. In the Warwick Commission report, for example, the point is made and reinforced throughout that the creative capabilities of a society are limited to the extent that significant segments of the population are excluded from exploring and developing their capabilities as a consequence of poverty, abbreviated education, and limited access to their society's resources of knowledge of all kinds. In this state of deprivation (as seen from the perspective of society's inherited resources as a totality), people nonetheless create cultures (criminal as well as legitimate) and modify their cultural inheritances in association with each other to provide working

knowledge for living in the social and economic environment in which they find themselves.

How can this working knowledge escape its immediate context of creation and become accessible to others? This question sidesteps any attempt to evaluate knowledge, to weigh its relative worth from a specific perspective like, say, commercialisation of an idea, or to advance a social policy of redistribution of wealth, equalising of opportunity etc (although a political party could add these goals), and points instead to the ways knowledge flows (or is obstructed from flowing) throughout society, from node to node in social networks where the nodes are singular minds. The term capturing the critical social mechanism making this process possible is conversation. So, does this mean that a government has to have a conversation policy? Currently the debate over secret mass surveillance of private communications could be seen as a sign that democratic states regard conversation between citizens as dangerous to their interests (rather than to the public interest); reciprocally, the conduct of government through "conversation behind closed doors" and the suspicion it can raise about private interests displacing public interests in official decision-making emphasises the divergence of state interests from public interests. As Milton observed (1644/1974: 200-201), the publishing of thought can be dangerous to the state but the risk of closing a door on access to new learning and insight is in principle greater than any perceived threat to the state.[19]

An excellent description of conversation occurs in the course of defining the terms on which professional design practice should be conducted, and it picks up the double aspect of a mode of exchange between people which involves attention to the difference of another's speech, and what might be implicit as well as explicit in what is said, face to face or at a distance: "The ability to convey and listen to the other is at its best when the exchange is heard as if it's a *conspiracy* (i.e., a breathing together) of *conversation* (i.e., a turning together). To have a conversation is to explore the other; to find relations and connections that can serve as starting points for contracts and fuller relationships" (Nelson and Stolterman, 2012: 176). In another context, research into the requirements for the formation of a knowledge society in New Zealand identified a specific linguistic process and competence – intermediation, or the process of translating between different communities

of expertise in order to facilitate the circulation of knowledge across society - as critical to innovation (O'Brien et al, 2000: 22-23). Researchers into innovation within firms have identified conversation, understood as the linguistic facilitation of exchange between people with different kinds of knowledge, to be a key activity in the development of new ideas and products (von Krogh et al, 2000: 125-146). From this perspective, language is not simply a background competence but a critical, dynamic element in innovation. These issues have been brought together by Fonseca in his study, *Complexity and Innovation in Organizations*, where he argues that innovation is "the emergence of new meaning and that such new meaning emerges in conversations between people [...] innovation in organizations is fundamentally a conversational process in which meaning is continuously dispersed" (2002: 7). A competent democratic state listens to the manifold if not in effect infinite public conversations occurring throughout society, not secretly to detect threats to itself but openly to understand movements in ideas and cultural meaning and discover patterns among the signs of society's possible futures.

The one attribute conversation between people located anywhere in society will not typically be granted is creativity or innovativeness in ideas. More usually, ordinary conversation from a policy perspective will be regarded as Jonson regards the conversation of the (female) critics of his plays who he stages as Gossips in *The Staple of News*, inexpert, interested in local family matters and celebrity rather than moral substance and truth, attracted by youth and promise rather than gravity and wealth, evaluating social events and persons according to their shared experience and values. But Jonson, despite his evident dislike of everything that the Gossips represent in their use of language, writes in for them a defence which can be read otherwise to what he clearly intended. One of the Gossips, Tattle (the others are Mirth, Expectation and Censure), refers to anecdotes circulating in their locality and says, "But whether it be true or no, we gossips are bound to believe it an't it be once out and afoot. How should we entertain the time else, or find ourselves in fashionable discourse for all companies, if we do not credit it and make more of it in the reporting?" (Act III, Third Intermean, ll.37-41). In the notion of adding value, Jonson allows however dismissively that passing information from one mind to another always modifies it. Without the learned controls of humanistic scholarship or scientific method, the stability and

truthfulness of knowledge is challenged. But unless those controls are themselves challenged, especially from "outside", from beyond the boundaries of current official knowledge, new perceptions and conceptions actualising human and social potential may be ignored or suppressed.

While Olssen et al have elaborated a powerful case for the priority of education over the economy as the primary object of government, their argument about the responsibility of government to education needs to be extended beyond the formal education system to include the now traditional cultural institutions – museums, galleries, archives and libraries – and their digital extensions, public media organisations, and those performing and conserving the repertoire of the arts which a society inherits from its past and is renewed and extended by artists in the present. The key factors in this extension are the common concern with what it means to be human and a humanistic conception of democratic principles manifested in the characteristic product of their work, an informed encounter between citizens using modes of conversation and negotiation in whatever medium to the end of advancing a personal and collective purpose. Overcoming the "democratic deficit" (Horner and Hutton, 2011: 116) and finding a way to a better democratic future depends on the quality, diversity and inclusiveness of the conversations a society carries on with itself. The radical implications of this position have been stated unambiguously by de Certeau in his reflections on the events of May 1968, which "affirmed a wild, irrepressible, new right, a right that has become identical with the right of being a human, and no longer a client destined for consumer culture or instruments useful for the anonymous organization of society. This right commanded, for example, the reactions of assemblies that were always prepared to defend it whenever it appeared to be threatened in the heat of debate: 'Everybody has the right to speak.' But this right was only given to those who spoke in their own name" (1998: 11). The informing conception is humanistic because the relation of exchange which is established is premised upon "the irreducible moral status of each person" (Olssen et all, 2004: 236). Derrida uses another phrase, "irreplaceable singularity" (1987: 37) which extends the implications of this founding of democracy on the person of the citizen by underlining how each person is formed over time as a unique intersection of cultural, moral, linguistic, historical, familial, ethnic, economic, technological, governmental and environmental inheritances and forces. And can be silenced over time as

well, as Sundaram (2016: 140) writes of dictatorship: "A society unable to speak was like a body that did not feel pain: one could cut off one's limb and not know it, or be told that this was progress. We needed to go from a single voice to a plurality, to counter the government in this way, merely by speaking, so that people would be come aware of the existence of an alternative, aware of what was happening around them. In speaking society would struggle, and feel its own pain."

A striking example of the foundational thinking needed in the formation of an education state based on such a conception of humanity represented by linguistic rather than economic exchange is David Carr's *Open Conversations. Public Learning in Libraries and Museums*, which takes as its double focus the singular citizen and democratic cultural institutions which do not exercise a role in the formal education system, do not have to work to negotiated curricula and national assessment systems, and do not command much interest in the context of knowledge economy and innovation policy development. He offers his reader an invitation:

> Thi*nk with me*. What if the museum, the library, the zoo, the history collection, the children's art studio, the science and the natural sciences collections, what if they are all about becoming something together – becoming thoughtful together, and striving to imagine together? What if our collections could be seen as structured situations, even maps, for finding our way together into the unknown and back, ways for sorting the contextual intangibles we all recognize in our lives, so we might imagine and understand the possible difference a single idea might make? (2011: xviii).

Think with me. This invitation, which echoes throughout the book, focuses attention on a fundamental condition and practice in democratic living. Extended fully, it proposes that the common mode of interaction between all participants in the public life of society should be founded on this invitation, which is also an injunction taking with complete seriousness the notion that a democratic society is the product of open conversations amongst its members across generations, whose diversity in terms of inheritance, education, knowledge, politics, wealth, cultures and languages does not diminish their equality as persons. There is nothing natural about such a mode of

conversation,[20] which challenges the highly structured exchanges typically carried on in processes like consultations between public institutions and citizen groups.[21] As with any social relationship, the ethical and behavioural protocols of democratic conversation must be learned as part of the process of becoming an adult in and a citizen of a democratic society (Levine, 2007: 254).

"Think with me" invokes a scene inviting productivity of a fundamental and intangible, one might say priceless kind, the production of self- and social-knowledge from the engagement of minds in conversation. For Carr, this is the scene which establishes and sustains democratic societies.[22] It invokes the moment when God speaks to Adam about his origins in Milton's poem *Paradise Lost* in a way which encourages Adam to achieve by thought new kinds of self-understanding; the scene when Eve and Adam discuss the wisdom of their working alone in the Garden, a discussion unresolved when Adam declines to resolve their differences by asserting authority and Eve goes to discover for herself by experience the meaning of their situation (1674/1971: 8.250-643); and the negative of these examples, Eve's discussion with Satan, when the skill and power of his words shapes her thinking until it becomes the echo of his (1674/1971: 9.192-375; 9.496-781). As the examples from *Paradise Lost* show, conversation, especially when it opens onto the unknown, is not safe, and may have destructive outcomes. But it founds a conception of society infinitely more complex than the current dominant origin scene, that of the exchange of goods, services and money in a market.

The current dominance of neoliberal, free market conceptions of society and government, in this context, are revealed for what they are, the position of a powerful segment of Western society (business and finance) which is readily exportable to non-democratic regimes because of its gross simplification of the nature of social exchange to the exchange of commodities for a price (but still wrapped in law written by the dominant partner as treaties, contracts, etc). To write this is not to deny the extraordinary importance in the historical increase in complexity of human societies of the invention of money as a means of representing value by quantifying it in certain exchange situations. But language was always already performing this function, enmeshing number in linguistic exchanges which incorporated cultural and

locational values, as it does now; for example, in the discussions about "free trade" into which other domains of value, like human rights, minimum wages, labour conditions, traditional cultures, and sovereignty are inserted by those who recognise both the reductiveness of the conception of relations between people and peoples characteristic of these negotiations and the specific interests which seek to benefit by defining and delimiting their terms to the quantifiable. The point is not that negotiations between very different regimes, histories, and cultures do not require the finding of common ground on which to work out whatever form of relationship is under discussion; but it is that working to a lowest common denominator disguises the fact of power as an inevitable dimension of any exchange, not just the relative power of different jurisdictions and unequally distributed concentrations of wealth, but the ways in which these inequalities replay in political terms within jurisdictions, shifting internal power relations and pushing to the margins the process of historically evolving and continually revised consensus in a particular community, society or nation about the fundamental values, purposes and responsibilities of that society deriving from its inheritance and its transformation through on-going conversation amongst all of its citizens.

What, then, are the most humanly distinctive qualities which are both produced by and modelled in open conversations, in any of the settings in which people gather to serve and satisfy collective needs and purposes? The following list compiled by Carr identifies qualities which cannot be traded or commodified except by detaching them from their singular human embodiments and attaching them to tradable things (as advertising does). He writes that "we cannot download, curate, or collect any of the following things: altruism, artistry, attention, authenticity, cognition, collaboration, consideration, courage, critical thinking, curiosity, democracy, empathy, esteem, expectations, freedom of thought, generosity, hope, imagination, inquiry, integrity, kindness, patience, respect, responsibility, or wisdom" (2011, xiv). In the hard world[23] of power politics, abuse of the law and electoral procedures, ruthless competition for scarce resources, massive accumulations of wealth, urban and environmental degradation, military, sexual and other kinds of violence, secrecy, addiction, crime, (expressions of our inhumanity), the scene of human exchange and possible transformation

represented by civil conversation reminds us of another, better conception of ourselves.

5.3.3 Information and Communications (Media) Technologies

Each of us is a cultural producer, and each of us is a medium through which culture disseminates and reproduces. As with all other forms of media, the medium is not neutral in the transmission, but modifies what is transmitted to others. Without media for communication, human societies would not exist. Without sign systems and media technologies, human thought would be locked in individual minds; as Carr affirms, the primary purpose of communication is to bring each mind out of its inherent isolation and open it to other minds, present and past, in the process constituting a society (2011: 133-134). It is for this reason that the protocols governing communication in a society and access to the channels through which it can flow are such an immediate test of the extent to which its claim to be democratic can be tested.

As Milton recognised in respect of the communicational technologies of his time, to achieve the force and audibility necessary not only to be heard but to modify the current official account of what matters in and to government requires access to the technological infrastructures facilitating and managing social communication at any scale. It also requires the state to ensure that such access is universally available. The ability of individual minds to interact with the collected thought of all other human minds, which is the source of the power of thought, is blocked when people are denied, by poverty, class, education or state regulation the literacies and technologies required to access humanity's thought and contribute to its expansion.

Modern media are the technological supplement which makes plain the always already technological character of acts of communication and the cultures in which they are embedded. The relationship is precisely defined by Debray when he writes that "the human miracle consists in *making meaning material*, the reverse side and paradoxical complement of the birth of intellect" (2000: 73). This position, a decisive characteristic of postmodernity, challenges the long history during which the medium has been treated as a neutral or transparent vehicle (99) in the process of communicating thought from one mind to another. At the heart of the

processes which make innovation possible (and remind us that innovation is always already an attribute of any society which is committed to surviving over time) is what Giddens has called "mediated experience". Tomlinson (1999) develops this concept with respect to modern media, showing that "the special, distinctive quality of mediated experience" is located by combining the "concept of mediation [as] the idea of overcoming distance" with a concept of "the medium itself *intervening* in the process, making its mark on the communication, producing qualitative changes in the experience of the thing communicated" (154-155; emphasis in the original).

As Bolter and Grusin (1999) demonstrate, "remediation" is the characteristic method by which media technologies innovate, both technologically and in the mediated experiences which they make available: "Digital visual media can best be understood through the ways in which they honor, rival, and revise linear-perspective painting, photography, film, television, and print. No medium today, and certainly no single media event, seems to do its cultural work in isolation from other media, any more than it works in isolation from other social and economic forces. What is new about new media comes from the particular ways in which they refashion older media and the ways in which older media refashion themselves to answer the challenges of new media" (15). In one respect, this is nothing more than a special case of Barnett's theory of innovation, in which the emergent emerges through recombinations of the already known; in another, it identifies a fundamental aspect of cultural knowledge and the means by which that knowledge is revised and reformulated as social and environmental change occurs. Because culture is collective knowledge, formal and tacit, and that knowledge must circulate across the spaces and times in which a culture continues to exist, there can be no culture without mediating technologies, just as there would be no point to media technologies if there was nothing to mediate. When culture is thought of as the distinctive property of indigenous peoples, who are presumed to live in an original condition of unmediated experience (the oral tradition) or as a specific type of media content available for sale in a media market, the deep interaction between culture and media technologies becomes invisible to policy.

In his analysis of the interdependence of technology and culture in human societies, Debray places particular emphasis upon the importance of

institutions and media technologies in constituting and maintaining knowledge as a collective, not individual activity. By distinguishing between communication as the action of connecting individuals in the present and transmission as the action of connecting groups through time, Debray focuses attention on the stability of and capacity for change in meaning over time as together enabling culture, defined as "the repertory of forms, intuitive schemas, and corporealized memories every society makes available to its members" (2000: 52), to provide order and facilitate innovation in society. He affirms that "We transmit meanings so that the things we live, believe and think do not perish with *us* (as opposed to *me*). [...] productions of consciousness - religions, doctrines, ideologies, disciplines - [impinge] decisively on the course of material things. [...] The administration of signs and images has effects and stakes that are tangible, constraining, and at times violent" (3,9). The role of public sector agencies is given new significance when they are considered in these terms as highly active, fundamental components of the apparatus societies develop for conserving and modifying their accumulated resources of knowledge, and transmitting them to future generations. By "Perpetuating meaning [the] institution acts as a kind of registry or patent office, but rather than passively conserving its charges, it is never done revising, censuring, interpreting, and peddling them" (11). While all public sector agencies share these characteristics, it is the specifically denominated cultural agencies which have the most explicit responsibility for transmission as the process of reflexively engaging the present and the past in ways which are sensitive to communal and national differences, and to the diverse media in which collective knowledge is stored and transmitted. It is out of this kind of engagement with collective knowledge by people in institutional environments, Debray argues in a manner similar to H G Barnett, that innovation occurs: "Transmission withers on the vine when the present is taken as the only model. And innovation itself withers with it, scorn for the past being the greatest enemy of progress" (18). To approach media policy from within cultural policy is to seek to connect it deeply with and continue to advance what is distinctive about New Zealand's cultural evolution. That such a step would not make sense in current policy settings is understandable, and so are the reasons why it should be taken. Debray argues that culture and technology are together necessary for innovation – "Without the quasi-chromosomal conjunction of cultural breeding ground with new technology, an innovation will not come forward and take over" (2000: 51) -

even if, as themselves, they are strongly contrasted by being located in quite different policy domains. Reciprocally, it is not possible to have a serious cultural policy without having a media policy which starts with language as the exemplary (and most universally used and accessible) medium of cultural transmission, storage and knowledge formation, but also attends closely to the other material means of storage and transmission, including the institutions which sustain and regulate these social capacities.

A good example of why both media technology and culture must be thought together in policy making for either is to be found in an adaptation of Francis Bacon's conception of the imagination as nuntius. Hartley (2012: 185, 192) puts this in a striking way when he uses the metaphor to define a distinguishing attribute of humanity as "*Homo nuntius* or messaging humanity". He writes that it "seems like a useful concept, because it requires attention to population-wide human characteristics, rather than to partial (elite-driven) or private systems, however large (like the internet), and their technological peculiarities", and because it conceives of human identity as produced by "externally *networked* brains, linked primarily by language – dialogic, iterative, generative messaging in a coded system or semiosphere. […] although it returns attention to individual agency and identity, instead of focussing exclusively on industrial-scale systems and structures, the concept of *Homo nuntius* also allows for the agency of the network or networks used (i.e. for institutions) to be part of species adaptation." Rather than accounting for the rapid uptake of digital communications devices by reference to clever design and skilful marketing (although there has been no lack of either), they gain their significance and power, like the postal system or telephony before them, from being able to place themselves in the middle between people wanting to send and receive messages at a distance. As Hartley notes, the possession and use of language is the common factor in messaging with any kind of technological device; he also affirms, like H. G. Barnett, that "Creativity is […] a population-wide attribute, it requires social networks, and its 'product' is the growth of knowledge, sometimes within a market environment, sometimes not. This is a radically democratic move" (48). But the common factors of language, creativity and media technologies have yet to be comprehended by the agencies of government.

Institutionally, government Ministries and national agencies which are now directly engaged in sustaining some part of the knowledge system of a democratic society are marked decisively by their historical origins, specifically in relation to the development of media technologies: libraries, archives and education focussed primarily on written language in print, both fictional and factual; museums focussed primarily on the accumulation of artefacts locating human knowledge of the natural and human world in their evolution through time, with commentary linking those objects to the totality of written knowledge about them; art galleries focussed primarily on the collection and display of pictorial and sculptural texts, also with linked commentary to written knowledge; universities were tied to specific forms of written record; cultural agencies were organised in relation to specific forms of artistic expression; radio and then television broadcasting followed print journalism in its mix of information and entertainment; classification and search functions – tables of contents, indexes and catalogues, and summaries of knowledge in encyclopedias, dictionaries and handbooks – evolved as the accumulations of knowledge expanded and its publics diversified. With new media technologies being invented from the early nineteenth century, the original conception of these culturally conserving institutions was expanded to include the full range of audio-visual media forms.

But this trajectory, of public institutions differentiating as new media forms evolved, which might have forced a perception that these institutions had something so important in common that they needed to be thought together in a new kind of cultural/knowledge policy, was disrupted by the development of digital ICTs with a quite different genealogy in technoscience and business. In order to reframe cultural knowledge and practice as producing a kind of capital asset capable of economic exploitation, the organisations most directly and historically associated with the conservation and creation of cultural knowledge had to be rediscovered as industries. This task was made easier by two factors: the modern evolution of mass media organisations using communications technologies, from printing through radio, telephony and film to computing, in which media technologies and increasingly private ownership of both them and the forms of content created with them and transmitted by their means became industrialised; and the late twentieth century (postmodern) remediation of all these technologies through the astonishingly rapid introduction of digital networked information and

communications technologies, globally extensive, personally adaptable, and focussed on economic development. Unlike any previous communications technology, digital ICTs became both the means of new economic development and also the immediate end, in so far as enormous public and private investments in technological innovation, infrastructure and digitisation of pre-digital textual matter, in research, education and training, and in telecommunications, defence, finance, banking, retail and manufacturing were required to introduce and normalise digital ICTs as an integral part of the social fabric. It was a remarkable achievement by the private interests which benefitted financially most directly from this quite amazing process of social transformation, and by the techno-scientific research and development functions of the state, to bring governments on board through a discourse which blended research, education, innovation and economic development under the rubric of the information or knowledge society.

With digital remediation of the whole of the pre-digital archive possible (limited only by time, money and copyright), and with the new order of born-digital texts, including in such non-traditional forms as blogs, websites and social media, the first characterisation of the new postmodern order as "the knowledge economy" accurately locates the dynamic for these media technology developments in the private sector. Now that the first economically significant phase, marked by the wiring of the world, the development and sale of devices to connect to the wiring, and habituation to their use, has been largely accomplished, the next economically significant phase is marked by enthusiasm among media, telecommunications and IT companies for (neo-colonial) dominance over increasingly extensive parts of the semiotic territory of the semiosphere, because of the vastly extended capability of networked digital technologies to channel and hence control, measure and monetise the total flow of signs in all media forms and genres. The significance for culture can be succinctly indicated, consistently with Debray's conception of technology. As a complement to the emphasis in advertising on technology impacts, presenting new digital technologies as irresistible forces for change, there was the iconic image of the very young child user, a new world and vacant territory with no baggage from the past which would complicate the rapid take-up of the new technologies. The conception that experience, memory and learning are obstacles to social,

technological and economic innovation – the blank slate of the child's mind being the ideal surface on which the ICT industry could write its version of the social – also serves to conceal the fact of the cultural and ideological conceptions designed into all media and cognitive technologies. Learning to use a digital device is usually to internalise and enact without reflection the culturally formed conceptions of human communication and of cognitive and social practice which have been designed into it.

Public cultural institutions have understood the logic of this situation, and have undergone major reconceptualisations of their missions, structures and the capabilities required of their professional work-force. This is an instance of Debray's view that interpreting society through its media technologies involves two branches of analysis: one is diachronic, "asking by which networks of transmission and forms of organization a given cultural legacy was constituted"; the other is synchronic, asking how "the appearance of a new system or equipment modifies an institution, an established theory, or precodified practice" (99). The adaptation of cultural institutions in the context of media evolution includes both dimensions, but Debray's two branches also highlight the nature of the massive fracture in networks of transmission which occurred late in the twentieth century in the evolution of cultural institutions. One consequence is that, as yet, it is barely possible to think together in a single policy framework the extraordinary diversity of recorded text-producing activity now possible as a result of the diversification of media technologies. Cunningham (2002: 61) highlights the problem in current conventional cultural policy when he affirms that "The arts, culture and creative industry sectors will need to get used to thinking of themselves as acting as part of a broader coalescence of interests encompassing the content-rich service industries such as education and learning, publishing, design, communications devices and e-commerce." Even more than the industry sectors, it is governments which need to understand why this coalescence matters and why the cultural institutions (nationally and locally) are a critical part of it, in order to give form to a new cultural policy able to represent the public interest in this aspect of cultural evolution. Instead, the cultural institutions remain disconnected in policy, a critical disadvantage for any attempt to formulate a new cultural policy which would think together their purposes and the media technologies which provide the materials they work with, the infrastructures for their work, and

the products they create in ways which would make sense of their fundamental cultural functions.

Because of the centrality of education to my conception of the democratic state, it is worth reviewing the relationship between media technologies, culture and policy as it can be exemplified by the institution of education. In his study, *The Moment of Complexity: Emerging Network Culture*, Mark Taylor is able to envisage a new set of professionally empowering possibilities which acknowledges changed relationships and organisational forms throughout society by focussing on an assessment of how knowledge and its organisation changes with changing information and communications technologies. He notes that "it is beginning to seem clear that the university of the twenty-first century will be an intricate network or network of networks which is structured like a complex adaptive system. […] In the future, the curriculum will look more like a constantly morphing hypertext than a fixed linear sequence of prepackaged courses" (2001: 234). In an advanced learning environment, engagements with knowledge will be more like the processes for creating works of art as Luhmann has analysed them than the acquisition of blocks of certified knowledge.

Thinking of society as a function of its systems, processes and material means for creating, storing and disseminating knowledge of all kinds is a way towards policy making for a knowledge society in which digital ICTs connect people globally and which is comprised of "complex adaptive networks" by means of which every kind of knowledge can in principle interact, that is, a conception more like an education system, or a university, or a global library than an economy:

> When extended to cultural processes, the notion of complex adaptive networks illuminates the ways in which symbols, concepts, myths, and theories transform noise into information, which can be organized in meaningful patterns to inform thinking and guide action. Effective patterns of meaning require a new architecture of complexity, which simultaneously embodies and articulates the logic of networking (16-17).

Another instance is the defining structural form and its materialisation by which Taylor distinguishes the postmodern from the modern, that is, the

network in contrast to the grid, examples of which he takes from urban architecture.

> By examining the architecture of Mies, Venturi, and Gehry, it becomes possible to trace the movement from industrial society, through media culture, to network culture. This trajectory suggests that the moment of complexity can be understood in terms of the shift from a world structured by grids to a world organized like networks (20).

He elaborates on these ideas[24] in a consideration of what the full shift to educational work in digital media might mean:

> If the wired world is a new frontier, it is unlike any we have known in the past. Instead of exploring a space that is already present, it is necessary to create an environment whose complexity is virtually unimaginable. […] The new educational environment that is emerging is more like a growing organism than an industrial factory. The ecology of this mutating landscape is as fragile as the ecology of the minds that create and are created by it. Viral webs and networks must be carefully cultivated. When attempting to support and coordinate the activities of many diverse individuals and groups, it is important to make every effort to avoid the pitfalls of highly centralized and hierarchical organizations. Wherever possible, the correlative principles of decentralization and distribution serve as guides for practice. In contrast to traditional business, education, and broadcast models, the creation of a decentralized and distributed network facilitates many-to-many communication among both providers and users. […] Unplanned interactions create the condition for the emergence of creative innovation (267-268).

The policy framework needed to encompass the implications of such a social transformation of the means for access to learning is to be found in a new cultural policy, because it is only policy grounded in the actuality of knowledge in mediated culture which can be capable of understanding and managing what Taylor refers to as the fragile ecology of the semiosphere as

the space of interactivity between minds and objectified knowledge. There is little space within educational policy framed by the economy and business interests for considering the institution of education, together with its students and teachers, in ecological terms as fragile organisms living and thinking in a "mutating landscape" characterised by "unplanned interactions". A cultural-technological rather than a techno-scientific paradigm for framing educational policy is necessary for the implications of postmodernity to be grasped and inform the work of government.

5.3.4 Cultural Policy and Openness

Recognising the deep implications of the intimate linkages between culture and technologies of all kinds (but here specifically media technologies) for thinking about democratic knowledge and innovation as outcomes of thought emerging anywhere in a society and communicated through the networks available to any citizen highlights several conditions underpinning the kind of (mediated) conversations which constitute the vitality of democratic societies and their ability to serve and fulfil public interests, and further specify the orientation of cultural policy for the education state. The common factor is openness.

Openness concerns public access to a society's resources of knowledge, to the communications media through which knowledge and conversation circulate and public opinion is shaped, and the ability of any citizen to contribute to decision-making and to understand the reasons why decisions are taken (Peters, 2010: 252, 255-256). For these social means and resources to be used by citizens, it is obvious that they must have education and experience sufficient to make productive use of them. It is therefore a fundamental obligation upon a democratic state that all of its citizens should have access to the kinds of learning required to contribute competently to public decision-making processes, using whatever communications media are commonly employed in such processes, and to use in a creative way whatever segment of knowledge matters to them. Clearly, the more completely a society's knowledge resources (and especially new knowledge) are owned by private interests, and the means of access to this knowledge are controlled through ownership of the communications channels making access and circulation of knowledge throughout society possible, the more

restricted will be citizen participation in the governance of society and the sources of innovation.

The issue of open access to information has become central to every aspect of discussion about information and communications systems in part because the invention of the Internet offered the prospect of redefining the role of global systems from the perspective of the public interest[25], while also offering the possibility of total control by private interests of every aspect of the systems facilitating the conservation and exchange of information, including all forms of learning, economic activity, the development of new knowledge, decision-making at all levels of government, and political debate.

Several strands in recent thinking about knowledge institutions help extend this notion of the education state in its relation to knowledge work and the knowledge economy. The challenge to the private ownership of knowledge and the top-down conception of innovation can be succinctly represented though three concepts: the knowledge commons, the gift economy, and engagement. What these concepts share is a fundamental conviction that knowledge and information are inherently public resources, not only because public funding generates much new knowledge but because the open exchange of knowledge on which democratic governance and social evolution depend cannot be accomplished by globalised markets based on private ownership and competition. As Bollier argues, "The commons fills a theoretical void by explaining how significant value can be created and sustained outside of the market system. […] The matrix for calculating the public good is not a narrow economic index like the gross domestic product or a company's bottom line, but instead looks to a richer, more qualitative and humanistic set of criteria that are not easily measured, such as moral legitimacy, social consensus and equity, transparency in decision making, and ecological sustainability, among other concerns" (Bollier, 2007: 29; See Peters, 2010, Cabrera, 2012). In other words, public policies for knowledge and communications need to be formulated in an educational and democratic rather than an economic framework, one in which the state conceives of itself as a trustee, or kaitiaki (guardian) of the public interest[26] and facilitates practices which encourage engagement by its citizens in shaping their future.

The question is not whether the public interest should be expressed through public ownership, although the role of public ownership needs to be assessed as a positive dimension of any economy rather than in terms of the private sector's self-conception and as the gap filler compensating for market failure. The issue is, like everything else in policy, one of being able to anticipate social futures through the best use of the best knowledge available to government, and to clarify the best mix of public and private in a particular state of society. But my own view is unambiguous on one point of principle (which is clearly also a political position): that a nation claiming to be democratic which does not define the parameters *in the name of all of its publics* for the management and on-going evolution of its critical infrastructures – such as energy, transport, health, communication, education – can at best be a shadow democracy in which its citizens will not enjoy the freedom to decide collectively on its future.[27]

An important study which brings the three concepts together is Kenway et al's demonstration of the way in which the knowledge economy, as currently formulated in public policy and state action, suppresses but cannot erase the existence of other economies, defined as the risk, gift, libidinal and survival economies. These spectral economies float around but are not engaged by the policy discourses and decision-making of Parliament and government, even though the gift and survival economies are of particular significance for the well-being and operation of democratic societies. The gift economy places in the foreground "three central obligations that the knowledge economy conveniently denies: to give, to receive, and to repay. The knowledge economy is a grasping economy, its only obligation is to acquire without constraint and reciprocity, and, therefore, it ignores the gift-like qualities of knowledge"; the survival economy enacts the ecological paradigm of indigenous knowledge: "premised on notions of complexity, respect, reciprocity and responsibility – it involves restorative justice." (Kenway et al, 2006: 122, 115; Kuokkanen, 2007; Waitangi Tribunal, 2011). A good example of the revaluation of current policy which would be impelled by these considerations is the so-called "burden of an aging population", if that population were to be conceptualised and valued in terms of the gift and survival economies, and if intergenerational relations within the institution of the family were understood to be as crucial to the sustaining of society over time as are society's cultural institutions.

Because of the present marginalising in public policy of those cultural institutions in democratic societies which most provide for and represent the extraordinary richness and diversity of human minds and lives in time and place, making this connection between them and the family as a multi-generational institution demonstrates clearly the impoverished conceptions of democracy which currently characterise the priorities governing western democracies. While globalised information systems appear to have in principle made global knowledge globally available, and scientific research appears to have made universally valid knowledge in principle universally accessible, an education state will recognise that knowledge and innovation are locally grounded in its citizens. Gibbons writes that innovation "remains a local phenomenon and serves as a constant reminder that globalization turns on differences in the sentiments of a population, in its particular institutional structures that are designed to achieve collective purposes, and in the cultures that give meaning and value to the decisions taken. As societies differ in their various historically endowed modes and capabilities, they will imitate, adapt and diffuse knowledge solutions differently" (Gibbons, 2004: 97). The sources of learning for innovation must be heterogeneous, multimodal, critical, engaging many kinds of knowledge in the way these are engaged in the network structures of fictional narrative or hypertext rather than the formal structures of traditional textbooks or bureaucratic policy documents.

If the local haunts the universal, the family haunts social policy, crime haunts the legitimate economy, and the "social network 'swarm'" (Hartley, 2012: 47) haunts expert knowledge, teaching also haunts research. Research-based innovation is highly valued, but the role of teaching as a powerful means of generating new knowledge and initiating innovation, especially innovation leading to new social and cultural forms and practices and sustaining civil society, is not. For the Canadian Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences (2004: 18-19), "Teaching is the most prolific form of knowledge dissemination. […] In the classroom, professors can and must exhibit the values of living in a free and open society of critical discourse and mutual respect."[28] The concept of engagement as applied to higher education institutions gives priority less to supranational linkages in research than to the complex of social relations which become visible when a tertiary institution conceives of its research and teaching in its local context

(Fitzgerald et al, 2012: 231-232; Levine, 2007: 261-262; Shellard and Craig, 2012), an orientation consistent with the practices of schools when they are freed to attend to the educational needs of their localities rather than locking them into globalised standards regimes[29]. It also foregrounds the relation between teacher and learner as an ethical relation between singular minds in a specific place and time, the classroom being a critical site in which the principles of democracy can and should be acquired and experienced first hand. In this respect, the classroom can exemplify democratic governance in practice as Bevir (2010: 272-273) has described it, a place in which learning how to do it is practiced using the resources each person brings to the classroom: "the possibility of local reasoning and situated agency entail a creativity that means rules, norms, and institutional and social trajectories are contingent and contested. An emphasis on culture and agency […] may give us hope for a pluralist and representative democracy built around diverse openings and support for citizens to develop voice, enter dialogues, and rule themselves." The terms used by Kenway et al to characterise the survival economy- respect, reciprocity and responsibility – are clearly critical protocols framing the social process of entering into dialogue with others and echo Carr's conception of the mode of engagement required for productive and mutually enhancing conversation, of which teaching is a distinctive mode and democratic governance, nationally and internationally, is its most complex form.

From another perspective, Raboy, Bernier, Sauvageau, and Atkinson point out that "Traditional cultural practices, mass-mediated communication, and public education have become intertwined, through networks of communication and information resources which are also fundamental to global commerce. […] The omnipresence of mass-media and their capacity for instantaniety confers on them a special status with regard to the exercise of citizenship and democratic public life" (1994: 39). No cultural policy can now ignore the issue of ownership of mass media content and the channels through which it is disseminated, given the critical function of these media in the transmission of cultural knowledge and the operation of postmodern societies. Through the same channels can flow both global and local knowledge; what the ratio between them might be is a function of the ownership and economic role of the channels. If media policy were to be firstly part of cultural policy, the role of the media in facilitating and

sustaining cultural transmission and hence civil society would be foregrounded. Their role in education and democratic life would be a function of the distinctive characteristics of those dimensions of society, rather than being defined by commercial models and interests. Their role in innovation, besides innovations in their own modes and forms of operation, would be, for example, not primarily to project images of New Zealand to New Zealanders to secure a national identity and to the world to brand products[30] which otherwise might not be easily differentiated from others on the world market, but to provide as much access as possible to a national conversation the content of which is what New Zealanders are thinking and doing about the future of New Zealand as a specific site of cultural innovation.

6. The public sector, and public value, in the e ducation state

Human societies can deal more productively with changing circumstances if their members can participate in the on-going evaluation and discussion of goals, values, models and beliefs as a collective conversation. To be effective, this conversation needs to be open to and include all the agencies and institutions of a society, at all of its levels, and it is the means by which people and groups differentiated by history, culture and degrees of social power can negotiate their on-going relations. At the centre of such a process in a democracy are two agents: the informed citizen who acquires self-knowledge and social responsibility in a variety of interrelated contexts - family, locality, work, leisure, culture, society, education, economy, nation – which are now penetrated as never before by global influences; and the institutions of government. For both agents, these contexts are dynamic, unstable and productive of destructive crises as well as constructive social innovation. The knowledge relevant to effective governance – by which I mean understanding societies in action and assisting their constructive and purposeful evolution - is diverse and no single discipline or method or agency can assume priority over any other.[31] But a key actor in these processes is the informed citizen in his or her role as a public sector official, a singular location of cultural knowledge acting in collaboration with others

to propose ways of thinking through the deep challenges any society faces in attempting to become a better version of itself.

Government is an institution of institutions, a system of systems, a network of networks, with singular, embodied minds - rule-performing (and rule-abrogating), knowledge interpreting and socially transforming - providing its vital energies. It is a conventional critique of state bureaucracies that they are unimaginative, bound by conventions, inward-looking, distanced from the publics they are supposed to serve. But all institutions and organisations (public and private) are open to such a critique; so it is only from a private sector political and ideological perspective that public sector agencies can be supposed to be uniquely in need of reform. As Palmer (2013: 695) argues, the "four pillars on which the success of western societies was built are representative government, free markets, the rule of law and civil society. These institutions have deteriorated". This trend has to be reversed if twenty-first century democratic societies are to flourish rather than decline into deeply stratified societies in which wealth is the only measure of personal and social accomplishment.

It is not inevitable that the foundational public institutions of a democratic society should be constrained by inherent conservatism or party ideology; to serve effectively the interests of civil society, which are much broader than those of the market, requires an openness to a society's possible futures and a clear mandate to assess and make publicly accessible the kinds of knowledge on which competent and collective decision-making in a nation's interests depends.

Since it is also apparent that the private sector needs the public sector (public funds, regulation, social infrastructures of all kinds, from law to systems of exchange to public health and the security of citizens), it would clearly alter thinking about the purpose of government if state agencies, like all other public assets, were to be considered as a wellspring of social energy and collective knowledge, an early warning system anticipating the future and constituting the on-going possibility of the existence of a society and its markets in the same way that culture does. Innovation is not the special competence of the private sector, as policy formulation seems to assume; it is a competency of a special kind of society, one capable of

thinking through its heritage, its cultural diversity and its social values towards its possible futures and of enacting that thinking through representative institutions.

6.1 Public value

The downsizing of the public sector which has been such a marked feature of neoliberalism in action is itself an outcome of the pursuit of a mode of thinking which privileges private enterprise in its globalising, corporate form and the economic model intrinsic to it over the public domain, public institutions, local societies, economies and cultures. To limit the capabilities of public agencies, especially in those dimensions of the work of the state not directly involved with commerce or the military-industrial complex, and to divert public funds to private uses, strikes at the roots of the possibility of further evolution of forms of democratic social governance. The key role of public sector agencies, since it cannot be a role of the market, is to protect, nurture and continually interpret democratic principles so that elected governments make decisions with the best advice in the public interest and according to public preferences. Furthermore, as Benington (2011: 49) points out, "Governments, dictated by electoral cycles, inevitably tend to focus on the shorter term, but public managers also have a responsibility to focus on the longer-term public interest, and to act as guardians of the public sphere in the interest of future generations yet unborn." At present, as has been widely noted in this phase of neoliberal downsizing of the public sector, this guardianship responsibility has become limited to preventing risks to the tenure of the current political party or parties in power.

The work public sector agencies carry out is knowledge work, and its scope is the whole of society, the principles and practices by which it is governed at all levels, and the history and future of its evolution in a particular territory. Public sector agencies are placed at a critical intersection between global and local flows of knowledge and innovation, especially democratic social innovation (Kelly, Mulgan, and Muers, 2002: 5-6); one of their tasks, like that of a democratic society's universities, is to interpret world knowledge through the lens of a particular national community for its citizens to use. Their principal accountability should be to the public, through well-

defined and openly formulated conceptions of public value (Benington and Moore: 2011).

How this concept could be applied to the criteria for evaluation of public sector organisations in the United Kingdom was delineated in *Creating Public Value: An analytical framework for public service reform* (Kelly, Mulgan and Muers, 2002). It refers to the reciprocal nature of the relation between citizens and their government in a democratic society, noting that "The fact that public value can be produced as a joint effort between citizens and government is particularly salient for outcomes. Government alone cannot deliver lower crime and better health: social norms of behaviour are critical" (16). The key premise is that the value created by government is determined by citizens' preferences for trustworthy government, due process, and the quality of decision-making, and that those preferences are formed in immediate social relations with others and public debate about a society's goals. The report affirms that "Good government requires citizens and their representatives to continually revise shared values and objectives through a process of public deliberation" (7) and claims that "Recognition has grown that, in addition to well functioning markets, successful liberal democracies require strong and effective governments able to guarantee fair treatment, equal opportunities, access to a range of key services, and to act as a steward of a country's interests within and across generations" (5-6). From a perspective after the 2008 Global Financial Crash, this statement invokes hopefulness more than a progressively accomplished rebalancing; but it nonetheless states a critical difference between the political and official components of the democratic state. In particular, its inclusion of stewardship (or guardianship, "kaitiakitanga") requires a professional function and mindset which works in longer cycles and to different authorities than the electoral cycle. The report also observes that the creation of public value is not just the work of public sector agencies: "Voluntary and community associations, business and professional and citizen groups will all play a key role in the achieving the goals of public policy" (6).

The dimension of the work of government which is most complex, most political, and most directly linked to the humanities concerns cultural knowledge and moral values. Issues invoking these forms of knowledge are also the issues which most directly engage with citizens' conflicting

conceptions of their society's purposes and the inherited principles and values which provide continuity in the conduct of social living. *Creating Public Value* argues that "One of the most important but perhaps least tangible benefits produced by government involves the creation of social *norms*, codes of behaviour and laws. Government produces benefits by helping set the rules of the game for civil society. It does this in a number of ways: for instance by using its moral authority to reduce socially destructive forms of behaviour (avoiding drunk driving), promoting socially beneficial forms of behaviour (charitable donation) and giving legal recognition to private acts that generate public benefit (adoption)" (17). While this beneficial function can be a source of hope with respect to the functioning of the institutions governing democratic societies, not least that decisions by government are knowledgable formulations of the mind of the governed, each of the examples points to an ever present question: in whose interests is the moral authority of the state exercised? This question has deep significance because the technocratic discourse of "evidence-based" decision making does not succeed in operating outside of the moral dimensions of any issue except by suppressing those dimensions.[32] Furthermore, the phrase "helping set the rules of the game for civil society" implies that a major (but not sole) responsibility of government is to define the boundaries of the meaning of the term civil in "civil society"; because those boundaries change over time, an education state would approach such change as a collectively conscious but not prescriptive process to be carried forward by education and learning in all its diverse forms. In both cases, whether the state is perceived to perform these functions on behalf of a powerful segment or of the whole society is critical to that society's ability to achieve constructive change. In the case of the whole society, it is also a test of the democratic credentials of a government. For Douzinas (2010: 70-71), "Politics is fast morphing into a type of market economics legitimized by humanistic moralism. As an economic operation, politics has become the terrain where negotiations and compromises are worked out, accounted for and aggregated between groups and classes that have accepted the overall social balance, distribution and inequality." In such a settlement, the powers of the state become coopted by and serve the interests of specific social sectors; challenging such a settlement has always been central to the struggle to extend democratic practice.

One sign of an orientation to public value is the commitment to open access to government information. The work of government is carried out by producing, evaluating and conserving data, information and knowledge about and on behalf of society and its citizens, ideally in their best interests and for their benefit. The public sector, in other words, at national and local levels, is in organisational terms the single most important creator of knowledge relevant to the state and conduct of a nation over time, and hence to the building of the nation's collective memory, as well as a source of information of immediate social and economic value. Archives New Zealand is formally charged with conserving and making accessible the national memory of the decisions and acts of government, but in performing this function it provides a valuable perspective on the knowledge work carried out by the public sector. Specifically, it is to be done on behalf of the public interest in the first instance, with the needs of the future as well as the present informing that work.

The facilitating of open access to government information is consistent with the view expressed by Jacques Derrida when he writes that there is "no political power without control of the archive, if not of memory. Effective democratization can always be measured by this essential criterion: the participation in and access to the archive, its constitution, and its interpretation" (1995: 4). The critical point for my purpose here is that an open and collectively built archive is associated with a fundamental characteristic of a certain kind of society, democratic society, which has been the goal (however contested) of social and political evolution in Western Europe for the past four centuries, and which is intimately linked with (but not subservient to) the evolution of a modern (and now postmodern) economy focussed on the creation, conservation and dissemination of knowledge, the city, industry and the exchange of goods and services.

The strangeness of open access as a public value is everywhere evidenced by the tendency of new regimes to attempt to return to a cultural ground zero through the destruction of languages, documents and objects storing and communicating foreign knowledge and values, whether in the contest over truth by religions and ideologies, or the contest over territory by states and empires. A local reminder that an open access system for government information requires new learning by citizens and government officials is

provided by a recent report of the Office of the Ombudsman on the operation of the Official Information Act.[33] It is also evidenced by the increasing pressure from states on journalists and media organisations to publish only officially scripted information. By contrast, a broadcasting system which emphasises public value would move in exactly the opposite direction. As Horner and Hutton (2011: 113) put it, "public value broadcasting, instead of mainly measuring audience ratings, would foster cultured and knowledgable viewers and listeners, whose judgments would be included in the assessment of performance and public value added."

6.2 Knowledge

Stuart Cunningham (1994, 6} has observed of public sector officials that "Often they are the most knowledgeable and canny of anyone on issues needing public debate and publicity, but cannot themselves initiate, or be seen to initiate, such debate. […] The speaking position of the academic as an independent researcher and commentator in this context has strategic value for the commissioners and users of cultural policy studies, however much of these findings are then redeployed as pawns in the four dimensional game that is policy formation and implementation." His distinguishing between the (relative) institutional freedom of the academic to speak in public and the more limiting institutional protocols governing officials makes an important point while also linking them professionally as equals in espect of their modes of engagement with knowledge.

But the recent move to require public sector organisations to supply advice conforming to the political convictions of a party in government fails to acknowledge the latter attribute and is absolutely destructive of the rationale of the public sector in a democratic society. The work carried out by public sector organisations, as with universities, is funded by the public to meet a need which members of the public cannot meet for themselves, which is the creation, acquisition and evaluation of the best available knowledge for thinking about the present state and situation of the nation and its future possibilities. The array of public sector organisations and agencies divides the I-space differently from the array of a university's disciplines; the latter are oriented towards the global context of knowledge work, whereas the former give institutional form to a nation's political and cultural history, its

distinctive social evolution and its on-going (re)interpretation. Having two strong but differently oriented institutional formations focussed on knowledge work in the national interest is productive when each engages with the other on the common ground of the nation's future.

It is not surprising that, by dissociating universities from the public sector and trying to treat them as corporations, the role of the public sector in the creation of a knowledge society appropriate to a nation of New Zealand's size and capabilities has become almost entirely obscured. It is remarkable that, in all of the policy documents and reports that I have read by government agencies aimed at implementing knowledge society conceptions, their role has never been discussed. In both kinds of institution the dominance of risk and mechanisms for absorbing it have exercised a predominantly conservative effect on their productive work on behalf of the people of New Zealand, in the evaluation of global knowledge and its relevance to New Zealand, new knowledge creation, and advice to government at all levels. The displacement of the public by the Minister as the client for public sector services has had a particularly limiting effect.

Rather than downsizing the public sector as the only goal, a new model of the public sector relevant to its actual importance for a small nation like New Zealand as a first-world, democratic society needs to be formulated and change based on it. In my view, the public sector is critical (perhaps much more than in other, larger societies) in the nation's capacity to keep up with the flows of new knowledge in which it is enmeshed but lacks a larger nation's capacity to assess. It has been recurrently observed[34] that the New Zealand public, through the government, provides a disproportionate percentage of the funds for new knowledge creation. I believe that this state of affairs is endemic and will not change because of New Zealand's history, remoteness and small scale on every measure. This is only the most obvious area in which the role of the public sector as the principal national means of creatively adapting to these inherent limitations must be reassessed.

Like a university, the public sector taken as a whole constitutes a fundamental part of a society's knowledge resources and the expertise required for their application to human and environmental betterment, and the way that the whole spectrum of knowledge is divided among its various agencies is

directly related to the understanding of public priorities and values among those responsible for their administration and effectiveness. New Zealand lacks a national university and will never be able to afford one (except, perhaps, by turning its competing academic corporations into a multi-campus institution). But, at the national level, government ministries are chartered with the responsibility to think nationally, and to advise the nation through the government of the day and through open access provisions about how New Zealand can best position itself in order to maintain and advance those social and economic attributes necessary to retain and further develop its self-conception as a first-world, democratic society. Very little, if any, of this work can or will be done by the private sector, and yet effective development of the economy by business depends on having access to this more broadly conceived knowledge. Other countries deal in part with this matter through an array of think tanks located across the political spectrum (but still more typically aggregated on the right-wing side of that spectrum because that is where their financing mostly originates) and civil society organisations. Just as New Zealand lacks the private sector funding for research, so it lacks that sector‘s funding for a spread of think tank organisations representative of the political spectrum. The only set of institutions with the potential to serve this purpose in New Zealand is to be found in the public sector. But to think this way is also to reframe some of the current assumptions about the role of the public sector, and the relation between the public sector and the government.

No longer is the human person the representative figure of the democratic state, however strongly ancient totalitarian or absolutist self-conceptions are persistently re-discovered by modern rulers; instead, technocratic organisation and regulation displaces any personification with textual abstraction, even if its structures and processes are constantly undermined by the human surplus of perception, motivation, belief, and knowledge brought by those whose vitality inhabits the apparatuses of government and gives them their semblance of life. Bevir (2010: 272) has argued that “An emphasis on culture and agency encourages us to explore the diverse meanings and traditions embodied in governance, revealing its contingent, contested, and complex trajectories. Following this line of thought brings into the foreground the distinctive cultural practices which are manifested in the relations between persons in some organisations, and the productive surplus

which officials bring into their work." Their being singular minds and nodal points in networks, exceeding any organisational rule because they, like the organisations themselves, inhabit the I-space as a networked cognitive space constituted by multiple formations and diverse linkages, is the actual source of the possibility of innovation in public sector agencies. The singular mind is always already interactive with and substantially informed by the collective mind of humanity and its multitudinous fractions, which intersect uniquely in that mind and locally in diverse kinds of civil society group formations where claims to know and understand the human situation in that place and universally are made.[35] The effects of combining and permuting world knowledge in a specific time and place are unpredictable and the primary source of all kinds of innovation, as well as all kinds of reduction and restriction, depending on whether it is public or private, democratic or autocratic, interests which frame decision-making in a particular group, community or nation.

In principle as well as in fact there should be no restriction of the kinds of knowledge which inform government; all kinds of knowledge can and should be informing public decision-making. But such openness to the whole of public thought requires time, real consultative processes by people educated to listen before speaking and both free and willing to look beyond the already known and taken for granted. In a system of government under pressure by narrow time frames, a hegemonic knowledge system privileging the techno-sciences, urgent demands by powerful economic interests, and a media system increasingly obedient to those interests (Laurens, 2015), it is hardly surprising that so much official talk about innovation and creativity merely circulates the policy currency of the time. As I have argued throughout, to think about innovation and creativity as a foundation for postmodern democratic social and economic development requires an extraordinary (impossible?) widening of the frame within which public policy thinking is now constrained. If it is foreign to current conventional thinking in law and modern humanities to understand legal work and humanistic knowledge as founded in and creative of fiction, how much more will that be the case in a government for which valid knowledge is that produced only by techno-scientific methods?

Public policy has to acknowledge overtly the moral complexities embedded in public decision-making, the way in which moral positions which are good in the abstract clash with one another between people and in the same person depending on the situation requiring assessment and decision, the group(s) to which people belong, their socio-economic positioning, and different cultural histories. Policy making is thus a rhetorical process of evaluating and negotiating arguments being made with different kinds of knowledge, from different positions in society; it is enmeshed in power relations, governmental, bureaucratic, and interest group. In an education state it would be practised as an educative process, part of the larger engagement of expertise with public knowledge as a mutual activity of reciprocal learning – the expert from the public's experience, the public from the expert's formal knowledge – with the aim of diminishing the distorting effect of power as much as possible. The process remains rhetorical because, even if public agreement can be accomplished on the facts or the truth of an issue of public importance there is unlikely to be only one conception of what might be the appropriate response to that knowledge and hence one simple formulation of public policy. For example, the fact of poverty or of crime is hardly disputed, but what should be done about the fact in either case is an intensely political, value-laden question. The best any democratic society can do is ensure through the means available to it that all citizens have access to the sources for forming an adequate understanding of the issues (that is, learning) and of shaping a public agreement through the appropriate forms and levels of government. The widespread cynicism about the point of participating in consultation processes as a citizen points to one aspect of the complex reality of life in a democratic society, that the knowledge – formal, informal and tacit - professed by a citizen is, in its unique formation as self-consciousness, experienced as differentiating that person from all others. The task for responsible democratic governance is to respect that difference in all of its levels and processes while ensuring that, because there can never be complete collective agreement on any issue, the established forms of public decision-making are also respected. It is obvious that such an approach does not sit comfortably with the current (and one-sided business) focus of government on resolving short-term economic issues along preset party lines.

The public sector policy writer is also positioned as a participant, not a neutral observer or recorder, making a claim to some expert knowledge, but

also responsible to the diverse publics that state bureaucracies in a democracy are supposed to represent. The policy writer's task is clearly different from the Member of Parliament's task, even though both are responsible for representing public opinion; in crucial respects it is a heavier responsibility because the policy writer is required to take into account the fact of political differences while attempting to provide the best formulation of an issue derived from all the knowledge from both expert and public sources. It cannot therefore be the responsibility of public sector agencies to present policy which already conforms to the political views of the governing party/ies; bureaucratic advice should be interpreted politically by the government and argued out in Parliament. Not least because the public sector is funded by the public, its officials should have as their primary responsibility the formulation of the best accounts relevant to an issue as it manifests itself in the distinctive context of a particular nation or region, so that the public is fully informed about what is at stake in the decisions to be taken.[36] In this way, public sector agencies assume their true importance in association with the tertiary sector as sifters, evaluators and disseminators of world knowledge on behalf of their publics, a critical function especially for small nations immersed in the global flows of new knowledge.

This account of the role of public sector policy-making assumes conceptions of care for and comprehensive understanding of the distinctive characteristics of a specific nation-state, and of a separation of powers between officials and the government in Parliament which allows full access to the public of relevant knowledge for decision-making on the public's behalf while at the same time ensuring that a decision to act on behalf of the nation remains in Parliament. But making public sector agencies subordinate to the political interests of the parties for the time in government means that decision-making based on the best accounts of available knowledge is deeply compromised, and the public interest in good government on behalf of the public is side-lined. Decisions and actions on behalf of a nation's citizens can never be taken without being framed by their values and histories; but these, too, need to be made explicit, and Parliament is the national site for the temporary resolution of their differences in a decision to act at a specific moment on a specific issue. However, the time-frame for decision-making in a state should be much longer than the timeframe for decision-making in the market, although it is the latter which currently determines the former and

also explains why so much new law fails to accomplish what was claimed for it. A public of citizens in a democracy cannot become educated in respect of new issues facing them in the shorthand way a public of consumers in a market can become "educated" by advertising.

In so far as a role of the state is regulation of society on behalf of its citizens, it will always be under pressure by interest groups whose time-frame for decisions is short. This situation imposes an even greater responsibility on public sector agencies to provide informed frameworks for thinking (at local, regional and national levels of government) which can anticipate short-term demands and locate them within broader public agreements about the longer-term directions and aims for the society.[37]

7. Law, humanities and democracy to come

From early in the development of the Humanities Society and formalised in the Research Policy (1996), the conception of the humanities included law, even though most lawyers (academic and in practice) would not have considered such a claim of much value. Although it had remained usual at my university for students graduating in Law to study for a Bachelor of Arts degree as well, the traditional humanities core of the BA had come to include the Social Sciences, and it is now increasingly common for degrees in Commerce, Information Technology and Science to complement the Law degree. So the creation of the field of Law and the Humanities at roughly the same time was another sign for the times, as the traditional links between the study of law and of the humanities had been diluted and other knowledges of greater perceived value, especially economics, were taking the place of the traditional humanities disciplines. It was clearly not that Law was, like the humanities, becoming marginal as a mode of knowledge in postmodern democratic societies. Quite the opposite. It was and is providing the critical technology for managing competitive relations in global and local markets, generating wealth, governing behaviour between persons, organisations and states, and creating supranational bodies.

I have in Chapter Two set out the basis for reconstituting an ancient association between the law and the traditional modes of European learning

which founded the humanities in the textual character of the objects created as laws and the processes by which they are interpreted and re-written under the pressure of changing contexts of reading and decision-making. But, as this section will demonstrate, this position can only be a starting point. By itself, as Milton noted in the epigraph to Chapter Three, writing laws accomplishes very little. For laws to affect social practices in the ways intended by the lawmakers, they must be understood, consented to, and open to amendment from critique and experience by an informed population; or they must be backed by force. The latter option is the default position everywhere, not least because the urgency to make laws is quite incompatible with the time needed for understanding and evaluating their meaning and implications. Public understanding of the law becomes unimportant when lawmaking serves predominantly the immediate interests of social elites.[38] One of the distinguishing marks of an education state would be that its approach to lawmaking would be a public, educative and fully consultative process (what might be called "slow law").

The proper complexity of the issues raised by rethinking together the law and the humanities is explored and presented in a very important and substantial collection of essays which engages all of the critical lines of thought with which I am concerned. In *Law and the Humanities: An Introduction* the editors present the collection as a review of a field of enquiry the beginnings of which were marked by the inauguration of the *Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities* in 1988. Several of the authors offer accounts of the evolution of the humanities, (Douzinas, 2010: 49-51; Sarat, Anderson, and Frank, 2010: 2-11; Shoemaker, 2010: 522); but one statement in particular brings together in a sentence the twin issues of the nature of knowledge in the humanities and the law, and the changing terms on which knowledge is currently valued in government and business. Winter (2010: 101) proposes that "[Humanities scholarship's] methodological commitment to an interpretive conception of 'truth' as that which emerges from the complex of human meaning, purpose, and goals places it beyond the facile objectivity of the more technical discourses that dominate legal studies today." The latter point is made bluntly in the Introduction, where the editors reiterate a foundational motive for developing the field, that is, "a self-consciously programmatic response to the pervasive influence of law and economics. (Today we would add empirical legal studies)" (Sarat, Anderson, Frank,

2010: 13). The editors of the first issue of the Journal tied the law very firmly into a reciprocal relation between the law, society and culture: "The study of law must be informed by an examination of the socio-cultural narratives that shape legal meaning and empower legal norms; conversely, the study of culture requires an understanding of the law as a normative edifice and coercive system" (quoted by Sarat, Matthew and Frank, 2010: 9).

In this double perspective, the law is like the humanities in its concern with the articulating of norms in cultural settings, but it is distinguished from the humanities by the power invested in it by the state to enforce the norms its language objectifies, including on the state itself, through the justice system (Sherwin, 2010: 268). This capacity aligns it with the dominant discourse of the state, the technoscientific knowledge system and its technologies for producing reality as such. But its likeness to the humanities is further emphasised by the nature of its relation to the worlds of human thought and action, both textually and, more specifically, through media narrative. Here the analysis of these legal scholars directly connects with my distinction between modern humanities, for which history and philosophy are the exemplary disciplines, and postmodern humanities, in which media studies (and the theory and fictionality of media texts) has become in principle if not in effect the exemplary instance of the humanities. The basis for this misrecognition is precisely observed by Winter (2010: 102) when he contrasts the always already and now intensively mediated relation between humanity and reality with what could be described as a Western cultural obsession with asserting the transparency of the media screen: "After the linguistic, hermeneutic, and cultural turns of the twentieth century, the idea of an unmediated reality to which we have direct and accurate access should seem like the kind of primitive belief that the West once reflexively imputed to 'less civilized' societies. Yet everywhere one turns, this kind of fundamentalism seems to characterize the times in which we live." It goes to the heart of the politics of knowledge (by which the humanities are disempowered in relation to the state) as well as to the function of law, as Douzinas connects them: "Humanity is now described in scientific terms, whereas the normative realm has been entrusted almost exclusively to law in the form of regulation. Law is no longer the form or the instrument, the tool or restraint of power; it has started turning into the very operation, the substance of power (2010: 70). All advanced knowledge work now faces this co-

option by the (corporate) state; but the law is uniquely integral to the articulation and projection of the power of the state in a democratic society.

In other words, in this unavoidable relation to the state both the institution of the law and the institution of the university are caught up in a dynamic relation to power which is marked by the scope of judicial freedom to decide a question, on the one hand, and academic freedom to decide a question, on the other, and by the social standing of each institution. The critical test is the extent to which the exercise of freedom to decide conserves the status quo or permits more of the "to-come", the potential of the future, to be realised and made available to conscious thought. For the latter to be the case, the state also must be oriented in its operation to the "to-come", not in the temporally and socially limited sense of market futures but in the more fundamental sense of democracy and humanity "to-come". As Douzinas puts the contrast, "Humanity has no foundation and no ends. Its metaphysical function lies […] in the incessant surprising of the human condition and its exposure to an undecided open future. Humanity exists as an endless process of redefinition and the necessary but impossible attempt to escape external determination. This speculative humanity can, however, only come forth in conflict with a subjugating legal Humanism and a civilizing Humanities that divide and discipline" (2010: 71). This contrast is otherwise captured in Derrida's distinction between calculation in legal decision-making, which repeats established formulae, and just decision-making, which is open to the difference in each situation requiring decision: "Each case is other, each decision is different and requires an absolutely unique interpretation, which no existing, coded rule can or ought to guarantee absolutely" (1992: 23). The editors of *Law and the Humanities* enlarge upon this distinction in a way which is directly applicable to the humanities as well when they write that, "When confronted with [law's fragmentariness, inconsistencies, incommensurabilities, and attendant uncertainties] and with all the moral pressures of adjudication, the temptation is great to shirk the burden of judgment and displace the locus of responsibility onto the language of law itself, to empty law of its meaning and conceive of legal judgment as the impersonal, methodological enactment of a linguistic form, a mere procedure" (5). An excellent example of not shirking the burden of judgment is the 1992 Mabo case concerning indigenous land rights in Australia, where the High Court's decision removed the historical foundation of colonisation

in the *terra nullius* principle justifying the appropriation of Aboriginal land and marked "the beginning of the sharing of justice and citizenship."[39]

There are three specific issues in the relation between law and a new humanities which I want to take up.

7.1. Singularity

The first is the recognition of singularity rather than repetition in legal decision-making, on which justice is founded. Douzinas writes that justice should operate "in relation to the other as a singular, unique, finite being with concrete personality traits, character attributes, and physical characteristics. This finite person puts me in touch with infinite otherness. Both inside and outside, justice is the horizon against which the law is judged for its routine successes and failings and for its broader neglect and forgetting of oppression and domination." Put most succinctly, the axiom of justice is "respect the singularity of the other" (Douzinas, 2010: 61)[40], which also states the ethic informing both textual analysis and critique in the humanities and the diverse conversations through which the outcomes of textual work are disseminated and critiqued. Even though this work is conducted within the frameworks of tradition, disciplinary formations, and political and cultural collectivities, James Boyd White affirms of legal thought and argument what I would also affirm of knowledge work in the humanities and any use of humanistic knowledge, "that there is – or should be –always an individual mind behind whatever is said and responsible for it" (2006: 44). The insistence throughout *Law and the Humanities* that the law is not an internally consistent body of true knowledge, progressively augmented, but a fractured body constantly being repaired and taken apart again, because its texts exist in relation to an always changing set of historical, political and cultural circumstances, applies equally to the humanities – and is constitutive of work in the new or postmodern humanties. All of the relations which found this conception of the law and the humanities, however some of their contexts of application and practice differ, is brought together in a single, long and eloquent paragraph in White's *Living Speech*:

> With respect to the facts, the lawyer is constantly brought to face the world outside the language of the law; the world of physical and

> emotional experience, inherently inexpressible - the pain of a broken arm, or a broken marriage, or a broken career – and the world defined by other languages, from science to psychology to economics to geography, each of which has its own domain and way of functioning, different from the law's. The lawyer must find a way to talk about the world of human experience, and the worlds created by multiple human languages, in the places and language of legal speech. This always involves a process of translation that is inherently imperfect; a large part of his or her art is the recognition of that imperfection and the discovery of a way to proceed notwithstanding. In all of this the law and the lawyer are resisting the claims of people, languages, and institutions alike that they have self-sufficient ways of describing the worlds and living within it that will work for all times and purposes – authoritarian systems of thought and life that cannot be questioned. Every case is new, and presents an opportunity to imagine it in new ways; to this end one calls upon other ways of talking, other languages, new perceptions and understandings, and one's own experience of life. Every case presents an opportunity for the judge or lawyer to call his reader into a fuller life of thought and imagination and feeling, all with the object of achieving justice - not for all time, but for this time, in the knowledge that in the next case it will have to be done again. (2006: 217-218).

In effect, this account of an ethic of professional speaking and social responsibility should apply across the board, in any relationship between expert and citizen. It is clearly of fundamental importance in the work of government officials and teachers, a core ethic for an education state founded on cultural policy. This cannot be the case in a society dedicated to concepts like efficiency and profit.

7.2. Fictionality

I have argued in Chapter Two that the traditional binaries used to value kinds of modern knowledge - fact/fiction; truth/lie; objective/subjective; reality/imagination - have been abolished in postmodernity by the irruption

of the excluded middle, the materiality of media technologies and the sign systems which together objectify collective knowledge in texts and memory systems and make its heterogeneity both inescapable and socially and culturally productive.

An important section of *Law and Humanities*, "Imagining the Law", attends to the relation between the law and media texts, not only through the regulatory and property rights dimensions of media law or for the ways in which the law and legal practice are represented in various narrative genres - film, novel, television – but by arguing for a more profound similarity between them. Heinzelman (2010: 215) argues that "legal discourse is riven with the fictional, understood as a mode of representing the relation between quotidian reality and its legal version because, like the novel, legal discourse relies on narrative and its interpretation as a form of knowledge" and affirms that it is "now generally accepted that the law is not simply a technique or a body of objective knowledge, but is, like the novel, a distinctive way of representing the world. The interpretation of laws, as well as legal practices and the role of law in constructing a just society, are open to debate and, like literature, are subject to those laws (ethical and aesthetic) that govern imagined realities" (240)". The phrase "imagined realities" is a significant repositioning of the connotations of the term fiction, the work of the imagination being to bring physical reality within the scope of human ethical and aesthetic commitments and values by means of representations which conserve its otherness as external to consciousness while constituting the shared content of perception. It is not the perception of reality which is brought into question, but an incompleteness in knowledge. A television series like *Castle,*[41] by pairing a writer of detective fiction with a detective, proposes that there is a seamless relationship between the conventions of realist narrative fiction and any citizen's conception of everyday real life, the (usually invisible) media work of writing creating a fictional copy of that imagined reality. What it may not propose is that the common factor linking the invented story with ordinary life is the human capacity for fiction, in the internalised cultural conceptions of reality which constitute common sense, from time to time and place to place, and in the ability to plot alternative pasts and futures represented by the imaginable narratives deriving from the mental position created by asking "what if?" and by the imminence of possible futures. Both the writer and the criminal are engaged in plotting,

each aiming to give shape to an as yet undetermined future; but in the story the criminal's actions in shaping that future are not permitted to escape the larger framing of social order by the novel, the television programme episode or the law. Knowledge derived from prior experience and situatedness, and the complex webs of relationships which constitute the social world, together make possible both the singular act which crosses the line between private and public spheres, disrupts law and social order and, when detected, transforms the citizen into a criminal, and the line of enquiry by which the detective (in this series in collaboration with the writer) constructs the singular, true narrative of that act.

Pervasive representation of the law in terms of realist conventions, especially in television, creates expectations about the law and its operation which citizens then bring to bear on situations in which they become legal actors, for example, as jurors. Lee (2010: 273) goes so far as to argue that "television conventions (domestic forum, viewer participation, short form, and repetition) have paved the way for juries/viewers to expect the same combination of drama and resolution in actual legal proceedings", so that such proceedings then function "as a reasonable model for the televisual conventions – conventions that, although fictitious, do respond to an actual wish of viewer/citizens to live within a sound social frame" (274). This is in one respect an instance of "the map preceding the territory", so that the framing or design of social reality (the conventions according to which social reality is for the time collectively constituted) is not simply determined by a given actuality. Instead, at the core of the relation between social reality and fiction (another excluded middle) is the citizen's "wish", the individual and/or collective motivation to realise a preferred, imagined but possible form of living which is now shaped and directed by society's media systems throughout the human life span as the role of the family or education has diminished.

If a television series like *The Good Wife* (2009-2016) represents "law's fragmentariness, inconsistencies, incommensurabilities, and attendant uncertainties" (Sarat, Matthews and Frank, 2010: 5) by interacting the settings of courtroom, law firm, government, the military, business, media, and domestic life and embedding them all in politics, the currently more typical trajectory of television representations of criminal acts and their

resolution does not terminate in the dialogic setting of the courtroom; the conclusive identification of the perpetrator is accomplished by the detective or the secret agent using scientific and other real world knowledge. The case is solved (and justice done, and the episode ended) when the criminal or terrorist is correctly identified by the detective and the facts of the case are explained in the form of the (only) true narrative of what happened. As Capretini (1983: 147) puts it, "Crime brings disorder. The traces of a crime bring confusion into the transparent (until then, anyway) sphere of reality." All of technoscience, but now especially networked ICTs (as an active and visible agent), can be marshalled in the pursuit of the criminal; forensic science and digital technologies provide the primary information required to construct the true narrative, which also serves to restore coherence and transparency to social reality. The structure and meaning of the original Sherlock Holmes stories, which promoted an ideology of scientific rationality as an infallible means for discovering the truth in human affairs as long as the observing, analysing and synthesising "instrument" of the detective's mind was not distorted in any way, is thus intensified by the development of forensic science and digital technologies as encyclopedic prostheses[42] which, correspondingly, reduce dependence on the singular instrument of the detective's own mind and provide authoritative knowledge. But this distribution of capacity to technoscience does not obviate the more critical aspect of singularity; however repetitive the narrative arc of each story/episode, the skill of the detective lies in making the right selection from his or her unique knowledge resources and applying them perceptively and interpretively to explaining a unique happening (this crime), which is also to constitute as an event in reality a web of relations linking times, places and persons in a true narrative.

It is important to highlight this aspect of the process of solving a crime because it identifies a structure relating knowledge and experience in the social reality of the crime story which is repeated in the difference between the methods of the sciences and the humanities. However powerful the "CSI effect" [43], the process of reasoning is neither inductive nor deductive; as Harrowitz (2010: 182) wrote in arguing that Holmes' mode of reasoning can be more properly described as abductive, "Abduction is the step between a fact and its origin; the instinctive, perceptual jump which allows a subject to guess an origin which can then be tested out to prove or disprove the

hypothesis." Capretini provides a further interpretation of the term when he writes that abduction is "based on a single fact, which sometimes presents itself as an enigma, something unexplainable: at this point the observer postulates a hypothesis, that is, he puts an idea into reality by asking himself if it can be demonstrated. […] Pierce insisted on induction's lack of originality, opposing to it the creative character of the hypotheses generated by abduction. This recalls the Holmesian motif of *imagination* […]" (2010: 142). Brier (2008: 114) has argued that abduction is "the ability to produce meaningful interpretations from a variety of experiences based on a mixture of perceptions and memories." All of these characteristics of a mode of reasoning productive of new knowledge in and of culture and social reality are equally descriptive of knowledge work in the humanities. All that one needs to do is substitute "text" for "fact" in Horowitz's and Capretini's accounts, and to emphasis the generative quality of this mode of thinking, which is neatly summarised by Capretini's phrase, "he puts an idea into reality by asking himself if it can be demonstrated." This is the originary move in the creation of narrative fiction in its modality of imagined reality, as it is in the production of meaning by interpretation. In more speculative fiction and poetry, the only requirement is that it can be written. For a new humanities, reality includes the semiosphere, its heterogeneous mixing of times, places, ideas and forms, and its complex interweaving with and of cultural, social and material reality. By contrast, Holmes, like a modern scientist, sees through texts rather than with them.

Heinzelman's linking of the novel and the law through their creating imagined realities is brilliantly confirmed by the representation of the complex and ambiguous functioning of the law in contemporary American society in William Gaddis's novel *A Frolic of His Own* (1994), in which social reality is anything but transparent and the law provides the principal form of resistance to its centrifugal or heterogeneous characteristics. But the law does not stand outside or above, like a statue of Justice or an institution like the Supreme Court; instead, it is woven through social relations and individual subjectivities as knowledge, discourse and practice, available as a weapon or a dialogic means of negotiation and mediation, its concepts and rules however understood playing an active role in every dimension of human relations, but especially the financial and the constitutional. Gaddis reveals the complexity of this discursive weaving at every moment of the

novel, which immerses its reader in the flows of conversation between characters generated by the self-consciousness, knowledge and experience of, and negotiations between, singular minds singularly positioned in a shared social reality. One example is part of a conversation between a lawyer, Harry, and his wife, Christina:

> […] Teen, how could we know it would all turn into such a…
> — Harry, could you…
> — No.
> — But you haven't even…
> — I said no Christina. Don't get me into it. Better watch out yourself too when she said she may need you.
> — She just means my moral sup…
> — If she's going to court she needs a witness. You were with her?
> — At the clinic? I had to go with her Harry. I mean you never know what's going to happen at a place like that and of course it did, this nicely dressed young man in rimless glasses suddenly stepping up and throwing catsup on her fur coat, something about spilling innocent blood God knows what he was, animal rights or rights to life, it was quite unnerving.
> — Probably both, and the gun lobby thrown in. You mean she had the abortion.
> — That's why she's terrified of going to prison, you heard her. This frightful boy demanding his paternal rights as though she were some kind of brood cow, she'd literally found him on the street picking up cigarette butts and pulling newspapers out of trashcans so she invited him to dinner and the police called just as they were siting down. He'd stolen a book from a bookstore to bring her as a gift, some science fiction nonsense about people living under water, he kept telling them it was his book, he meant he'd written it there was his name on the cover but the price of books is so appalling these days he obviously couldn't afford it but of course they couldn't see it that way till she went down there herself and ordered fifty copies to calm them down. Now he's ready to send her to prison for murdering his child. His child!
> — Nobody's going to send her to prison, certainly make the world safer for democracy if they did but she'll probably just be cited for

contempt and fined, a good healthy one if she shows up in those diamonds. What was she doing at a public clinic?
— She could hardly go to her own hospital, I mean not while she's suing them could she?
— You mean she's got one set of lawyers bringing this suit for foetal endangerment and another set to defend her abortion. No wonder they talk to each other.
— I suppose that's exactly why she has two sets. I mean this way she probably counts on winning one or the other after the lesson she learned losing that dreadful custody battle over T. J. she's still livid about it.
— But she won didn't she? Doesn't the boy live with her?
— That was the problem Harry, Neither of them wanted him. Of course the father paid through the nose for support and a trust fund, one of those quart a day louts in ostrich skin boots who owned most of downtown Lubbock till somebody shot him and she had to take his estate to court against six other paternity suits for a settlement. I mean that's hardly the case this time. God knows what this miserable boy thought he was up to, he's really not quite bright if you take a look at his book.
— Maybe just bright enough to figure if he got her pregnant she'd marry him, the inevitable divorce comes along and he ends up with the child and collects a bundle for its support. Like T. J. in reverse.
— Well you see you could help if you wanted to Harry, think about it, I mean of course he was planning something like that, he… (238-240)

What is wonderful about the writing of this novel is its constant representation of what to "think about it" signifies about being human, and how that mental action and its elaboration in conversation constantly links the most diverse domains of knowledge, imagination and experience in local transactions mixing understanding and social action, in which the law is an ever-present component. The novel as an imagined reality opens a cognitive space for exploration and enquiry into possible versions of reality, into what might have been or could be, as a critical part of the collective process of both achieving consensus about what is real and envisaging futures which provide templates for social action. As Heinzelman notes, fiction in this

sense is an integral component of legal thinking, in the interpretation of texts and construing the meaning of human actions.

7.3. Democracy to-come

The ground of innovation and creativity in law, as in the humanities, lies in the just interpretation of the singular text/event and its liberation of future possibilities for thought. The impulse to conserve, strong in both the law and the humanities and of great importance in ensuring that a society or nation maintains continuity over time with its cultural origins, can nonetheless serve to bind the thought of the present to its pasts rather than provide openings to its possible futures. We live under the hegemony of a progressivist ideology focussed on science and technology as the knowledges which matter, and yet we in democratic societies seem to have given up any progressivist belief in the further evolution of democracy or the amelioration of unequal social and economic inheritances. Central to any conception of democracy to come is the role of the law as both the guardian of the interpretation of a nation's constitution and the most direct medium through which its interpretation can be challenged, revised and renewed. In this way the law is both constitutive of the state and the means of its deconstruction. It is through the latter capability that the law can open a society to its possible futures, and specifically to the forms of democracy to come which it can realise in the practice of collective decision-making and the ongoing reform of the core institutions established for this purpose.

A previous Prime Minster of New Zealand, Sir Geoffrey Palmer, offers a particularly relevant discussion of law reform in a chapter in his autobiography, *Reform: A Memoir*. His argument also links to my larger case for an education state. Palmer notes that "Government is an endlessly iterative process" (2013: 601) while also observing the tendency for law reform reports to be neglected if they do not align with a government's political priorities. Put another way, this is to recognise that Parliament, as lawmaker, should produce texts which aim to clarify existing thought and practice or to modify it on the basis of the best knowledge through the power located in the structures of government. What is most significant about Palmer's account of the law reform process is that it blends expert knowledge and public experience with the end of ensuring that government

decision-making is based on a legal framework which is in touch with and responsive to public knowledge of the world as it is, and the complex ways in which that knowledge is interpreted by history and values. A political (party) perspective is only one among many informed perspectives on the state of society at any moment, and it is critical that the legal framework within which free citizens act and decide about the future development of their society is as relevant to their circumstances as possible. As Palmer shows, a public body mandated to test the adequacy of existing law and to explore recommendations for change outside the party political system by drawing on international and local research and extensive local public consultation can provide an important public service by creating openings to the future for public thought and increasing public awareness of the importance of the law-making work of Parliament. As he wrote, "the need for updating the law and keeping it in good repair is as great as ever" and, for this function to be performed effectively, Palmer affirms what I want to affirm for a new humanities: "Lawyers, legal educators and judges need to increase the range of their skills if they are to be successful law reformers" because, at the core of the process lies understanding of "the expectations and values of the community" (619); in other words, to make expert, formal knowledge relevant to informed practice in society as a whole is critical for the effective participation of expert knowledge in public conversation about the future of society and requires of the expert the same rhetorical skill that I have argued is required of the representatives of the academic humanities in their engagement with and promulgation of humanistic knowledge.

Palmer's view that Aotearoa New Zealand is most unusual among nation-states in not having a written Constitution adds a further important dimension to this conception of the text-based character of the law and its role in society. There is no objective or absolute basis on which a society or a state can be founded; the idea of a state and a nation exists and is sustained in the minds and experiences of its members, and the texts which record from time to time how those members represent their thought about themselves to themselves and the world. The moment of foundation is typically retrospectively validated, as Derrida has demonstrated and has been exemplified in Aotearoa New Zealand in the recovery of the Treaty of Waitangi more than a century after its signing.[44] Texts, especially the regulatory texts of the law, objectify this thought without being able to make

it permanent or their meanings invariant. This is a critical strength of text-based societies when the interpretation and revision of the texts which record the foundational principles, beliefs, histories and regulations framing common sense and giving order to social life is an on-going, socially inclusive process by which their meanings are adapted with deliberation to changing circumstances, knowledge and values; equally, however, that strength is dissipated when their interpretation is controlled by authoritarian institutions.

Douzinas observes that "life under the rule of law is more than an implied social contract; it is a structure of feeling, a way of being in the world, which reflects a rich, complex, and deeply embedded set of traditions and cultural practices" (2010: 71). This excellent summary of the underlying implications of this discussion of the law as an instance of the humanities at work in the world emphasises, as does Gaddis in his novel, that the law in democratic societies is not just a technical mystery into which a few are inducted, but is distributed throughout society as a form of common knowledge, a heritage, a part of democratic culture, an intrinsic element in the constitution of the selfhood of the democratic subject. Miller and Yudice (2002: 190) affirm that the "task of binding people to a polity" is constant; it is also, of course, never to be completed, not least because new generations have to learn why being bound matters and how each citizen can think and act freely in ways which contribute to the on-going reinvention of that polity by its members as a collective and negotiated project. The task, as I am arguing throughout, is educative in character and, as a first principle, must be sensitive to the singularity of minds, cultural histories, beliefs and long-term social goals. The more the "task of binding" is left to the policing and other coercive and surveillance arms of the state, the less that state can claim to be a democracy and the greater its failure over generations to govern justly on behalf of all of its people. Unlike the rest of the humanities, the law is directly involved in the governing of society; but to understand that the primary purpose of that involvement is the maintenance and extension of justice and the freedom of the citizen, and the responsible administration of political, economic, and cultural relations among citizens and the institutions of civil society is also to acknowledge that the law itself is framed by the question, what does it mean to be human?, and by the opening to possible futures which multiple possible answers to that question make available.

By placing the work of government, law, and the humanities in a democracy under the sign of justice, the complex dynamic between the singular citizen, the cultural knowledge and forms of social order developed over time and in a specific place, and the means by which that knowledge and those forms of order are adapted to changing circumstance and by the pressure of thought is made more explicit. As Derrida has demonstrated, a just decision crosses a threshold between the known and the unknown and so extends the scope of the knowable by its focus on the singular instance:

> for a decision to be just and responsible, it must, in its proper moment if there is one, be both regulated and without regulation: it must conserve the law and also destroy it or suspend it enough to have to reinvent it in each case, rejustify it, at least reinvent it in the reaffirmation and the new and free confirmation of its principle. Each case is other, each decision is different and requires an absolutely unique interpretation, which no existing, coded rule can or ought to guarantee absolutely. At least, if the rule guarantees it in no uncertain terms, so that the judge is a calculating machine, which happens, and we will not say that he is just, free and responsible (1992: 23).

We might also substitute "artist" or "humanist" for "judge"; their work of decision, whether judgment, artistic creation or textual interpretation, is to be evaluated according to the same criteria and the expectation that the agent of this work is "just, free and responsible" in its performance. And, as each of these practitioners is also a singular citizen, it is critical to democratic decision-making that the state should sustain the conditions necessary for "just, free and responsible" thought and action. The orientation of the education state towards the practice of justice in all of its institutions depends upon this humanistic conception of the role of the law and opens the way to democracy to-come.

8. Sites of Conversation

8.1 The Media System of an Education State

Just as the role of the public sector in New Zealand has been profoundly distorted and its importance to social and economic development deeply compromised by the reforms of the past thirty years, so has the role of the media. Media systems are fundamental social technologies, and the existence of "the public" is largely a function of the ability to access and use the communication channels available to citizens. Just as it is insufficient to evaluate public sector agencies on the basis of their contribution to economic activity, so it is necessary to ask in what ways the current media system of a democratic nation creates public value by facilitating and informing public conversation.

The capacity of New Zealanders historically to use world knowledge creatively was a function of the value placed on public education and the public library, two nationally dsitributed institutions constituting a media system. These were key elements in a democratic infrastructure providing open access to information to a diverse public, not just an expert caste, which did not attempt to predict or direct its uses.[45] In its utopian version, the internet was to be omnicompetent in respect of these functions in the new information order. But, like other broadcast media before it – print, radio, television - the internet is a site of a power struggle between public and private interests, in which the public depend on active engagement on its behalf by the state in order to even up the odds. The lack of support by the previous National government for the public charter for broadcasting (and for TVNZ7 in particular) clearly demonstrated, in New Zealand and at least in this matter, that the state is not fulfilling this role.[46]

An evolving knowledge society and creative/innovative uses of knowledge by its people depend on the widest possible access to the widest range of sources. This turns back to Derrida's observation about control of the archive, because limiting the extent of control over knowledge and its circulation exercised by specific interests (corporate, state, religious, professional, etc) goes to the heart of a society's capacity to reinvent itself democratically, especially as now in times of rapid change. Milton's *Areopagitica* explored these issues at the time of the origin of the English triennial parliamentary system and its complex relationship to the printing press as a technology enabling a kind of public broadcasting in competition with the pulpit. The concept of public value applied to postmodern media

systems whether under public or private ownership points towards a similar analysis, based on increasing public understanding of the world at large as a critical context for understanding and discussing collectively the issues and decisions facing the citizens of a particular society. If Aljazeera offers an excellent example of how a global television system can create this kind of public value, the national conversation about New Zealand in the world is carried on most diversely by public radio. At the heart of public value in the evaluation of media systems is the ability of citizens to acquire new knowledge presented openly (including openness about the values shaping that knowldge), and to learn and share learning with others; the role of the education state in media policy and provision is to ensure that citizens are capable of using contemporary media to these ends and understand why their participation in the government of their society matters. An education state would also ensure that the criterion of public value is applied to all media organisations broadcasting within national boundaries as an alternative to audience ratings as a measure of value.[47]

It is a theme through this book that a major outcome of the genesis and evolution of postmodernity is the invention of networked digital information and communications technologies; an outcome, not the determinant, in this period of epistemic change. No aspect of society or subjectivity has been left untouched by this development in cognitive technology and the devices which provide the digital entry point to virtuality (the novel, of course, is such a device, but employing a different distribution of functions between technological and human capabilities). In relation to government and the operation of the public sector, digital ICTs have brought with them new powers and responsibilities, and profound organisational change. In his study *The Civic Long Tail*, Charles Leadbeater considers these issues from the citizen end of the spectrum, and argues that the increasing diversity of networked communication tools is generating new expectations among citizens about their role in shaping decision-making. But what is the right relationship between citizens using social media to advance their interests and the tendency of expert systems, holding and accumulating data, to become impersonal and alienating? He argues that what is needed are “systems that scale but which are also intelligent enough to attend to the local, the human and the personal” (2011: 25-26). As with everything else to do with

technology, it is not the technology as such but the designers and the designs they have incorporated in it which matter most. As he observes,

> Better systems to mine and analyse data, to make automated decisions about allocating resources, could, at the extreme, license 'government by algorithm'. Government departments, service delivery chains and entire cities could be run by pervasive, invisible systems of which we have little knowledge. That is not at all the same as revitalising democracy by using the web to make it more collaborative and conversational. The challenge is to find a way to combine these two very different visions of the civic future: more effective and intelligent public systems, based in part on the analysis of 'big data' combined with more adaptive and capable communities, able to use the data to solve problems they face (18).[48]

Public sector agencies at all levels of society are critical for providing fora, public access to media systems and information to ensure that this public conversation is resourced, that they are recognised as participants and not controllers,[49] and that its outcomes can be connected in to the various layers of government. As I will discuss below, the city is a particularly important setting for this public work, because the greatest concentrations and diversity of knowledge and interests, and the most advanced forms of media systems, are located in urban spaces.

Consequently, to approach the question of innovation through culture, and to approach the question of technology through the example of media technologies, is to demonstrate how far apart are the different framings of innovation and knowledge policy when the starting point is either technology or culture. For the former, culture is typically placed in the background as the local context in which knowledge work determined by international measures of value is done and new technologies are installed; for the latter, technologies wherever invented are understood and adopted (if they are, and even if they are imposed) through their acculturation and adaptation in local contexts of use. To regard media technologies as the exemplary instance of technology as such is to bring into the foreground the deep interactivity of technology and culture, to shift the centre of knowledge policy away from the universals of technoscience and towards the ongoing (re)production of

society and its economies through cultural innovation. In this respect, the capacities of digital networked media of communication for intensifying conversation through the cultural processes of dissemination and reinvention are what matter most.

8.2 The Parliament of an Education State

The Parliament of an education state is its representative institution, distilling a society's conversations (including those initiated and participated in by public sector agencies) into just policies and laws through open, deliberative debate and public consultation, and leading democratic social innovation (but, as it were from behind). Parliament's role as the model for and guardian of the open conversation of a democratic society exceeds in importance its function as lawmaker or economic developer; in the former role lies most of the possibility for constructively managed adaptation and change through public learning and participation. Parliament from this perspective can be thought of as the collective author of an on-going social fiction or imagined reality, through its decisions, acts and laws (all discursive) creating new social worlds and giving form to possible futures through acts of comprehending and knowing. When Milton challenged his Parliament's decision to impose censorship on the press, he affirmed that its greatness as a democratic institution would be most apparent "when your prudent spirit acknowledges and obeyes the voice of reason from what quarter soever it be heard speaking."[50] That the "voice of reason" is multiple only magnifies the complex role of Parliament as a democratic nation's officially representative voice, and its work as productive of the new meanings needed to make new thinking and social action collectively possible in a nation's cultural space. For Latour, in his fundamental challenge to Western conventions of thought, democracy only begins to be realised when both human and nonhuman collectivities are able to speak.

With Parliament, the public sector, universities, the private sector, and civil society, a democratic society has available to it a diversity of institutional means and perspectives to assess what can be known and its relevance to its cultural evolution, and to formulate policy options and the terms of decision-making at a national level. The crucial function of Parliament is to make choices on behalf of the public. Because no knowledge claim by itself can be

simply authoritative, but must also pass through the test of values and beliefs, it is necessary that, in a democracy, the composition of Parliament should reflect the major groupings of political thought and conviction, and that Parliament's decisions should be recorded and empowered as laws. For the work of Parliament, carried out at the summit of the public conversation in a nation state, must be based on the best assessments of the state of the nation if its governance is to be open to its possible futures rather than closed by recycling ideas and beliefs which are past their use-by date.

There can never be a policy in a democracy which can articulate without qualification a unitary national conception, however much a technocratic mindset would prefer that to be the case. Politics is a humanistic and not a scientific enterprise, a fact often noted with regret or despair by scientists and misrecognised by politicians who claim to formulate their policies from evidenced-based knowledge. The very point of politics (at least where political discourse and behaviour is not dominated by the sound bite, focus groups and the crafting of media images) is to articulate value-laden positions on issues of fact, meaning and possibility, in effect providing one of the socially active domains where cultural knowledge (and therefore the humanities) is being put into practice. As Debray succinctly opposed them, "culture is what splits apart the human species while technology unites them" (2000: 56). All policy is the negotiated outcome of divergent ways of thinking expressed and modified in conversation; my point is that there should be no privileged conversations in this social process, no inside track stifling other perspectives which may be more in touch with the possible futures of a society, no prior determination that some kinds of knowledge are of more inherent value than other kinds. The current contest between so-called left and right parties through polling and focus groups for the 15% or so of swinging voters at election time is democratically self-defeating and cynical; it abrogates the ability of political leadership and party formation as one means (civil society organisations are another) of clarifying the implications for social action of different ways of thinking and prevents a broader discussion engaging the many different dimensions of belief and value which it should be the task of Parliament to reconcile as much as possible. Momentary crystallisations of a national conversation into policy and law is here understood to be the outcome of a mutually educative process in which local conversations are heard across the nation, modifying each

other even while never simply becoming repetitions. And the form of words taken by the policy or the law, as it circulates through the public sphere through education, public relations, news media and acts of regulation, becomes generative of further conversation, including challenges in a court of law and academic critique. The law or policy thus formulated is always provisional; it represents a collective decision for the time, always to be revised in an on-going enquiry into the difference it has made in the life of the singular citizen as well as the collective life of the nation.

Consent by the people to the rule of law and to taxation, on which the conduct of democratic societies depends, is fragile. A government in a democratic society is an interface between its citizens and the complex global order of state and non-state organisations, public, private, civil society, militant, and criminal. If a small nation state like Aotearoa New Zealand is required to position itself as a dependency of the current imperial power, it must surrender its unique culture, formed from the cultures and languages of the peoples who reside in its territory, to the dominant imperial culture. This is not just a matter of the globalisation of trade and specifically of the entertainment industry and the IP in cultural goods; it goes to the core of the foundations and historical evolution of political and social thought in a specific geopolitical space. It is apparent, for example, that the similar British foundations of democratic governance in the United States and New Zealand have been elaborated in culturally very different directions over the past two centuries. But now these cultural differences are being often silently erased through instruments like trade negotiations which entrench the conceptions of the social bond and the obligation of government to citizens familiar to the dominant power. This is merely the universalising of imperial cultures, not post-imperial globalisation as symbolised by the free flows of heterogeneous knowledge and values across borders. Imperial powers have always imposed themselves on subject populations through non-military as well as military means. If finance and law are obvious examples, another is the use of imperial literature and arts in and out of formal education as a form of soft power[51], culture in this modality having been demonstrated by postcolonial analysts to be a significant means of binding British colonies to the British Empire.

A programme which is discovered in a nation's conversations, which grows out of local knowledge and is given national form by negotiation among all the individuals and groups with an interest in it, will always be politically shaped because social, institutional, financial and ideological power are also dimensions of any conversation. But the critical difference in a democratic conversation is that those dimensions should be mitigated rather than magnified by the conduct of Parliament. Parliament's creative role is discovery, not imposition; like the principles informing slow food, attention to the quality of the ingredients, the cultural soil they grew in, and their thoughtful combination produces laws and policy with deep roots in the lived world of the nation and its heritage. By reflecting the nation's conversations back to the nation in forms which draw them into acceptable because openly discussed and debated solutions to perceived national problems and issues, Parliament performs its cultural work in a way which enhances the quality of democratic life.

The political party is a good example of the interaction of the singular mind with a collectivity founded in a shared history and body of knowledge, and beliefs and theories about what it means to be human (hence political cultures), in which factual evidence is necessary in political representations of the world but is never sufficient because that evidence remains to be interpreted by ways of thinking into social reality. Political parties need to convince the public that their interpretation of the best knowledge available is the right one in the circumstances, but this process of public evaluation depends upon public access to fully informed and accessible sources, including explicit judgments about the inadequacies and limitations of current knowledge. In other words, political thought and action occurs in the semiotic space in which humanity negotiates its relation to the given world and to the multitude of cultures, histories, societies, nations and their possible futures which have materialised and continue to materialise in the given world as expressions of what it means to be human. As I have argued, semiotic space is also the space of the humanities. Brier writes that the foundations of science lie in "the human perceptive and cognitive ability to gain knowledge and communicate this in dialogue with others in a common language" (2008: 83); it is the capacity and need for "dialogue with others in a common language" which founds all knowledge formation. Politics precedes science as a mode of knowledge-based decision-making, and

science cannot supplant it. Dialogue is formed and modelled in culture and exemplified in political discourse as one among many situated and institutionalised (and often ritualised) instances of dialogic exchange. What needs to be emphasised is that, to be meaningful and productive, "dialogue with others" cannot be either a closed system or one in which one voice in an exchange dominates and can silence the others, especially by employing the power of a social or official position.[52] Much of current political discourse fails to meet this criterion, one reason why democratic politics have reached a very low level of estimation in most democracies, and even more in the estimation of citizens of societies in which democratic institutions are unavailable or sit uneasily on top much more ancient methods of governance. To achieve decision-making on behalf of a group or a nation, a social process which should be sensitive to the singular mind and its experience of the world, given and human, and to the differences revealed in dialogue between contemporary minds and between those minds and the accumulated resources of knowledge available to them, is both the burden and the dream of democratic insitutions and democratic politics. The more this dialogic process is compromised and negated in the name of urgency or expediency, the more temporary and unstable are the foundations on which citizen consent to government is granted and maintained, and the greater the tendency for states to use police and military powers for control of their own populations.

Throughout the world, the concept of democracy is being hollowed out by business-driven states in Western societies and by their support of non-democratic regimes, and by the abuse of electoral procedures, judicial systems and constitutional frameworks which should (but do not) guarantee full citizen participation in the conduct of society. Whether because of passing legislation under urgency, manipulating electoral procedures to block expression of the (heterogeneous) will of the people, gaining favourable legislation by the use of wealth, or any of the other methods conventionally employed to corrupt the principles upon which democratic government is supposedly founded, the case for democracy has become profoundly compromised by the very people who claim to represent it in government.[53] Parliaments have followed the ideological permissions of the past three decades and their elected members have become an interest group using the means available to them to protect and advance personal and party interests over those of the general public. It has become less a means of resolving

differences through public and collective discussion and decision-making (however that has usually been more of an ideal than a fact of its operation) than of allocating public resources to those with the most social power, not least now because of the constraints imposed on its open and free operation by privately owned media and their power to shape public perception.

A more productive way of thinking about the relation between Parliament and citizens is by shifting attention from those who hold most social and economic power to those who constitute the "civic long tail" (Leadbetter, 2011), citizens distributed through the myriad networks and groupings of interests which make up a complex society. It is here that the full diversity of culturally inflected knowledge comes into play, the creativity of singular minds is manifested in communication with one another, and the practice of innovation is explored. Whether the social site is the backyard shed where innovations in personal computing were imagined and embodied in machinic forms, the kitchen or the coffee bar, the gym or the hospital ward, the board room or the office, the nursery or the classroom, new thinking is a function of the openness of conversation and the cultural inventory participants bring to it. In one respect, Parliament is just another social site able to advance innovative thought through conversation and decision if its processes and its participants conceive of their role in this way, but with the peculiar function of being tasked to hear the infinite number of local conversations which give initial definition to informed reflections on experience and to condense them into programmes, plans and laws which capture for the nation the implications of citizens' awareness of movement and change where they are geographically, socially and culturally situated. The current common process, which is to download programmes, plans and laws into the nation from other societies because they have "worked" elsewhere and which gives the impression of achieving something, ignores all of the cultural embeddedness which was crucial to their effect at their point of origin and the cultural differences which inhibit, compromise, distort or (sometimes) enhance their proposed effects when relocated. As Lotman has argued, translation and not copying is always the procedure when knowledge crosses cultural and linguistic borders at any level of social organisation, and it is an activity in which Parliament engages constantly, whether it recognises it or not. To hear what its publics are saying, Parliament must first listen and not dictate. The main tendencies or divisions in public thought and culture must be

represented among those elected to Parliament, difficult if the electoral system prevents it.[54] But the effectiveness of a fully representative Parliament and government depends on the complementary existence of a public well-informed and socially and politically engaged.

The title page of Hobbes's *Leviathan* is a powerful representation of all forms of absolutist or totalitarian rule, still the most common at the beginning of the twenty-first century, in which the heterogeneous vitality and power of the city's people is absorbed by the interests of the leader. The representation is suggestive of another reading pertinent to twenty-first century democracies and the mediation of relations between the state, the private sector and the public by databases and networked and encrypted communications systems; instead of assimilation into the body of the king/state as bodies, citizens are now assimilated as signs of themselves written in official records and the traces of behavioural attributes left in communications and commercial record systems. The city remains full and apparently free while under not the eye of God or the king but the now multiple eyes of the digital panopticon, symbolised for the early twenty-first century by Google Earth and the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV/drone). Control is exercised through virtual citizen bodies created by those owning digital systems and the personal data they accumulate, another aspect of the imagined realities[55] by means of which the postmodern state acts on the social and given worlds.

Non est potestas Super Terram quae Comparetur ei Iob. 41. 24
LEVIATHAN
Or
THE MATTER, FORME
and POWER of A COMMON-
WEALTH ECCLESIASTICALL
and CIVIL
By THOMAS HOBBES
of MALMESBURY
London
Printed for Andrew Crooke
1651



Ilus. 2: Hobbes, *Leviathan*, titlepage

8.3 The City in the Education State

Writing from London during the civil war, Milton asked his readers to "Behold now this vast City: a City of refuge, the mansion house of liberty" (237). For Milton, the liberated city is the engine of social and intellectual innovation and the first task of government is to protect and enlarge the liberty of the thinking citizen; a democratic state which fails to make this its priority is on the way to becoming, or has become in principle if not yet in fact, "oppressive, arbitrary, and tyrannous" (241)[56]. It is both startling and deeply ironic that the code word of the proponents of the knowledge society – innovation – should be precisely what Milton sees as the consequence of intellectual and political liberty, but for him focussed on the discovery of new knowledge which has direct implications not only for what it means to be human but for the nature and practice of human institutions. He is writing in a time of civil warfare between different interpretations of fundamental conceptions of humanity and human institutions – the early twenty-first century is a time of global warfare on the same grounds – and while he draws an analogy between the social energies released by war and the intellectual energies released in a state governed by a foundational principle of the liberty of the citizen, he emphasises the concentration of intellect and thought in the city: "the pens and heads there, sitting by their studious lamps, musing, searching, revolving new notions and idea's [sic] […]; others as fast reading, trying all things, assenting to the force of reason and convincement. […] Where there is much desire to learn, there of necessity will be much arguing, much writing, many opinions; for opinion in good men is but knowledge in the making" (237).[57] And, of course, a critical factor in the ability of the city to function in this way is access to the means available for public communication; without a media system open to the publication of new ideas without censorship, what Milton calls the condition of "free writing and free speaking" (240), their extensive dissemination and the widest public engagement with and benefit from them is impossible.[58]

The living social environment in which the quality, competence and foresight of the work and thinking of the democratic state is most fully revealed is the city, understood as the site of the most complex human expressions and interactions (personal, cultural, institutional, political, economic and natural, from the most embodied in the street to the most abstract in statistical representation or between sites of social and financial power), a local instance, shaped by topography, climate, geopolitics, ideas and history, of humanity's ability to evolve beyond our origins in nature through collective thought. Soja (1996: 81, 311) quotes Lefebvre's description of the city as a "possibilities machine"; as the site of thirdspace, it is "a lived space of radical openness and unlimited scope, where all histories and geographies, all times and places, are immanently presented and represented, a strategic space of power and domination, empowerment and resistance." The fundamental components of a city's vitality are the singular subjects of a social collectivity, possessed of cultural inventories and communicational competence, and their inventiveness in the face of complexity, not least their own. To walk in the city is to move in a galaxy of worlds, each discrete and visible body marked by unique but mostly hidden histories, each a node of invisible networks of energy and meaning, each a chance scripting of life composing consciously and unconsciously the text of its future and that of humanity.

The city is an instantiation of the semiosphere, a local totality of the human past, the present and anticipations of the future, a heterogeneous assemblage of texts enduring, being rewritten, forgotten and replaced, like an archive filling the space of its ground plan and creating new space as it extends its borders. It is a complex, collectively created text all of whose component parts are inscribed with meanings, and composed, like sculptures, by impressing will, intention and knowledge on to physical matter. It is the composite scene in which all of the institutions of a postmodern society interact knowledgably with citizens and with each other. In the educational and memory institutions of the city – library, archive, museum, gallery, school, university, and government, in their traditional and digital modalities – are located the greatest concentrations of a society's cultural records and it is, consequently, the prime site – physical and virtual - of humanistic learning. The city is the fullest collectively evolving expression of what it means to be human, and hence the ultimate focus of the work of textual

critique characteristic of the humanities. At any given moment, the cultural fields of any postmodern society are in a chaotic flux of contested values and political formations; discovering patterns in this flux is the work of a new humanities.

The city is a text of texts written in all media and using all the materials available over time to signify, accumulate, revise and condense meaning in forms which are reflective, exploratory and defining of our (in)humanity. It is the organic, pre-modern city of Bacon's *Design of Cities*, as an evolved, collective construct without deliberate planning but shaped by its geographical location; or More's Utopia as the work of art and reason, designed by a singular mind (both king and author); or the new Jerusalem, mystically revealing the divine ordering and end of the universe. In the midst, over time, there are cities which become subject to ideas and geometries, manifested in authored buildings – Wren's St. Paul's or Michelangelo's St Peter's, with Rome as the model of the imperial city; and then designed townscapes – The Mall in Washington, DC, the Edinburgh New Town, Canberra with a lake at its centre and its Parliament under a hill; and New World frontier towns fitted into the grids of military organisation. And the neoliberal city exemplified by Panama City,[59] to be contrasted with "'generous cities': human settlements that nestle within the living world" and are regenerative by design (Raworth, 2017: 223). It is the digital environment[60] of cyberspace imagined by William Gibson and the learned City or City of Science invoked by Latour (2004: 36, 67).

The imagined city is materialised over time in built forms and manifests in its layers and zones the changing social and class structures of the society to which it gives material expression. It is also materialised in fiction: The Last Redoubt in William Hope Hodgson's *The Nightland* as the defensive exoskeleton for the remnant of humanity drawing upon the last energies of a dying planet and its dying sun, rethought in Greg Bear's *City at the End of Time*; the space station Babylon 5 in the TV series of the same name providing the same means of sustaining social and animate life in the vacuum of space but, like any global city, a place of interaction for an astonishing diversity of cultures and species; or the virtual city of the Metaverse in Stephenson's *Snow Crash*; or New Corabuzon of Miéville's *Perdito Street Station*, to be read together with the alternative London of Gibson and

Sterling's *The Difference Engine*; or the alternative Manchester of Noon's *Automated Alice*: these cities are imagined as chaotic but also knowable and familiar sites of human, non-human and technological species, economic, political, intellectual and cultural diversity in contrast to the absolute philosophical and legal order of More's Utopia.

The city both incorporates and fails to reconcile according to any rational principle of order the extraordinary diversity of human invention, as self- and collective invention, accumulating in its physical evolution and territorial expansion fragmentary instances of all of its histories and the ideas of humanity enacted in and on it over its lifetime[61]. This is why the city can be regarded as a text, its possible orders and their on-going recomposition a local instance of the semiosphere, its dynamic the materialisation of the energies of thought (of which its economic activity, now taken to be the most important of its characteristics, is but a subset of its energies and dynamism and is dependent on the semiotic for its content and purpose). It is a work combining art and technology, bricolage and found art accumulating through the passage of time, intentional authorship by singular minds and collectivities of minds, space written into built form through the application of knowledge by technological power, wealth, politics and ideas, and written aesthetically whether in ugliness or beauty, reason or unreason, hubris or humility, because (like the Tower of Babel) inevitably expressive of the moral qualities of the builders.

Lotman's (1990: 191-202) discussion of St Petersburg as a particular instance of what is distinctive about "the city" as a human creation has particular significance here. His general observations are highly relevant to any consideration of the scope of cultural policy, and of integration within the humanities:

> The city is a complex semiotic mechanism, a culture-generator, but it carries out this function only because it is a melting pot of texts and codes, belonging to all kinds of languages and levels. The essential semiotic polyglottism of every city is what makes it so productive of semiotic encounters. The city, being the place where different national, social and stylistic codes and texts confront each other, is the place of hybridization, recodings, semiotic translations,

> all of which makes it into a powerful generator of new information. These confrontations work diachronically as well as synchronically: architectural ensembles, city rituals and ceremonies, the very plan of the city, the street names and thousands of other left-overs from past ages act as code programmes constantly renewing the texts of the past. The city is a mechanism, forever recreating its past, which can then be synchronically juxtaposed with the present. In this sense, the city, like culture, is a mechanism which withstands time (194-195).

Writing from a new world city with only a fraction of the years European and Middle Eastern cities have endured, it becomes easier for me to see how those living only in awareness of the city's present and believing that they are located on the cusp of its future can think so little of its accumulated past, when that layer is so thin, where the official model of time is progressive, not recursive, and where land and buildings are understood primarily in terms of their market value. It is also clear why the destruction of cities in revolutionary phases of social change should occur; the city also preserves and materialises the experience and memory of oppression and the entrenchment of class interests in its zones of privilege and authority, that dimension of its existence in which generative "confrontations" facilitating renewal are blocked. Lotman's description shows how the city multiplies the possibilities of normal individual creativity and innovativeness by contextualising and complexly informing it, giving a precise geography, history and communicational infrastructure (from the street through all of its media systems to the sites of its governance) to the larger collectivities of languages and cultures in which each person is enmeshed.

In respect of St. Petersburg Lotman makes a distinction which applies perfectly to the present disjunction between neoliberal, technocratic policy formation and the complex reality of cities, and helps explain the exclusion of humanistic knowledge and modes of thinking and analysis from official decision-making. He writes that the city "had to be both an economic centre and the place where different cultural languages came together; and semiotic polyglottism is the law for this type of city. At the same time, the ideal of the 'military capital' demanded uniformity and strict conformity to a single semiotic system" (201). The neoliberal discourse of government requires a

similar reduction and requirement for conformity to a dominant discourse, a command structure made operational through economics and finance, "the city organized by precepts and deprived of history" (201). Ironically, in Lotman's view, the actual economy is polyglot and nonconforming, like culture.

Put another way, the city rather than the firm should be the model object for innovation policy, as it should be for cultural policy. Eltham (2013: 550) argues that the focus of innovation studies on the firm misses what matters most about cultural markets: "The complex interplay of cross-border distribution networks, cultural tariffs and language barriers creates a mosaic of different markets for cultural products that bears little resemblance to the single market, perfectly competitive models […]. This mosaic is as much social, political and linguistic as it is economic." While this mosaic is here constituted from a nation-state perspective, the metaphor applies equally, and with more force, to the city as the fundamental site of cultural innovation and so to the components of cultural policy.

The city in its diversity of instantiations is the fullest collective representation humans have achieved of their capabilities (and deficiencies) as knowledgable, productive and sociable beings; the postmodern city exemplifies both the incorporation of given world into the human order and, as the scene of cultural heterogeneity and multiplicity, the principle of local diversification of language and culture in the context of globalisation. This conception of the city is being explored in many different ways, particularly in the contexts of globalisation, economic change, and the introduction of digital information and communications technologies. In an assessment of developments and changes in cultural policy in Europe from the 1960s in the context of urban regeneration, Franco Bianchini (1993: 200) has observed that "In the 1970s and 1980s city cultural policies have in many cases been more innovative and based on broader definitions of 'culture' than national policies" which have tended to "be imbued with a triumphalist, civilisational notion of European culture and identity, emphasising 'high' art and national cultures, rather than popular, local and ethnic cultures." At the heart of these policies is a "cultural planning perspective rooted in an understanding of local cultural resources and of cities as *cultural entities* – as places where people meet, talk, share ideas and desires, and where identities and lifestyles

are formed" (212). Bianchini proposes that "linking the debate on the future of cities as physical and economic entities to that on the future of citizenship and local democracy" (205) is now a critical task, a view shared and extended by Friedmann in his concept of "multipli/city", a term which recognises that citizenship is increasingly taking multiple forms – local, national, and transnational – and that this diversity is enacted in and constitutes over time the distinctive character of a specific city. He affirms that "a vibrant civil life is the necessary social context for human flourishing. Multipli/city acknowledges the priority of civil society, which is the sphere of freedom and social reproduction - and it is for its sake that the city can be said to exist" (2002: 112).

To ensure that cities develop in ways which offer the optimum conditions for sustaining human life and the reproduction of society requires innovative action across the spectrum of human needs, grounded in cultural values and principles, the full exercise of democratic citizenship, access to the most extensive resources of knowledge, a private sector able to generate economic value from local innovation and a public sector able to guide, support and resource the development of city-regions.[62] It has been increasingly recognised that the policies for urban regeneration through cultural and arts enterprises which followed and sought to compensate for the globalised shift of manufacturing from established industrial cities to new sites providing cheaper labour and less regulation have had mixed results. A recent analysis of this phase of culturally-led policies and practices for urban renewal asks whether the typical outcome was successful regeneration of local communities and economies, or merely property development. Miles (2013: 28) concludes that "New cultural venues transformed a city's image through a level of investment lower than that required for the renewal of a social fabric or an economic infrastructure. The shift in image was aimed in any case at external perception, not recognition by a city's diverse, competing publics. It subsumed diverse realities within a single representation of a future to which the city's governing commercial and cultural élites aspired." As he observes, the single representation is in effect a brand (22-23), further evidence of the extent to which commercial ways of thinking have come to dominate all areas of social and economic development, displacing the majority of the publics of a city from any claim to ownership of the city as a space of multiple meanings and practices. Miles

asks a question about cities which can also be asked about nations: “to whom [do] they belong? And who was able, or not able to participate in determining the image of a city which reshaped its built and social as well as its economic environment?” (21).

This question has been asked in similar ways in projects which begin with the premise that a city and its region belong to the people who live there and who are integral to its development over time. The Core Cities project in the United Kingdom (https://www.corecities.com/), for example, argues that social and economic renewal begins from local concentrations of energy and knowledge, reversing the top-down approach of centralised government in a democratic nation-state; it aims to work out the implications for planning and for the practice of government of engaging with the people actually living in a place over time as the means of finding solutions for the problems those people are experiencing and, on a larger scale, for the city of which their locality is a part. This way of thinking reverses the approach of neoliberal urban planning, centred on high-value property development and massive infrastructure projects. But to undertake such a reversal requires much new learning, both by citizens and those who would govern. The Core Cities report by Blond and Morrin (2015) is unambiguous on this point: “The complexity of the cultural, organisational, constitutional and legislative forces which underlie the current dysfunctional nature of local-central relationships must be recognised and addressed and the barriers overcome if significant powers are to be transferred and full place-based devolution achieved. All parties to this process must change their assumptions, approach and organisation.” Changing modern habits and assumptions in government requires dispensing with the “prevailing culture between central and local government [which] is based on hierarchy, bureaucracy and models of ‘command and control’” (9), an account which applies just as much to innovation and new knowledge creation as it does to understanding any city from a position within the multitude of cultures of that city, and to the formation of a new cultural policy and a new humanities.

This broad, city-based perspective for cultural policy, which is rooted in conceptions of democratic citizenship and quality of life, opens directly on to H. G. Barnett’s conception of innovation as cultural change, a product of dynamic cultural settings and rich cultural inventories. It also proposes a

critical turn away from the global as the point of reference for determining national policies for the evolution of the knowledge society. An innovation policy which grew out of cultural policy would have to give serious consideration to a conception of development as endogenous rather than exogenous as at present. Although no culture is ever simply separate from any other, it evolves in a local ecology which is literally as well as metaphorically the ground of its difference and therefore of its innovative capacity within the global distribution of cultures. As Friedmann has written of the city-region, "To be sustainable [...] the development of city-regions must be firmly based on their own resource complexes. [...] Central to this model is an inclusive, working democracy. Power is decentralized, but there are mechanisms for strong decision-making at the center. The local state in this model is a proactive state that pays attention to the need to preserve and improve the quality of the region's wealth-creating resource complexes, while striving to encourage innovative thinking and practice without presuming to act as its own entrepreneur in every case" (2002: 30, 37). It is cultural policy which, in principle, can provide the lens through which local cultural difference can be both perceived and magnified, and can empower citizen and civic society action in their own spheres. Just as each of us is a part of many different social groupings, so urban localities participate in many different kinds of governance grouping, at city, region and national levels. Local governance cannot take the place of institutions and agencies with national or international spheres of responsibility; each has its proper domain but must accept primary accountability to their citizens. Bland and Morrin emphasise the need to "recreate a participatory politics through empowering localities and creating a sense of a 'shared state'" (2015: 7); by contrast, how difficult it is for those in the reaches of national and international government most distant from the localities in which most citizens live to think democratically in this way is made clear by Jacques Rancière in his *Hatred of Democracy* (2006).

A Demos report which brings many of these issues together in its focus on one city is *The Dreaming City*. Its emphasis is consistent with Bevir's (2010: 272). argument in *Democratic Governance* that postmodern forms of governance need "a more dialogic approach to policy. We may give up management techniques and strategies for a practice of learning by telling stories and listening to them. […] Citizens too can tell stories about their

world. Policy can arise out of dialogues and learning among citizens with the state playing a largely facilitative role" The authors of *The Dreaming City* sought to discover the future possibilities for Glasgow from a close encounter with the ways in which citizens imagined their city, based on a view that "Significant investment has gone into stimulating and supporting economic innovation in cities. There is now a growing need to match this with equivalent investment in social and democratic innovation" (Hassan et al, 2007: 207).

In a most important respect, the report was consulting for evidence sources which in other contexts would be described as fictions deriving from "the most abundant and potent source of new ideas and practices a city has — its people" (44). Understood from this perspective, Glasgow is a city that "feels bigger and more resonant than the physical space it inhabits. In this, Glasgow, like other cities, exists both in reality and as an imagined city of the mind" (75). The questions these researchers asked on behalf of the citizens of Glasgow (but, by extension, cities anywhere), go to the heart of the key issues and motivations for change from which conceptions of city futures can be best formulated: "What kind of cities do we want to live in? Who has the energy and impetus to make change in them happen? How will people be involved in the process of change? What kind of support do they need to help shape their shared futures? These are all political questions" (45). Furthermore, an orientation towards the future requires a particular mode of sociable learning and thinking, only hinted at, for example, in the Foresight methodology discussed in Chapter Three. The report defines this mode as futures literacy, which means "thinking imaginatively about the future but also being able to act in the present. […] Becoming a futures-literate city means connecting individual and collective aspirations for the future at a scale and within contexts that people find meaningful and can participate in practically — in neighbourhoods, public spaces and public conversations" (20-21). In this account, the city in its many local contexts is the prime site of creativity and innovation, the locus of "the energy of thought" in all its heterogeneity. One critical dimension of the knowledge resources it draws upon is the embodied experience of its citizens and the knowledge derived from that experience by what Bevir called "local reasoning" (see Chapter Three).

Soja's perception expressed in the late 1990s of a "general sea change in the very nature of contemporary urban life" (1997: 19) occurring during the last quarter of the twentieth century and his argument for a new conception of the city, the postmetropolis, and a new set of concepts on which to found urban analysis, applies with great exactness to the humanities. The city is like the art system (the work of art, the gallery/museum and the accumulation of knowledge through analysis and critique taken together) as Luhmann describes it, a materialisation of ideas and forms drawing upon the past and transforming them in the process of bringing into collective consciousness what is coming into existence and has not been before. Soja argues that changes in the modern city are so profound that "we can no longer simply add our new knowledge to the old. There are too many incompatibilities, contradictions, disruptions. We must instead radically rethink and perhaps deeply restructure – that is, deconstruct and reconstitute - our inherited forms of urban analysis to meet the practical, political and theoretical challenges presented by the postmetropolis" (21). To make this comparison is not to say that such deep restructurings are not occurring in the humanities, but to argue that the transformations of the postmodern are not just relevant to postmodernists in period study, but that the whole textual corpus of the humanities is reconstituted by the postmodern just as is the city as a textual corpus accumulating and forgetting through time. Furthermore, a city, and not a globalised conception of a discipline, provides the local challenge to the adequacy of humanistic knowledge in that place for that city's (and its nation's) self-comprehension and deliberated evolution; that is to say, its cultural policy. And, as I hope I have demonstrated, the challenges are "practical, political and theoretical", involving conceptions of the work of humanistic knowledge in the everyday orders of social living, the contest of values as well as the politics of knowledge in which its practitioners are engaged, and the conceptual frameworks within which interpretive textual analysis and the search for meaning is carried out.

9. Conclusion

My purpose in this chapter has been to widen the scope of the discussion of culture and policy in the preceding chapter to include domains of government and society which are of particular importance in considering how cultural

policy might be approached when the question of culture and hence of cultural policy is no longer addressed through the arts. To consider that a truly democratic state is first and foremost an education state, and that the foundational policies of such a state are cultural policies, requires an integrative conception of the cultural work of government as it is expressed in public sector agencies and their relations with one another, on the one hand, and the institutions (especially Parliament) by which a democratic society deliberates about and reflects upon itself.

Making education the defining work of a democratic state implies that the fundamental elements constituting the possibility of the social – language, memory, cultural knowledge, communications media and the city – should provide the matrix in which both the work of government and the designing of education and training for that work should be recast. It implies a redefinition and repositioning of work of public sector agencies away from their subordination to the government in power for the time being and towards the public on whose behalf they perform their administrative and knowledge-creating work, work which should be measured against a criterion of public value. It implies a redefinition and repositioning of the city as the engine of culture and innovation, and the replacement of hierarchical conceptions of governance by democratic and participatory processes which engage citizens' knowledge and experience where they live. It implies a redefinition and repositioning of the role of law and the justice system as the source of negotiated order in society and as motivated by the unending search for the just decision. It implies a redefinition and repositioning of the role of a public media system which is capable through its professional programming of providing access to self-selected life-long learning through world news and encounters with many different kinds of knowledge and entertainment. It implies a redefinition and repositioning of the curriculum and research programme of the academic humanities (including the relations between the humanities and the social sciences) so that the conversion of their present marginal status to a foundational role in the work of government and cultural transformation can be effected.

It matters enormously, therefore, how the government of a nation-state and its public sector participate in a national conversation about the principles informing the on-going evolution and negotiation of the future of the nation

and facilitate local exchanges of knowledge by establishing the conditions required for the constructive conduct of such a conversation. It is through cultural policy that these conditions can be established. And a new humanities is needed to provide an overarching analytical and interpretive framework. Just as Bevir is arguing for a change in social scientific modes of thinking and analysis in order to make a new conception within the discipline of political science about political and bureaucratic action possible, which he calls interpretive social science, so am I arguing for the necessity of a new humanities in order to make a foundational conception of cultural policy thinkable, together with a claim for the substantive importance of humanistic knowledge to democratic government.

Achieving a significant change in public sector understanding of the role of the humanistic knowledge in society, including the economy, and hence of the foundational importance of cultural policy, will require at least four closely related achievements:

1. recentering the institutions of the democratic state on education as the anchor to which all other responsibilities of government are attached;
2. formulating an inclusive description of the cultural dimension of society and its representation by agencies of the state, including appropriate criteria for measuring and representing the economic value of activity in the various economies characteristic of this dimension;
3. applying the concept of public value to the assessment of the work of public sector agencies and media systems; and
4. establishing a new conception of advanced knowledge and training in a new humanities (including the creative arts, media and cultural institutions) able to give form to the cognitive and imaginative capabilities needed to comprehend a postmodern democratic society's possible futures and contribute to their mapping and realisation through policy and public conversation.

The abstractions of technocratic discourse provide powerful tools for identifying trends and patterns in social evolution, but they also displace and substitute for the much more textured public conversation which weaves histories, values and beliefs into every concept and proposition about the past, the present and the future. This textured conversation in its

heterogeneity (spoken and written) is most fully encountered in cities, and in narrative fiction. Formal and expert knowledge, and the economy, are always elements in fictional representation, but they are typically contained within a more complex account of human interests and purposes. An education state would build the perceptions of artists in all media into the core of its knowledge work, because such thinkers are society's early warning system at the level of culture, values and insight, by means of imagination and embeddedness in place, time and collective knowledge occupying the role once occupied by prophets and similarly discounted when their perceptions do not conform with the dominant truth system.[63] It would also take the evolving city and not its subset, the market, as both the primary source of innovation and the test of the competence of its cultural policy.

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[1] http://www.calumcolvin.com/Ossian.html.

[2] See my 2014 paper, "Cultural Ballast: Stones and meanings flowing in time and space".

[3] "Wellspring" has been used before, in Chapter Three, but in relation to the humanities. In this report, the term humanities is used once, in the Foreword, but it has been removed from the related section in the body of the report; it appears otherwise in references to the Arts and Humanities Research Council. The reports on the research into cultural value being undertaken by the AHRC also fail to mention the humanities.

[4] Bentley and Wilsdon (2003: 15-16) state that "Successful reform does not only depend on the level and scale at which decisions are taken or performance measured; it will require greater adaptive capacity in organisations at every level of the system [...] we need systems scapable of continuously reconfiguring themselves to create new sources of public value."

[5] A good example from the interface between government and business, on the one hand, and research on the other, is Counterpoint (counterpoint.uk.com). Originally the cultural relations think tank for the British Council, it now presents itself as "the first and only research and advisory group that specialises in decoding the social and cultural drivers of political and economic change. These dynamics shape the world in increasingly unpredictable ways […] We interpret our findings through a set

of multidisciplinary lenses: Our team uses cutting edge social science research and its extensive network of relationships across the globe to make sense of how the world's most challenging dynamics affect our clients. We turn these insights into strategic recommendations. […] We provide cultural intelligence" (counterpoint.uk.com/about-us/). Clearly a new humanities would make the same claims for the capability of humanistic knowledge.

[6] Bradbury (1953/1996).

[7] Schiller (2013: 14).

[8] The ability of some corporates to operate globally and to pick and choose where they locate employment in order to reduce labour costs and taxation is a clear sign of their abuse of their economic power and regulatory failure by nation-states. They are also marked by their specific cultural origins and are best understood in cultural terms, as Boisot's analysis of "the firm" has demonstrated.

[9] Wallace (2011) analyses this issue in detail.

[10] Hayles (1999) is an extended demonstration of "how crucial it is to recognize interrelations between different kinds of cultural productions, specifically science and literature" (24).

[11] Gimblett (1998: 150-151) writes that "heritage is not lost and found, stolen and reclaimed. It is a mode of cultural production in the present that has recourse to the past. […] Heritage adds value to existing assets which have either ceased to be viable […] or that never were economically productive […]. Heritage orgaizations ensure that places and practices in danger of disappearing because they are no longer occupied or valued will survive. It does this by adding the value of pastness, exhibition, difference, and, where possible, indigeniety. […] Heritage and tourism are collaborative industries, heritage converting locations into destinations and tourism making them economically viable."

[12] SeeTiso (2006).

[13] See Stainforth's discussion of the origin of and purposes served by the concept of memory institution, investigating the evolution of Europeana from a digital library to a network of people and projects. "The attempt to hold two models of memory and two modes of organizing information concurrently results in a tension between access to culture (as administered by memory institutions) and participation in culture (as part of a broader set of activities online)" (2016: 331).

[14] Recent policy reports by the British Library and the National Library of Scotland are powerful exemplars of this position.

[15] Brier (2008: 71): "The professionl indexers subject-indexing performance is never mor than 75 per cent consistent between all indexers on a detailed or 'deep' indexing of a document."

[16] Johnson comments that "A seemingly unrelated force propelling the particular views associated with monolingualism in 20th-century U.S. society has been the preoccupation with science and scientific principles. . .. American English contains ample semantic notions that are evidence of scientism in worldview such that sciencelike ideas form the basis for beliefs about reality in everyday life. . . . The dominant vocabulary for communication in the second half of the 20th century features terms [like "senders", "receivers" and "feedback"] suggesting a mechanical/mechanistic metaphor . . . [which offers] no hint of the deeply cultural and symbolic nature of all communication" (2000: 300-1).

[17] See, for example, Eco (1995).

[18] Dr Elgin has also explored the implications of her arguments in science fiction, in a trilogy of novels beginning with Native Tongue.

[19] Placing "in principle" here is deliberate. Milton's notorious refusal to grant freedom of publication to Catholics (1974: 244) has to be acknowledged, not least because it has been foregrounded locally in a recent article on free speech by Max Rushbrooke (2015). As his discussion shows, context matters in any decision to publish thought or prevent its publication. A good test is one's response to the use of the word "conspiracy" in the quotation from Nelson and Stolterman, not least because Milton and his contemporaries still had the Gunpowder Plot in mind. For a recent discussion of the Plot's wide ramifications, see Shapiro (2015). Milton's response is discussed on 153-154. Are there ideas which can, as such, so threaten the constitutional and legal integrity of a state that their proponents must be silenced, or is external organisational, state or military power supporting such ideas also necessary to justify censorship?

[20] And there is nothing inevitable about the form conversation might take. A potent example of a surreptitous invitation to "Think with me" has been revealed by the exposure by investigative journalists of the role of big data, social media, and private interests in shaping electoral behaviour by means of the internet. Seem for example, Cadwallader (2017, 2018). The latter

article quotes Cambridge Analytica's CEO's metaphor for their work: to "infect the blood stream of the internet" (12).

[21] Carr's line of thought is strongly endorsed from a different perspective in Friedrich et al's (2010: 579) argument that "Democracy […] is made visible in these moments of emergence of the political, in which a certain allotment of shares or parts is challenged and equality asserts itself testing an unequal status quo. […] The notion of planning subjects with the purpose of ordering (the future) society requires, among other things, a particular epistemological structuring of agents and agency that can foresee the future through ordering procedures of the present; [,,,] Uncertainty or undecidability stand in the way of progress and thus need to be policed, even in the name of a future democracy."

[22] Bennett (1998: 210-213) analyses the concept of the museum-as-contact zone, with particular reference to the civic role of the museum.

[23] A vivid exemplar of this world is uncompromisingly presented in the TV series Billions (2016-).

[24] An important context for his argument, and a material exemplification of it, is the work on media philosophy, Imagologies, jointly authored with Esa Saarinen.

[25] See for example the Information for All Programme (IFAP) of UNESCO.

[26] Bollier (2007: 32) instances "the public trust doctrine [which] declares that certain resources are inherently public in nature, and may not be owned by either private individuals or the government. The doctrine, which goes back to Roman law, holds that government is a trustee of the people's interests, not the owner of the public's property, and so it cannot sell or give away that property to private interests."

[27] The harsh and undemocratic reality of so-called free trade was fully exposed in the secrecy of the TPPA and TTIP negotiations. See Halimi (2014) for a succinct critique of the TTIP, and Kelsey (2010) for the determined public questioning of the claims made by the promoters of the TTPA for the benefits to New Zealand. Ghosh's three novels (2008, 2011, 2015)explore critically the free trade proposition in the historical context of English imperialism, mercantilism and the Opium wars.

[28] Olssen et al (2004: 270) make the same point about school teachers.

[29] Winkley (2011); Clink (1996). An insightful exploration of the local complexities facing educators is given in Season 4 of The Wire (2007).

[30] The most typical sign of New Zealand's cultural distinctiveness among world cultures (apart from Māori art and performance) is landscape imagery, a conception deeply entrenched in European New Zealand art but now intensively repeated in mass media imagery, colour photography, public relations and marketing, cinema and web pages. In government publications, this sign is also produced back to New Zealanders as the definitive mark of national cultural identity. Media technologies render the image object endlessly repeatable, instantly perceivable and memorable, and deprived of history or politics; these latter dimensions of its operation are only uncoverable when the image is understood to be, not a copy of the real world only but a producer of myth, in Barthes' sense of the term, and the work of media technologies is understood to be fully implicated in the transmission and hence shaping of cultural knowledge as a political process.

[31] Stehr204-205) argues that "There are no universally accepted moral codes that could mediate differences or transcend conflicts between the various interests that believe it is necessary to act, or to bridge the gap between understanding the need to act and the capacity to put such understanding into practice. Nor is there a central societal vantage point, an objective perspective, or even a globally accepted construct that could somehow overcome such tensions. We live in essentially fragile societies."

[32] A representative, if somewhat surprising, issue is the proposal to impose a meat tax. At the base of such a proposal are complex moral questions about the environment, the economy, animal rights, health, poverty and social development which cannot be resolved by narrowing consideration to present interests and quantified assessments. For a succinct account, see Guardian Weekly

[33] The report emphasises that "the OIA does provide a strong framework for enabling open and transparent democratic government in our country. […] However, it is how the OIA is applied in practice every day that matters" (2015: 144). "If the OIA is to achieve its purposes and continue to be effective over time, it needs to be used properly by everyone – the media, politicians, researchers, special interest groups, and the general public, as well as government agencies. Anyone who acts unfairly can contribute to and encourage a chilling effect on how the OIA operates in practice" (142).

[34] See above, ch.2.

[35] Kaldor (2003) identifies the 1980s and 1990s as the period when a nation-state bounded conception of civil society gave way to a concept of global civil society: “The new meaning of civil society involves a process of campaigning, lobbying and struggling for a new generation of rights, including gender, the environment and peace, at global, national and local levels. Global governnce, aframework of overlapping authorities, is being constitued by and helping to constitute global civil society.” She acknowledges that her interpretation emphasises activism: “civil society thus consists of those groups and organizations through which individuals can influence and put pressure on the centres of ploitical and economic authority, in particualr through which they negotiate new social contracts or bargains at a global level.” She also warns of ”the real danger that the new types of warfare [prevalent in the 1980s – network warfare, conducted by networks of state and non-state actors, neo-modern and spectacle warfare conducted by those states which continue to pursue unilateralist policies] will overwhelm civil society. These new types of warfare cannot be contained by territorial borders; the world is no longer divided into zones of war and zones of peace. Nor do these new types end decisively. On the contrary, they generate extremist ideologies, fear and hate on which such ideologies thrive, as well as a global criminalized economy with a vested interest in extremism”(143. 146, 147}

[36] A good example of such a process is the way in which the New Zealand Land and Water Forum, estabished by the government, achieved consensus on extremely complex and divisive isses to do with the national management of water. The failure of the government to endorse the Forum’s work in legislation is a failure of education and learning in the governing party, as well as compelling evidence of what could be accomplsihed if public agencies operated according to the conventions informing the consultative process (the conversation) of the Forum.

[37] Stehr (206) argues that “The currently constant and controversial public debates about the consequences of new scientific knowledge and technical artifacts, and calls for their regulation and administration, are expanding the public sphere in modern societies. The organization of the public sphere is changing, and participatory demands and contributions to the regulation of knowledge are bound to become more routine.”

[38] A succinct example is the analysis of the way in which laws are made in Europe, in which the European Parliament plays a minor role (Laurens,

2015).

[39] Pearson (1995: 57). See also Terri Janke (1998). Our Culture: Our Future.

[40] Murav (2010: 405, 408) discusses the situation "when the suffering of individuals as singularities cannot be translated into the abstract categories of the law", taking child-removal cases in Australia as instances showing how translation is a critical component in the adjudication of a wrong. She demonstrates that plaintiffs "could not show that they had suffered a wrong […] because the language in terms of which the harm was perpetrated, the language of the law and the state that removed the children, is the same language in which the plaintiff's case against the state was adjudicated. The harm could not be phrased in terms of indigenous law, tradition, and culture."

[41] Marlowe (2009-2016).

[42] Capretini (1983: 148) writes that "We can easily compare Sherlock Holmes's inner space to an encyclopedia, not only for its variety and vastness of knowledge, but also for the impossibility of having them all under control to the same degree, from the mnemonic point of view. […] an encyclopedia shows reality through the enunciation of the cultural variables through which its objects are thought."

[43] Lee refers to "the CSI effect" [a term attributed to Max Houck] which refers to "the perception of the near-infallibility of forensic science in response to the TV show" (2010: 31).

[44] Derrida (1992); Orange (1987).

[45] See Griffith et al (1997).

[46] See the Better Public Media Trust (betterpublicmedia.org) and the publication The People's Commission on Public Broadcasting and Media (www.peoplespublicmediareport.com).

[47] Horner and Hutton (2011: 113): "public value broadcasting, instead of mainly measuring audience ratings, would foster cultured and knowledgable viewers and listeners, whose judgments would be included in the assessment of performance and public value added."

[48] The dark side of Leadbetter's foreshadowing has been amply exemplified by the use of disinformation to affect election outcomes. If states can be expected to make use of any method which might destabilise a competitor, the hidden application of private wealth to this end, as in the exposure of Cambridge Analytica's role in the 2017 US Presidential election and the

Brexit referendum, is a further sign within democratic states of the extraordinary imbalances caused by excessive wealth.

[49] Cunningham (1994: 6) writes that "the bureaucracy is in an inextricable 'feedback loop' with the social fields of political-cultural activity. [...] governmental processes are constitutive but not determinative."

[50] Milton (1664/1974: 199).

[51] Chandra (2013: 94-95) writes that "it is no coincidence that the first classrooms in which the English novel was studied were located in colonial universities in India. The task of turning Indians into proper modern subjects with the right sort of interiority, reflexivity, and individuality demanded that the most sophisticated technology of selfhood be brought into play, and of course this instrument was the modern novel."

[52] Latour's (2004) brilliant reconstitution of democracy takes these points further, arguing for "a new assembly of humans and nonhumans […] To limit the discussion to humans, their interests, their subjectivities, and their rights, will appear as strange a few years from now as having denied the right to vote of slaves, poor people, or women. […] there are millions of subtle mechanisms capable of adding new voices to the chorus " (69). Where I have taken "conversation" as the summary term for informed communication between citizens, Latour considers in detail discussion (65), controversy (66), propositions (83), and articulation (86) as important dimensions of speech in this assembly.

[53] See Rancière (2006).

[54] The move in New Zealand from a first past the post to a mixed member proportional system for electing Parliament was an important step in this direction, however disliked by the established parties and however much it has been used to frustrate progressive policy development. As with law-making which is unproductive unless it goes together with extensive public education, a change to electoral procedures by itself does not make a more representative Parliament or change the habits of inherited parliamentary practice.

[55] A brilliant imagining of this state of affairs as an alternative history of the Victorian period is the novel by Gibson and Sterling (1990), The Difference Engine.

[56] The vulture funds are a notable current example of these characteristics.

[57] Milton's qualification, not just any man but good men, establishes a moral discipline on the work of intellect which is an important correlative of his argument for freedom from censorship by the state.

[58] Castells (2012: 222) provides an updated view of the same conditions when he writes that "The space of the movement is always made of an interaction between the space of flows on the Internet and wireless communication networks, and the space of places of the occupied sites and of symbolic buildings targeted by the protest actions. This hybrid of cyberspace and urban space constitutes a third space that I call the space of autonomy. This is because autonomy can only be insured by the capacity to organize in the free space of communication networks, but at the same time can only be exercised as a transformative force by challenging the disciplinary institutional orders by reclaiming the space of the city for its citizens."

[59] Popelard and Vannier (2015) argue that the history of Panama City's development foreshadows the way in which, "Now mobile and globalised, [capital] is turning states and their capital cities into instruments for guaranteeing and supporting its movements."

[60] Hayles's emphasis on the emergent nature of text, and her use of biological metaphors, like ecology and environment, encourages the application of her concept of the computer as a "material-semiotic machine" to the city as the most fully equivalent location for the experience of reading electronic text. See for example de Certeau (1984), "Walking in the City." The term "semiosphere" is consequently also relevant for thinking about the "space" containing cities as "material-semiotic machines" which is generated and sustained by texts in all media and languages. A city is a local site of the semiosphere.

[61] An excellent example is Gibson's 1986 story, 'The Gernsback Continuum', in the collection *Burning Chrome*. See Burrows (1997).

[62] John Friedmann (2002: 22) provides an extended discussion of these issues. He defines a city-region as "a functionally integrated area consisting of both a large urban core and a contiguous region that serves this city's multiple needs and provides a space for its expansion. […] Within this complex, the traditional distinction between urban and rural ceases to be meaningful. The whole of the city-region has, in fact, become a new form of urban landscape." This physical territorial extension of the city needs to be

complemented by its extension in virtual space. See Graham (1997) and McBeath and Webb (1997).

[63] Hassan, Mean, and Tims (2007), Part 4, “The Power of Story”.

5. Locating the New through a New Humanities

"to discover onward things more remote from our knowledge" (Milton, 1974: 235)

In a world under the hegemony of science and scientism, it should come as a surprise to find that the epigraph to this chapter is the work of a poet, political and theological radical, and public servant, and that his conception of discovery is founded in literature and the unending reworking of the body of inherited and new knowledge by the energetic application of educated and liberated minds. If for Milton it was the authoritarian mix of theology, church and monarchy (and then Parliament) which imperilled the search for truth and placed humanistic enquiry on the margins, today the same effect has been accomplished by the mix of science, business and the democratic state.

Try to imagine any government instituting a Humanities Strategy as a "whole of government" approach to the knowledge society. That it is so counter-intuitive, so Utopian, so productive only of a "meere fiction"[1], marks how far the routine ways for imagining the work of government with and for knowledge have become habituated to the claims of the techno-sciences and conventional measurements of their economic value. To emphasise that the present settlement about knowledge is an imaginary construct, based on the promotion and public acceptance of claims and specific value propositions, is to bring the politics underpinning this settlement into the foreground. As I have noted earlier, whatever scientists might think about the self-evident, even overwhelming, value of their work, it can be sustained and publicly funded only if the public is, and continues to be, convinced of its importance; and this is a fundamentally political and rhetorical process. In an analysis of the changing context for science in postmodernity, Gibbons et al (2001: 189) note that

> Popular images of science represent a vital link between scientific culture and the general culture of society […] Yet these images, by their very nature, blur what scientists call 'facts' with 'fiction', the

> products of the human imagination. It is by means of such blurring that they bridge the gap between science and society.

From another angle, this statement is directly applicable to the humanities, and to literature in particular. I have already discussed the invisibility of the humanities in public discourse, their spectral existence as the other to the sciences now hinted at through their fragmentary presence in various of the social sciences, and by the resolute incompatibility of indigenous knowledges. It is equally useful to think of the humanities as "blurred" in another way – rendered out of focus by the dominant knowledge system of science and associated with popular rather than with rigorous knowledge, personal and private rather than objective and economically valuable knowledge, the past rather than the future of society. And within the modern humanities, a similar blurring obscures the knowledge work of "literature" in official accounts of the purposes and outcomes of research.

Milton's epigraph to this chapter captures succinctly the Baconian ethos of modern science as an exploratory and progressive expansion of the known into the territory of the unknown, vividly represented by the visual metaphor of a ship sailing through the Pillars of Hercules into the open space of the ocean (and the future) before it which illustrates the title page to Bacon's *Novum Organon Scientiarum* (see Chapter Two). This metaphor still underpins the public representation of scientific and technological discovery, even if the mode of transport has become a spaceship and the Pillars of Hercules are now located on the edge of the solar system or erected precariously on the margins of black holes. But for Milton the material real included the spiritual as well as the physical orders of creation, and "onward things" were discoverable by theological and poetic as well as philosophical and scientific enquiry.

The dominant model of scientific discovery now uses the wonders of the physical universe as captured in sublime images by instruments like the Hubble telescope or the Large Hadron Collider as a powerful rhetorical tool in its promotion of its social value; as Gibbons et al put it, "they bridge the gap between science and society."[2] And, of course, there could hardly be more powerful visual metaphors, macro- and micro-cosmic, for "things more remote". But can such images convey knowledge as well as wonder and

awe? What process of translation from image into language, beginning with a caption but hardly stopping there, is required? In this as in many other domains of twenty-first century information and communication technologies, the image silences a thousand words, rather than productively stands in for them. Images were condemned by Reformation Protestants as "laymen's books" and, however important visualisation has become in communication and research, the ancient debate between the sister arts of poetry (linguistic) and painting (visual) has not been resolved, not least because many of the significant developments in digital technologies, especially for general use, have emphasised increasing fidelity to the multimedia characteristics of human sense perception while being dominated by the visual. But knowledge as such, when objectified, is properly represented by the abstractions of alphanumeric, diagrammatic, and diacritical signs and the formal grammatical, syntactical and generic rules for their combination, in the broad spectrum of disciplined modes of writing, the poles of which (as I will discuss below) are mathematics and poetry.

1. Othering the Techno-sciences

I have argued that the scope of a new or postmodern humanities is delimited only by its objects of investigation and interpretation, that is, the contents of the semiosphere or, to decompress that designation, all written objects created in whatever medium and whatever language. My aim in this chapter is to locate one particular set of objects within the totality of the semiosphere on which the claim that a (new) humanities contributes to fundamental innovation and new knowledge creation most fully depends.

My argument seeks to position a new humanities not as a remnant of an earlier phase in the evolution of human knowledge but as the postmodern other to science in the discovery of "things more remote", despite lacking the resources of rhetorical, technological, and economic power currently enjoyed by techno-science. Now that the empire of modern western science has claimed absolute authority over the realm of the real (however demarcated), and the realm of the gods has been relegated to the domain of the imaginary (as much an aim of secular humanism as of science), what territories of innovation in knowledge worth having are left for the

humanities to claim? Practically, as the situation of the humanities in Aotearoa New Zealand has demonstrated, there would appear to be none. As I have argued earlier (Chapter Two) there is an exact analogy between the situation of indigenous knowledges in relation to modern science, and that of the humanities. In both cases, a progressivist ideology of knowledge consigns other methodologies and modes of relation to the real to the limbo of irrelevance and error. Furthermore, customary claims to territory, (literal and metaphorical), can be evacuated by money power directing the stroke of a lawmaker's pen and supported where necessary by (para)military force.

One reason for discounting the value of knowledge created by the humanities is that the binaries structuring modern knowledge work – body/mind; imagination/reason; subjectivity/objectivity; fictionality/reality; narratorial/analytical; recollective/progressive; reflexive/denotative; value laden/value free; qualitative/quantitative; public good/private good – exert a very powerful influence over the valuation of different kinds of knowledge, and the objects of knowledge. The academic humanities in general would still largely place themselves discursively on the right side of the first five of these binaries, but to varying degrees on the left of the last five, partly depending on whether they can also be categorised as social sciences, for example, in research assessment exercises or grant allocation procedures.

Put another way, the most crucial difference which consigns humanistic enquiry to the margins of modern knowledge creation is the object of enquiry. Just as the objects, states, forces and happenings of the given world or the physical universe are the focus of scientific investigation, so are the objects, states, forces and events of the human world the focus of humanistic investigation. Obviously the science set and the humanistic set overlap, the common factor being the materiality of the objects in both sets, including the materiality of human beings. The difference lies in part in the contextualising of any object: is the context in which this piece of stone is apprehended constituted by other rocks, as in geology, or by its social uses (a bank, a sculpture, an altar), or by meanings and associations which it has in a culture and which attach as signifieds to the signifiers which represent it discursively (marble, jade, granite)? The most defining difference, however, is whether an object carries inscriptions of any kind, that is, intentional marks addressed to another capable of interpreting those marks as

communicative. Samuel Butler claimed when writing as Lunaticus to *The Press* in Christchurch (New Zealand) in 1863 "that no other animal but man has hit upon the intentional tacking of its mind onto matter, and without this no intellectual development and consequently no material development is possible. […] Whatever has tended to promote this matrimonial alliance of mind with mind will be found to have been attended with material progress; and nothing has been found so real and permanent a parent of good solid material welfare, as those things which have increased the facility of the interchange of thought, experience and opinion" (Jones 1959: 198-199). As I have argued in Chapter Two, this class of objects (texts) constitutes a distinct or supplemental sphere in relation to the material order of things; the semiosphere is not given but made by human effort and thought drawing on the resources of culture, supplemental to the given world if culture is either regarded as attributing meaning to that which has no inherent meaning or as one way of making the hidden intelligibility of the given world and ourselves accessible to thought and consciousness.

All texts (semiotic objects) are instances of culture and, because they have been produced by human beings, provide evidence for the fundamental enquiry about ourselves which is focussed by the question, What does it mean to be human? The intellectual and cultural capabilities which make modern scientific investigation of the physical universe possible and which are manifested in scientific texts and other kinds of technological object, and the on-going revelation of these capabilities over time as the project of techno-science evolves, provide a crucial dimension of the evidence for an elaborating answer to that question, just as do other facets of social activity, like education, law, business, religion, medicine, politics, war, agriculture, the arts and crafts, and sport. It is the task of the new or postmodern humanities to investigate the world of the semiosphere, micro-cosmically and macro-cosmically.

2. Creation, creative, creativity

Recently in knowledge policy the terms create, creation and creativity have been appropriated by the techno-sciences from the creative arts. As I have discussed earlier, the university remains the most vivid institutional example

of the current version of the power-knowledge relation disadvantageous to humanistic knowledge, in which the work of the creative arts can be linked with the work of science under the sign of creativity and innovation but not also through a claim to be discovering new knowledge. How artistic creativity and critique could be understood to be partners with science in the creation of new knowledge rather than as a decorative extension of science is a mystery at the core of the modern western university.

Because this formation of "the university" came to regard its work as a scientific process of forming true knowledge of that which was outside it, that is, the physical universe and human society, subsequently identifying the creative arts and media outside the university as proper objects of the work of academic reason inside the institution made very good sense. But there is a further parallel; just as the scientific and technological work of creating new things in the physical universe has entered the university from industry, in research centres, laboratories, and incubators, so has the work of creating new artistic objects come within it, in creative writing programmes, film, television and theatre schools, music composition, design and fine art, video games and so on.[3] That creativity is now claimed as strongly for science as for the arts is a significant index of the extent to which knowledge of all kinds has become the most powerful means for transforming physical, social and mental worlds in conformity with (some) human conceptions and desires; but the reciprocal claim for the creative arts, that they produce not only economic value (media industries, crafts, education, entertainment and tourism) but also new knowledge beyond that occurring in specific media and craft technological development, has yet to be recognised, especially in public policies for knowledge.

If the dominant method now informing the deliberated creation of new knowledge about the given world is based on hypothesis, experiment, instrumentation and logical deduction, and the dominant method informing the deliberated creation of new knowledge in culture is based on axiom, experience, instrumentation and abduction, it is not surprising that the creative arts remain largely unassimilated in knowledge policy. The important distinction between these different routes to new knowledge is not whether one has a better claim to the term "creative" than the other, but in the relation between the object of knowledge and the structured process whereby

knowledge is generated about or from it. In culture, because there is no outside to the semiosphere and both the object of analysis and the means for presenting the outcome of that analysis are textual (semiotic objects), the scope and dimensions of creativity and invention are as manifold as are the scope and dimensions of the semiosphere. As a subset of the semiosphere, the texts produced by the creative arts, which I will term aesthetic texts, are of unique importance to the new humanities.

Towards the end of Powers' novel, *Orfeo*, the composer Peter Els is listening to a song cycle on his car radio. He identifies the sources as "Peter Lieberson, Pablo Neruda. But such names are at best composite pseudonyms. These phrases assembled over centuries, the work of more anonymous day laborers than history will ever credit. You're in there yourself, down a branch of the self-spreading Net, stepfather of a fleeting mood of modulation, vector for new infections" (2014: 360-361). If the art system is distinguished from other systems in postmodern societies by its ability "to accept multiple descriptions of complexity", (Luhmann, 2000: 306), then we might say that it is also most fully open to the actual and potential expansiveness and heterogeneity (the democracy) of the "self-spreading Net". Els imagines that he will continue to exist not as a personal name but as a form, a new element in musical composition which extends what can be thought and imagined musically and is capable, like any objectified knowledge, of being used for new purposes in new contexts with or without attribution. Here, in this single capsule, is a theory and means of innovation at its greatest generality and in its greatest humility; enquiring further into it is the purpose of the rest of this chapter. The matter with which creativity works is the stuff of global conversation, its collective recollection in the semiosphere, and its selective aggregation by cultural inventories, given form by singular persons but recollecting almost none of them by name; the widest opening to the possibility of new knowledge and understanding is through singular attentiveness to that conversation in its diversity of cultural forms and languages, and through inventions – the exemplary case being artworks – which can generate for their users imaginative spaces for the contemplation and modelling of the to-come, and through whom it can be embodied by persons and texts in local times and places, in the process modifying reality. The principal value of innovations in thinking derives not from their

monetising but from the ways in which they can provide new openings on to the question, what does it mean to be human?

3. Focusing in the cultural field

Within the disciplines making up the modern humanities, the standing of those concerned with aesthetic texts is ambiguous. What kinds of knowledge result from research into and with aesthetic texts, in the fields of literature studies, media studies (journalism, photography, film, radio, television, digital media), art history, classics, design, music, performance arts and digital arts, given the distinctive character of the objects studied by these disciplines? As singular compositions (whether individual or group authored, edited and designed, and however multiply reproduced) combining subjectively elements from anywhere in the semiosphere, in any language and any medium, aesthetic texts share an absolutely distinguishing characteristic, the fundamentally constitutive roles of mediality and fictionality in their composition. I have already argued in Chapter Two that the semiosphere defines the scope and kinds of objects in relation to which humanities enquiry is knowledge-creating work and have sought to distinguish in Chapters Three and Four between culture as the creative and performing arts and culture as the totality of a social group's meanings and values concerning the life-world. While the latter defines the kinds of knowledge with which the humanities are (and always have been) concerned as both conservers and innovators, during the twentieth century some artists (and scientists) have directly challenged the conventions of representation naturalising realism which underpin conceptions of "established reality" (Luhmann 2000a: 144) in Western cultures. It is by means of this challenge that the humanities become fully capable of creating innovative knowledge. As Luhmann (2000a: 17-18) puts it, "Art renders accessible what is invisible without it. […] Is it conceivable that art, as a kind of 'writing,' builds a bridge between perception and communication […]?" Its innovative work of rendering is accomplished through media forms rather than discursively; it is the work of the humanities informed by critical, textual and cultural theory to translate into discursive forms what the arts make accessible to perception and consciousness, that is, into new knowledge. Innovation in the humanities, which reaches out into all spheres of culture and society, depends most

completely on works of art which open thought to what is yet to be known, and which reflexively engage the knowledge they make possible in the creation of new artworks. Clearly, this relationship is constituted by an exemplary subset of the whole range of texts categorised, on the one hand, as aesthetic texts, and on the other, as academic humanities texts. Both kinds would be properly described by Bernstein's term, "difficult". It is on the foundation of the objects constituting the category of innovative aesthetic texts that I want to build this last stage of my argument for a new humanities as a project for "discover[ing] onward things more remote from our knowledge."

The three marks of difference which I have identified in order to constitute a subset of texts (aesthetic texts) within the totality of the semiosphere[4], and hence within the totality of the humanities – singularity, mediality, and fictionality – are the marks which, in the modern period, have been used to diminish or deny truth claims deriving from the citation and interpretation of these texts. Knowledge, as modern science creates it or modern philosophy identifies it, is marked by its universality, its independence of the medium by which it is communicated or in which it is stored, and its dissociation from any interference from or dependence upon the subjectivity and cultural location of the scientist or the philosopher. Reading for informational content is the current dominant mode of reading; but reading for the factors of singularity, mediality and fictionality (which are also constituent characteristics to some degree of any text) widens a text's evidential potential because such reading exposes its contextual – cultural, institutional and subjective - embeddedness to analysis and understanding. It allows one to ask not only, what does this text know, but also why, when, where and to whom does this knowledge matter. A text which emphasises its referentiality, that it should be understood as existing only in order to represent and communicate some aspect of the real world wholly outside it and in relation to which it entirely effaces itself (the text as window), will necessarily work to suppress any indications of authorial singularity, mediality, or fictionality; whereas an aesthetic text, which exists so that the imagined world given existence by its means can be conserved and recreated in the minds of those who encounter it in times and places other than that in which it was composed, claims these characteristics as integral to its purpose and value.

3.1 Fictionality and Mediality

Traditionally, fictionality is distinguished from other modes of representation by the exploration of what is possible or potential in narrative forms claiming a likeness to the real world but not basing a claim to value on the literal truth of that likeness. In the order of truth defined by science, no truth claim can be made on the evidence of a fictional representation; and yet fictionality is a constitutive component of the textual objects making up the category of creative arts and therefore part of the corpus of the modern humanities, and they are socially and economically important in education and entertainment, not least because they can foreground and make accessible to thought and self-awareness differences among systems of cultural values and beliefs. Offering ways of thinking outside the taken-for-granted of ordinary experience and the calculations of government, education and business, fictions can activate those capabilities of human subjectivity and cognition which can challenge the assumed limits of the real by asking "what if?", by forming mental models and narratives of alternative forms of living, thinking and knowing and using them to critique the present order of society and its official knowledge. In some circumstances, collective human action based on such acts of imaginative and collaborative mental building through texts of possible worlds can be transformative of social reality and the given world.

Of course, asking "what if?" is not the uniquely distinctive property of fiction writers; it is a humanly characteristic way of orienting thought towards possibility, that which is outside the taken-for-granted. In both dimensions of reality (social reality and the given world) the power of techno-scientific knowledge is now most fully expressed in its capacity to create new things, biological as well as technological, for which the idea or model (the "what if?") precedes the new thing. Baudrillard (1994: 1-42) has argued that the entry to postmodernity is marked by the "precession of simulacra", a cultural and social condition in which the power of modern knowledge has advanced to such a degree that it is able to transform nature itself, a stage beyond the invention of technologies as prosthetic extensions and magnifications of human powers. The project of shaping nature to serve human interests is an ancient one, manifesting itself more recently, for example, in the conversion of the pre-colonial natural order of New Zealand into landscapes and

townscapes signifying European conceptions of productivity and civilisation. But for Baudrillard contemporary advances in scientific knowledge make available to human agency a power much greater than that required to transfer a known order into a new territory. In a precise application of a metaphor exemplifying the transformative process of imperial expansion across the planet to the condition of postmodern knowledge, he has argued that now it is "the map that precedes the territory." (1994: 1) What humans can desire and conceive has left the realm of the imaginary, the ideal, the fantastic, the utopian, and is now expressed in simulations as blueprints of new realities to be produced by manipulating nature and human nature. A fine and satirical example of a fictional analysis of the application of these powers to reality transformation is Jeff Noon's *Automated Alice*, in which the government of a future Manchester employs "Djinnetic Engineering" with the aim of producing a pliant population, but with startling and unanticipated results.

Put this way, the crucial issue raised by the term fictionality is not that of misrepresentation or the distortion of the real as such by the imposition of a deviant subjectivity, but the means available to thought for thinking differently, and having "real world" effects. These means are inevitably political because they include values, beliefs, ideologies, histories and laws, and their enactment is civil, most fully in the collectivity of the city. The circuit from the mind to the real through the fictional text and politics can be transformative of the real; at least, all that of the real which it is possible for human thought to represent, modify or seek to make new. In other words, extending the scope of the term creativity to embrace the sciences as well as the creative arts blurs the borders of the binary fiction/reality while also extending the zone of fiction to include both art and technological objects.

In so far as a socially transformative or educative purpose has been traditionally claimed for art, literature, music and theatre, and that this work is to be accomplished typically with fictional means, it is clear that the period of the postmodern marks a convergence between this capability of aesthetic texts and the simulations created from techno-scientific knowledge. In both cases, the basis of this convergence is the belief that a mental conception (an idea) can have a transformative effect in the real; once again, this belief is a foundation for the meaning of the term "innovation" which,

until recently, applied to changes in political, intellectual, legal and theological thinking and their social consequences. So, two key terms in the postmodern policy frameworks of western governments, creativity and innovation, conceal fictionality at their core.

They also conceal mediality, the quality of a text deriving from the materiality of the medium in which it is composed and transmitted. The twentieth century has witnessed an astonishing elaboration of media power, through the development of mass media organisations in news, telephone, radio, music, film, and television, and their full convergence in the globalised systems of networked digital information and communications technologies and the corporations which own them. As these technologies – cognitive machines with increasing capabilities for intervention in the subjective worlds of their users on behalf of their creators and designers – have evolved, so has their attempt to disguise their power by association with scientific canons of the real, the claim that technologies are value free, and the traditional denial of mediality by encouraging the belief that the screen is transparent, a window onto reality rather than a critical factor in the work of representation. By contrast, the kinds of aesthetic texts which matter in my claims for the creative arts in the creation of new knowledge are those which are conscious of their mediality and work to disrupt transparency in the act of giving form to value-laden thinking. If the products of globalised media systems are simulations, they are also aesthetic texts promoting and disseminating the systems' values; but by denying mediality, and by linking fictionality with entertainment, such texts enter and work to transform reality in ways that the human subjects of such transformations may not recognise.

A wonderful anticipation of this position is also a fine imitation of the genre of traditional humanistic scholarship. In a story, "Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius", which is perfectly attentive to the textual voice ("rigorous prose" (2)) and procedure of the scholar investigating texts, discovering their real world relationships and drawing out meanings from their objective characteristics in a collaborative process of interpretation, Borges reveals the lineaments of modes of thinking of a world profoundly foreign to those investigating it. But however foreign, analysis of the evidence of its languages as well as other information recorded in an encyclopedia makes it possible for them to comprehend the logic and coherence of those foreign

modes of thought. Trying to locate a country, Uqbar, with a literature which "never referred to reality, but to the two imaginary regions of Mlenjas and Tlön", the narrator/investigator acquires a copy of *A First Encyclopedia of Tlön. Vol XI. Hlaer to Jangr*. This volume is received as "a vast methodical fragment of an unknown planet's entire history", its scope evidence that it could not be the invention of one mind. The story explores what is distinctive about Tlön, expanding on the implications of an initial observation: "The nations of this planet are congenitally idealist. Their language and the derivations of their language - religion, letters, metaphysics - all presuppose idealism. The world for them is not a concourse of objects in space; it is a heterogeneous series of independent acts. It is successive and temporal, not spatial." Furthermore, because "Centuries and centuries of idealism have not failed to influence reality", the act of thinking a thing can make it real. The rest of the encyclopedia is finally discovered; it is learned that Tlön is the invention of a secret society, and that the task of inventing a country, or a world, requires centuries. But it is the consequence of media dissemination (journalistic, in this case) of knowledge about Tlön which comes to preoccupy the narrator, because people's fascination with this world progressively brings it into existence, displacing present reality: "How could one do other than submit to Tlön, to the minute and vast evidence of an orderly planet? It is useless to answer that reality is also orderly. Perhaps it is, but in accordance with divine laws - I translate: inhuman laws - which we never quite grasp. Tlön is surely a labyrinth, but it is a labyrinth devised by men, a labyrinth destined to be deciphered by men." In a further hundred years, "someone will discover the hundred volumes of the Second Encyclopedia of Tlön. [...] The world will be Tlön." Baudrillard's analysis confirms this fictional anticipation; both are strongly aware of the dangers resident in the human power to modify reality and a totalitarian desire for order and symmetry, but both also accept that the mental/textual action of prefiguring new possibilities and then modifying reality in terms of that prefiguration are integral to human social action. A more recent example is William Gibson's invention of the term "cyberspace" in *Neuromancer* (1984). As Hayles observes:

> The Neuromancer trilogy gave a local habitation and a name to the disparate spaces of computer simulations, networks, and hypertext windows that, before Gibson's intervention, had been discussed as

> separate phenomena. Gibson's novels acted like seed crystals thrown into a supersaturated solution; the time was ripe for the technology known as cyberspace to precipitate into public consciousness (1999: 38).

What I am concerned to argue here is that postmodern western societies (and others) are experiencing a process of profound collective mental transformation which is being effected through the fictions projected most widely now by digital media technologies. Such transformative processes have traditionally been associated with and accomplished by the arts, the school, the court of law and the pulpit but have now been magnified enormously in their technological power and reach to modify the thinking of their subjects. At the same time, they have been largely cut loose from the social motives, moral frameworks, public interests and civilising imperatives directing those traditional cultural institutions (however compromised by conservatism and the control of elites), to be directed overtly instead by commercial motives and private interests for private ends. Science fiction is a critical generic development in this context because it reveals the whole spectrum of fictional thinking, from "hard" science fiction in which futures are projected in absolute accordance with current scientific knowledge, to "space opera" and fantasy in which fictional futures (and pasts) are freely invented without such constraint. Such narratives are a generic correlative (and often a critique) of a progressive ideology of knowledge and social evolution; and they are frequently the first place in which the potentials in scientific knowledge for the transformation of the real are made available for more general thought and so enter the conversation of society. Jameson argues that

> the most characteristic SF does not seriously attempt to imagine the 'real' future of our social system. Rather, its multiple mock futures serve the quite different function of transferring our own present into the determinate past of something yet to come. It is this present moment – unavailable to us for contemplation in its own right because the sheer quantitative immensity of objects and individual lives it comprises is untotalizable and hence unimaginable, and also because it is occluded by the density of our private fantasies as well as of the proliferating stereotypes of a media culture that penetrates

> every remote zone of our existence – that upon our return from the imaginary constructs of SF is offered to us in the form of some future world's remote past, as if posthumous and collectively remembered (2005:288).

From another perspective, envisagings in print and pre-electronic visual media of possible futures have given, by being remediated in moving image and now digital media, the effect of reality to a collectively shared image repertoire. The conventions of print technology and the linguistic medium, and the vagaries of individuals' private imaginative renderings, are replaced by the seamlessly detailed and fixed forms of collectively witnessed multimedia narrative in the society of the spectacle, powerfully enhanced by computer graphics. An exemplary "local" example is Sir Peter Jackson's *The Lord of the Rings* trilogy. The same shift applies to our knowledge of the "real" past, a multiplicity of worlds only conventionally more real than the future because of the physical remnants of the past which are still present and with which the effect of reality can be composed, using the power of multimedia to generate compelling images of possibly real worlds. This is not to argue that the past did not happen, but that our knowledge of its actuality is increasingly shaped by the power of twenty-first century media to confer the *effect* of reality on narratives in which speculation and invention play critical but often disguised roles (the recent popularity of the English Tudor period for television series is just one example). In one respect, this is nothing other than the updating of conventions applying to classical history writing, in which the historian was permitted to invent what was not otherwise recorded anywhere, for example, the speeches attributed to historical actors. But that was a permission consistent with the formal relation to truth of rhetoric and poetry, not history written according to the canons of scientific objectivity, documentary evidence and pictorial realism. It was accepted that history writing (as we might also note of future writing), is silently or openly shaped by historians' purposes and the audience(s) for whom they write, in whatever media form.

My claim that fictionality and mediality are inescapable components of all forms of communication is intended to reframe a position stated powerfully by Bacon when, in the process of sifting the inherited body of knowledge for what was true in it, he determined the conventions of scientific

communication and scientific thinking by identifying how knowledge became corrupted by the infiltration of anthropocentric perspectives, human desires and beliefs. By using a powerful Reformation term for intellectual hygiene, the term "idol", he sought to define an experimental method and linguistic procedure which would completely divorce the pursuit of truth from those innate human and inherited cultural characteristics which deranged it.[5] His list of idols – of the tribe, the cave, the market and the (academic lecture) theatre - is compelling, because it takes into account every dimension of human thought and action that is expressive of what it means to be human. It is only now, in the postmodern reaction against the totalising of the scientific project, that Bacon's idols are being rehabilitated, so to speak, so that the distinctively human contribution to evolution can be more adequately comprehended.[6] While modern science continues to define itself in part against them (creationism being one example, organics being another), a differently purposeful account is being given which brings the humanities, as the domain of knowledge which conserves them and studies their products and effects, back into play. Thirdspace, the space of the real-and-imagined city, is a positive conceptualisation of the cultural space located pejoratively by the idols.

To make the humanity of the thinker vanish, leaving only the thought, is a sign of the presence of truth - and of horror, because such a representation proffers a world devoid of humanity, a world of black holes and dark matter. But this is a dimension of reality and truth; the universe does not run according to human will or sentiment, even if that is one version of the ultimate aspiration driving the work of acquiring knowledge. It is also not the only dimension. Thomas Nagel in *Mind and Cosmos* argues axiomatically for a secular conception of evolution which includes an inherent relationship between the given world and the human mind: "The intelligibility of the world is no accident. Mind, in this view, is doubly related to the natural order. Nature is such as to give rise to conscious beings with minds; and is such as to be comprehensible to such beings. Ultimately, such beings should therefore be comprehensible to themselves" (2012: 17). One of the distinguishing characteristics of such beings is that they are "value-sensitive agent[s]" (113), but the evolution of a domain of value is not, as Nagel points out, a simply benign development, because it has generated good and evil, and the proliferation of complexity (122). He argues that "The inescapable

fact that has to be accommodated in any complete conception of the universe is that the appearance of living organisms has eventually given rise to consciousness, perception, desire, action, and the formation of beliefs and intentions on the basis of reasons. […] what a theory of everything has to explain [is] not only the emergence from a lifeless universe of reproducing organisms and their development by evolution to greater and greater functional complexity; not only the consciousness of some of those organisms and its central roles in their lives; but also the development of consciousness into an instrument of transcendence that can grasp objective reality and objective value" (32, 85).

To make, therefore, the humanity of the thinker visible as an active component of thought describes a fundamental kind of knowledge work. A spectrum is thus constituted in which scientifically generated knowledge is only one segment of the totality of human knowledge - as I have previously described it, only one territory in the world of the semiosphere. Bacon's project, to sift the wheat from the chaff in the semiosphere of his time, affirmed a criterion which has been rigorously observed by modern science, even though there is presumably no necessary linkage between science and a progressivist philosophy, capitalism or democracy. But the forces now enmeshing humanity in crises of various kinds – environmental, economic, political, ethnic, ideological, religious – which are in part contributed to by the applications of techno-scientific knowledge (notably by advanced weaponry) and for which that knowledge by itself has no solution – are requiring a much more value- and culture-centred approach to the formation and application of knowledge.

I have argued in Chapter Four that Parliament is the representative scene of the conversation among the members of a democratic society, providing the means for its temporary condensation into law and regulation if its intended function is not disrupted by special interests, deliberate misrepresentation or corruption. Parliament in this view should represent not the power of the state (as the institutions a society establishes for its on-going governance) but the power of the public to shape the direction, purpose and conception of the state in its plurality of functions. The social domain in which, outside of Parliament, the conversation of society is most intensively carried on is the city, which is marked by the intense concentration in a territorial location of

the key infrastructures for the transport and exchange of people, ideas and goods, and is therefore the scene of political organisation. Creating knowledge in the humanities involves thinking humanity together with society, of which the economy is only a subset, regarding culture as interactive with the vastness of the given world and constitutive of the real, not subordinate to it, recognising that collective and personal memory is fundamental to the possibility of human futures, and embracing the city (actual and virtual) as the local scene and engine of knowledge creation. The critical relationships continually re-thought in and by the humanities are those connecting singular human beings with culture and environment in different spaces and times, society in its distinctive forms of other people, clusterings of values and beliefs, and the city, and the justice and violence of the state. They are brought to exploratory thought most fully by aesthetic texts.

3.2 Thinking with and through aesthetic texts

The complex way in which an aesthetic text intersects with a subset of society in a moment of its performance is finely narrated in Powers' *Orfeo* (243-255), when the composer, Peter Els, goes into a café at what had been his university and becomes aware that the music playing on the café's speaker system is his own composition. Through an extended description of the piece's development the narrator interpellates fragments of the different ways the piece is heard, or not heard, by those in the café, and especially the diverse moments of awareness, anticipation and reflection which give the reader access to Els's mindlife. The most interesting couple to Els are themselves music students, one of whom is annoyed by being distracted from concentrating on the score of his own composition, and the other who allows herself to become absorbed by the music and cannot quite connect her knowledge of it to its composer sitting at the next table. While the recorded piece retains its integrity, whatever the social context of its performance, how it is apprehended is as various and as accidental as the singular histories and states of mind and feeling of the people who happen to be present at the moment of its performance. The strange conjunction of times and places which the music effects is exemplified by Els: "The glimpse of open ocean, at six minutes, lasts no more than a few sustained measures. When the splendor passes, it beaches Els again in this place, a visitor from the future come back to intercept his own past. He sits here, years too late,

knowing everything" (251). The music motivates consciousness and generates thought in its relation to its hearers, and participates in the flexible, various spatio-temporal movements of consciousness, but does not itself determine what that thought or state of consciousness should be.

Given the beginnings of the coffee house in the late seventeenth century as a place for the conversational exchange of ideas amongst an intellectual elite, its demotic version here re-emphasises the necessary embodiment of thinking in serendipitous communicational exchanges and the singularity of each person, enveloped by their mindlife which is momentarily breached by some out of the plethora of signs available for conscious attention in the rich totality of that social space. The differences of response, attention, awareness, thought place exactly the fundamental unpredictability of the new as a product of the complex intersection of personal and cultural history in a moment of time and place, the replay of a composition in that ordinary place making it different and providing different opportunities for its meanings to be apprehended in some way. It is in the moment of awareness, as something significant captures mindlife for a moment and generates a motive for thinking something new into existence, that the fundamentals of innovation are to be found.

The moment in the café is a moment in which a text from the semiosphere can touch or move in unpredictable ways through the minds of those present at its performance and attending to it to some degree. Its effects on thought are multiple; what differentiates the account of thinking generated by an aesthetic text in the narrative and the kind of thinking in the humanities which is intended to create formal knowledge from the same encounter is its deliberateness, its duration and its disciplinary context. As I have already noted, while a new humanities have as their scope the totality of texts gathered in the semiosphere, of which aesthetic texts are a subset, the most powerful relation for the work of ta new humanities in knowledge creation is the interpretive relation between a reader and aesthetic texts which are conscious of their fictionality and mediality.

My argument from this point will proceed to identify the exemplary mode and medium of writing which provides the ultimate foundation for the formation of humanistic knowledge, as a truth-generating process complementary to

science (a new humanities, science's currently missing twin in the conventions of Shakespearean comedy). As I have already proposed above, this mode's defining characteristics are singularity, mediality, and fictionality. It therefore shares in and acknowledges the dominant modalities of twenty-first century media as I have sketched them in Chapter Four while also in its constitution offering a potent critique of those modalities as they have recently evolved by adaptation to the coordinated forces of neoliberalism, privatisation, and corporate globalisation.

Since innovation is now precisely related to the creation of knowledge with market value as intellectual property and/or as materialised as new kinds of product, in what sense can art works be said to produce knowledge of any kind, let alone innovative knowledge? My answer, heavily depended on Luhmann's analysis of the relation between the art work and the art system, is that works of art in themselves do not create knowledge even while employing all kinds of knowledge in their creation. This is a primary reason why modern claims for their economic value and their innovativeness focus on their qualities as a special kind of object in a special kind of market rather than on the way, uniquely different to the technosciences, that they make the discovery of new knowledge possible.

3.2.1 Theorising the Artwork

The exemplary object which provides the link between innovation and cultural policy, and my argument for repositioning the humanities as knowledge which matters in the governance and on-going (re)invention of democratic societies is the work of art. For my purposes, the concept of art, and the set of objects which can be classified as artworks, needs to be as inclusive in terms of historical evolution, form, medium and genre as possible. As I have already noted in Chapters Three and Four, when discussing the art system and communication, Luhmann's *Art as a Social System* provides a challenging and extremely helpful way of thinking about the social functions of art and the ways in which these functions change as societies become more complex. My concern at this point is directed towards the origin and distinctive qualities of artworks; the following brief summary will hardly do justice to the scope and implications of Luhmann's analysis, but I hope that it is accurate to his principal concerns.

Attributes of the artwork which focus Luhmann's conception of the art system as both postmodern and strikingly distinctive in relation to other social systems are: its singularity as something new, an event; its creation of a fictional reality; its recursive and intertextual qualities as a medium of communication; and its relation to knowledge and meaning.

3.2.1.1 Singularity

The material singularity of the artwork is strikingly affirmed in an analogy and a conception of its origins. As Luhmann (2000a: 42) puts it, "Despite the built-in, local, and context-specific rationality of its decisions, the work of art itself, being neither the sum nor the aggregate of individual features, is not rational – in this respect, it resembles the world." At every point, the physical existence of the artwork places it in the real world, but as a humanly (personally, socially and historically) made thing founded by making a distinction: "One cannot start from an immediately given nondetermination – an unmarked space, a primordial entropy or chaos, a empty canvas or white sheet of paper – without distinguishing this state from what is being done to it" (55). The artwork comes into existence when a void is marked with signs; a later expression of this concept, "the unmarked space where signs are engraved into the empty stage, the white sheet of paper, or the silence that makes tones resonate" (291), underlines its generality. For an object to be a modern artwork, it must be singular, and the critical attributes of singularity are the "local, and context-specific rationality of its decisions" and an element of newness (303), which derives from a moment of "self-generated difference" which is its origin and which founds its difference from any other object. In claiming the value of innovation, the modern artwork is expressive of, and presents itself in a critical relation to, its cultural time and place.

The motive which initiates the creation of an artwork is necessary but incidental to an account of its coming into being: "The first impulse is never the artist's 'own intention' – in the sense of self-observed mental states – but something one attributes to the artist as intention when observing the work. One cannot reverbalize intention, at least not apart from the information one gathers from observing works of art" (24). An excellent example of this conception is provided by Anselm Kiefer in a discussion of the significance of his work. On the origin of his paintings and sculpture he said, "It begins in

the dark after an intense experience, a shock […] At first it is an urge, a pounding. You don't know what it is, but it compels you to act. At first, it is very vague. It must be vague, otherwise it would just be a visualisation of the shock experience."[7] This compulsion, in Luhmann's analysis, initiates "a new series of operations [which] starts from a self-created difference […]. It (somehow) selects one of an infinite number of possible distinctions in order to constrain the work's further construction" (29). The artwork develops through this process of selecting among all the possible distinctions which come to mind as a consequence of reflecting on and following through the manifold possibilities inherent in the originating motive.

The cognitive capability on which the creation of an artwork depends is termed intuition:

> the thesis of the primacy of perception in consciousness includes imagined perception, that is, the self-induced simulation of perception. In the following, we shall call this type of perception *intuition* (Anschauung). Intuition is commonly defined by its utilization of such media as space and time. It implies a double move – and this distinguishes perception from intuition – a transcending of what is immediately given in perception toward the *constitution of spatial and temporal horizons* and an *erasure of information concerning its own spatial/temporal location*. Only in the form of intuition does art acquire the possibility of constructing imaginary worlds within the life-world while remaining dependent on triggering perceptions (not least, the reading of texts) (7; author's emphasis).

The artwork thus achieves object status, like the objects of the given world, but as the outcome of a creative act which has its origin in a motive, the implications of which are as unknown to the artist at that originary moment as they are to the reader/viewer at the moment of first perceiving the artwork. Furthermore, the materiality of the work is constituted by its drawing upon the formal and medial resources of art, the source of its "individual features". In these ways, the artwork is both of and in the real world while constituting another, imaginary world.

3.2.1.2 Fictionality

The analogy with given world objects is not (any longer) the result of conceptions of the artwork as imitating or representing the world, and therefore as having a secondary relation to reality. Instead, the modern artwork

> establishes a reality of its own that differs from ordinary reality. And yet, despite the work's perceptibility, despite its undeniable reality, it simultaneously constitutes another reality, the meaning of which is imaginary or fictional. […] Only when a reality "out there" is distinguished from fictional reality can one observe one side from the perspective of the other. Language and religion both accomplish such a doubling, which allows us to identify the given world *as real*. Art adds a new twist to this detour, which leads via the imagination away from and back to reality – art realizes itself in the realm of perceptible objects. Any other doubling of reality can be copied into the imaginary reality of the world of art - the doubling of reality and dream, for example, of reality and play, of reality and illusion, even of reality and art (142-143; author's emphasis).

There is, therefore, a fundamentally different value to be attributed to the role of fiction than that encapsulated in the traditional binary, truth/fiction:

> Only within a differentiated distinction between a real and a fictional, imagined reality can a specific relation to reality emerge, for which art seeks different forms – whether to "imitate" what reality does not show (its essential forms, its Ideas, its divine perfection), to "criticize" reality for what it does not want to admit (its shortcomings, its "class rule," its commercial orientation), or to affirm reality by showing that its representation succeeds, in fact, succeeds so well that creating the work of art and looking at it is a delight. The concepts imitation/critique/affirmation do not exhaust the possibilities. Another intent might address the observer as an individual and contrive a situation where he faces reality (and ultimately himself) and learns how to observe it in ways he could never learn in real life. One thinks here particularly of the novel.

> The novel is an imitation that, rather than referring to reality directly, copies one imaginary reality into another such reality (143).

This succinct history of the functions of art through its various forms is given a different, evolutionary perspective when Luhmann argues that art is enabled more completely to fulfil its social function "to the extent that it emancipates itself from externally imposed or outwardly directed purposes (for example, of a religious, political, or pedagogical nature). Whatever is produced 'artificially' provokes the question: 'What's the point?'" (23). This question does not determine its own answer, but orients the reader/viewer towards opening an enquiry into the possible meanings of a work. The open-endedness of the question, and the creation of a fictional reality which distinguishes artworks from other kinds of objects, support the view that "art tests arrangements that are at once fictional and real in order to show society, from a position within society, that things could be done differently" (313). Such testing is accomplished by making a "detour […] via the imagination" which places the issue of fiction in a relation to another binary pair, actuality and potentiality, invoking the difference of the real from the possible in the context of an orientation of the artwork towards the future. The openness of the artwork is itself a direct consequence of the indeterminacy of its creation and formal evolution, and this becomes a most important characteristic in modernity: "Art exemplifies a situation in which the future, no longer guaranteed by the past, has become unpredictable" (309). Artworks can draw their material from anywhere in the past of art in the process of condensing potentiality into form and composing a fictional reality. Luhmann insists that the function of fiction is intimately concerned with understanding reality: "Fictionality still presupposes the possibility of discovering what the world is really like, so that fiction can offer a fitting description" (290). In this sense, like the artwork, reality is emergent by means of the differences art offers to perception and the formation of meaning. As he observes in another context, in modernity "the world" becomes reconceived as an "unreachable horizon that retreats further with each operation, without ever holding out the prospect of an outside" (92), a condition exemplified by the artwork which achieves in its formal closure a "unique, circular accumulation of meaning" (120) and yet cannot foreclose on its interpretation.

3.2.1.3 Mediality and Communication

The distinctive point of origin for an artwork is a self-created difference, a mark which generates "the difference between 'marked' and 'unmarked' space" (29) -which is also the difference between the semiosphere and the given world - and the experience of being "plunged into the open, undetermined space of a medium's possibilities" (153). A critical aspect of the materiality or thingness of the artwork is the medium which materialises the marked space brought into existence by the artist's motive and the forms of the marks employed as the work develops. It is striking that Luhmann does not, in his extended analysis of the medium/form distinction as it applies to woks of art, refer to the now conventional twentieth century media technologies. Instead, his examples of media include light, sound, language, writing, paint, a theatre stage, a sheet of paper, stone, metal, the human body, space and time; his examples of forms include words, utterances, narratives, genres, theories, truths, postures and movements of the human body in theatre and dance, tones and styles.[8]

He argues that the medium/form distinction is of particular significance in understanding the nature of art because it identifies the two most general components of an artwork and their integral relation to one another, so integral that "the medium can be observed only via forms, never as such" (106). A medium shapes what can be done with it; a form generated in a medium can enlarge the possibilities inherent in that medium. The interactivity of medium and form in the work of the artist is generative of the work, not by rule but by the mutual stimulus of motive, medium and form as the work evolves in imaginative time and space (113). A fine example is Powers' evocation in *Orfeo* of Messiaen's writing his *Quartet for the End of Time*: "Messiaen […] slips back into the spell of patterned sounds. He needs nothing else – only notes, added pitch by pitch towards some obscure whole. As summer dies and fall follows it into extinction, something begins to fill the empty pages: a quartet from beyond all seasons" (110-111). This composing together of medium and form is the source of the artwork's newness, its unpredictability, and its difference from given world objects to which it is otherwise aligned as a real thing in the world: "art is neither a sign for something else nor the mere form of the material" (120). Instead, "The work of art is an ostentatiously improbable occurrence" (153), one

outcome among many possible outcomes of the generative relation between form and medium.

What I am calling mediality is a critically differentiating feature between given world objects and artworks, and brings into the foreground the play of signs as differences, not as referents, in the constitution of the work. Luhmann encapsulates these characterisitics in a discussion of medium as form: "a medium – the material of which the artwork is crafted, the light it breaks, or the whiteness of the paper from which figures or letters emerge – can be used as form, provided that this form succeeds in fulfilling a differentiating function in the work. In contrast to natural objects, an artwork's material participates in the formal play of the work and is thereby acknowledged as form. The material is allowed to appear as material; it does not merely resist the imprint of form. Whatever serves as medium becomes form once it makes a difference, once it gains an informational value owing exclusively to the work of art" (109). In these ways, the medium/form distinction serves to highlight the challenge offered by the work as a semiotic object uniquely positioned in real time and space, that is, the challenge to render it intelligible in the social medium of meaning, to decipher it (126). Luhmann affirms that "the art system is a special system of social communication" (128).

3.2.1.4 Meaning and Knowledge

In its composition and reception, then, the artwork is emergent for both the artist and the reader: it constitutes "an eventlike process that can realize itself only in time. […] With respect to the operativity of its observation, the artwork must be a temporally abstracted structure. It is a program for repeated usage which – like today's complex computer programs – blocks access to what is actually going on during the execution of the operation. To put it differently, the artwork itself offers no clue as to what happens in the process of understanding the work" (43-44). Instead, what matters is what the artwork as a medium of communication makes it possible for both its creator and its readers/viewers to perceive and understand, which is not any one determined meaning because of the connotative character of the marks employed to create the work and "the diffuse heterogeneity of observer perspectives" (49). As in any other communication, "Communication occurs

whenever the utterance of an information is understood – which may result in acceptance or rejection, consensus or dissent. Moreover, communication through art is not concerned with automating understanding. Rather, it is inherently ambiguous" (39). The common resource is the medium of meaning, which Luhmann decribes as the "most general medium that makes both psychic and social systems possible and is essential to their functioning" (107). Meaning is a semantic formation "constituted by the distinction between actuality and potentiality (or between the real as momentarily given and as possibility)" (107), a distinction which occurs "at the heart of experience and communication" (139) and which I have previously discussed in the form of the speculative question, "what if?". Meaning, unlike formal knowledge, is "bound to a certain point in time […] As a self-reproducing (autopoietic) process, meaning must always begin with the actual, a historically given situation" (107-8) but move into the contingent realm of the possible. A particular function of art in the production of meaning derives from its creation of fictional realities through which possibilities are actualised, with the effect that "Art radicalizes the difference between the real and the merely possible in order to show through works of its own that even in the realm of possibility there is order after all" (145). Not just one order, but a variety of possible orders discovered in the process of creating artworks and the production of new meaning based on them: "art projects a society as yet unable to experience and describe itself adequately" (145).

By grounding his conception of the artwork in the primacy of perception in human cognition, Luhmann does not claim that the artwork is itself knowledge. He observes that, "While thought is highly aware of its obligation toward intersubjective agreement […] perceptions are intersubjectively different and always new" (39). What it may contribute to knowledge is a function of its reception and interpretation, the work of understanding performed by a reader or viewer and which is exposed to others by being verbalised. The artwork "distinguishes itself from verbal communication in that it operates in the medium of perception or intuition without drawing on the specific potential of language to produce meaning" (25). This does not mean that artworks are only composed of (combinations of) visual, auditory, and tactile components, whether static or in motion. Of poetry he writes that "A poem's 'message' does not allow for paraphrase,

nor can it be summarized in a proposition that can be true or false. Rather, connotations, not denotations, mediate its meaning. […] words are used as a *medium,* rather than for the purpose of expressing an unambiguous denotative meaning" (25). A general characteristic of artworks is the reversal of normal expectations about efficiency in communication: "art aims to *retard* perception and render it *reflexive* – lingering on the object in visual art (in striking contrast to everyday perception) and slowing down reading in literature" (14). Furthermore, "deliberate indeterminacies play a significant role, particularly in artistically mediated consciousness to the point where we find ourselves confronted by the hopelessly unending interpretability of 'finished' works" (11-12).

In modernity and postmodernity, the key constituents of the artwork are its difference initiated by a motive, its use of the polysemous capabilities of signs, forms and media (that is, its use of the resources of the semiosphere, including its intertextuality and multimediality) to create a singular and new fictional reality, and its intent to communicate. Its primary function is to impel the discovery of more of reality by exploring what is possible by "extend[ing] the realm of communication beyond what can be put into words" (18). Nonetheless, neither this intent nor this function can be accomplished except by a return to language: "Art can only exist when there is language – this is less trivial than it sounds. […] the artwork […] only comes into being by virtue of recursive networking with other works of art, with widely distributed verbal communications about art, with technically reproducible copies, exhibitions, museums, theatres, buildings, and so forth. […] One turns to the medium of language while retaining art and its works as a topic" (22, 53). Luhmann's book is a perfect exemplar of the way in which artworks are generative of knowledge not limited to art itself but extensive to reality as it is and might be. The contribution of the artwork to knowledge is indirect and unpredictable because it occurs through the agency of the reader/viewer: "In creating a double of reality from which reality can be observed, the artwork can leave it to the observer to overcome this split – whether in an idealizing, critical, or affirmative manner, or by […] discovering and realizing various possibilities of order on the basis of an increasing freedom and a growing distance vis-a-vis an established reality" (143-144).

Faced with the historical evolution of diverse forms of art, and especially the difference between literary works and those composed in non-linguistic media, Luhmann raises the question whether a unified theory of artistic kinds is possible. His answer is in the affirmative, grounded in an analysis which is very important for my argument about the need to bring cultural policy into the foreground of public policy thinking. As he points out, "Even today, the notion of a unified art system meets with sceptical resistance, mainly because of manifest differences among the arts, especially when it comes to the question of whether or not literature ought to be considered a part of the art system" (179). My exposition of Luhmann's theory of the artwork is altogether aimed towards identifying a uniquely significant social function for artworks in all media in the formation of new meaning and knowledge, however the process of that formation is culturally and historically influenced. Luhmann argues that "What presents itself to observation in the form of art is an independent contribution to communication that cannot be translated into any other medium. […] What is at stake is not a problem to be solved once and for all but a provocation – the provocation of a search for meaning that is constrained by the work of art without necessarily being determined in its results" (24). This emphasis upon the artwork as a medium of communication for the formation of new meaning, a work possessing formal order but open to multiple interpretations, is encapsulated in a single sentence definition of the medium of art: "This medium is the improbability of the combinatory structure of form that art wrests from everyday life and that refers the observer to other observers" (128). The communicational circuit instantiated by the artwork constitutes a social relation among its community of readers/viewers which is productive of knowledge; it is in their work of verbalising to one another the perceptions generated by the artwork that society becomes able more fully to comprehend itself and to begin to comprehend the forms of its possible futures.

3.3 Discovery by Art

For Luhmann, in the theory and social function of the arts "the real issue (as postclassical music and painting demonstrate) is the general problem of fictionality, the exclusive rule of art over the difference between reality and fictionality" (179). His analysis identifies, as I am attempting to do, how fictionality is fundamental to understanding the evolution of postmodern

societies, and how re-thinking the existence of artworks and their ability "to discover onward things more remote from our knowledge" should impel a profound shift in current ways of thinking about the origins of new knowledge. I have referred now three times in this discussion to Richard Powers' novel, *Orfeo*, because it provides a brilliant exemplification of Luhmann's analysis of the cultural and social functions of the novel as a genre and of his reference to music as evidence of his argument for the core function of fictionality. Pertinent here is the composer Peter Els's recollection of his first major composition, a setting of the concluding lines of Whitman's "Song of Myself" which marked his shift at university from chemistry to music:

> He studies the words for days, listening to the sounds contained in them. Then the phonemes and accents led him forward. Note by note, phrase by phrase, he relived that picnic in the snow: the sun low in the sky through the bones of an oak, promising some hidden continuance, and that shivering girl holding a thermos in her mittened cellist's fingers, challenging him with a few chanted and expanding words […] Each measure he wrote changed the ones he'd already written, and he felt them all, already being altered by the unformed noises of the years to come. […] He stole from Mahler, to be sure: the blurred boundary between major and minor. The shaky key regions that wheeled off, before the end, into wildness. A spinning waltz, a distant brass band. Slow ascent tumbling down in a heartbeat, only to climb again in a reprieve of the next measure. All the individual components had a familiar air. But the thing as a whole never quite existed before Peter wrote it down (61-63).

Motive, medium, form, the past of music providing materials for something new in music drawn from the realms of experience and the possible and made actual in performance, whether imagined by reading the score or by hearing the work performed. Powers does not offer an interpretation of the work, and Els makes no claims for its meaning. But the imaginative space which it creates takes its composer and its listeners into a fictional reality from within which what Luhmann calls "established reality" (144) can be reflected upon. What might be discovered as knowledge from this shift of

position is the articulate work of reader/viewers, whatever knowledge base they might individually bring to their experience of the work.

My overall argument proposes that the work of discovery initiated by an artwork is carried on by anyone who reflects on their experience of artworks and endeavours to communicate those reflections to others in the vast networks constituting postmodern society. But there is also an expert dimension to this thoughtful work. Here, too, is the reason why it is the artwork which most completely opens the way to the creation of knowledge in a new humanities. Luhmann notes that "When art is considered to be a sign, thinking of art in terms of its uniqueness becomes an option, and when art is understood to be a form combination, uniqueness becomes an imperative – enforced by the mode of production and by the requirements of understanding" (168). The formal work of the humanities, textual interpretation, is most fully exemplified when the meanings generated by the "open-ended multiplicity of possible connections" (104) among the signs, forms and media composing an artwork are verbalised with the intent of making the discoveries of artists available to thought and knowledge. The move to fiction allows form to be given to what is possible and the meanings of that form to be engaged in the critical and reflexive work of thinking society towards its better futures.

4. Poetics

Aesthetic texts are always already fully within culture. They reflect humanity and our knowledge of the world back to ourselves in ways impossible to science. They draw from collective knowledge, using the sign repertoires of language, image and sound as these have been culturally elaborated throughout human time, and from our inherent capability to reflect on ourselves and our circumstances hypothetically, speculatively. They take us mentally out of ourselves in order to bring us back, but somewhere else.

By employing any combination of elements from the range of available sign systems and media modalities, they can challenge not only conventional forms of imagination but also the established rules (the grammars) for combining these elements into forms productive of knowledge. For Bernstein

(2011: 73), “In contrast to the syllogistic rationality of expository writing, poetics is situational, shifts with the winds, courts contradiction, feeds on inconsistency.” Aesthetic texts adopt fictionality as a mode of cognition, and address society (and the given world through society) in political terms, that is, terms which compose facts and values together.[9] Poetics is a general term for the theory of the composition of texts, which are produced from the matter of other texts and the semiotic and media systems available to a society and are designed to involve or shape a reader’s emotional and imaginative as well as cognitive engagement. It is thus a theory of, or rules for, a certain kind of communication between human beings.[10] Although it would be normal to exclude scientific texts from poetics, regarding that as proper to the creative arts, such an exclusion is as inappropriate from the perspective of a new humanities as is the view that science is culturally neutral. A poetics of scientific texts, for example, would include prescriptions for objectivity, denotative language, realistic images, diagrams and tables, mathematical expressions, exclusion of metaphor, the use of the passive voice. Descriptive terms like clear, lucid, transparent, rational, and methodical would identify an aesthetics of controlled emotion and disciplined subjectivity; a medium (print book, film, TV programme, web page etc) would be employed in such a way that the object of the scientific enquiry would be made present to the reader as such and as though the singular person of the researcher was as dissociated from the research results as are the technologies employed in the research and in its communication. Similar descriptive terms and most of the prescriptions outlined above would apply in a poetics of the modern (but not postmodern) humanities, as they adapted discursively to the conceptions of scholarly communication defining scientific method, discourse and publication conventions, and the poetics of print media news reporting.

A fine example of the difference between referring and signifying is offered by Gass using the example of a statue, the most physically real of aesthetic texts. The statue is like a world in the void of space, a text in the void of the semiosphere considered as the invisible but real dimension of the real world opened up by human thought, rather than a person in the richness of their local space-time context:

> On the other side of a novel lies the void. Think for instance, of a striding statue; imagine the purposeful inclination of the torso, the

> alert and penetrating gaze of the head and its eyes, the outstretched arm and pointing finger; everything would appear to direct us toward some goal in front of it. Yet your eye travels only to the finger's end, and not beyond. Though pointing, the finger bids us stay instead, and we journey slowly back along the tension of the arm. In our hearts we know what actually surrounds the statue. The same surrounds every work of art: empty space and silence (1970: 49).

By invoking the sign repertoire (or cultural inventory) of a viewer, the sculpture brings into play cultural values and meanings which are given real presence by being embodied in action.[11] Furthermore, none of the values – purposeful, alert, penetrating – are "in the real", and their meanings are not necessarily only or universally good. All it takes for the statue to be identified as a representation of a tyrant, and the statue will communicate (to someone subject to or aware of tyranny) threat, control and surveillance. Gass's context for the statue of the void (instanced physically as a gallery or other display space distinct from everyday social space) does not so much argue for the dissociation of the aesthetic object from reality as for its locating in the physical real the existence of that which is otherwise hidden and invisible, the cultural systems of value and meaning which constitute and structure social and political reality.

Just as the possibilities of art have changed with the invention of new media technologies as one component of massive social and cultural changes over the past two hundred years (for example, Benjamin (1970) and Nichols' (2000) reframing of Benjamin's analysis), so the meaning of the term poetics (like the term writing) has widened to embrace the kinds of texts distinctive to these media, however much they share features with earlier forms (for example, narrative fiction in print, the novel, and in the theatre (especially in the form of the opera) becomes the movie, the television series, and now electronic literature), as it has also widened to include the new disciplines formed by the study of the textual products of these media technologies.

Is there a kind of textual object which, more than any other, opens the possibility of innovation and the discovery of new (that is, transformative) knowledge by the humanities complementary to science and of the same

fundamental value to human social evolution? I have already argued that the boundaries (or horizons!) of the academic humanities have had to expand in order to bring these new media within the scope of the intellectual work of the university; what I want to develop here is the claim that the most exemplary form of the aesthetic text remains the poem. The poem's exemplarity consists (in so far as it does) to the extent that it persists as a linguistic artefact, whatever the surface on which it is inscribed and however any specific media technology contributes to the effects of the poem, which are both cognitive and affective, constituting a mental event which can be productive of other events in other times and places, and knowledge in the I-space. It is there, in the interactive environment of minds, institutions, politics, cultures, histories and texts, that new humanistic knowledge is formulated and expounded, and the most complex form initiating this humanistic knowledge work is the poem.

4.1 Poetics and the Poem

I have argued to this point that, within the accumulated contents of the semiosphere, there are many different kinds of texts which can be grouped in various ways according to distinguishing features, for example, mediality (whether a text suppresses or reflexively engages with its medium), fictionality (whether a text erases from or embeds in its work the imaginative, affective and moral formation of the singular mind which has thought and written it into existence), and rhetoricity (the academic discourse conventions which signal a particular positioning in expert intellectual work, and all the other generic conventions governing the social production and reception of discourse). If the humanities discipline which could position itself most closely to the sciences and the dominant communication medium of print in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was history, then I would argue that a new humanities, occasioned in principle by humanity's entry to postmodernity from the mid-twentieth century, is to be derived from locating the theory and practice of mediality/textuality at its heart. Because "media studies" is a narrower term of reference typically applied to mass media, and because the advent of networked digital ICTs has dramatically diversified the opportunities for text creation, a theoretical foundation is needed which embraces all media and all kinds of text (the contents of the semiosphere, not ranked according to any criterion of value). If bibliography

is the name for the theory and practice of mediality/textuality in the era of print, a new name is needed. Since I have argued in Chapter Two for expanding the meaning of "text" to refer to any object in any medium using any system of inscription, and terms like textography and mediography already have established uses, "text studies" will have to do as a placeholder. Textonomy (Aarseth 1997) is an attractive possibility, but the scope of the term text is limited.[12]

Within text studies there are many subsets, reflecting the evolutionary history of media technologies, sign systems, contexts of creation and modes of publication, and discipline formation in the humanities. But the subset I wish to focus on, and break down further, is distinguished by singularity of authorship, reflexivity in respect of its medium, and a capacity to displace a reader's/viewer's/hearer's normalised world construction with another imagined and possible world. I would call this literature, if "literature" were to be understood as the writing out, and the reinventing through fiction and interpretation or critique, of culture and subjectivity in their most complex and subtle dimensions, in any medium of representation. However skilfully the scenic values and other aspects of world construction are designed and composed, it is language which permits us to locate and express most fully the meanings of what we are shown and told. By means of such texts a writer or reader engages with culture as such, and in its relations with the material world; that is, literature engages with humanity as such, as the collective producer of the diversities of knowledge, meaning and value which is the truly distinctive contribution humans make as a part of the ecology of the Earth. But the term literature has remained fixed by the media used originally in the formation of its texts, namely, written language and print, and the institutionalising of the texts of the print medium as the true type of formal knowledge (so that "literature" can refer to texts written with a high degree of consciousness of form, genre, linguistic style and aesthetic effect, or narrative fictional texts, or published knowledge in any academic or professional field). So, for example, to refer to literary texts created in hypertextual or other digital formats, it is currently usual to refer to e-literature or hypertext fiction; and other narrative fictions are distinguished by the medium in which they are instantiated (theatre, opera, film, TV series, videogame[13]). Furthermore, the proponents of virtual reality conceptions of new media, by emphasising the value of media as their capacity to achieve

the audiovisual effect of perceived physical reality, disguise the designs which all media forms have on their readers and which are implemented rhetorically and mentally. I therefore take “Literature” here to refer to those academic disciplines at the heart of which is the study of narrative fictional texts in any medium, but it must also include any text in which the application of the formal and aesthetic potentials of the letter understood as a signfying mark are significant factors in its composition and the efects of meaning it can achieve.

All of the texts in the subset covered by the term literature as I have extended its scope perform to varying degrees a function crucial to innovation; they create the possibility of some kind of transformation of the real by stimulating (and simulating) transformations in thinking, by placing their readers in a suspended relation to the real occasioned by the human ability to formulate speculative scenarios of the kind “what if?” or “not yet”. But there is a further reduction I wish to make, to bring the work of transformation as close as possible to thought as such, which I take to be represented most fully by written language using abstract notation systems – alphanumeric, ideographic, musical - and formal grammatical, syntactical and generic rules of combination. Even here there is a further distinction to make, based on the singularity of the personal origin of thought and a reflexive relation to the conventions governing the use of sign systems for the communication of thought. The kind of text capable of possessing all of these characteristics is the poem, and I will seek to show how, in our time, it is the poem which provides the most complex and articulated opening to the formulation of innovative knowledge by the methods of a new humanities, “new” because to take the poem as the exemplary instance of the artwork as a source of new knowledge challenges the double value associated in the modern humanities as well as the sciences with the real and the objective as guarantors of truth in the processes of knowledge formation and validation.

4.1.1 An origin

Proposing to build the case for the importance of knowledge creation by a new humanities on poetry will undoubtedly seem incredible, including to many in the academic humanities. But I believe (while granting a bias inherent to my own context of English literary studies) that it is only by

pressing as far as possible towards what locates the ground of claims that the humanities have and can create knowledge of enduring value and innovative effect that a conception of the humanities to-come possessing equality with the claims for techno-science in its diverse disciplinary expressions can be formulated.

An opening which brings ancient traditions of thought to bear on the present can be found in the reflections of an Indian novelist and programmer, Vikram Chandra, who exemplifies in his writing the proposition that "The world is a web, a net, as is each human being nested within the world, holding other worlds within" (2013: 166). These worlds for Chandra include Indian literature and literary theory, British colonial culture, modern and postmodern Western literature, and a "contemporary American culture of programming" (61). As a result of attending a reading in New York by Indian poets on tour he began to explore the traditions of Indian literary theory; this dimension of his cultural inheritance provided the way to a different understanding of the relations between the two kinds of writing, particularly how far an analogy between programming and literature can be taken. Chandra quotes from the Rig Veda: "Language cuts forms in the ocean of reality" (167), which points to a problem at the heart of his discussion investigated by ninth century CE Indian theorists of "the Sanskrit cosmopolis": "how the effects of a language can escape language itself" (221). In respect of poetry, this question impels an enquiry into "how poetry moves across the borders of bodies and selves, and […] how consciousness uses and is reconstructed by poetry, how poetry expands within the self and allows access to the unfathomably vast, to that which cannot be spoken." For programming, he argues that emphasising traditional literary qualities like elegance "says nothing about the ability of code to materialize logic. […] Code is uniquely kinetic. It acts and interacts with itself, with the world. In code, the mental and the material are one. Code moves. It changes the world" (221). The common factor, then, linking the writing of code with the writing of fiction is that both "are explorations of process, of the unfolding of connections" (239). They make the as yet unknown available to knowledge, giving culturally inflected forms to what is emergent in our human attempts to understand and modify the world in which we live.

Chandra's book is a striking exemplification of humanistic thought in practice. In a move determined by my own literacy and characteristic of humanistic method, I intend to recover a text which engaged the same problematic over 400 years ago, Sir Philip Sidney's *An Apology for Poetry* (1595), and then to link its arguments with those of Alain Badiou, a philosopher in the Platonic tradition with which Sidney aligns himself. A deep continuity can be observed between our present and the founding of the modern period in Europe, notably the transition from Christian to secular humanism and its complex interactions with the development of modern science, the new dynamic represented by the social and economic roles of the city and its communication systems, and the evolution of the democratic nation state. The status of the humanities, like that of poetry, has declined dramatically during this period, especially in relation to government and the state. The claims made for them by their practitioners (however fundamental in respect of a conception of the knowledges required for the state and society to function effectively, and of their capacity to create new knowledge of value to society and the economy) have clearly had negligible effect, notably in the past 50 years and especially in the context of the knowledge politics systematically pursued by the proponents of neoliberalism.

Because the informing context for these matters is so large, historically, politically and culturally, it is worth returning to a kind of beginning comparable to that which I have signalled by taking my chapter epigraphs from Milton. A fine instance of what I have called deep continuity is to be found in Sidney's *Apology*, the first elaborated theory of poetry in English, written at the very beginnings of the modern period and the first steps in the expansion of the British empire, in which the very issues of cultural disempowerment with which modern and postmodern humanities struggle were explored in relation to the nature and cultural standing of poetry. It is also a defence of the possibility of an English literature (that is, not Literature, but the distinctive forms of that textual category which are made possible by the English language and its cultural settings), and his text is regarded as marking the beginnings of literary criticism in English.

At the foundations of the modern western order of culture, society and knowledge we can observe through Sidney's text the articulation of a structure of relations which has been progressively entrenched by scientific

and technological development and its commercial extension. Sidney noted the forces involved in terms of relations to knowledge and the role of information and communications media, in a way which was prescient not only because his argument failed in both the short and long term, but because the terms of his argument remain to be re-asserted in our present, now that the environmental and social consequences of the dominance of technocratic values and modes of thinking have become glaringly apparent.[14] By making his text present to us again, we can perceive what has become marginal in the official account postmodern science-based societies give of themselves, and why public thinking and policy should become open (again) to knowledge formulated by a new humanities from its most original source in the poem.

The theory of poetry advanced by Sidney aims at the total reversal of what he notes is the situation of "poor Poetry, which from almost the highest estimation of learning is fallen to be the laughing-stock of children" (1973: 96). Accomplishing this intention requires him to place poetry in the context of the other powerful modes of knowledge of his time, including religious knowledge. His argument clearly foreshadows the empirical, technocratic and pragmatic principles, conceptions and values on which modern western societies are now based, in research, government and economy. Specifically of the English, he writes that "Our nation hath set their hearts' delight upon action, and not upon imagination, rather doing things worthy to be written, than writing things fit to be done" (126). It also foregrounds the contest which persists in the academic humanities between literary, historical and philosophical studies, and offers a reason – in the derivation of the object of their knowledge work in the given world – why the latter two have been able to align themselves with the sciences and social sciences as these have evolved through the modern period, whereas literary studies (except, for example, in bibliography and literary history) have not. He observes that "There is no art delivered to mankind that hath not the works of Nature for his principal object, without which they could not consist, and on which they so depend, as they become actors and players, as it were, of what Nature will have set forth" (99-100). This is not an argument against, for example, the knowledge work of natural philosophers, or historians, or lawyers as such, or their accurate performance of the script nature presents them with (Sidney writes of Italian as aspiring to be a "treasure-house of science" (96), as his aspiration is for English), but it is an argument against its limitations,

which are the limitations or "narrow warrant" of nature itself. This knowledge when true is intended to "tell you what is and is not" (124), which today is one foundation of the claim for the absolute priority of scientific over other modes of knowledge formation. But for Sidney, in a characterisation which is startling because it so completely runs against current conventions, the natural sciences (including history and philosophy) are but "serving sciences" (104), means to a larger end which they cannot accomplish by themselves.

All of the knowledge Sidney is considering shares a common quality: it is expressed linguistically, and in writing. So, at the heart of his argument lies a conception of writing and authorship which is capable of being a means for generating true knowledge by transcending the limits imposed on the creators of all other kinds of knowledge by the requirement of fidelity to the real (Nature), and by what we would now call disciplinary knowledge, in which the creators of new knowledge are limited by the protocols and boundaries of a discipline field; as he puts it, they are "wrapped within the fold of the proposed subject" (102). The uniquely different kind of author is a special kind of poet, conceived of as a radical source of transformative knowledge in contrast to those poets claiming authority because their writing is grounded in religious, philosophical or historical knowledge. Two classical terms, prophet and maker, capture the defining qualities of this poet's creative knowledge work, which are summarised in two descriptions: the poet "borrow[s] nothing of what is, hath been, or shall be; but range[s], only reined with learned discretion, into the divine consideration of what may be and should be" (102), and, "disdaining […] subjection [to Nature], lifted up with the vigour of his own invention, doth grow in effect into another nature, making things either better than Nature bringeth forth, or, quite anew" (100). Poets are "makers of themselves, not takers of others" (131); "whereas other arts retain themselves within their subjects, and receive, as it were, their being from it, the poet only bringeth his own stuff, and doth not learn a conceit out of a matter, but maketh matter for a conceit" (120). Sidney is assisted in developing his conception of the poet by the Christian conception of God as maker and its consequence, that we are capable of knowing "what perfection is" (101). The object of representation is "the *Idea* or fore-conceit of the work" (101), which the poet discovers by "freely ranging only within the zodiac of his own wit" (100), governed by "no law but wit" (102).

This radical claim for the superiority of knowledge created poetically by a singular mind crossing the boundaries between the actual and the possible, generating new concepts by generating from the singular resources of that mind the intellectual matter from which they can be drawn, is of profound significance as a corrective to the now exclusive claims of scientific method to be the only valid source of new knowledge. Against such claims it proposes a singular origin for new knowledge in one resourceful mind exploring in thought and language beyond the limits to the collective knowledge work of those bound to Nature or the real, which is part of the resource available to the poet. This is not to privilege individualism or subjectivity over collective interests, so that the experience, sensations and perceptions of the poet are affirmed and expressed in a private and subjective space protected against the powers of the state, society and its institutions. Critical to this conception is the freedom to innovate (Sidney's term is "invention") given by following where the mind leads, and especially into the domain of what can be imagined as possible futures and moral transformations because of what thought can do and language can express. Its difference lies in the conception of humanity as not only part of nature, but also as its supplement, and it is in this kind of poetry that distinctive attributes and capacities of humanity are most fully realised.

The humanistic context which so fully informs Sidney's thinking is integral to the specific conception of the work of poetry and the poet as he formulates it, but it is a context which postmodern western societies need urgently to recover. Just as the singularity of the poet's exercise of thought is a necessary condition for creating knowledge of value, so the immediate use of that knowledge is singular, in the enhancing of "the knowledge of a man's self, in the ethic and politic consideration, with the end of well-doing and not well-knowing only" (104). Social action on the basis of this knowledge is as much a test of the quality of the person deriving knowledge from the poem, as the idea and its expression by the poem is a test of the quality of the poet's mind. Not surprisingly, the human activity for which knowledge creation (and specifically poetry) is most important is education. As Sidney writes, "this purifying of wit, this enriching of memory, enabling of judgment, and enlarging of conceit, which commonly we call learning" (104) connects the individual to social betterment through "virtuous action" (104), "justice being the chief of virtues" (106). How reductive the present emphasis on

education for economic development is in comparison to this humanistic conception of the person acting knowledgably, morally and politically in the interests of achieving a more just society, that is, a society capable of achieving more of what we can know and imagine of what it means to be human in the given world.

Sidney's conception of the ideal type of the poem and poet brings together a theory of knowledge and cognition and the linguistic and aesthetic forms which have evolved to express the work of the mind. He leaves the discovery of new knowledge of the real (Nature) to those whose work it is, drawing upon it but without conceding authority to it; instead, it is the poet who has "all, from Dante's heaven to his hell, under the authority of his pen" (111). As a resource for the work of the poet, existing knowledge is transformed in two ways, one linking imagination and fiction, the other the skilful use of artistically composed language to shape a reader's reception of a poem. Both focus on affecting the mind by using media forms to open a mental space in which mental events can set up a critical relation to real world events. The space constituted by the poem is the space of "what if?", the space in which "what may be and should be" can be explored, the space in which our humanity as the cultural supplement expanding the real can be engaged, and it is opened by employing the cognitive instruments of language and image.

The irony of the position as it is stated here is that what Sidney regards as "serving sciences", bound to the real, now claim to have fully occupied this mental space, and that the knowledges they represent signify the supplement that humanity brings to nature. The crucial difference lies in the term fiction and its now entrenched cultural significance as, firstly, entertainment (which is where it achieves some recognition in economic and cultural policy), and secondly, as a mode of representation incapable of producing knowledge with evidential or probative value. In one respect, this characterisation of fiction is now based on a profound misrecognition; as I have already noted, science and technology as a knowledge project with material outcomes has in many of its domains adopted "what may be and should be" as the informing principle of research and its application. In other words, fiction as the term for thinking about what could become real is integral to post-industrial societies and their economies. But Sidney also imposed a crucial

qualification on such fictions; if they exclude consideration of the moral implications of what they imagine and bring into existence, then the outcomes of the mental work done to think them into existence are fundamentally defective. He also answered the objection that the imagination is not a means to valid knowledge when he offered the test which is also in a different way offered by science and technology. Knowledge created by formulating and communicating thought fictionally is to be validated by observable practice. The poet does not "build castles in the air" (101); the imagined world of the poem is not an end in itself but can effect actual change in the real world.

As I have noted already, Sidney's theory of the effective transmission and application of knowledge worth having is educational; his argument that poetry is both the best medium and the best modality for this purpose is based on the view that learning does not occur if it is not desired by the learner, and imitation of ideas through social action cannot occur unless the learner's mind (and especially memory) is actively engaged. It is not just a matter of passive imitation of a model vividly described, because the realm of the idea and the realm of action are not equivalent. The first stage of learning from the poem is learning "how and why that maker" created the model/idea presented by the poem; it is the second stage where the contingency of time and place imposes a crucial requirement on the reader and a limit on the scope for direct effect of the poem. Sidney advises the reader to "use the narration but as an imaginative ground plot of a profitable invention" (124), which I take to mean that the embodiment in action of the idea formulated by the poem requires each reader, by engaging their knowledge, insight and experience with the idea of the poem, to translate the model/ idea into appropriate but singular action. Enactment of the idea of the poem is both a translation and an interpretation of the informing concept by its readers, involving momentary decisions to act by embodying the idea in specific situations at specific moments in time; the idea is multiplied and modified in the world and by this human medium can change the character of a society.

The educative power of the poem lies in its double capability, stimulating the imagining of fictional worlds and encouraging their translation into the real through human action energised and focussed by the poet's linguistic skill: "if reading be foolish without remembering, memory being the only treasurer of

knowledge, those words which are fittest for memory are likewise most convenient for knowledge. […] the words (besides their delight, which hath a great affinity to memory) being so set as one word cannot be lost but the whole work fails" (122). Although a poem for Sidney is a written artefact (123), he typically imagines poetic communication as oral speech using narrative form to construct imaginable working models of ideal or true human thought and social action. Hence his definition of poetry as "an art of imitation […] a representing, counterfeiting, or figuring forth – to speak metaphorically, a speaking picture – with this end, to teach and delight" (101). The poem presents to the "eyes of the mind" (99) subjectively what the new audiovisual media of the past century now present objectified on a screen. In one respect this is but a confirmation and extension of Sidney's emphasis on a story-telling medium capable of vividly replicating our visual relation to the world. But in another it affirms his view that the medium principally able to accomplish this end is written language ("to speak metaphorically"), the medium of thought and knowledge in its modality of poetry (Opie, 1988).

Sidney observes that a poem may traditionally use regular verse forms, relating them to neoclassical conceptions of rational order and the function of number in nature, but they are not essential (121-122). Any medium which is used to accomplish personal and social transformation through the imaginative, subjective, moral and aesthetically affecting exploration of alternative models of human living is in that use functioning poetically. And, since Sidney's model poem is one which narrates human thought, feeling and action in simulated events designed to provide imitable and attractive models of perfected humanity, his poetics can apply to and be used to discriminate among the productions of the whole panoply of narrative multi-media forms developed since his time, and most specifically in the twentieth century.

A powerful desire manifested in modern media evolution is the achievement of the technological means to render with absolute visual fidelity either the real or the imagined as though it were real, one to which he attested when he praised writing that could represent "virtues, vices, passions so in their own natural seats laid to the view, that we seem not to hear of them, but clearly see through them" (108). The wonder now is the picture, not that it speaks - reversing Eve's astonishment before the speaking serpent in the Garden of

Eden. This displacement of language by the image (another instance of knowledge politics at work) is at the core of the problem of the humanities in the postmodern knowledge economy in that they, in their full disciplinary integrity, only speak, whatever the media modality of the objects they interrogate. The desire for media which can represent the real as we see it is as old as the representational arts, and it is the past century which has evolved those media to their present extraordinary levels of capability – but in a manner typically consistent with the progressivist, scientific framing of knowledge and conceptions of the real which dominated the culture and motivations of that century. The shift from epic poetry to the prose novel and then the cinema as culturally dominant narrative fictional forms is also a shift towards increasing conformity with the conventions of realist representation, a criterion shared with science and history. One of the remarkable aspects of twentieth century media evolution is that Sidney's definition of poetry applies with uncomfortable pertinence most fully to television advertising, literally speaking pictures employing fictional micro-narratives which aim to inform and sell by modelling desire and invoking values using aesthetic means.

Given that twentieth-century media and their continuing evolution through digital media have fully exploited the power of the medium to shape viewers' knowledge of themselves and the world they live in, and their behaviour in that world, based on advanced scientific knowledge of the interaction of knowledge, desire, and self-concepts in human action (which nonetheless supports the same understanding of human cognition that Sidney made the basis of his poetics), the difference lies in the purposes and ends of this use of media power. For Sidney, it is the coming into being of a just and humane society, grounded in individual knowledge of what could be and given collective form by means of individually motivated decisions and actions in a specific time and place. He would understand, because he understood the effects of "infected will" and material self-interest, why such a potent force and integral capability in human societies could be perverted from that aim, to serve the exploitative interests and will to control of powerful people and organisations.

The poetic power of the medium must be married to a singular mind possessed by the highest conceptions of human capability for its power to

produce the kinds of learning which Sidney understands to be critical in social evolution and which has the fullest achievement of human potentials in society and nature as its goal. He would surely grant the title poet to at least some of the writers of science fiction, those like Philip K. Dick or Iain M. Banks or William Gibson who employ current knowledge in the creation of fictions providing their readers with the means to think humanely forward and so contribute to shaping what may be and should be in the future worlds resulting from human thought and action, and especially in that world uniquely brought into existence by human social action, the world of the city. If any postmodern actuality confirms Sidney's conception of the profound chasm between humanity's "erected wit […] and infected will" (101) and the work needed to bridge it, it must be the global city.

Science and media technologies have shifted the boundaries between kinds of knowledge and their distinguishing characteristics as Sidney could know them. The creation of that which has never existed in nature now defines the goal of science and technology, for example, in genetic engineering, space exploration, and digital information and communications technologies. But Sidney's fundamental contrast between poetry and the other professional domains of knowledge creation remains entirely relevant today. Throughout his essay, he holds fast to the criterion of personal moral quality as an integral component of knowledge work, locating the ultimate purpose of that work not in the end of knowledge for its own sake, of for power or wealth, but in the betterment of human society through the moral, intellectual and consequent civil betterment of humanity. If his assumption of universal moral values derived from European classical and Christian traditions has been displaced by conceptions of cultural difference and human rights, his humanistic anchoring of his discussion of the value and purpose of knowledge to the improvement of the quality of human living in social relations remains of critical importance to any consideration of the claims to be made for the humanities as knowledge of value.

As Sidney recognised, the problematic difference separating modern humanities disciplines, and the humanities from the sciences, has its origin in the fictionality and singularity of the objects of literary/media study and the refusal in the modern university or by government to admit evidence from the analysis of fictional objects as having probative value. Sidney's humanistic

argument challenges the current conception of society and its knowledge system created by the alignment of the techno-sciences, government, business, and the market. His model of poetic innovation emphasises the creation of socially transformative knowledge by the intellectual labour of free minds disseminated through media forms which stimulate imagination and desire for learning in their readers. It places realising the moral, social and intellectual potential of humanity in the foreground and its goal is the institution of the just society brought into being by the just acts of its citizens.

4.1.2 From the Early Modern to the Postmodern

Poetry for Sidney, when written with artistic skill by a writer singularly open to perceiving what is true in knowledge, is the most effective means of communicating "the conceits of the mind" through reading to another mind with the end of enhancing self-knowledge and stimulating civilising social action. This humanistic imperative remains fundamental to claims for the value of aesthetic texts in any medium and the textual work of the academic humanities, even while conceptions of the relations between the artist, the artwork and knowledge, and the purposes of academic research, have changed through the modern period.

I wish to contextualise Sidney's defence of poetry in a way which will demonstrate these continuities while also taking into account the shifting relationship between poetry and knowledge in postmodernity. In order to do this, I will firstly draw upon two books about poetry written by Arthur Cook and Charles Bernstein; taken together they provide perspectives which allow me to extend the core principles of Sidney's theory into the vastly changed conditions of postmodernity. Specifically, their book titles identify distinct but overlapping ways of conceiving the situation of poetry within the modern knowledge system. In *The Reach of Poetry*, after setting out a conceptual framework, Cook begins with the modern period and writes back to the beginnings of European poetry, concluding with a return to some modern poets writing in various languages, European and English. His aim is to show how poems across the whole "reach" of the European tradition achieve wisdom as their highest accomplishment, in complex interaction with each other in the mind of a reader (who can also be a poet). As he writes in opening his last chapter, "Poetry, at the quick of its expression, always

preserves as well as transmits what has gone before, not just the rhetorical postures of tradition but the processes and acts of thinking that they serve and that underlie them. For modern poetry – or poetry since Baudelaire – the range of integrative gestures is very great, but at their best they do not entail contradictions of one poet by another, even when the choices may involve exclusions" (1995: 249).

Cook's qualifications, like Sidney's, emphasise a continuity of purpose within a widening diversity of expressions which is to be understood by reference to the best instances of poetic practice throughout European history. Bernstein takes another route to a similar end, clearly expressed in his title, *Attack of the Difficult Poems: Essays and Inventions*. He identifies a situation for modern poetry which contrasts completely with Sidney's praise of poetry as that professional mode of language use which has the power to address "popular judgments" (1973: 97), based on the view that modern media have abrogated this role: "The reinvention, the making of a poetry for our time, is the only thing that makes poetry matter. And that means, literally, making poetry matter, that is making poetry that intensifies the matter or materiality of language – acoustic, visual, syntactic, semantic. Poetry is very much alive when it finds ways of doing things in a media-saturated environment that only poetry can do" (2011: 30). At their best, postmodern poems are characterised by a "high syntactic, grammatical, or intellectual activity level; elevated linguistic intensity; textual irregularities; initial withdrawal (poem not immediately available); poor adaptability (poem unsuitable for use in love letters, memorial commemoration, etc.); sensory overload; or negative mood" (4). Bernstein would agree with Cook that poems do not displace each other in the way that new knowledge in the sciences displaces earlier knowledge. Instead, he invokes a situation where each new poem (at its best) may challenge not only thought as such but thought about poetry: "While poetics brings to mind a long history of laws of composition, poetics can also stress poesis – the actual making or doing; poetry as process. Every doing carries the potential of something new, emergent, something not already predicated by poetics. Practice overtakes theory, practice changes theory" (73), a process which, when the "doing" is reading and rereading, he elsewhere refers to as "reinhabitation" (255).

“Something new, emergent, something not already predicated”. At the heart of this discussion, Sidney, Cook and Bernstein agree that the best poems possess the capability of going beyond the known. To think the thought of a postmodern poem is a reflective, deliberative, recursive process not governed by ordered narrative, the formal patterns of rhyme and metre, or the constant presence of a poet/narrator/speaker. It assumes a mode of consciousness as a flowing together of many dimensions of knowledge, experience, self-awareness, memory, association, belief, relationship with others, which has been finely characterised by DeLillo as “mindlife”: “Two near strangers in night confinement inside the laboring drone of a small car, coming out of long silences to speak abruptly, out of long thoughts and memory chains and waking dreams and every kind of mindlife, the narrative that races just behind the eyes, their words sounding clean and shaped in the empty night” (1992: 27). Like a poem, their words exist in the shared space between their private states of mind, their meaning as much a function of the hearer’s reception of them as of a deliberately formulated meaning by the speaker, an exchange in which hidden states of consciousness and incommensurate, unconnected life histories which are being composed moment by moment, are momentarily linked and mediated by a common language.

Mindlife, the condition and quality of being conscious, self-aware, sharing an external world and yet always distanced, always relating to it through the screen of a private and fluid life historical narrative, on the one hand, and whatever compilation from the collective resources of the semiosphere have become part of that knowledgeable self-construction, is a brilliant term for what Sidney refers to in the phrase “zodiacke of his own wit” and makes more explicit the nature and mobility of the singular mind from which poems among other forms of creative thought issue. That the creating mind is always already informed by shared resources of knowledge means that the subjective origin of the poem does not disqualify its claim (or claims made on its behalf) to truthfulness. Sidney noted that the exemplary poet in his theory is both entirely free to create without submission to any external authority (“no law but wit”) and yet applies a discipline to the flow of creative energy and intelligence which he refers to as “learned discretion”. I would suggest that this is not to be read as self-censorship but as a recognition that to communicate truth humanistically (to teach by delighting) requires the use of

a shared language, shared conventions of expression for sense-making, and a shared resource of valued knowledge which ranges as far back in time and across languages and cultures to the extent that it is available to any poet and that poet's community of readers. Bernstein and Cook (and Luhmann) would also agree with Sidney that absolutely integral to this capability is the origin of the poem in a singular mind. For Cook, "There is a wisdom in the best poetry that makes it universal, rather than just subjective, though such wisdom derives from the engagement of a subjectivity" (1991: 317). For Bernstein, 'The poets I most care about are, maybe, trying to become human – or nonhuman; anyway, they are not so quick to assume what the human is or how it manifests itself' (2011: 244).

Being able to apprehend and realise in mind that which is not but should or could be in experience and the modes of living that a society values and seeks to develop in its members, and to find ways of communicating those apprehensions to other minds so that they can initiate further thought about what could be known of and done in the world, is the work of what Bernstein calls "the difficult poem". For Sidney, to write such a poem required an imaginative encounter with ideal forms of life already modelled in antiquity and accessible through the "highest knowledge" and wisdom (110), true knowledge not just rationally received but passionately embraced in an action of apprehending and loving the good, what Sidney refers to as "to perceive the beauty of virtue" (117), and enacting that love in a way which "extendeth itself out of the limits of a man's own little world to the government of families, and maintaining of public societies" (105). For postmodern democracies, the issue is what diversity of forms of life and value are consistent with the principles underpinning democracy as a concept of popular sovereignty grounded in the equality of individual citizens profoundly concerned with the distribution and management of social power and wealth. There is no ideal model sanctioned by antiquity to be imitated, but situated minds to be shaped by thinking critically with already achieved knowledge derived from local experience as well as the semiosphere, and lives and societies to be shaped by the embodiment and enactment of those thoughts. For Cook, "The pragmatic situation of a poem is deep and complicated, responding to conditions that reach through the whole society. […] poetry is a sort of seismograph for changing assumptions" (1995: 54). He argues for a conception of the poem as coming into being between two

poles of discourse/language use, conversational and oracular, which combine in a specific way in the nineteenth century to constitute the democratic poem. This polarity locates the poem within two modes of relation to society and culture, the circulation of collectively accumulated and objectified knowledge and meaning in ordinary language, on the one hand, and individual apprehension, without other authorisation, of states and conditions beyond the limits of the currently known, on the other.

For Bernstein, "Poetry's social function in our time is to bring language ear to ear with its temporality, physicality, dynamism: its evanescence, not its fixed character; its fluidity, not its authority; its structures, not its storage capacity; its concreteness and particularity, not its abstract logicality and clarity. […] Poetry in a digital age can do more than simply echo the past with memorable phrases. It can also invent the present in language never before heard" (2011: 105). He affirms that the relation between the difficult poem and its readers is open-ended and interactive, such that the outcome of any act of interpretation can be both socially and culturally formative, and at the same time provisional and incomplete because other acts by other readers will also affect the meanings of the "fluid mosaic" (248) of a poem, a term which can equally serve as a figure for a society's cultures and histories:

> There is no end to what you might need to know to read a poem and maybe no beginning either. In my textual economy, each poem is an initiation into a world of particulars both inside and outside the reader's information databank. […] all that's needed is a willingness to jump into the middle of a flow of experience, just as you do every time you open the door to your house onto that other world we sometimes call everyday life. The fact is that as a culture we don't share a fixed set of given, all-purpose, cultural and historical reference points or, in so far as we do, there are relatively few of them and, taken as topological points, they make an inadequate map of our history, our contemporaneity, our aspirations and destinies (252).

To create a more adequate map requires estranging the normality of the everyday by contrasting the transparent realist norm (the world "out there" operating coherently under one clock) with the discontinuity of singular

perceptions and chronologies and membership of a society lacking a "fixed set" of "cultural and historical reference points". Thomas Nagel gives a different inflection to this contrast by taking conscious life, in which actual and imaginable are inherently combined, as the reference point for thinking about values: "It would be a mistake to try to find a common denominator such as pleasure and pain to accommodate in a single realist conception the diverse values that are generated by all the actual, not to mention imaginable, forms of life. Instead, value must be seen as pluralistic. The domain of real value, if there is such a thing, is as rich and complex as the variety of forms of life, or at least of conscious life." (2012: 119).

If the poem which satisfied Sidney's idea of the true poem presented to its reader or hearer perfected models of human living, it made them accessible by using linguistic means which were quite familiar to everyone – narrative, vivid imagery, the musical affectivity of rhythm and sound - and so skilfully that the language itself dissolved into the imagined (fictional) world evoked by the poem. For Bernstein, the opposite is the case: "If poetry in analphabetic culture maximizes its storage function through memorisable language (formulaic, stressed), then poetry in the age of postliteracy (where cultural information is stored orally, alphabetically, and digitally), is perhaps most fully realized through refractory – unmemorizable – language (unexpected, nonformulaic, dis-stressed)" (103). It is in language freed from the obligation to create a world according to the conventions of realist narrative, and able to separate words from their referential function by foregrounding their conceptual and cultural work, that the difficult poem manifests what otherwise, Sidney argued, made the poem distinctive as a mode of access to the highest kinds of learning – the authority of the individual mind objectifying its singular thought of the to-be-known in writing. Instead of signifying rational structure and realist spatial construction, the poem for Bernstein is an environment of incommensurable sights and sounds – "'a dimension of mind'" (117) which achieves expression in McGann's n-dimensional text - in which a reader is able to "try out alternative ways of thinking, to listen to the way language sounds before trying to figure out what it means, to lose yourself in a flurry of syllables and regain your bearings in dimensions otherwise imagined as out of reach" (17). Cook offers a similar if more restrained view of the core experience of reading a poem when he writes that "Modern poetry's very uncertainties

move it into a sort of questing" (1995: 52); "The self is two selves, that of before the poem and that of after. But these two selves are, as it were, split and re-joined in a time sequence. The same self is split and rejoined through the epiphany that spreads 'evenly' through the poem" (51). These metaphors re-present Sidney's conception of a fictional narrative which can effect change in the actual world through transforming a reader's self-knowledge by displacing certainties in the interests of discovery, the ideal in the interests of the emergent. As Bernstein puts it, echoing and modifying Cook's "reach" of poetry, "The poem is an initial point of embarkation on journeys yet to come, on earth as they are in the imaginary space between here and there, now and then, is and as" (255). The effect of the poem is aporetic, in Calvino's (1998: 67-68) metaphor revealing that the real is a bridge we build narratively for ourselves (and must continue to build) across a void.

Postmodern poetic space is constituted mentally and realised intersubjectively through languages and other media technologies in textual objects constituted by the actual and the imaginable and the attempt to transcend the cultural boundaries of both. In respect of its mix of order and multiplicity, it is a dimension of what Boisot has termed the I-space; in another, it is the space of cultures and cultural artefacts. The material real in all its mysteriousness and enormity is not a limit; the scope of poetic thought is a function of the combinatory capabilities of the elements of the language system energised by a singular mind. As Satan observes in *Paradise Lost* (1. 254-55), "The mind is its own place, and in itself / Can make a heaven of hell, a hell of heaven." A fine example of the postmodern form of this poetic space of consciousness and invention is offered by Bernstein in some reflections on a volume of Mapuche poetry, translated from Mapudungun into Spanish by the poets, and then into English. In an essay entitled "Our Americas: New Worlds still in Progress" he offers it as an exemplary instance of his term Americas, which signifies "the multiplicity of our senses of America" (67). He expands on what he means by multiplicity through a double analogy which is highly relevant to understanding the conditions of postmodern poetic thought and the knowledge which may be derived from it:

> I am suggesting that we conceptualize our Americas as a hypertextual or syncretic constellation, with alphabetic, glyphic, and a/oral layers. A constellation is an alternative model for

> understanding what is often characterized as fragmentation, parataxis, isolation, insularity, atomization, and separate development. Hypertextuality maps a syncretic space that articulates points of contact and that potentiates both spatial connections among discrepant parts and temporal overlays that merge or melt into one another (69).

A hypertextual or syncretic constellation. A fluid mosaic. Imaginary space. A text of n-dimensions with reach across all times and spaces. A bridge across the void. Postmodern metaphors and concepts for thinking about the poem, but also a cultural-historical variation upon Sidney's foundational concept of "no law but wit" which marks the poem's emergence from singular acts of radical thought and linguistic creativity.

For Sidney, one dimension of the work of a writer in English in his time was to assist in the creation of an English language capable of the heights of artistic and learned achievement of the classical and Renaissance European languages. For Cook, to read comparatively across the reach of European poetry it is necessary to master the languages in which that poetry is written, and the cultural histories in which they are enmeshed. In both instances, a multi-lingual practice. For Bernstein, facing globalisation in media and commerce, there is a triple imperative: "Read globally, write locally" (77), and think hypertextually. To do this in the new world of North and South America requires interconnection and translation among the constellated texts of the multiple languages, sign systems, cultures and histories of the continent in the search not for universal truths or validating traditions but for what is indigenous. The volume of Mapuche poetry locates the complex cultural politics inherent in this search; perhaps, Bernstein writes, "what makes this *indigenous* for our Americas is not the single strand of the Mapudungun but the braided layers of the aboriginal, the colonial, the immigrant: specifically the joining of any two against a third, which is perceived to be the greater threat" (69). The imaginative space in which the Americas can be invented is the space of thought populated by the contents of the semiosphere, among which the poem, as linguistic fiction, provides an opening on to what is not yet in reality but can be written into existence from and in the evolving languages of the Americas.

These views retain the ancient meaning of prophecy and the Muses as marking an intermediary space between the known and the unknown, the poet's linguistic and aesthetic powers providing a vehicle for making the as yet unknown apprehensible in some way.[15] Bernstein and Cook claim that poetry, oracular or difficult, is a fundamental means by which the boundaries of the known can be crossed and shifted. But, critically, the boundaries and their crossings are mental constructs and mental events, and their modification is discursive, in the power of language in the full range of its characteristics and qualities to objectify thought and to reformulate it as knowledge. The transaction/crossing occurs as a mental event, an innovation in thought which is itself an act but which may also be embodied in social acts in specific times and places.

If Sidney's exemplary poem aims to offer its readers narrative fictions of their perfectibility which they can live out, transforming both themselves and the actual world in the process, Bernstein's difficult poem aims to engage its readers in constellated thinking generated by immersion in the complexities of ordinary language. As a linguistic genre, it is the novel which powerfully continues Sidney's conception of poetic fiction, and which can fulfil the same purpose of leading readers into worlds (especially worlds of thought) beyond their ordinary experience. But, as the capacity for considered thought is diminished by the pressure of the technologically generated and globally distributed image, its rhetorical excess and informational impoverishment (its appropriation of the poetics of narrative fiction according to the conventions of what Bernstein calls technorationality (78)), other conceptions of the poetic come into play. In Cook's and Bernstein's terms, it is the sheer complexity of what ordinary language can signify when employed poetically which underpins the claim that the poem is the key to opening the potential for innovation in thought. A good example is Cook's discussion of Wordsworth; to bring fully to knowledge the nature of the transformations in thought and poetic form which are accomplished by his poems requires exploring the imaginative space in which what it means to be human is being placed in question at his time, an approach comparable to Bernstein's concern with "the multiplicity of our senses of America". In respect of a changing conception of the poet, Cook writes that "Insofar as Wordsworth's poems are an unbridled conversation, they imply the dialogic contract of an open-ended democratic society, a world that borrows the attributes of private

sociability rather than those just of public self-presentation. But to the degree that he presents himself as an oracle, he acts as a prophet, the aristocrat of nature, who behaves in a profoundly different way, and by profoundly different rules, from Pope, who was an aristocrat of society" (1995: 59). To investigate more fully the implications of this change would require understanding the poet's "deep assumptions [which] would involve attention to historical conditions, and a description of them would be endless. Industrialization, attention to the sublime, and a threshold consciousness, Wordsworth's 'something evermore about to be,' would surely figure in such a description" (72). Ever impending, the poem is a threshold between the known and the unknown; but it is also an instance of that always emergent human complexity which it is the task of the poem to think, and of language pre-eminently to signify.

The poetic text presents and records thought in language, not as the copy of an original but by writing thought into existence in an imaginary space.[16] Neither the objects of the given world nor poems are themselves knowledge, but provide objects to think with, and about and from which knowledge can be derived. A principal difference is, of course, that poetry is made of the same stuff as knowledge, that is, language, and because of that draws from ("imitates", in Sidney's terminology) existing collective knowledge and the writer's life experience and learning as sources of the materials it employs. The (difficult) poem is both a linguistic artefact and a fictional construction ("the ground plot of a profitable invention").

The poem is an incalculable and momentary crystalisation of the poet's mindlife, engaging the resources of the language system, the contents of personal and collective memory, knowledge derived from experience and social learning, the complex cultural, political, artistic and economic architecture of the world of the poet's present, and the forces impelling change in that world. Its thought is seismographic, bringing deep cultural processes to consciousness. The poem becomes a textual event in the semiosphere when published; when it intervenes in the mind of a reader it can generate an event in thought which may issue as another poem, or a text (exposition, interpretation, commentary, theory) extending formal knowledge, and/or as an event in social reality by being localised and embodied (translated and interpreted) in conversation and action by a singular

mind/person. When translated into other languages or instantiated in different media, it is all these things but also something other than itself as it adapts to the different world construction of the new language or the different materiality of the new medium. Each of its versions will mean differently in some ways, marking out the distinctively accumulative, diffusive and recursive route towards wisdom and truth taken by knowledge in the humanities.

Sidney produced his theory of poetry at an early stage of a cultural transition in Europe of importance as vast as the most recent epistemic shift, of which digital information and communications technologies are a sign, an instrument and an effect. Literate communication was then available only to a small percentage of the male population, and very few women; as his examples and metaphors emphasise, to be a "right popular philosopher" (1973: 109) was to speak (and write) in a mode able to reproduce the communicational forms of the pervasive oral culture while aiming for high artistic achievement. The literate segment of this audience (readers as well as hearers) was also addressed in writing which rewarded extensive learning and aesthetic and linguistic sophistication, epic and metaphysical poetry being two examples (the same is now the case, for example, in cinema). However, in the twenty-first century, even though a poet's speaking directly to a present audience and giving a singular voice to the words on the page or the screen is taken to be an instance of the least technologically mediated and therefore the most authentic mode of communication, its context is a social reality in which communication is increasingly technologically mediated and self-reflexive thought is typically too complex to be expressed or understood with any fullness using the means of speech and oral memory. The form of the poem and the transaction between poet and audience which is exemplary for postmodern poetry is written rather than spoken; the reader, in Luhmann's words, is "plunged into the open, undetermined space of a medium's possibilities" (153) and exposed to what is potential in the language of the time.

5. Poetry and philosophy in a new humanities

As borders demarcating clusters of text in the semiosphere are adjusted over time, as new kinds of text and medium are invented, and as theories and beliefs about the nature of the relation between author, text, reader, history, culture and society change, so the scope and meaning of terms like "literature", "poem", "poetics", and "poetry" develop critically and philosophically. However disruptive to established knowledge these changes can be, and however they might be resisted, the text objects with which they are concerned persist and in their singular existence may challenge any theory or category applied to them. This crucial and distinguishing feature of knowledge work in the humanities is demonstrated by the three writers about poetry discussed above. Although they all share a common focus (the poem), a common tradition (European poetry), and a common profession (literary criticism), each is differently positioned in time, interests and professional identity, a positioning which explicitly marks the distinctive intellectual trajectories and immediate purposes of their texts. While I have sought to draw some key themes pertinent to my interests from their work, in the process implicitly engaging their larger arguments and selection of texts and times with my own, the contexts in their discussions from which I have drawn ideas and quotations also shadow and critique the use I have made of them.

My purpose now is to extend from literary criticism to philosophy the scope of my case for the poem within the more general category of the art work as the primary source for the creation of new knowledge in the humanities. In respect of relations between academic discourses, the professional politics engaged by Sidney have only become more complicated, now not least because of the powerful links between philosophy, linguistics, computing, and cognitive and neuro-science. The position adopted by Sidney on the knowledge work of the philosopher in his analysis of which professional linguistic discipline – history, philosophy and poetry – was the best for teaching true knowledge remains common (and notably in the humanities) even in this period of the astonishing multiplication of expert languages: "For his knowledge standeth so upon the abstract and general, that happy is that man who may understand him, and more happy that can apply what he doth understand" (1975: 107). But Sidney also recognises a proper distinction between "learned" and "popular" relations to knowledge, the philosopher in professional and disciplinary practice addressing other experts in

philosophy. This distinction has been massively elaborated and entrenched by the expansion of expert knowledge through the modern period, but it is the period of the postmodern which has most dramatically produced a crisis in the conception of expert knowledge in the humanities. Sidney's humanistic model, which is based in literate education and a theory of communication to a general audience and which has persisted in Anglo-American universities, has been challenged by the irruption of theory and the development of highly complex, conceptualised (philosophical and political) modes of textual analysis associated with European writers like Barthes, Foucault and Derrida. From my point of view, this crisis has established clearly the terms through which the intellectual grounds for expert humanities practice must be articulated. The issue is fundamentally different from the earlier twentieth century adjustment of the humanities as an intellectual project to the rational modes and conventions of scientific thought because it affirms a differently rational ground in concepts and practices which are intrinsic to the cultural/textual/medial materials of the humanities. In this respect, even though the literacy of that segment of Western populations who have experienced undergraduate tertiary education in the humanities could not be described as general literacy, the gap between that level of intellectual formation and the most advanced practice of theoretical textual analysis is very significant.

My purpose here, however limited by my own literacy, is to affirm the fundamental importance of the most rigorous and expert modes of textual analytical work in the humanities because they affirm the actual complexity of human thought and the diverse modes of its social and cultural realisation and communication throughout human history. By keeping the poem in view, but by stepping outside the domain of the disciplines which have evolved in the most proximate relation to aesthetic texts and into philosophy, it becomes possible to obtain a purview on the whole field of the postmodern humanities. At least, the work of Alain Badiou presents such an opportunity, an effect of his work (if not his own purpose) being a re-visioning of the place of the humanities in the orders of postmodern knowledge.

I should comment a little more on "opportunity". "Badiou" as a name in the semiosphere collocates a diversity of texts written by him in French, not all philosophical, many of which are now translated into other languages, and

published interviews and academic commentary and critique. As he has noted, his name and not a discipline or an institution is the address of his works in the semiosphere (2008: 29). His major texts are written to and for philosophers, and engage complex and fundamental questions which have their roots in the origins of Western thought. The writers throughout history whom he directly writes into his work are European, and he is unqualified in his affirmation that discovering truths is the work of thought, even if that work has no possibility of closure: "Every thought is polemical. It is no mere matter of conflicting interpretations. It is about conflicts in existential judgments. This is why no real conflict in thought reaches a full resolution" (1998: 50). He sees in his own major works a process of evolution in thought, in part deriving from reciprocal critique among contemporary philosophers. A reader encountering his texts by whatever accident of discovery and sequencing, and in translation, will not necessarily construct "Badiou's thought" as Badiou himself, or any of his philosophically expert readers, will conceive it. But this is typical of transmission and dissemination in the semiosphere and hence the humanities, where texts can constitute events in thought that open possibilities for discovery unanticipated by them because of the contexts into which they are drawn by a reader who is dislocated physically, linguistically and culturally from the place and time of their composition. Among all the ways in which writers about his work conceive of his importance to philosophy as a knowledge project, I was initially attracted by his placing of mathematics and poetry at opposite ends of a spectrum of modes of writing while also defining them as conditions of philosophy, and it is this aspect of his work that I wish to draw into my consideration of innovation in the humanities.

Badiou places himself in the Platonic line, as does Sidney. Both share a refusal to be tied to the physical real as the determinant of the possibilities of true knowledge, they both foreground the mental work of thought as critical to the apprehension of truth, they both claim language as the primary medium of thought, and they both seek to rescue poetry from Plato's critique. Like Sidney nearly five hundred years ago, Badiou grounds his analysis in a set of relations which brings the contemporary parts of the whole body of knowledge into a comparative and qualitative relation with each other, presenting them as discursive acts of human thought. The temporal distinction between them which matters for my purposes here is that between a belief,

shared by Sidney and Milton, in the pre-existing unity and completeness of truth which is to be recovered by human thought and action, and the cultural move undertaken in Europe and its global extensions in subsequent centuries which installed the open and always receding horizon of the future as the point of reference for knowledge work. The dominant progressivist and empirical foundation of this modern conception, which has now authorised science as the source of true knowledge and business and the economy as the principal focus of government, has always been accompanied by its obverse, both in terms of knowledge traditions (the bodies of alternative and indigenous knowledge animating the critique of modern western scientific agricultural and medical knowledge and practice, for example), and intellectual work in the creative arts and cultural theory.[17] In the latter domains of enquiry, which are neither progressivist nor conventionally empirical, claims to truth remain provisional and contested, the objects which underwrite the claims being themselves open to multiple interpretations. As I have argued in Chapter Two, if the physical objects of nature (the given or real world, including ourselves) are the objects of scientific enquiry, the semiotic objects (texts) of culture are the objects of humanities enquiry.

5.1 On the margins

Badiou's reflections on the purpose and contexts of his thought are of great value in clarifying distinctive aspects of thought in the humanities. One starting point is similar to Sidney's concern with the low esteem for poetry and, in fact, to most recent commentators on the humanities: "Philosophy is affected by a malaise and what I shall term a delocalization: it no longer knows if it has a proper place" (2008: 3). This illness, it might be said, is socially induced: "the problem is one of knowing if, in the world as it is, there is the slightest chance for such an enterprise [as philosophy] to flourish or be heard" (2005b: 39). In considering how to redress the situation of philosophy, he affirms that it is "necessary to ask what philosophy's relation to life is. This question is fundamental. If you can't say what purpose philosophy serves from the point of view of the true life, then it's just one more academic discipline" (2013: 114). Adding the qualification "true" adds a thinking subject, knowledge, a decision process, and a moral goal ("The

true life […] consists in living under the sign of the Idea" (2013: 111)) to life as a biological given, what he calls "chaotic prodigality" (2006: 79).

What this orientation towards the true life means for philosophy is also what I believe it means for the humanities: "Philosophy is, then, three things. It's a diagnosis of the epoch: what does the epoch propose? It's a construction, on the basis of this contemporary proposition, of a concept of truth. And, finally, it's an existential experience relative to the true life. The unity of the three is philosophy" (130). Boisot's concept of the I-space as a virtual space of multiple orientations of knowledge (political, institutional and organisational condensations sited in time and positioned relatively by the axes of concrete-abstract, undiffused-diffused, uncodified-codified), and Lotman's semiosphere as the totality of textual representations of thought (both discussed in Chapter Two), are other versions of Badiou's dynamic conception of thought and its incalculable productivity which must be (re)claimed for the humanities in the current world knowledge order so that knowledge work in the humanities can be recognised as creative of new knowledge as necessary to human evolution as is the knowledge created by science and technology.

There are four steps into Badiou's thought which I will take to engage with his conviction that "thinking, our thinking, is essentially tied to the infinite" (2006: xvi), how it is distinguished from the current emphasis upon the productivity of science, and how it changes the grounds upon which the importance of the humanities can be understood: the relation of philosophy to other modes of thought (the conditions of philosophy) which he calls registers or truth procedures; axiomatic thought; the relation between thought and event; and the formation and communication of thought focused in the question of writing.

5.1.1 Truth procedures

It is, first of all, important to state an axiom, which unequivocally locates the materialist framing of his thought: "In a world, there are only bodies and languages, except that there are truths" (2013: 109). It has the impersonality and disruptiveness which he attributes to "the cold rationality of mathematics" (2006: 15) and the power of mathematics to effect an

"estrangement of intelligence" (12); placing it in the foreground here ensures that the fundamental ground of his approach to the question of philosophy and its conditions is unequivocally stated.

He writes that philosophical diagnosis of the epoch requires that philosophers "begin to take stock of the current becoming of truths within the fourfold registers of science, and particularly of mathematics; of politics, and particularly of the end of the age of revolutions; of love, and particularly that which psychoanalysis introduces into it of light, and shadow; and of art, particularly poetry since Rimbaud and Mallarmé" (2008: 14). These four registers of modern (Western) secular knowledge constitute the conditions for philosophy as that mode of thought capable of discerning the truths that are differentially or partially apprehended in the four registers but rendered incoherent or inaudible by the corporate media systems of their epoch; they "comprise an epoch, a dynamic of thought, in which each and every subject is inscribed", on the basis of which philosophy "tries to think a concept of the contemporary" (2013: 114). Science, politics, art and love interact in the built environment of the city, "which is the name of assembled humanity" (2005a: 16).

From this perspective, "Philosophy comes to consist in an invitation, a path, a point of access to what, in the place of Truth, is brought out into the open" (2008: 15-16). I take "the open" here to mean not only the space outside the boundaries of what at any time is collectively known and an effect of the unpredictable interactions of forms of knowledge, but also the polysemous discursive space of the public domain in contrast to the disciplined space of academic institutions. And what better a way is there of thinking about the orientation of the humanities to thought than in the terms "an invitation, a path, a point of access", a way into "the labyrinth of meaning" (2008: 13)? If Badiou writes for postmodern philosophy, not as a domain in the humanities but as the principal means of discovering truths in human knowledge, I would like to think that Bernstein is writing for the postmodern humanities when he affirms that "There are no core subjects, no core texts in the humanities, and this is the grand democratic vista of our mutual endeavour in arts and letters, the source of our greatest anxieties and our greatest possibilities" (2011: 8).

Furthermore, the "point of access" can be usefully made more specific. In an essay entitled "One, Multiple, Multiplicities" Badiou contrasts two methods of thinking, in one of which the historical accumulation of texts recording thought persists in an active relation to contemporary thinking, through a reference to "problems that have power, that is to say, to those problems whose solution matters to the dual becoming of thought and what it thinks. Galois once said that the problem was constituted by reading 'the unknown' into the texts of one's predecessors. […] By not following this logic of the unknown, which functions like a strict selection principle for productive forms of thought, empirical prodigality becomes something like an arbitrary and sterile burden. The problem ends up being replaced by *verification* pure and simple" (2006: 79-80: emphasis in the original). This distinction is clearly not one which automatically distinguishes the humanities from the sciences, since "empirical prodigality" applies equally to the natural order and to the semiosphere; quite the reverse. It is only when thought in the humanities is focused on problems that have power by opening to the unknown through the n-dimensional space of the semiosphere that their productivity for thought can become properly apparent.

5.1.2 Axiomatic thought

The primary relation between the historicity of texts, the formulation of problems in thought by reading those texts against what they did not know, and the locating of these problems in relation to what is yet to be known identifies a conception of knowledge work which is fundamental to a humanities to-come. But the implications of that conception need to be made more explicit by attending to Badiou's concept of thought and its axiomatic foundation. He states that "thought is not primarily a description or a construction but a break (with opinion, with experience), and hence a decision" (2006: 54). This is thought as "transversal" (145; cf 2005b: 45) to what is collectively known, the intellectual capacity to break with what is established and become free of the already thinkable (2006: 47-48) which is to be open to the unknown, and hence to possible truths. His opposition to what he sees as the relativism of postmodern thought and its denial that there are truths is a critical element in his claim for philosophy (and three of the four truth procedures) that thought as such (and not only scientific method) can reveal truths about the world. For Badiou, "a truth is, first of all,

something new. What transmits, what repeats, we shall call *knowledge*. […] a truth begins with an *axiom of truth*. It begins with a groundless decision – the decision to say that the event has taken place […] a subject is what fixes an undecidable event, because he or she takes the chance of deciding upon it." (2005b: 45-47; emphasis in the original). The coming of a truth into the world depends upon a subject's being willing to accept indeterminacy rather than repetition and yet to make a determination by employing an axiom. Critically, this process creates a break by being discontinuous with what is already known, and because of the aleatory and contingent nature of "the decision to say". The situation of human knowing in the world as it is analysed here is superbly visualised at the point of entry into Badiou's *Infinite Thought*:


Badiou
INFINITE THOUGHT
continuum

Illustration 1: Badiou, *Infinite Thought,* cover.

A good example of axiomatic thinking is the concept of choice, which accompanies concepts like indeterminacy, incalculability, and the unknown, and without which there can be no need or possibility for making decisions. As Badiou puts it, "Thus the Platonist will admit the axiom of choice rather than its negation, because a universe endowed with the axiom of choice is larger and denser in terms of intelligible relations than a universe that refuses to admit it." (2006: 57). But the anchoring example, the axiom on which everything else is founded, is the proposition attributed to Parmenides, "The Same is both thought and Being" (1998: 52), which Badiou otherwise states as "the 'co-belonging' or 'ontological commensurability' of 'the knowing mind and the known'" (2010: 109). It is this axiom which supports the proposition that "'truth' is only ever the name of that through which thinking and being correspond to one another in a single process" (2006: 55).

There could not be a more fundamental proposition on which to found the truth claims and methods of a humanities to-come. This intent of this axiom, and the use of axiomatic thinking, is a core issue in Thomas Nagel's *Mind and Cosmos*, where he challenges the current Western settlement on empirical science as the source of authoritative knowledge and writes that

> Certain things can be assumed, if there is such a thing as reason. First, there are objective, mind-independent truths of different kinds: factual truths about the natural world, including scientific laws; eternal and necessary truths of logic and mathematics; and evaluative and moral truths. Second, by starting from the way things initially appear to us, we can reason collectively to achieve justified beliefs about some of these objective truths, though some of those beliefs will probably be mistaken. Third, these beliefs in combination can directly influence what we do. Fourth, these processes of discovery and motivation, while mental, are inseparable from physical processes in the organism" (2012: 85-86).

Like Badiou, Nagel seeks a basis for understanding which makes sense of human evolution and the difference it makes in the world, including the singularity of that evolution in this place in the universe (83). In particular, "Since the emergence of value is the emergence of both good and evil, it is not a candidate for a purely benign teleological explanation: a tendency towards the good. In fact, no teleological principle tending toward the production of a single outcome seems suitable. Rather, it would have to be a tendency toward the proliferation of complex forms and the generation of multiple variations in the range of possible complex systems" (122). We need, in other words, conceptions of ourselves and/in the given world which "make mind, meaning and value as fundamental as matter and space-time in an account of what there is" (20). Nagel argues that, when we reason, in the realm of values as well as facts, "Something has happened that has gotten our minds into immediate contact with the rational order of the world, or at least with the basic elements of that order, which can in turn be used to reach a great deal more" (83). Human thought and knowledge is just that, constituted by our humanity and our evolution in the singular biosphere of the Earth and yet capable of reaching beyond the limits of bodily experience and perception through thought as such and the symbolic and technological means humanity has developed to express, record, test and conserve that thought. It is also, fundamentally, grounded and opened out by singularly located minds and their ability to discover experientially something of what can be thought, in a moment involving an event, a choice, and a decision.

5.1.3 Thought and event

So much of what constituted the coordinates of humanistic thinking in the West and exemplified by Sidney at the beginning of the modern period can be reaffirmed from this account. A truth (whether as always already given or as new) becomes accessible to thought by means of a singular event: for Sidney, the reader's desiring reception of the poetically narrated Idea and its challenge to habitual thinking which is then brought to life by decision and embodiment in moral action in a specific time and place; and for Badiou, the momentary and unplanned perception of a set of relations in a specific time and place which constitutes an event that disrupts conventional knowledge by being named and so opens the singular subject of thought to new possible truths. The intersection of these transactions in both instances is the singular

subject of thought, the embodied mind; the necessary locus of the process of truth is the situated mind enmeshed dialogically in the local and global society of minds, both present and past, and motivated to act in order to advance that process in the world.

Badiou characterises the totality of knowledge as a "swarming of forms of knowledge", from one aspect manifested by "the encyclopedia of the situation"[18] and from another by "the polymorphous interweaving of forms of knowledge that language continually elicits" (2008: 125). These metaphors emphasise the generativity of knowledge in the multiplicity of its forms as they interact within the vast heterogeneity of humanity's languages. His conception of modern (Western) knowledge as the four conditions of philosophy proposes a mapping of the contemporary semiosphere as a virtual world comprising the textual continents of science, politics, love, and art (but what other continents are yet to be discovered or are rendered invisible by this map?), with philosophy as the metalanguage of Borges' librarian in "The Library of Babel", "a place in which", just as in literary fictions, these continents in my figure "crossover or are compossible in time" (2008: 180).

In other words, Badiou provides an exemplary conceptual framework for re-thinking the humanities, one which steps outside the inherited disciplinary bureaucracy of university organisation while keeping the politics of knowledge firmly in mind. Taken together, his five terms (art, love, politics, science and philosophy) constitute a set of categorical divisions establishing a conceptual frame for a new humanities, most vividly grounded in his conception of "Authentic philosophy [which] begins, not in structural facts (cultural, linguistic, constitutional, etc) but uniquely in what takes place and what remains in the form of a strictly incalculable emergence". (2008: xv). With this account of the grounds and forms of knowledge, inherited categories and values no longer need to dominate thinking about the purposes of the humanities; neither the impossible disjunctions of truth, reality and fiction, nor the institutional formation of now traditional disciplines established in relation to the literate evolution of languages, societies and cultures, nor the accompanying historical development of technological media and archives, need to determine the role of the humanities. Instead, the humanities can become directed by the infinite search for the truth of an event, the coming to be of humanity.

In this brief compass, the reason of the humanities is disclosed. Not that Badiou refers to the current administrative collection of disciplines which sometimes remembers what it has in common under the term humanities; however oriented by and to philosophy, his discussion of thought and truth is resolutely located outside any particular institutionalised knowledge formation (while acknowledging the need of institutions to conserve the historicity of thought (2008: 29)). But he does, in the context of a conception of love as "the first opening-up of finitude, of the passage from the one to the two" (2013: 54), define "humanity" as that which "sustains the infinite singularity of truths that fall within these types. Humanity is the historical body of truths" (2008: 184). He affirms that "Humanity can be attested if and only if there is (emancipatory) politics, (conceptual) science, (creative) art, and love (not reduced to a mix of sentimentality and sexuality)", which for me affirms that creating knowledge cannot be a value-free practice and that what we know of ourselves and our world is an unending and eventful process of discovery or encounter in time and place, a process which is carried out in our own time through the four types and for which the term humanity is their "knot" (2008: 185; Corcoran 2015: 185-189) or ultimate point of convergence. From this perspective the term the humanities names the historically accumulating body of knowledge which is integrated by the problem, What does it mean to be human?, and by a common set of reading and writing methods and practices (2013: 88-91).

5.1.4 the question of writing

These methods and practices are finely exemplified in Badiou's work and his commentary on it. He distinguishes three different kinds of writing in an extended reflection on his relation as a writer to what he has written: "My aim [in writing philosophy] is to give to things that are already formed in my thought a protocol of transmission that is already satisfactory to me, personally. […] In the big books, in any case, I try to approximate as much as possible a detailed and argued expression of my thought; I'm in a rationality of transmission. In the other books, I seek above all to be clear and to ensure that the readers are fully on the level of what is being discussed; […] When I write theatre, it's totally different. I don't know myself exactly what I'm going to write" (2013: 88). A parallel categorisation emphasising different audiences would be expert/popular/creative; but this would not be consistent

with his view that "philosophy addresses all humans as thinking beings because it assumes that all humans think" (2005b: 29) or that, following the structure of this statement, philosophy writes through him as a subject of thought. By contrast, when writing for the theatre, he attests to an openness and lack of prescription: "The architecture of a philosophical idea exists in itself; it has its own autonomy. […] But in a novel or a play, that which exists is co-extensive to the writing" (2013: 88-89). This distinction is consistent with Sidney's contrast discussed above between writers "wrapped within the fold of the proposed subject" (1975: 102) and poets who are "makers of themselves, not takers of others" (131): "whereas other arts retain themselves within their subjects, and receive, as it were, their being from it, the poet only bringeth his own stuff, and doth not learn a conceit out of a matter, but maketh matter for a conceit" (120). Different modes of learned relation to the Idea can be adopted by any writer, different modes of transmission can be assimilated by any reader; these recognise the variety of literate identities which can be practised legitimately and productively in the articulation and transmission of thought, and which make up the virtual society of the semiosphere and the complex, multi-layered conversation of the humanities.

There are three further aspects of writing which qualify this account in ways highly relevant to the humanities. Firstly, however disciplined by its architecture, philosophical writing is marked by its singular origin. As Badiou explains, "you try to focus directly on a universal but this engages your own singularity at the same time. […] This is very different from scientific culture, where a collectivity decides the norm. […] style is what attempts to hold together what is, in principle, philosophy's absolutely universal vocation and the fact that there are few undertakings that are as radically singular. […] Style is, of course, the signature. 'It's by Alain Badiou.'" (2013: 90-91). It is clear why what is otherwise a very traditional conception of literary writing, one distinguishing between generic form and expression, is being activated here; Badiou wishes to protect the rationality of philosophical writing from the sophists' rhetorical conception of language while protecting the singularity of a philosopher's thought and its expression as a defining quality of philosophical writing.

His desire is further underlined by his sweeping condemnation of "the language, which governs us today: the language of communication and reality, the confused language of images […] which is the province of the media" (2006: 241). In contrast to the rational uses of language in any of the truth procedures, and the purpose of philosophy, media communication "transmits a universe made up of disconnected images, remarks, statements and commentaries whose accepted principle is incoherence. Day after day communication undoes all relations and principles, in an untenable juxtaposition dissolves every relation among the elements it sweeps along in its flow. And what is perhaps even more distressing is that mass communication presents the world to us as a spectacle devoid of memory, a spectacle in which new images and new remarks cover, erase and consign to oblivion the very images and remarks that have just been shown and said" (2005b: 30). By contrast, he argues for what could be called slow philosophy (2005b: 38), standing outside of the "speed of the world" and its "great incoherency". Because philosophy's "natural element is language", the media system's incoherent uses of language undermine the philosophical project of "reconstructing […] the category of truth."

It could be inferred here that the fundamental contrast is between singular and collective or corporate authorship regardless of the medium, a contrast which founds the conventional distinction between scientific and humanistic knowledge creation in academic work even though it is the case that, in all academic fields and intensified now as a result of research assessment exercises and their quantitative bias, "a collectivity decides the norm." It is Sidney's position which establishes the more radical ground of authorisation, and which I am confident that Badiou would intend in his reference to style as signature – "no law but wit" signifies both the generativity of, and the social risk to, a singular mind's exposure to the unknown or "the place of Truth" and the distinctiveness of the written record of that exposure.

It is striking that neither Badiou nor his philosophical commentators pay any attention to the constitutive role of the material medium in his emphasis upon the letter and writing as the mode of existence of thought. A notable example is *The Badiou Dictionary*, which declares its ranking of components of Badiou's philosophy in the cover illustration, and confirms that ranking by what is not included in the index: language, letter, literature, novel, poem, art,

medium, writing. There is some discussion of the poem in the dictionary entry on "Conditions", "Cinema" gets an entry of its own, as do "Theatre" and "Linguistic Turn"; but "Poem" gets no entry, even though "Matheme" does. Badiou's materialism does not seem to extend to a full consideration of the implications of the materiality of media technologies in the formation of thought, for example, the ways in which media shifts participate productively in changing conceptions of thought and knowledge.[19] But in one respect he does: not by considering the relation previously discussed, in which the print monograph signifies as well as models the scholar's intellectual work and its rationality, but the role of media in the conservation and memorialisation of that work, and even the possibility of its reaching a universal readership through time. As he writes, "I see written texts as that which remains. In order to remain, you have to write!" (2013: 88-89).



Illustration 2: *The Badiou Dictionary,* cover.

6. Mathematics and poetry as thought

"minds that can wander beyond all limit and satiety" (Milton, 1974: 220).

In his literary criticism, Badiou pays close attention to the ways in which the writers he discusses employ written language. Writing does not merely stand in for what it signifies; in his discussion of Pessoa, he writes that "Pessoa seems to tell us that writing is not a forever imperfect and obscure reminiscence of an ideal elsewhere. On the contrary, writing is *thought itself*, and nothing but" (2006: 41: emphasis in the original). From this fundamental point Badiou demonstrates throughout his work how philosophy, mathematics and poetry are related and differentiated as effects of written language.[20]

Philosophy discerns what is differently distinctive about the thought of mathematics and the thought of the poem as "these two extremes of language" (2006: 246). Their similarity is described in this way:

> Mathematics is a fictive activation (*activation fictive*), in which existence in act is lacking. […] thought can activate the [arithmetic-] One or the [geometric] sphere from the experience of an organism or an object. What does this 'activate' mean? Precisely this: to treat an existent as if it were an act when it only exists potentially. It means […] taking something as separate that is not. […] what has the power to activate potential being? Or, what has the power to separate the inseparable? For moderns like us, it should be obvious that the answer to these questions is language itself. […] If I say 'let a sphere,' I separate it from every spherical object. At that point matheme and poem are indiscernible (1998: 46-47).[21]

What these forms of writing have in common is a mental operation finding form in written language with no empirical referent, a fictional invention which does not merely make "castles in the air" but, as Sidney affirmed, gives a form to thought which could become, or be found already to be, a truth of the world. As extremes of language, they share with philosophy "the *common task*, which is to think what was unthinkable, to say what it is impossible to say" (2008: 246; emphasis in the original). They differ in that mathematics is characterised as "a form of writing subtracted from the poetics of natural language" (2006: 82), marked by a "literal univocity"

(2008: 72) and "an argumentation that does not sustain itself on the basis of anything other than the imperative of consistency […] the matheme is that which, by causing the Speaker to disappear, by removing any mysterious validation from its site, exposes argumentation to the test of its autonomy and thus to the critical or dialogic examination of its pertinence" (2005b: 70). Mathematics is "ultimately a rigorous esthetics. It tells us nothing of real-being, but it forges a fiction of intelligible consistency from the standpoint of the latter, whose rules are explicit" (1998: 48). It is "a thought that is immediately written as thought, a thought that exists precisely only inasmuch as it is thinkable" (2005a: 19). "That mathematics thinks means in particular that it regards the distinction between a knowing subject and a known object as devoid of pertinence. […] discovery and invention are strictly indiscernible." (2006: 56) "Mathematics is precisely the thinking which has nothing to do with the experiences of consciousness; it is the thinking which has no relation to *reality*, but which knots *letters* and the *real* together; a thinking faced with the void because it obeys the ideal of formalization" (2005a: 67).

Badiou's analysis of the nature of the poem seeks to revise its Platonic banishment from the city by marking a fundamental change in the relation between mathematics and poetry as forms of written language. His anchoring conviction is that "thinking, our thinking, is essentially tied to the infinite. But the infinite as a form of being is mathematical, while the infinite as a resource for the power of language is poetic" (2006: xvi). On this ground, "the modern poem identifies itself as a form of thought. It is not just the effective existence of a thought offered up in the flesh of language, it is a set of operations whereby this thought comes to think itself" (2005a: 20). The poem no longer occupies a secondary relation to either the real or the ideal; instead, it is "a supplement, a chance, an incalculable, [that] throws us outside of ourselves" (2005b: 75). From the momentary conjunction of elements of language in a singular mind an event in thought emerges: 'The poem presents itself as a thing of language, encountered – each and every time – as an event" (2006: 240), which Badiou understands to be "nothing other than the possibility of randomness in the structure of the world" (2006: 125), and therefore the possibility of choice and the need for decision. The modern poem "locally effectuates the infinite of language" (2005a: 25; compare with Luhmann's phrase "unreachable horizon" (2000: 92)). By

absolute contrast with the logical rigour, impersonality and transparency of the matheme, which frees thought by subtracting it from the situated complexities of language, Badiou describes the way to freedom opened by the poem as follows: "In order to be free with regard to the mystery in letters that the poem constitutes, it is enough that the reader dispose himself or herself to the operations of the poem – literally. The reader must will his or her own transliteration. […] You, me--summoned to the operations of the poem, we listen to the murmur of the indiscernible" (2005a: 34). The poem is "not a rule-bound crossing, but rather an offering, a lawless proposition" (2005a: 17).[22]

The position established here places mathematics and poetry as forms of thought located at opposite ends of a linguistic spectrum. The matheme is an instance of thinking open to truths because it logically elaborates an argument from an axiom, itself sheerly a product of thought with no authorisation beyond itself, but observing with absolute strictness the requirements of mathematical discourse - consistency of logical deduction and the excision from its employment of "the letter" of a singular voice, metaphor, narrative and the polysemousness of the sign. The contrast with art as a truth procedure is striking. As Badiou puts it, "art's irreducible cultural multiplicity" means that "Art is certainly the most implicated in the diversity of cultures, languages and historicities. A poem is rendered in a particular language" (2013: 68, 67). The poem is an instance of thinking open to truths because it elaborates a singular thought with no authorisation beyond itself out of the full resources of a particular language manifested in the "voice" of a singular mind, and is the product, the mark and the memory of a chance event. The poem, like the matheme, is an act of thought made manifest in writing; its effects are not registered through the public test of its argumentative rigour, as they are for the matheme, but through the process of transliteration which I take to denominate the process whereby each reader, desiring incorporation into the poem's thought, provides for it a unique localisation or inhabitation.[23]

Both the matheme and the poem are written and neither are themselves forms of knowledge, but in writing in whatever media modality they become objects of knowledge. Both are instances of fiction because both create imaginary spaces in writing, without claiming any present verification or

pre-existing reference for their thought, but fiction which opens access to the possible real as the site of truths yet to be discovered. For both, the horizon to thought is the infinite, that void which encloses the continuously expanding world of language and the semiosphere. It is the matheme and the poem which are the human means of intellection enabling humanity *by thought alone* to cross the borders between the semiosphere and the void/infinite, the known and the emergent, the calculable and the as yet unknowable.

A brilliant imagining of this fundamental situation can be found in a story by William Gibson (1986), "Hinterland". As a result of the disappearance and then return of a space ship, a point in space is discovered which apparently gives access to another star system. Ships with just one crew member are sent in order to learn more, disappearing through "the point, the singularity – we call the Highway" (60) and returning without warning or pattern. Each return provides another fragment of evidence of the reality of that otherwise hidden world because seemingly random examples of utterly foreign biology or technology are found in each ship. But the crew member is psychologically destroyed, incapable of making any comprehensible report: "People are popping back off the Highway dead, or else they come back drooling, singing nursery rhymes. The live ones last about three days, won't say a goddamned thing, then shoot themselves or go catatonic" (70).

Predictably, and as Badiou would expect, it is the greed "of an information-hungry global economy" (62) for the foreign (necessarily advanced) technologies and the knowledge incorporated in them which impels the continuing exploration, the destruction of the pilots (who choose to make the trip) being just a side effect. But this fiction is a profoundly serious attempt to imagine the psychological reality of crossing into/thinking the infinite void (a space without love, "an emptiness cold and implacable" (74)) and the risks and dangers which Badiou associates with the process of truth and its coordination in the free thought of the philosopher. "At the edge of the Highway every human language unravels in your hands" (71).

It is critically important to emphasise that the matheme and the poem are pathways to truths through "the letter", which is not merely a vehicle for the transmission of thought but integral to the possibility of thought. As the extreme, opposite points in the ways by which thought and writing give

access to (discover and invent) new truths, matheme and poem operate on the margins of language, where reason and meaning are threatened with unravelling, but also where the emergence of new truths becomes possible. For the postmodern, Badiou demonstrates that the foundational modes of thought which originate postmodern knowledge and hence postmodern humanities and are at the core of humanity's capacity to invent new knowledge are (now) the matheme and the (postmodern) poem.

7. Knowledge to-come in the Humanities

My purpose in this chapter is to rebalance the appropriation of innovation in knowledge by the sciences and their publicists by making a claim for the humanities and humanistic knowledge as an equally important if differently grounded source of innovation. Badiou's work is aimed at resetting the structure of values which has shaped the period of scientific dominance in thought about knowledge and its purposes: "The positivist and empiricist approaches […] have been highly influential during the past two centuries […] The claim that science constitutes the one and only paradigm for the positivity of knowledge can be made only from within the complete disentanglement of philosophy and mathematics" (2006: 24). Reversing this disentanglement involves placing philosophy outside the four registers while making it dependent upon them as the means by which truths discovered in the work of the four registers can be conjoined and clarified; in the process, philosophy departs from its current location as one among other academic disciplines. He rejects the notion that philosophical writing can be regarded, in relation to each of the four conditions of philosophy, as "the tranquil aggregate of an aesthetics, an epistemology, an erotology and a political sociology" (2008: 43). In effect, he re-grounds the knowledge work carried on in the traditional and new humanities disciplines by re-distributing them among the four conditions as modes of writing and truth procedures occurring between the poles of the matheme and the poem. In accomplishing this work, he writes analyses of poems (and cinema, theatre, dance, and art) and presents them as instances of philosophy, not literary or other media criticism, commentary and interpretation.

The challenge offered by Badiou to the humanities as a complex of disciplines evolved in relation to institutional change and new media technologies, the work of memory, the conservation and re-interpretation of collective knowledge, and to the open question, what does it mean to be human?, is to the purpose of humanities knowledge work and the grounds on which claims for its value can be made. Fundamentally, can true knowledge be created by acts of thought by singular minds expressed in some media form using the full resources of language?

If we begin from the position of a new, singular mind in relation to the encyclopedia, the predominant mode of thinking engaged in by that mind must be educational, in order to incorporate some portion of already existing collective knowledge. At any moment, however, simply because of the singularity of that mind both genealogically and situationally, the heterogeneity of languages, and the indeterminacy inherent to any situation, thought "beyond the information given"[24] at such a moment can also occur. As Badiou writes, "The undecidable [is] a perpetual incitement to the exercise of inventive intuition" (2006: 55). This is to affirm a true equality of creativity and innovation as a universal human capability, as it does a mind's dependence on access to as much of the power of language as that mind can sustain. A democratic conception of innovation includes events not only of the epochal scale discussed by Badiou in relation to the arts and politics but also of the local scale discussed by Carr and Bartlett.

When Badiou writes that a politics which is "groping forward to declare itself" (1998: 56) is a "politics of subtracted singularities", that is, a "politics of existence subtracted from the State", he provides a language for grasping precisely what Milton declares in his last poems, at the foundation of parliamentary democracy.[25] Both principal characters, The Son of God and Samson Agonistes, experience events in their situations in which the complexities of accumulating acts of thought are momentarily resolved by a decision which does not repeat existing models of decision or action but, by entering the void of the aporetic or incalculable, thus alters the possibilities of existence. These poems exemplify the view that "thought is not primarily a description or a construction but a break (with opinion, with experience), and hence a decision" (2006: 54). In the case of the Son of God, nothing actually happens immediately as a result of this event in thought; in the case

of Samson, his historically transformative action at the moment it occurs shatters explanatory continuities. Neither the poet narrator, nor Samson, nor his audience, nor the reader, can claim any insight into Samson's decision to act. Only later is the event reclaimed by conventional interpretation, drawn back into what Badiou calls the encyclopedia and Derrida the calculable by those of his "nation" with a stake in it, and in the process missing its truth. Linking Milton and Badiou across the centuries separating them shows how little the potential of the thought of parliamentary democracy has been fulfilled in the practice of modern states.[26]

If the (difficult) poem, like the matheme, draws minds out of that part of the encyclopedia into which they have been incorporated towards new truths, then there is also a role for expert readers to assist that universality of possible readers to make more sense of what it is that the poet has brought back from beyond the borders of the known and into language. Badiou identifies a long-standing tension between "critical" and "creative" writing in the domain of literature when he asks, "To what, within thought, is poetry opposed?" and answers, "What poetry forbids is discursive thought, *dianoia*. […] Dianoia is the thought that *traverses*, the thought that links and deduces" (2005: 17). But the truths to which the poem opens access through thought can be rendered as knowledge because thought generated by the poem can find another textual body (signs, ink and paper, pixels on a screen) and so become a form of knowledge: "The word 'knowledge' must be reserved for what relates to an object, the object of knowledge. There is knowledge when the real enters experience in the form of an object" (2006: 241). In the case of the poem as object, this entry is by its transliteration into the mind of the singular subject of knowledge and its interpretation by interaction with the resources of language, including modes of discourse, available to that mind. The expert work of the humanities in the creation of new knowledge depends upon having means of access to the infinite of thought and language, the outside of the encyclopedia. Access is through the learned ability to read and write across some part of the totality of human knowledge (in Badiou's terms, philosophy and the four registers of science, art, politics and love), but the two symbolic forms which most fully materialise the crossing between the known and the unknown in thought are the matheme and the poem (but also the work of art).

7.1 Writing space

Before considering some instances which exemplify both Sidney's and Badiou's conceptions of the poem, there is one other aspect of writing and the materiality of the text in relation to the poem which I want to consider. Badiou writes that there is a need to "open up a space of thought that is not regulated according to the naming of the 'there is' (this is what I call the operations of closure). The terms constituting this space are: indeterminacy, difference, subject, undecidability, atypicality, coupling, doubling, inclusion, genericity of the true. And a few others as well" (2006: 96). This space is named "the event", but naming an event "is *always* poetic: to name a supplement, a chance, something incalculable, it is necessary to draw from the void of sense, in the absence of established significations, and to the peril of language" (2008: 42). The whole possibility of (and need for) transcending repetition in every aspect of thought and life is captured here, together with what is actually at stake in desiring the new. Transformations in thought and knowledge, whether at a local or global scale, in principle expose the settlements in thinking and institutions which secure social and disciplinary order over time. To become a subject of the (postmodern/difficult) poem is to experience exposure to a real (including ourselves) which always exceeds the knowledge we have of it. But that is not therefore exposure to vacancy, but to the potential of the real which only fully human thought can access and through which are always already woven moral, affectional, memorative, and political strands.

Badiou offers a compelling analogy at the end of his chapter discussing Philosophy and Art in *Infinite Thought* when he writes that "The poem marks the moment of the empty page in which the argument proceeds, proceeded, and will proceed. This void, the empty page, is not 'all that is thinkable'. It is, on the contrary, under a rigorously circumscribed poetic mark, the means of saying, in philosophy, that at least one truth, elsewhere but real, exists, and drawing from this recognition, against the melancholy of those that regard from afar, the most joyful consequences" (2005b: 81). The possibility of a text's coming into existence is signified by the empty page; the other minimum element necessary is the letter. It will seem banal to say that these two material things are the origin of a written object, a text. But, as Badiou's use of the concept of the empty page indicates, a great deal can

hang on how one thinks about it. And, not least, the notion of origin itself. As Luhmann (2000a: 55) writes, "One cannot start from an immediately given nondetermination – an unmarked space, a primordial entropy or chaos, a empty canvas or white sheet of paper – without distinguishing this state from what is being done to it." It is only when writing starts that the situation of thought in reality, and the situation of reality in the semiosphere, is made fully evident.

In Chapter Two I discussed "the text" and why I believe that such a term is needed to connect in one order the diversity of written or discursive objects, in whatever medium they exist. It is worth repeating Hayles's axiom: "For information to exist, it must always be instantiated in a medium" (1997: 189). She does not write, "for thought to exist", but access to others' thought is utterly dependent upon its textual embodiment. Badiou's page has literally and materially to be an unlined sheet of paper, not the virtual page of a word processing application which is already marked before intentional writing commences. In contrast to the white page of the print book, the digital screen is black, like outer space; when energised, the screen becomes busy, coloured, enacting a version of social reality, iconically staging all the attentional and political dispersals of thought as such which networked collectivities and their communicational protocols engender. When Hayles asks of Mark Z. Danielewski's experimental novel, *Only Revolutions* (2007), what is the writing-down system?, she replies: "Cooperating in the authorial project are the software programs, network functionalities, and hardware that provide sophisticated cognitive capabilities, including access to databases and search algorithms. Networked and programmable machines are here much more than a technology that the author uses to transcribe pre-existing thoughts. They actively participate in the composition process, defining a range of possibilities as well as locating specific terms that appear in the text. The author function is distributed, then, through the writing-down system that includes both human and nonhuman actors" (2012: 230).

Humanities scholars who have addressed the implications of this medium shift from print to digital have produced powerful insights into the relation between knowledge creation, media forms, institutional practices and social and economic change. Studies of the history of the book are one major

outcome of this interest. Another exemplary instance is the work of David Jay Bolter and others in both theorising the implications of digital technologies for knowledge work and the new kinds of text which the new information and communications technologies could make possible, and creating software which enabled their theorising to be explored in practice. Out of this work came innovative authoring software, Storyspace, for the writing and reading of e-literature, and a publishing enterprise which made available new literary compositions to a readership interested in the potential for literature of the new digital technologies as writing and reading machines. The work of cultural theorists like Katherine Hayles, Alan Liu and Joseph Tabbi, the development of the Electronic Literature Organization (ELO), and the formation of a field of theory and practice under the term digital humanities all testify to the profound implications for knowledge work and artistic practice of the new digital medium beginning in the late twentieth century.

There is just one concept which I want to allude to here, the concept of "writing space". Bolter (1991: 11) defines the concept as "the physical and visual field defined by a particular technology of writing. All forms of writing are spatial, for we can only see and understand written signs as extended in a space of at least two dimensions. Each technology gives us a different space. […] For medieval handwriting and modern printing, the space is the white surface of the page, particularly in bound volumes. For electronic writing, the space is the computer's videoscreen where text is displayed as well as the electronic memory where it is stored. The computer's writing space is animated, visually complex, and to a surprising extent malleable in the hands of both writer and reader. […] These different conceptual spaces foster different styles and genres of writing and different theories of literature. […] With any technique of writing […] the writer comes to regard the mind itself as a writing space. The writing space becomes a metaphor, in fact literate culture's root metaphor, for the human mind." One might, however, make the metaphor plural, the "different conceptual spaces" created by different media technologies fostering different conceptions of the human mind.

Bolter also makes it clear that writing as the externalisation of thought is an inclusive concept, and not restricted to the uses familiar to traditional

(manuscript and print) alphanumeric literacy and the forms of the humanities associated with it. He notes that "Mathematics has been a special kind of writing at least since the evolution of modern notation in the seventeenth century. The set of mathematical equations that defines a physical theory is a symbolic text of the highest order. And science itself has been a formal language since the time of Descartes and Leibniz, or indeed Galileo with his claim that the book of nature was written in the language of mathematics" (9-10). It is obvious that the literal and conceptual languages of science and mathematics have fully asserted their dominance within the western knowledge system, and Badiou's argument both recognises this development and proposes that it puts in place a profound limitation on the evolution of knowledge as the search for meaning and truth; as I have argued, his opposing the matheme and the poem as a complementary pair can recover the humanities as truth-formulating fields of enquiry founded on the written and conserved outcomes of thought in all natural and formal languages, without limitation on their expressive capabilities.

However, a black sign on white space is the zero degree of writing, whether what is written is a mathematical equation or a musical score or a poem, an architectural drawing or dance notation, computer code or a chemical formula; in Luhmann's (2000: 291) words, writing "understood as graph, fissure, design or contour". It is writing at its most material and least referential, by which objects in the real are related to themselves and to human interests and values, become objects of knowledge and means to accomplish human purposes through knowledge about them. But in every case, it is writing which is designed to have an effect in/on the real, whether through a human or a machinic subject.

To face the lettered page as it is, and not as we are trained to use it as a transparent medium providing simulated access to the real and from which reading strips the informational content, is to face the disjunction between two models of thought and knowledge, one grounded in the multimedia moving image, the other in black-on-white language, and to foreground the work of thought inventing what is true and real as a passage through the full range of the human mind objectified by the semiosphere. The plastic space of the intersubjective mind is given momentary shape in writing as the black letters locate coordinates of possible thought; but, as Calvino imagined it

(1998: 69) they constitute a bridge over the void, through which, in the white spaces between letters and words, the emptiness and infinite potential of the surrounding space remains always present. Such writing best represents the situation of thought as such in relation to the given world, the more elaborated, coloured and multimediated writing spaces literally and metaphorically screening out recognition of the void which penetrates all representations of knowledge, renders provisional all claims to truth, and signifies both the not-human and the open space of innovation beyond the scope of the encyclopedia on which thought can write.

The extraordinary flexibility of the writing space in the instance of narrative fiction is succinctly expressed in a reflection by the narrator of Richard Powers' novel *Generosity*:

> *Time passes*, as the novelist says. The single most useful trick of fiction for our repair and refreshment: the defeat of time. A century of family saga and a ride up an elevator can take the same number of pages. Fiction sets up a conversion rate, then changes it in a syllable. The narrator's mother carries her child up the stairs and the reader follows, for days. But World War I passes in a paragraph. I needed 125 pages to get from Labor Day to Christmas vacation. In six more words, here's spring" (156).

Writing on the void foregrounds not the self-evident existence of the real and human dependence on it for knowledge, but the unlikeness of the material means available to formulate and represent what we can know to the material forms of the objects of our knowledge, including ourselves. Neither the objects of the given world nor poems are themselves knowledge, but provide objects to think with, and about and from which knowledge is derived. Hence human knowledge is a function of the expansive network of systems of signs collectively invented for objectifying it, the most limited being the most powerful metonymy for knowledge in the current phase of Western social and media evolution, the image.

The webscreen in contrast to the lettered page is a digital portal of the semiosphere, full of links away from what is immediately present, other potential foci of attention, other orderings of thought than the one in the foreground, a text displayed not as a cut from a whole in order to focus

attention on a part as does the picture frame or the print page but a constant reminder of the many multimedial operations instantly available to disseminate a text in its present instantiation or transform it into something else. If the degree zero of the white sheet of paper as a writing space objectifies the thought of a singular mind distanced from immediate interaction with others, the networked computer or mobile phone screen as a writing space objectifies much more fully and vividly than could the newspaper as their print technology predecessor the temporal and narrative immediacy ("mindlife") of the consciousness of socially, informationally and eventfully immersed minds. The two media forms continue the ancient oscillation between distance from the moment, and immersion in it, as modes of situating thought.

7.2 Writing Space – Reading

A writing space is also a reading space, the text serving as the intermediary between minds and offering a reader the possibility and the means, depending on the reader's fluency with the communicational apparatus employed by the writer, of absorbing for the time of reading another mind's conceptual framing of the world. The reading as well as the writing process of engagement with the n-dimensional space mapped by a text is well described by Bolter (1991: 11): "In the act of writing, the writer […] enters into a reflective and reflexive relationship with the written page […] It becomes difficult to say where thinking ends and writing begins, where the mind ends and the writing space begins." For both the writer and the reader, the mediating space of the text objectifies the "fictive activation" of thought, which includes the identities of both writer and reader as these are constituted by the text to support its claim to authority and value and to ensure its most productive reception. But acts of reading have this special obligation, that the reader should allow the text as a distinctive ordering of thought and experience to be mentally realised as much as possible in its integrity.

In the form of the print book, the space of the page as a unit of meaning is permeable simply as a result of oscillations in attention as the eye is caught by words on the opposing page, the memory of previous pages reinserts them into the moment of reading, or associations with other sources of knowledge

or personal experiences contribute to shaping the event of reading. Whatever the particular affordances of other media objects (a musical or other performance, a painting, a movie, radio, TV, or a web document framed by icons, sounds, advertisements, and links to other content), the same interaction between text, reader and media environment occurs. But for the text to fulfil its communicative purpose, it must for the time it occupies the attention of a reader/viewer order the reader's subjectivity according to its particular construction of meaning, textual work which is most strongly challenged by the new media environments of the later twentieth century.

As Cook (1995: 50) writes of the effect of reading a poem, "The self is two selves, that of before the poem and that of after"; Badiou describes the same experience as "mental capture" (2005a: 44). Both identify a principal quality of this engagement with poetic writing, that the writing space which it occupies invades mental space and can modify the mental world and self of the reader in fundamental ways. The effect, personally and socially, may range from restoring or maintaining a steady state to revolutionary action, from an utterly imperceptible variation in thought or behaviour to epistemic/regime change at a global level. Life in society depends on our ability to imagine ("read") the mind-worlds of other people, and much that is socially destructive derives from imaginative failure or the malign use of such knowledge. It also depends increasingly on openness to the possibility of new knowledge and acquiring the critical and reflective means of assessing and acting on it. Conventionally, this is what making sense means, in that it requires the imaginative ability to perceive the possible orderliness of a text which may not conform in any way to the learned and normalised framing of knowledge and experience which a reader brings to it. In the gap between the normalised and the possible lies choice and decision. It is in the dissonance between internalised and new orders and framings that, in this domain of discovery, "things onward and more remote" are to be found.

8. FOUR Instances of the poem

Sidney's definition of the poetic as a modality of language emphasised the poet's inventive intelligence as the source of the "fore-conceit" (Luhmann's "intuition") of the work which is realised in a narrative fiction because the

Idea which it renders accessible cannot be perceived or understood by reference to the world as it is. In order for that Idea to have a transformative effect on that world, it must pass into and shape the thinking of readers who can locally enact a version of the fictional model of true and just action and so contribute to bringing the real world actually closer to the Idea. For Badiou (2013: 111-112), "living under the sign of the Idea" of the true life means living in a continuity with the past while being engaged in an always unfinished project. "We return in this way to the aim of ancient wisdom, taking up in our turn this quintessentially initial aspiration to a life that is not only marked by the Idea and by truth but by the idea of a fulfilled life, a life in which everything that could be experimented with, as far as truth is concerned, has been." Experiments in living, and experiments in thought, come together under the sign of the poetic.

One: Philip K. Dick, *Eye in the Sky* (1957, rpt. New York: Vintage Books, 2003).

Among other media forms which have developed since Sidney wrote his theory of poetry, novels clearly can be instances of the poem as he defines it. I will consider one example, Philip K. Dick's *Eye in the Sky* (1957). The "fore-conceit" or motive of the novel is a question raised by social constructionism: if each of us lives in a reality which is collectively constructed, how do individual versions of that reality accommodate each other? This question is explored narratively through the transformative effect on a group of eight visitors to an advanced research facility in California in 1959 where a device called the Bevatron was being tested. Its purpose was to permit "advanced research into cosmic ray phenomena artificially generated within controlled conditions" (14). As a result of a failure in the proton beam deflector, the beam cut through and destroyed the observation platform, the visitors falling to the floor of the chamber containing a giant magnet and being seriously injured. Exploring the effect on the group of visitors of exposure to the intense magnetic field becomes the work of the narrative, enmeshed as it is in the politics of the cold war and the extreme public sensitivity in the United States to the threat of Communism.

Dick underpins the fictionality of his novel by locating its world just two years ahead of the real world of its publication date, so that for contemporary

and informed readers (in the R&D-based, military-industrial complex developing in California, anyway) the slippage between ordinary social reality and the fictional social reality of the novel as Dick's realist writing represents it would be very slight. And this indistinction is critical to the novel's principal theme, the relationship between the real world as such and the private worlds of each individual. After the accident, the eight visitors return to consciousness and their homes and find themselves in a perplexing, altered reality – "objectively the scene was prosaic, the usual scene from his bedroom window at nine-thirty on a cold October night" (31), but shadowed by "vague phantasmagoria" (39), leading some of the characters to the conclusion that "We're going to have to work out the dynamics of this thing. This world, or whatever it is, has its own laws. Different laws from the ones we're familiar with" (41). The systematic construction of this version of reality produces a world run according to the laws enforced by a severe divinity through actual divine intervention according to Old Testament practice. The characters actually experience these laws in operation, and conclude that they have become embedded in the world-view of one of their number. Altogether three such worlds are experienced as the characters try to find their way back to the prosaic and familiar social settings which are not totally ordered by any one subjective construction. The novel, in other words, engages the potentiality of the semiosphere as the world of diverse kinds of cultural knowledge, but here manifested in singular and totalitarian constructions of social reality by which one mind dominates all others. Each character's personal world construction is a powerful mixture of prosaic, objective, everyday reality and the multiple possible worlds written into textual and cultural existence by human thought and intersubjectively shared in experience as knowledge, belief and practice by fractions of the members of modern societies. The novel explores the totalitarian potential of this power when singular, private worlds accrue the social power enabling their dominance. It is crucial to the novel's narrative of discovery that, however totalising these singular worlds are, they do not abolish memory or knowledge of the existence of other possible worlds among the characters submitted to and governed by them.[27]



PHILIP K. DICK

"George Bernard Shaw!" McFeyffe howled fearfully. "The greatest playright in the world! William Butler Yeats, the greatest poet. James Joyce, the—" He broke off quickly. "Also a poet."

"Author of *Ulysses*," Hamilton added. "Banned for years because of its lewd and vulgar passages."

"It's great art," McFeyffe croaked.

Mrs. Pritchet reflected. "Yes," she agreed finally, her decision made. "That judge decided it was art. No, Mr. Hamilton, I think you're quite wrong. The Irish have been very talented in the theater and in poetry."

"Swift," McFeyffe whispered encouragingly. "Wrote *Gulliver's Travels*. Sensational work."

"All right," Hamilton agreed amiably. "I lose."

Almost unconscious with terror, McFeyffe lay gasping and perspiring, his face a mottled gray.

"How could you?" Marsha said accusingly, lips close to her husband's ear. "You—beast."

Amused, Miss Reiss contemplated Hamilton with new respect. "You came close."

"As close as I wanted to," Hamilton answered, a little shocked at himself, now that he thought it over. "Sorry, Charley."

"Forget it," McFeyffe muttered hoarsely.

To the right of the road lay an expanse of barren fields. As he drove, Hamilton searched his mind; hadn't something been here? Finally, after considerable effort, he recalled. This was supposed to be a roaring, hammering industrial section of factories and refining plants. Ink, tallow, chemicals, plastics, lumber . . . now it was gone. Only the open countryside remained.

"I was by here once before," Mrs. Pritchet said, seeing the expression on his face. "I abolished all those things. Nasty, bad-smelling, noisy places."

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EYE IN THE SKY

"Then there aren't any more factories?" Hamilton inquired. "Bill Laws must feel disappointed, without his soap works."

"I left soap plants," Mrs. Pritchet said sanctimoniously. "The ones that smell nice, at least."

In a kind of depraved way, Hamilton was almost beginning to enjoy himself. It was so completely faulty, so ramshackle and precarious. With a wave of her hand, Mrs. Pritchet wiped out whole industrial regions, the world over. Surely this fantasy couldn't last. Its basic substructure was breaking down, crumbling away. Nobody was born, nothing was manufactured . . . entire vital categories simply didn't exist. Sex and procreation were a morbid condition, known only to the medical profession. This fantasy, of its own innate logic, was tumbling.

That gave him an idea. Perhaps he was tugging at the wrong end. Perhaps there was a quicker, easier way to pull the fur off the cat.

Only, there weren't any cats. At memory of Ninny Numbcat a miserable, baffled fury rose up and choked him. Because the tomcat had accidentally strolled in her way . . . but, at least, cats existed back in the real world. Arthur Silvester, Ninny Numbcat, gnats, ink factories, and Russia, still muddled on in the real world. He felt cheered.

Ninny wouldn't have liked it here, anyhow. Mice and flies and gophers had already been eliminated. And, in this distorted existence, there wasn't any back-fence carnality.

"Look," Hamilton said, as an initial experiment. They had entered a run-down slum highway town. Pool halls, shoeshine parlors, slatternly hotels. "A disgrace," he declared. "I'm outraged."

Pools halls, shoeshine parlors and slatternly hotels ceased to exist. All over the world, more blank spaces opened up in the fabric of reality.

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Illustration 3:

Before taking these points any further, it is important to give attention to the materiality of the text of the novel as a writing space. Treating two pages of the novel (Illustration 3) as an object to be observed requires suspending literate competence and noticing the ordinary conventions of print media presentation. Dick's pages are completely conventional; they contain their written language in print in the rectangular block of black letters located with geometrical precision within the larger white rectangle of the page, a long-established convention of page layout which is now also normalised in digital simulations of the page as a unit of textual organisation.

If we start with the black letters, we have either mass locating space and giving it definition, or the void overwritten and populated by the letters and at the same time surrounding each letter and emphasising the authorial and social force required to give order to the linguistic signs and create meaningful relationships among them. Spatially, the geometrical order of the

page of black type can be regarded as a systematic reduction of the spaces, masses, figures and tonalities of a black and white photograph, itself a sign and not a copy of a real, to the concepts and systems of iconic and tonal signs which render the photograph perceptible and thinkable. Unlike the photograph, but like the moving image, motion in time, space and subjectivity discursively traverses the space of the page as narration. Narrative seeks to give shape to space and trajectory to time; from this perspective, the repeated rectangular ordering of each narrative page signifies the power of authoring reason to create such an order out of the stuff of the given world, experience and inherited knowledge, the kind of order that rational perspective gives to/finds in the visible world and embodied in architecture, including in some places in the form of cities.

The diversity of signs organised page by page by the same rectangular frame and by the conventions of narrative discourse in print affirms that the relations between objects in space and time are or can be rationally ordered. It is also a fundamentally humanistic construction, a filling of the void of the world with meaning by the knowing action of bringing a new world into existence in writing. But one only needs to open Mark Danielewski's *House of Leaves* to be reminded, as graphic novels also remind their readers when they disrupt the regular geometry of the traditional comic page, that the arrangement and display of signs on the space of a page typically exemplifies (but can also modify or contest) cultural conventions that socially and subjectively sustain established conceptions of real world order. In the dis-order of his page layout, Danielewski challenges the imposition of realist conventions on narration. In particular, the title metaphor for the book signifies the excess of thought over physical or objective reality through the discovery that the internal dimensions of the house in which much of the action of the novel takes place are larger than its exterior dimensions, a situation comparable to the relation of the space of the imagination to that occupied by the work of art, or the space of the semiosphere to that of the library.



Illustration 4:

At each moment in the writing, the effect of the freedom for thought available in fiction is obvious. From letter to letter, word to word, nothing is simply predictable, although everything can be anticipated by the reader, even if that anticipation has to be revised by what is actually written. Appreciating this fact about the writing requires reading to be slowed right down; normal reading, like the situation in the novel itself, assumes conventionality in world construction until that assumption cannot be sustained if sense is to be made. Furthermore, paragraphing serves to distinguish the direct discourse of characters' voices and the narrator's setting by indirect discourse of those voices in a shared time and place (with the narratorial privilege of full access to the minds of the characters) and to link them in a montage in which the forward movement of the narrative creates for the reader the imaginative illusion of a coherent reality and causes the encompassing presence of the void to disappear.

The gap in which we live, between the given world as such and truths as such, is signified by the unlikeness of the material means available to

formulate and represent what we can know to the material forms of the objects of our knowledge, including ourselves. Knowledge is knowledge of, not from or in, the things known (apart from technological things, where knowledge is both in and of the thing). When looked at rather than read, or read as objects, words and other kinds of sign remain stubbornly themselves, representing what we know to ourselves in any one of many languages, composed together according to the formal rules of grammar and syntax developed over time for registering the complex dimensions of human experience in and of the given world and the worlds of culture.

The novel does what novelists have learned to do routinely, which is to enable the reader to shift perspective effortlessly within and without the mindlives of its characters, imaginatively seeing and knowing them as bodies, minds and selves in social space, in this case contrasting the assumption of an everyday, seamlessly real world which is the same for everyone with the way that world is differently composed and populated according to what an individual accepts or denies as being part of the apparently objective ordering of the real. The characters in the world of the narrative do not have the novelist's capability, but have only our ordinary inferential access to each other's minds. But the physical world external to them (reality), which they have in common, is taken to be full (the world as represented cinematically); each person's private world, and the measure of its limitations or difference from the taken-for-granted, is represented as a subtraction from or modification of that fullness.

Many kinds of knowledge circulating in the California of the 1950s manifest themselves as the narrative takes shape, a crucial dimension of the work of imitation required to build a fictional post-World War II California. The knowledge each character possesses contributes to their difference from as well as their similarity to one another. But, critically, this knowledge is not referred to non-fictional sources outside the narrated world for its authority; it circulates in that world as an inherent factor in its constitution and functioning, the semiosphere of the 1950s being an invisible dimension of the social reality of that period as elements of it become present in the minds and conversation of its inhabitants. It is particularly important to note how much of the knowledge in the novel circulates in direct speech; it is not just knowledge, but it is "my knowledge", identifying a person's cultural,

professional and social positioning. Its function is dialogic; each moment in the narrative typically requires characters to achieve provisional agreements resulting from argument and analysis in order to act collectively and be open to future possibilities, and so to reduce claims made on the basis of power or authority. But these dialogic processes are contained within the declarative frame of the person whose closed mindlife dominates the world in which the other characters are forced to live.

Between the two totalitarian poles represented by Wall Street and Communism exists the democratic middle, which is personified by the principal female character, accused of Communist sympathies because of her reading and public activities. She is dangerous because

> She signs Party peace petitions and she reads the *Chicago Tribune*. People like her – they're more of a menace to Party discipline than any other bunch. The cult of individualism. The idealist with his own law, his own ethics. Refusing to accept authority. It undermines society. It topples the whole structure. Nothing lasting can be built on it (231).

The truth procedure of *Eye in the Sky* is its fictional invention in the generic form of the novel of a possible world, and its exploration of totalitarianism through an individual's power to remake the real world by projecting their private mental world on to it and all other minds.[28] The truths it makes accessible are for the reader to formulate in another textual mode, including the modes of philosophy, literary criticism, history, politics, sociology, anthropology, review, blog, email, or to translate into another medium, like film, setting in process another cycle of textual transmission, interpretation and knowledge creation.[29] But it is important to emphasise that it is a distinguishing quality of the modern novel as a media form to engage within its fiction a panorama of the given, social and subjective worlds and to impose on its readers a responsibility akin to that sought by Sidney. As Luhmann describes the evolution of the novel, it "paved the way for the reflection of the distinction between fiction and reality within itself. Fictional texts were produced in such a way […] to present the reader with situations that called for *decisions*, by means of which he would individualize himself in ways that yield consequences" (2000: 282; emphasis in the original).

From another perspective, the modern novel engages all four conditions of philosophy as Badiou defines them, as well as philosophy itself. Even the two pages of the illustration confirm this point; art, love, politics, and science are all written into the narrative of the novel because they delineate the primary modern dimensions of human thought and experience and their weaving together moment by moment is the basis of adaptive subject formation and shared cultural identities. To produce knowledge from the novel requires thinking the novel systematically through any one or combination of these categorical lenses, depending on the expertise of the reader, with the important corollary that making decisions is a critical part of forming knowledge from reading fiction. Continuing exposure to the possibility of being read is all that is needed for this text to do the work of a poem as Sidney defines it, and serve as the "ground plot for a profitable invention" (1973: 124).

I have approached *Eye in the Sky* as a singular example of a space given form by writing and a poem. It is important in the context of post-print multi-media technological evolution to identify the defining attributes of truth procedures in the domain of art independently of traditional genres as these have defined initially according to the affordances of orality and print technology and then by their extensions and displacements as each new medium offered other expressive possibilities to thought and representation. The common ground in respect of the claims I am making is to be found in Badiou's characterisation of novelistic prose as "an art of redoubtable, abstract complexity" (2008: 180), or Luhmann's statement that "The work of art is an ostentatiously improbable occurrence" (2000: 153), or Bernstein's concept of the "difficult" poem; all take as a foundational criterion for generating events in thought of a potentially transformative kind the use of the full resources of a fictional medium, because it is with those resources fully engaged that the complex potentiality of human thought can be actualised.

Two: A R Ammons, "Retiring", *Lake Effect Country* (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1983), 12.

A R Ammon's "Retiring" is the nearest of the texts which I am considering here to the traditional visual and formal conception of a poem. It can be defined as a lyric, it is composed of four groups of words which can be

described as stanzas, it is precisely placed in the space of the page beneath a title word, and its use of a serif font, two font sizes distinguishing the title and body of the text, word spacing and short lines together create an aesthetic effect of calm and orderly reflection. As with Gass's reading of the statue, the poem's being fully contained in the otherwise empty space of the page and completed by a full stop refers the reader's eye back into and through it, restraining the onward pull of the flow of discourse and reading and the invitation to move directly to a new poem on the next page of the opening. The poem comes into existence between the void and the complexity of the language system, which is always evolving.



Retiring

I'll keep the brook watched,
the crinkles of light
between flow-stones
bundled into sheaves:

I'll sort the clouds into
categories between
the great names—
nimbostratus, cirrocumulus—

till so many fine distinctions
become clouds again:
I'll probably get the sun
up and down, turn

the stars through the round
sprinkling sheets, become essential
at all the wind's swerves,
keeping it going right.

12

Nature Poetry

If no one sends you
messages to read, none
you can read
(so you have no
replies to shape)
still you may irrelevantly read

messages sent to
no one, light shaking
off a poplar leaf
(like seen wind chipped free)
or breaking into
threads

of bright-backed water
in brookstone shallows:
these
messages, though
not sent to you and
requiring no response

may nevertheless be
taken
down in strict
observances (like studied regard)
as if to be nearly adequate
messages to no one.

13

Illustration 5:

What does the writing space in which this poem is inscribed signify, given that on this page the interaction of void and letter typically involves the much fuller presence of the void separating words and letters in contrast to the ordering of space, time and consciousness asserted by the double rectangle

of page and type constituting the conventional page of prose narrative? The pressure and density of things and relationships in social reality which fills the type space of the novel page is subtracted from the writing space generated by the lyric, just as the position created for the reader is less one of observer and more one of participant. The poem foregrounds and objectifies the abstract and virtual space of culture and subjectivity ("the experiences of consciousness" (Badiou, 2005b: 67)) which distinguish the poem from mathematical thinking) as it is configured by the two-dimensional space of the page and the n-dimensional spaces of language and of the human mind and its flows of thought. By being immersed in so much white space, its words are perceived as objects made visible by a light without colour which casts no shadows, the light of the world of the semiosphere; there is no mystery about them taken individually, but together they compose a unique object creating a unique event in thought for each reader. The mystery resides in the meanings they generate and accumulate from their sequential and recursive interaction with the meanings of those words already available to the mind of a particular reader, and their release from any specific placing in the given world, as it is or as it can be imagined.

This mystery locates a fundamental difference in modern thinking which goes to the heart of claims for a new humanities. As Nagel (2012: 13-14) puts the difference, "there are doubts about whether the reality of such features of our world as consciousness, intentionality, meaning, purpose, thought, and value can be accommodated in a universe consisting at the most basic level only of physical facts […] to those who doubt the adequacy of such a world view, the different attempts to accommodate within it mind and related phenomena all appear as attempts to reduce the true extent of reality to a common basis that is not rich enough for the purpose." To go with the poem as constituting a mental event or "experience of consciousness" is to allow one's mindlife to be progressively modified, first by the title word's appearance in the space of the page to name the poem, and then by the subject position, 'I', which anchors the words. The poem evokes the presence of a subject of thought thinking and hence invites the reader to imitate that thought process, to become that thought, for the duration of the moment measured by the interaction of a specific reader's apprehension of the words as it emerges through following the temporal flow of the writing in the time of reading and the mental spaciousness generated by the writing. But the reader can choose

how to become a subject of the poem by adopting one or more of the familiar positions socially available to respondents in acts of communication: identification, becoming the "I" of the poem for the time of reading; objecification, observing the "I" as an other and remaining detached; dialogically, by imagining an exchange with the poem's imagined speaker.

Each position alters the possible meanings of the poem. The title itself introduces at least a double orientation, because "retiring" can signify "unassertive", disclaiming a position of power or authority, and "withdrawing from", leaving a stage of life behind, a revisioning of identity. Each phase of the poem is initiated by "I'll" and defines an intentional orientation of consciousness towards the world outside the mind. This "fictive activitation" of a set of desired and imagined future actions includes the expansion of consciousness into ever-vaster domains of the universe and a recognition in the last phase that the work proposed may not be achievable. The expanding horizon of the poem follows the steps to knowledge and power over the given world, from observation to naming and assimilating. Watching is not passive, but leads to categorising and ordering of what is observed; bringing what is observed into knowledge requires naming, but the achievement of ever-finer discriminations includes the acknowledgment that the given world escapes capture by those names and is indifferent to them; bringing the otherness of the given world into knowledge offers a vision of full integration between mind, self and world, but achieving that vision may not be either attempted or accomplished.

Is the poem expressing a desire for human control over nature, or does it express a hope that there might be an integral link between the processes by which the universe keeps "going right" and the ability of human thought to comprehend those processes correctly and work in harmony with them? Does it propose that human consciousness is essential to the universe (either as part of the essence of, or necessary to) or does it merely found a collective delusion of power and control over the given world? Does language add anything to or reveal anything about what already is? Does thought give access to what is, or only reveal humanity's immersion in its own self-serving constructions? Every reading of the poem will in one way or another, explicitly or implicitly, address these questions. The work of the poem as a truth procedure is to create an event in thought which generates such

questions and to require a decision on the part of a reader about them. That decision will not finally determine what the poem means but, if disseminated, will contribute to humanity's on-going search for knowledge and understanding of its relation to the rest of the universe.

I referred earlier to the reader's awareness of the next poem in the collection. However carefully one might try to exclude it, one cannot avoid awareness of it as one's eye leaps the space between the poems, apprehends echoes and continuities in words and phrases, in effect draws the other poem into one's reading. This experience makes explicit what happens as the line endings hover on the edge of the void of the page as the eye pauses before returning to find the first letter of the next line and maintain the flow of thought or begin a new phase in its development. At each moment in reading, memory of what has been read informs the reader's anticipation of what is yet to be read, but is also revised and modified as the unique and provisional coherence of any poem asserts itself in relation to the others comprising the collection. The emptiness given body by the words is also full of the potential for knowing and meaning, an "invisible, intangible swarming" (Borges, 1971: 52) generated by the intratextual relations among the poems and their "outside", the infinite of the semiosphere as it is invoked by the interaction between the text and the reader's stored knowledge and experience.

Such poems (but all artworks) affirm a reciprocal relation between the given world and embodied minds, but one in which the world as such when given to consciousness and thought becomes immersed in situated experience and a personal version of humanity's accumulated knowledge. From this relation, which is also a translation of the given world as such into human means of sense-making, emerge artworks, the unique and momentary forms thought can take in various media. Latour (2004: 85) in a quite different context (wine-tasting) provides a very pertinent way of thinking about what matters here: "reality grows to precisely the same extent as the work done to become sensitive to differences. The more instruments proliferate, the more the arrangement is artificial, the more capable we become of registering worlds. Artifice and reality are in the same positive column, whereas something entirely different from work is inscribed on the debit side: what we have there now is *insensitivity*" (emphasis in the original). Crucially, the effect of

completing a work is not determinative of the thought it initiates; as Luhmann writes (2000: 25), "What is at stake is not a problem to be solved once and for all but a provocation – the provocation of a search for meaning that is constrained by the work of art without necessarily being determined in its results. In the beginning, there is a difference […]", generated for no reason that matters (except in retrospect) because what emerges from that initial difference cannot be predicted. To follow "no law but wit" is to enter the possibilities of thought as such for understanding the truths of our world.

Three: Dinah Hawken, "The Brain and the Leaf", in *One Shapely Thing – poems & journals.* Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2006, 62-74.

A good example of a beginning which does not predict what emerges from it is "First I see a single leaf./ Light, veined, shapely, green", which inaugurates Dinah Hawken's poem, "The Brain and the Leaf".[30] This "self-creating difference" (see above 3.3.1.1, 3.3.1.3) opens into a meditation on seeing imaginatively, both the world outside the mind and the brain which makes that world accessible to consciousness and knowledge being apprehended as recollections of what was once actually seen. The poem contrasts the scientific study of vision, determining what is characteristic of any brain, with observing the experience of seeing in "the way *my* brain/is capable"; a "kind of dreamy scanning" gives greater clarity in some circumstances than "looking in a focussed way." The poem enacts this quality of consciousness by the ways its words condense into lines and repeated two-line stanza-like units which gather thoughts into possible meanings without building a narrative or argumentative order. Instead, the experience of reading is one of momentary adjustments of awareness; the two-line units pause, or flow, shift perspective and attention, return to a previous thought in a different context, marking out a distinctive and abductive process of sense-making in the space of the page. In Badiou's terms, "the poem is an operation, it is also an event. The poem takes place. […] It offers us a taking place in language" (2005: 29).



The Brain and the Leaf

'The human brain, so frail, so perishable,
so full of inexhaustible dreams and hungers,
burns by power of the leaf.' Loren Eiseley

First I see a single leaf.
Light, veined, shapely, green.

Then I see a single brain.
Convoluted. Soft. White and black.

I see both, one after the other.
Imaginatively. In the internal air.

I imagine them with my own brain,
the one I will never actually see

because it is housed
as if in a bank vault

for the time of my life.
But it must be inseparable

– somehow – from the imagined brain
and the imagined leaf.

*

62

I realise I have fallen in love
with the imagined leaf.

I simply love that leaf.
Instinctively. But still

I will force myself to include it
in the same image, at the same time

as the imagined brain
even though I am afraid

that the mass, fleshiness and colour
of the imagined brain will detract

from the definition
and life of the leaf.

*

It does. And I discover
that it is harder for *my* brain

to see two things at once
than it is to see them singly

and that, as a consequence, the *effort*
to see also detracts from the clarity

of seeing and therefore
from the imagined leaf.

Though not from the *love*
of the leaf which seems to be

63

Illustration 6:

The poem affirms a mutual relation of dependence; perpetuated in imagination and unbound from the simply real,

> The leaf has taken a life
> in my mind defying gravity:

and it is there, held by the brain and the poem, "to help us to live". Both brain and poem mediate between the world as such and perception and consciousness of that world; both together offer the possibility of intersecting bodily experience and sensation through imagination with meanings and values. There is one further clarification of what is at stake in this necessary action of imagination towards the given world, exemplified by the imagined leaf. To "save it and be saved", the last line of the poem, is motivated by a recognition early in the poem that

I realise I have fallen in love
with the imagined leaf.

From its inaugural moment the thought of the poem reveals to the poet and her reader what the imagined brain cannot, which is what *her* brain is capable of thinking and the complex of ways it uniquely, humanly, links the object world through imagination and love to the perceiving and embodied "I".[31]

Four: Jorie Graham, *Swarm*. New York: The Ecco Press, 2000.

The sequence of steps I am following here is simply stated: in each instance of "the poem", the writing space is progressively more emptied out of language, and the structural relations among the words are progressively more deeply fractured. The full page of realistically observed and narrated social reality from *Eye in the* Sky creates a stable perspective for the reader on a doubled reality, that which is collectively shared and is the foundation of common sense in the world imagined by the novel, and that which is a private version of the "same" world imposed by one character on the other characters which they apprehend by observing changes in their world as they have previously known/thought it. The two lyrics initiate thinking about interactions between the given world and the conscious I, exploring how the object world becomes incorporated in the mind while remaining itself and engaging the reader in the thought which emerges from reflecting on that incorporation. Now, in this last example, the reader encounters a mode of writing in which disconnection and disruption in every dimension of the relations of consciousness and world as these can be mapped by language is predominant.

I will consider one poem, "Underneath (13)", [illust 3], a glance at which immediately evidences this disruption, which is integral to the volume as a whole. *Swarm*, the title of the collection, signifies a gathering and a departure without a predetermined place of arrival, a state of affairs which is manifested at the level of the volume as a whole by the arrangement of individual poems. Of the total of 36, 16 are entitled "Underneath"; of the 16, 8 are distinguished by bracketed names, and 8 by bracketed numbers, from 1-13, among which 4-6, 10, and 12 are missing. These poems are distributed among the others, but not in numerical order. The implication, confirmed by

specific poems, is that the collection does not encourage the construction of a narrative ordering of the poems; this kind of sense-making is not on offer. Paragraphs and stanzas in the conventional sense of organised units of meaning have disappeared, to be replaced, in this poem (but not in every poem in the collection), by single lines which seem to achieve as much coherence in thought at any moment as it is possible to achieve, and many of those lines are broken by gaps.



UNDERNEATH (13)

needed explanation
because of the mystic nature of the theory
and our reliance on collective belief
I could not visualize the end
the tools that paved the way broke
the body the foundation the exact copy of the real
our surfaces were covered
our surfaces are all covered
actual hands appear but then there is writing
in the cave we were deeply impressed
as in addicted to results
oh and dedication training the idea of loss of life
in our work we call this emotion
how a poem enters into the world
there is nothing wrong with the instrument
as here I would raise my voice but

[102]

the human being and the world cannot be equated
aside from the question of whether or not we are alone
and other approaches to nothingness
(the term "subject")(the term "only")
also *opinion* and *annihilation*
(the body's minutest sensation of time)
(the world, it is true, has not yet been destroyed)
intensification void
we are amazed
uselessness is the last form love takes
so liquid till the forgone conclusion
here we are, the forgone conclusion
so many messages transmitted they will never acquire meaning
do you remember my love my archive
touch me (here)
give birth to a single idea
touch where it does not lead to war
show me exact spot
climb the stairs

[103]

Illustration 7:

What is at stake here? If we recollect Barthes' definition of a professor as one who finishes his sentences (1976: 50) so that the sentence signifies the ability to find in or impose on experience a rational and authoritative order and so constitute knowledge, then it becomes apparent that the "voice" of the poems is neither constituting such a subject position for itself or the reader, nor assuming that any of the inherited structurings of experience as these have sedimented into the grammatical, syntactical and generic forms of linguistic expression and collective knowledge can be used without question as a ground for thought. The two words of the opening line of the poem, "needed explanation", locate immediately both the becoming conscious of a motive

for beginning a process of thinking, in a state of need without an acknowledged origin, and then a focussing of that need after a pause on to a problem in knowledge. Or, they can be read as signifying a conversation which just at that moment becomes audible, either to a third person or because the private flowing of mindlife at this moment becomes speech and so can be attended to by a second person (we, us, our, you, yr, your) even though all the words originate with "my voice" and the other is offered words to speak.

The poem's coordinates are defined by the opening and closing lines: need seeking understanding across a gap of silence and emptiness, in the opening line; and the closing, the affirmation "We exist Meet me", which acknowledges a fundamental human fact, "the body the foundation" for knowledge of the world, self, and the personal existence of others, but also seeks beyond the fact of existence (in a request which could also be a plea) a form of relationship between "We" and "me" in which embodied persons meet in their bodies and offer each other reciprocal recognition. Here, it is the poem's speaker who is thinking the possibility of this recognition, not claiming that the other person comprising the "We" has committed to meeting. The gap in the line both recognises that the conceptualised relationship is being imagined, and is not (yet) a fact, and that between the two bodies there exists a void which only a decision on the part of the other person can bridge.

The line "intensification void" indicates the parameters between which the work of the poem oscillates: gaps, line endings, all the white space of the page as a contemporary cave wall on which to write; words like "nothingness", "alone", and "*annihilation*", make present at every moment of reading the poem the imminent dissolution of meaning and self; intensification is evidenced in the fragments of words and phrases which range over many dimensions of the thinkable as instances of the pressure of thought and attention needed to resist the void and the implications of being alone, and of the truth of the axiomatic line, "the human being and the world cannot be equated". The idea of the loving relationship as the conserver of one's existence ("touch me (here)"), identity ("my archive") and the ground of history in memory locates their incommensurability.

The poem instantiates aporetic space, that which is underneath "collective belief" and "at the bottom below the word", a space of consciousness in which "the tools that paved the way" are no use but "there is nothing wrong with the instrument" of the poem. What is accomplished is the simultaneous recognition and enactment of thought's self-construction and its tentativeness in settling on a specific pattern or structure of relations; there is not one narrative but many possible histories and theories which do not provide any decisive clue to the future. In their place is the event of the poem's thought, achieved by entering the world and history in the written body of the poem and the mind of a reader through the writing, which "give[s] birth to a single idea" by means of "my voice". The volume as a whole is an instance of the energy of thought constituting the semiosphere; the repetition of words heading different elaborations of thought creates an intratextuality for the book, while each poem stands as an object in its own right – even if the rational ordering of thought signified by stanza forms is almost entirely suspended, the objectness of each poem remains. References to other writers open any poem beyond the physical boundaries of the book into the cultural inventories of the poet and her readers.

The mental work of the reader is thus critical as the place where the birth of the idea generated by the poem may be experienced. If there are "so many messages transmitted they will never acquire meaning", neither an eventful encounter between this poem and a reader, nor the achievement of new knowledge, can be predicted. The process whereby truths may be identified from an engagement with the poem as a thought is not authoritatively determined or policed, but remains embedded in the flows of discourse which constitute a society and the semiosphere of which the poem becomes a part once published. "Swarm", in this context, becomes a metaphor for thought coming into provisional definition from the chaos of the language system. Any singular reading will condense possibilities of meaning from the poem; in a poem as freely ranging over vast territories of thought and awareness, space and time as "Underneath (13)", offering no closure but only openings on to what may be possible, the singular readings will accumulate over time, interact, perhaps modify "collective belief", perhaps confirm that the poem's enquiry into love as the sign of the difference the human makes in the world, or intensity of thought as the means to withhold the pressure of the void, are truths of human existence.

A more formal example of reading from the work of professional readers is pertinent here. Two essays on *Swarm* by Klink (2005) and Yenser (2005) are reprinted in *Jorie Graham. Essays on the Poetry*, edited by Thomas Gardner. While they agree on the difficulty of the poems in this collection, they also proceed to provide well argued analyses of them, including the larger context of her previous publications. The academic knowledge work exemplified in these two essays demonstrates the formal process of creating knowledge from the thought of the poem. It is not that the prose of argument in the interpretive essay re-presents the fragmentary and elusive writing of the poem as the definitive statements which it conceals or obfuscates. Instead, the different priorities in thought, literacies and experiences of these expert readers are objectified through their engagements with the poem, and their essays are the thoughtful outcome or record of that engagement. Not, therefore, stating what the poem really intended to say but did not, but making a case according to the formal conventions of academic literary critical discourse for thinking the meaning of the poem as an object of knowledge in a particular way. The poem's words remain visible in quotation, signifying their displacement by acts of analysis and interpretation, which are also acts of translation. Neither essay is definitive concerning the "true meaning" of the poem; each essay modifies the possibilities for meaning and hence extends the ways in which the archive of the semiosphere is refreshed and reviewed and the possibilities for thought are extended and multiplied. This process cannot result in the discovery of a final, formal proof of the truth of the poem's thought, but that thought carried into the minds of others can produce what Badiou claimed for philosophy, "a diagnosis of the epoch" (2013: 130) and collective agreements on new understandings of the given world and the true life. The work of the poem is to make new thought possible, through the intersection of its condensation from the system of linguistic signs and generic forms with the unique mind/person of any reader in the void of the page/screen. Reading "Underneath (13)", and then reading Klink's discussion of it (2005: 165-167) and Yenser's discussion of the group of poems with that title (2005: 162-163) demonstrates unequivocally how interpretation is focussed by the instrument of the poem, but is not constrained by a single, authoritative body of knowledge. It is inter- and intra-textual, just as Graham's poems are, and contextual to the time and place of reading and writing; it is productive of knowledge, but knowledge resulting from explorations driven by singular minds affirming their

singularity and ultimately seeking answers to the question, what does it mean to be human?

9. Conclusion

The *logos* in fact never speaks in a clear voice: it looks for words, it hesitates, it stammers, it *starts over*" (Latour 2004:183; author's emphasis). If this statement seems to apply most immediately to Graham's poem, it nonetheless goes to the core of my argument about the relation of mutual dependency between the work of art and the work of creating new knowledge in the humanities in postmodernity.

This chapter has aimed at identifying a modality of writing which is fundamental to the claim that the humanities are a powerful means, complementary to the sciences, for the creation of new knowledge. It attempts to bring into the foreground a structure in the relation between thought and knowledge which is constituted by the singular mind, written language as sign and medium, and the objectification of thought as fiction. The four instances of "the poem" which I have discussed can be said to converge on one fundamental problem, which they offer ways of bringing to thought but to which they offer no definitive solution: what occurs at the experiential intersection of the singular mind, other minds, the given world, the collectivity of knowledge, and the void surrounding that collectivity and how can such occurrences open humanity to new knowledge and the possibility of truths? This intersection locates the critical origin of new humanistic knowledge in an event which is not self-explanatory or simply determinative of the knowledge which an encounter with it can generate. The exemplary event is the work of art, most fully situated by the poem.

Rather than attempt to provide definitive interpretations of each poem in the preceding section, I have sought to emphasise the way in which each text establishes the ground of its thinking about humanity by positioning a reader's mind in relation to some part of the spectrum of knowledge identified by Badiou's four conditions of philosophy – politics, science, art and love – and some aspect of living in the world as it is given to us and made by us. Each poem provides an incentive to think more and differently;

what the consequences of that responsive thinking might be cannot be predicted by the poem or its writer, even if the poem is making substantive claims about the kinds of thinking it is seeking to encourage or inculcate.

The point of aesthetic texts, one might say, is to perform exactly the opposite function to that performed by scientific texts, that is, rather than erasing any trace of "the person" in the process of formulating knowledge, to insist that the problem of knowing the world can be as well approached through the inclusion of the apprehending and experiencing singular person/embodied mind in the process of acquiring and formulating thought and knowledge. But the poem, in Graham's term, is an "instrument", just like scientific instruments, in providing access to dimensions of the world and ourselves which are inaccessible to ordinary sense experience and collective knowledge. A compelling example of this comparison would be the Great Hadron Collider, both the immensity (and cost, borne by society) of the machine in comparison to the immensity (and cost, borne by the poet) of the poem. It is tempting to think together the invisible dark matter filling the void of the universe and the invisible semiotic matter potentially present as a result of the embeddedness of any text in the Text[32] of the semiosphere and the web of meanings attaching to that text in the moment of encounter with it which are specific to a particular reader. It is thought, memory, reading and writing which make this massive invisibility accessible and give it form. As I have affirmed, aesthetic texts are always already fully in culture but also open on to the void into which culture continually expands and in which humanity, for better and worse, discovers more of itself.

For Badiou and for Nagel it is axiomatic that there are intrinsic links between the system of nature and the system of language, so that thought objectified in the contrasted forms of the matheme and the poem is a competent means of discovering or inventing possible truths about ourselves and the world we live in. A discovery process founded on "no law but wit" and on axioms which initiate thought about what is conceivable rather than what is already known is a truly creative process.

If mathematics is our most abstract means of writing by which the physical universe becomes accessible to thought as such, a symbolic means which requires translation (like the poem) in order for its thought to become

available to knowledge and to circulate through society over extended periods of time, so the (difficult) poem is our most abstract means of rethinking and remaking the knowledge accumulated in the semiosphere, the subjective and collective universe of recorded human experience and memory. It is the poem which, from its mysterious origin in a singular human mind, repeatedly opens towards possible answers to the question, what does it mean to be human?, a question which has multiple answers, and invokes the possibility of multiple truths. It is in the multiple, made accessible by the positioning of thought between the attitude of the fictive "what if?" and in an open and democratic politics of equality to come, that the possibility of creative, non-deterministic change based on collective and accumulated knowledge exists. The four poems are inherently political, in whatever ways they constitute in writing relations between human and non-human, self and other, power and love, fact and value, times and places, the known and the yet-to-be known. Milton made the point a long time ago that form in the writing of poetry has an inherently political meaning and effect, one dimension of the acts of choice and decision required to compose a poem. In a preface to *Paradise Lost*, Milton argued that rhyme is not essential to poetry; instead, the blank verse in which his poem is composed should "be esteemed to be an example set, the first in English, of ancient liberty recovered to heroic poem from the troublesome and modern bondage of rhyming" (1971: 39).

Sidney conceives of poetry as a techné of civilisation, a medium and mode of communication which makes available to other minds the truth-revealing thought of a singular mind located in a specific time and place. That thought, transcending the boundaries of any knowledge system or discipline, is authorised by nothing more than the singular creative intellectual action claimed by Sidney to be the distinctive attribute of the poet. For Sidney, the poet reaches mentally outside existing knowledge and into ideality; but this "outside" might just as well be projected forward, as Derrida places the human knowledge project under the aegis of the emergent, the "to-come", or Badiou under the aegis of the infinite. As a work of art, it has no correlative – however categorisable, it exists as a unique object in the semiosphere until it is engaged through reading by a unique mind. It becomes a generator of meaning and knowledge when the effects of reading are communicated, the most basic mode being paraphrase or commentary, the poem translated into

ordinary (prose) language. These forms of writing are not the poem itself, just as real world objects do not mean by themselves but have meaning attributed to them when they are brought into language. As Luhmann (2000a: 294; emphasis in the original) observes, art "depends on a supplementary *linguistic* mediation of its meaning." It is at this point that knowledge in the humanities comes into existence, engaged not only with works of art as events, but with all the kinds of textual events which humanity generates and which are productive of knowledge.

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[1] Milton describes the Bishops' attempts to prevent reformation by generating public fear of sects and schisms in the Church as the production of "meere fictions and false alarmes" (1953: 794). "Fake news" is a worthy descendant.

[2] The wonders of creation did the same for Christian theology.

[3] Luhmann (2000a: 294-295) observes that "we find a blurring of the distinction between artistic types – the painter, the sculptor, the poet, or the musician – in the figure of the 'artist' as such, for whom one can no longer specify criteria of inclusion."

[4] See Chapter Two, 4. Semiotic Objects and the Space of the Humanities, for the larger context.

[5] Francis Bacon, *New Organon* Book I (Aphorisms XXXIX-LXVIII).

[6] Bacon's account of the four idols or "illusions which block men's minds" is set out in Aphorisms XXXVIII to XLIV. Two statements made here locate the issues at the opposite pole to my argument for the humanities based on the singularity of each human mind. Firstly, XLI states that "all perceptions, both of sense and mind, are relative to man, not to the universe. The human understanding is like an uneven mirror receiving rays from things and merging its own nature with the nature of things, which thus distorts and corrupts it"; XLII states that "each man has a kind of individual cave or cavern which fragments and distorts the light of nature. This may happen either because of the unique and particular nature of each man: or because of his upbringing and the company he keeps; or because of his reading of books and the authority of those whom he respects and admires; or because of the different impressions things make on different minds, preoccupied and prejudiced perhaps, or calm and detached, and so on. The evident

consequence is that the human spirit (in its different dispositions in different men) is a variable thing, quite irregular, almost haphazard" (2000: 41).

[7] Prodger (2014: 41).

[8] Luhmann (2000b) defines the system of mass media as "all those institutions of society which make use of copying technologies" (2) and the code of the system as the distinction between information and non-information (17); its function for modern society is, like that of science, "the materialization of reality for society" through "the knowledge of the world that the system of the mass media produces and reproduces" (76). Luhmann analyses this work of the mass media through three programme strands, news and in-depth reporting, advertising, and entertainment.

[9] Latour (2004: Ch 3) makes abolition of this distinction critical to his conception of political ecology.

[10] It is useful to distinguish between four terms that concern different aspects of the composition of a text. Poesis refers to the process of creating thought/ideas, which Lotman (2009: 151) terms "mental experimentation"; semiosis to the process of communicating intention, purpose, meaning using signs; techne to the process of applying knowledge and skill to the shaping of matter, for example, verse, architecture, fashion, crafts, machines of all kinds, sculpture; poetics to the theory/body of knowledge setting out the rules and practices for giving ideas material form.

[11] John Edgar's landform sculptures, stone cut with engineering precision, evoke the fundamental relation between the matter of the given world and its incorporation into the human orders of belief, value, culture, history and place. Catalogues to his exhibitions explore the meanings of the objects as signs: http://www.johnedgar.co.nz/

[12] Textonomy is defined by Aarseth as a typology of textual communication, and the scope of "text" is limited to "any object with the primary function to relay verbal information" (62).

[13] Calleja (2011).

[14] A striking instance of the diversity of critical approaches (formative texts of a new humanities) is given by placing together Bonneiul and Fressoz (2016), Ghosh (2016), Monbiot (2017) and Streeck (2014, 2016).

[15] See Moore (2010). Milton's Urania perfectly exemplifies the power (conceived allegorically as the sister of wisdom) needed to cross into the potentially dangerous regions of the as-yet-unknown or experienced.

[16] See n.19.

[17] For Badiou, philosophy's relation to politics is obversive. He writes that "In politics, thinking searches within a situation for a possibility *that the dominant state of things does not allow to be seen*. For example: today, in Europe as elsewhere, the state of things is the market economy, competition, the private sector, the taste for money, familial comfort, parliamentary elections, etc. A genuine political thinking will attempt to find a possibility which is *not* homogeneous with this state of things" (2005b: 62: emphasis in the original).

[18] Badiou (2006: 149): "I call 'encyclopedia' the general system of predicative knowledge internal to a situation: i.e. what everyone knows about politics, sexual difference, culture, art, technology, etc."

[19] Badiou's approach seems to omit consideration of the multiplicity of paths offered by different media technologies for the transmission of thought through a society. A good local example, Giovanni Tiso's blog [http://bat-bean-beam.blogspot.co.nz/], makes possible exactly what Badiou looks for when he seeks a form of communication which encourages reflection, deliberation, the perception of pattern, the experience of coherence, demonstrating how new media can generate subjects of thought rather than overwhelm them with incoherent sensation and spectacle.

[20] Another writer who has gone deeply into the matter of mathematics as writing is Brian Rotman. His work, based in semiotics, is highly relevant to this discussion, as it is to thinking about the humanities. He presents mathematics as an "ongoing cultural endeavour"; both as "always part of the larger and open-ended human initiative of constant becoming – an enterprise never free from choice, contingency, the limits of our (always material) resources, and the arbitrariness of history" (2000: 3, 123-124), and as exemplifying "the norms and guidelines of the 'rational' – that is, the valid argument, definitional clarity, coherent thought, lucid explanation, unambiguous expression, logical transparency, objective reasoning – are located in their most extreme, focused, and highly cultivated form in mathematics" (1). He writes that "mathematics is a form of graphism, an inscriptional practice based on a system of *writing*. But more than a system, it is a *language* whose symbols, figures, notations, graphs, diagrams, equations, and metadiscursive devices are manipulated according to procedures that depend on and mediate meanings attached to them. . . .

mathematical signs do not record or code or transcribe any language prior to themselves" (44: emphasis in the original). He argues, "in a direction familiar to those in the humanities", that "rigor is not an externally enforced program of foundational hygiene, but rather an intrinsic and inescapable demand proceeding from writing: it lies within the rules, conventions, dictates, protocols, and such that control mathematical imagination and transform mathematical intuition into an intersubjective writing/thinking practice" (2000: 58). He compares mathematics with literature in the respect that each "conjures invisible proxies and identificatory surrogates of ourselves out of writing" (1995: 410). For mathematics, "the imagined scenario is a world conjured into being through written signs, and the thing being mathematically tested is a written statement, which, on this view, becomes a prediction about the mathematician's future encounters with signs. In other words, mathematics is a rigorous inscriptional fantasy: the insistence on writing determining what can be legitimately imagined, and the ongoing process of imagining controlling what the mathematician can meaningfully and usefully write down" (2000: 122).

[21] See the entry "Matheme" in *The Badiou Dictionary*, for Badiou's use of this term.

[22] Luhmann quotes Kristeva to this effect: "Poetry is that which has not become law" (2000: 126).

[23] Badiou explains more fully that what is involved in attending to any new form, using music as an example, is "a protocol of incorporation (as for all the other - scientific, political or amorous – types of subjects:): those who listen to the work, or attempt to listen to it, will have to transform their individuality, their relation to art and their particular way of listening. Incorporation within a subjectivity consists in this transformation. […] music's creation of its listeners takes time" 2013: 70).

[24] The title of a book by Jerome Bruner (1973) which was important to me.

[25] In an unpublished Victoria University of Wellington doctoral thesis entitled *Democratic Intellect: Freeing Thought for the Democracy To-come*, Jafar Mirzaee Porkoli argues for a line of continuity between Milton and Derrida as singular examples of radical critical humanism, and demonstrates for Milton what I want to claim is defining of poetic compositions which create the possibility of transformative mental events (thought) when engaged by a reader. Porkoli demonstrates that Milton's poetry persistently generates a

demand for decision, the outcome of which is productive of new knowledge (of self, society, the world) if it involves a reaching beyond the repetition of conventions and rules by placing the reader in an aporetic mental space beyond the boundaries of the already known, which is also that space otherwise named the future.

[26] Badiou (2005b: 41) wries that "we live in a vulnerable, precarious world. […] We must not allow the global acceptance of the themes of liberal economy and representative democracy to dissimulate the fact that the world the twentieth century has given birth to is a violent and fragile world. […] We need a philosophy open to the irreducible singularity of what happens."

[27] See Philip K. Dick, *The Simulacra* (1964), for another exploration of these issues, this time in a future United States of America governed by an invisible cartel of business corporations through the media simulation of elected government.

[28] For a contemporary example, see Sundaram (2016) and its analysis of the evolution of the authoritarian state as a projection of its leader, in this instance Kagame in Rwanda.

[29] In the early 1980s Ridley Scott's *Blade* Runner (1982), his film version of Dick's *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?,* together with Gibson's cyberpunk novels, crystallised a conception of a totally immersive and degraded urban future which now reads as a powerful counter-envisaging of the future of Western societies to that being promoted by neoliberalism at the same time.

[30] An extract from the poem can be found at http://www.scottishpoetrylibrary.org.uk/poetry/poems/brain-and-leaf

[31] Latour (2004: 22) contrasts "the difference between the old objects and the new ones, between matters of fact and what could be called *matters of concern*";
the former "belonged without any possible question to the world of things" but are now "giving way to *risky attachments,* tangled objects" (emphasis in the original).

[32] Barthes writes in his essay, "From Work to Text", that "the metaphor of the Text is the network [...] the Text is that social space which leaves no language safe, outside, nor any subject of the enunciation in position as judge, master, analyst, confessor, decoder. The theory of the Text can coincide only with a practice of writing" (1977: 161, 164; emphasis in the original).

6. Conclusion

"To be still searching what we know not, by what we know" (Milton, 1644/1974: 239)

Marian Maguire, "James K. Baxter and Odysseus explore the Upper Whanganui" (2010). Reproduced with permission of the artist.

This etching links my claims for the poem to the conclusion's epigraph and to the figure of exploration in the title page illustration to Bacon's *Instauratio Magna* in Chapter Two. It brings together the local and the global in a striking fiction, that the poet James K. Baxter could be engaged in exploring the Whanganui River in a canoe in which Odysseus is his companion and is leading the way. Maguire has imagined a fundamental conjunction at which the humanities find their origin as a means of giving discursive form to human experience in time, place and culture: the generativity of the poem as a means of exploration into the unknown, the reading together of past and present, a shared human purpose, cultural difference and the singularities of person and place.

The problematic addressed in this study was generated from attempting to engage knowledge in the humanities with the work of government. At a time of intensive promotion of the concept of the information or knowledge society, it became critical to be able to answer the questions, What is the value of the humanities in government and for society?, and, Can the humanities claim to be a source of innovation? Since both of these questions had to be asked and answered in a context of government thinking, in which

"the economy" provided the framing for both question and answer, one response from within the humanities began with a denial that such questions, framed in this way, should or could be answered. The value of uselessness was opposed to the values of a utilitarian culture. Such an argument affirmed that "the humanities" were an established and self-sufficient body of socially and culturally valuable knowledge with its own imperatives, methods and interests, however marginal they seemed to the knowledge interests of the democratic state and the holders of financial and social power, and not least those who governed universities.

In the opening chapter's brief narrative of the rise and disappearance of a national organisation to represent the humanities in Aotearoa New Zealand, the process of trying to articulate a different answer which would be audible to government (and to those professing the humanities in universities and society at large) made it clear that it was not only government's mind which needed to be changed, but that the current traditional conception of the humanities was inadequate to the task. The fact that no agency of the New Zealand government held a specific mandate to advance the humanities in government, in contrast to the position of the sciences, highlighted the distance in thinking which had to be covered if a successful case for the recognition of "the humanities" as a socially and economically valuable body of knowledge were to be made.

This book addresses the implications of the thinking done in the name of the Humanities Society of New Zealand (HUMANZ), a site for thought and practice positioned outside the institutional location of the academic humanities in the universities. Since the 1990s and 2000s were a period of fundamental challenge to those speaking for the humanities in democratic societies everywhere, but especially in Anglo-America where the tenets of neoliberalism were most vigorously transforming conceptions of government, society, and knowledge of value, those of us in New Zealand engaged with these issues found ourselves in significant company. Much of the work we did was assisted by the work of others, in Australia, the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom. But that work could travel only so far from its specific cultural and institutional origins; the difference of New Zealand's positioning in these deep global transformations, not least because of the post-colonial review of relations between indigenous and settler populations being carried out by means of the Treaty of Waitangi, had also to be understood. It was in this context that the importance of thinking of

humanistic knowledge as local in origin and enmeshed in culture, in contrast to the universalism of scientific knowledge, was decisively confirmed.

Given the hegemony of techno-science in Western democracies, broadly speaking two approaches to the problem of the humanities in relation to the state were available (putting the status quo to one side). Either: reframe the humanities as the human sciences, following European practice, and so deal at least rhetorically with the lack of fit between the social sciences and the humanities and the former's claim to be of direct value to government in the management of the economy and society; or: challenge the current settlement in which the role of government is primarily economic, and seek to open up an alternative conception, which would relocate the discussion of the relation between government and the humanities. The second option, requiring new thinking about both government and humanistic knowledge, was both less practical and more utopian, but it did open a space for thinking which the former option did not.

Of course, the practical work of opening this space, as recounted in Chapter One, was largely determined by opportunities provided by government policy development, that is, it was opportunistic rather than driven by a grand plan. In retrospect, it becomes easy to perceive how superficial continuities are maintained by the recycling of key terms and concepts, like "knowledge society", in government policy statements over time, even while those terms are being re-purposed as political imperatives shift and change. It is only in the writing of this book that the implications of that work have been able to be reflected upon and some conclusions drawn.

Chapters Two to Five explore the implications of adopting a conception of the democratic state and its responsibilities more in tune with the character and social functions of knowledge created in the humanities. It was striking to observe how little purchase "the humanities" had (and have) on government policies for knowledge and how marginal were the academic humanities in New Zealand universities, the only institutional site continuing to maintain those disciplines traditionally gathered together as the humanities at the most advanced level of knowledge work. There was no account in government policy of what happened to this dimension of academic knowledge when it left the university in the minds of those who studied it but did not stay in the university to be the means of its formal reproduction. I have referred to this form of humanities knowledge, eclectic, principled, value-laden, locally and culturally inflected, publicly shared and

disseminated in diverse social contexts, as humanistic knowledge. Distinguishing between the advanced intellectual work of academic humanists and the myriad ways in which that work is transformed by and applied to social living exposes the situations in which academic humanities knowledge is tested and critiqued in singular, experimental acts of moral choice and decision. And the results of this testing by living flow back into academic humanities because humanists live in both spheres and participate in the manifold conversations through which knowledge of all kinds is disseminated and modified in society.

A constraining factor in developing an understanding of government from the perspective of the humanities was the immediate context motivating official thought and action. The ideological movement named variously as neoliberalism or neoconservatism provided the principal conceptual means for rethinking the role of government in society in the later decades of the twentieth century; its dominance was magnified by startlingly rapid developments in computing and communications technologies. Together, these sociocultural forces impelled the globalisation of techno-scientific knowledge, business and the movement of money, generating conceptions of a fourth industrial revolution based on these new technologies and the knowledge they made accessible for the creation of economic value. Hence the information and then the knowledge society and its correlative, innovation, became the determinants of thinking in the policy domain. The humanities, to be visible and audible in that domain, had to find a way of speaking about themselves in those terms.

The main themes deriving from the work done under the aegis of HUMANZ can be summarised as: a theory adequate to what is and should be distinctive about academic humanities knowledge and the work it does in and for society in postmodernity; a conception of the state which follows from this theory and enables humanists to address the state and be heard; a re-orientation of the state's policy work which follows from this conception of the state and its role in a democratic society; and an account of the sources from which a new humanities can claim to produce new knowledge in academic and general public contexts which is innovative and a force for social and cultural evolution.

6.1 Knowing humanistically

The analysis offered in Chapter Two entrenches a version of the "two cultures" hypothesis, not as a competitive contest for dominance and mutual exclusion, but as an inherent complementarity between ways of knowing which are integral to what it means to be human. An absolutely distinctive role for the humanities is given by the fact that the objects studied by the humanities are real and yet different from given world objects because they are composed of signs inscribed on a material substrate, and because they exist in a world/space (the semiosphere) supplementary to the given world/space which provides the objects for scientific study. In the semiosphere are only unique textual objects, singulars like persons in society; it is the work of the humanities (academic and public) to discover knowledge from interactions with and between them. The semiosphere places together texts from across the whole spectrum of languages, media forms, cultures, times and places. What is critical about this is their heterogeneity and multiplicity; in effect, the infinite possibilities for interactions in thought and for making the passage between the known and the as yet unknown. In this conception, which includes Derrida's "university without condition" and McGann's n-dimensional text, there are no privileged texts or disciplines. The chapter thus argues for a conception of expert intellectual work which is not bound by traditional humanities disciplines. Instead, it is grounded in a common theory of the text (which requires theories of language, mediality and fictionality) and a transversal practice, generative of knowledge by making crossings between texts marked by diverse origins in culture, language, institution and history. But language is privileged, in the sense that it is the fundamental means by which humanity expresses thought and conserves its knowledge; it is also unavoidably plural and heterogeneous, so that this work of knowledge formation is also plural and heterogeneous in its outcomes. It is productive of axioms and themes which can cross cultures and expand our understanding of what it means to be human, but which cannot aspire to the status of universals. Writing and reading, in diverse forms, media and languages, are the fundamental technologies of the humanities. In the new order of networked information technologies the form of writing which may have a much greater capacity to engage singularity with supercomplexity (than the academic article or book) is the essay (re)formed in the digital space of writing.

It is rarely possible to demonstrate a clear causal track between singular instances of writing and collective changes in thinking, belief, and social

practice, as the increasingly complex analysis of the historical formation of societies and institutions demonstrates. Retrospectively, it is conventional to identify some authors as founders of thought leading to profound changes in social reality, for example, St Paul in respect of Christianity, Galileo in respect of science, Marx in respect of political economy, Freud and Jung in respect of human psychology, Hayek in respect of neoliberalism, or Foucault in respect of the institutions of government. Each of them conveyed answers to the question, what does it mean to be human? I have sought to keep Milton in mind as such a founder. *Paradise Lost* was read intensively for two centuries after its publication, giving shape to the manifold potentials of protestant democratic thought in the minds of its socially diverse readers. The poem was made present to them in both the highest achievements of the art of the book and in its cheapest formats in social contexts increasingly remote in time and place from the moment of composition, an agent of British protestant culture carried across the globe as the British Empire expanded its reach. This is just one example of the conversation of the humanities as knowledge is created and re-created over time through reading, writing and speaking subjects and the flows of understanding which accumulate in scholarly interpretation and other forms of commentary, and which are decisively expressed in social and political action.

The accumulating effects of new thinking in acts of collective decision-making are what really matter from the perspective of humanistic knowledge. Events generated as embodiments (singular or collective enactments) of foundational thinking require for their occurrence long-term, multi-generational processes of subject formation through education, socialisation, politicisation, and legal, institutional and governmental change. The productivity of humanistic knowledge is most fully realised in the work of civil society organisations. As I have argued, the city is the social domain which concentrates these processes and derives its human purpose from them; it is in that place that the diffusion and exchange of the collectivity of human thinking is at its most intensive, where the greatest diversity and potential in knowledge can be encountered. But it is encountered at its ground level in the singular human mind, whose thought in so far as it reaches beyond the boundaries of the known and the calculable is inherently poetic and fictive.

6.2 The Education State

The institutions of the state through which humanistic knowledge is disseminated and conserved have a primarily educational purpose and motivation, in which the economy is an important but not a determinative component. They recognise that humanity, through imagination, collective memory, learning and cultural formation, is engaged in an unceasing and collective process of social and cultural reproduction and transformation, one aspect of which is technological and economic innovation in the context of environmental change. In this conception, the human life span (long term) rather than the time span of the economy (short term) should constitute the temporal frame of government policy formation and direct the work of public sector agencies. For this orientation of thought and work to be possible, public sector agencies must be dissociated from the political interests of any governing party, and be capable of taking the long view on the public's behalf (as universities are supposed to do). It seems to have been forgotten under the neoliberal consensus that public sector agencies are funded by the people, not by any political party; they therefore have a higher duty than to conform in their knowledge work to shifting political prescriptions, while also recognising that policy formation is not a value-free activity. It has to be the task of any political party in government to explain and justify to the people, especially through Parliament, how their policies assist in meeting the long term development goals of their society and constructively reconcile disparate public conceptions of those goals; and it has to be the task of the public sector to provide benchmarks against which policy proposals and new laws can be measured. The concept of public value provides a standard against which the work of public sector agencies can be assessed by the public; reciprocally, a democratic society depends for its adequate functioning upon well-informed citizens who grasp the point of life-long learning and participation in democratic decision-making.

The role of media, information and communications technologies is critical in a society's management of its possible futures, but the social competence of this complex, high technology system is deeply compromised by its being operated for profit by private owners. A democratic society cannot properly exist without equal and open access to the means of communication available to its members, just as it cannot exist without access to clean water or breathable air. As I have argued, the creation of new knowledge depends

upon open access to knowledge of all kinds, and the freedom to exchange one's thinking with others. That freedom is manifested in the infinity of conversations which link people momentarily to one another and provide the first and most universal means for the transmission of new ideas. By placing gateways across the means by which citizens can have access to others and share their thoughts, private ownership of the means of communication and textual conservation limits the potential of singular minds in a collective process of exchange to discover and formulate new knowledge. It must be obvious that this issue is very different from the formulation of protocols for the socially acceptable use of communications systems, which is a task for government and not the private sector. In a democratic state, the exemplary scene of this public conversation and the protocols by which it should be conducted is Parliament; the exemplary technology is the law. The measure of the civil quality of a society and its ability collectively to produce its future in a form which enables more of human potential to be realised in that place is the quality of the public conversation among its citizens. A critical index of that quality is the public support for and engagement with a diverse civil society sector.

6.3 Cultural policy

Taking the semiosphere as the given world for knowledge creation in the humanities means placing knowledge work in the larger domain of culture rather than the narrower domain of techno-science and the economy. Crucial institutions for the conservation and dissemination of a society's knowledge are its cultural institutions – all levels of education, libraries, museums, archives, galleries, digital repositories. In contrast to organisations using knowledge for profit, it is only the state which can ensure the long-term protection and development of these fundamental institutions. Without them, a (national) society at best becomes tunnel visioned, amnesiac, inattentive to its inherited structuring principles, indifferent to the generative value of multiple cultural origins and kinds of learning.

At present, cultural policy in New Zealand is broken-backed, typically stuck within the terms of a creative arts policy reinforced by arguments for the economic value of the arts, and apparently unable to bring to bear the knowledge already held in cultural policy agencies based on a much more

inclusive conception of culture than that informing arts policy. This matters because it is fundamental to my argument for the humanities that new knowledge of cultural value (humanistic knowledge) is given definition in local communities as well as by expert work in academic humanities. What connects them is the conversation of society, located within cultural fields and concentrated and amplified by cities as medium and record of this conversation. This is the proper context for media policy, which should aim at ensuring that humanistic knowledge can circulate freely across all of a society's channels of communication. To attend to the circumstances which make humanistic knowledge productive of new thinking is to attend to the social processes characteristic of cultural knowledge creation, which includes the creation of scientific and economic knowledge as significant components but embraces the whole spectrum of value-laden knowledge constituting a particular national society and giving it its identity. A selective policy, as now, ensures the literal and metaphorical impoverishment of a society's primary resource, its accumulated stocks of knowledge and its ability to multiply them.

In this humanistically oriented conception of knowledge, the possibility of discovering the new in thought, the as yet unknown, is generally attributed to singular minds embedded culturally in diverse flows of information and knowledge. One site of this embeddedness is the university, each institution gaining part of its distinctiveness from being a local opening to the richness of the semiosphere. For a new humanities, it is the opportunities offered by encounters with textual diversity to discover what is yet to be known by following "the logic of the unknown" that gives the university its significance. Chapter Five argues that it is the work of art which exposes humanistic thinking most fully to the as yet unknown, the void beyond the borders of the semiosphere. Just as the sciences locate their model of innovative knowledge creation in the expert scientist, observation, experimental method, the laboratory, and the research institute, so a new humanities needs a model of innovative knowledge creation based on axiomatic thinking, theorisation and textual analysis which enables productive engagement with the interests of the education state in knowledge work and cultural policy. The conception I have elaborated in the last chapter is founded on the work of art as a kind of object which is designed to generate events in thought by using knowledge and signs, but which does not by itself create knowledge. It is the second and third stages in the interaction

of a reader/subject of the work, moving from experience of the event, to thought about it, and communication of that thought in some form, that generates the possibility of new knowledge. As a distinctive kind of object in the semiosphere, governed by “no law but wit”, the work of art is free to cross the borders of what is currently known and knowable; following the work across those borders and coming back generates the possibility of new understanding. For a new academic humanities, as the expert level of knowledge work on the side of culture in its textual manifestations and as a mode of enquiry founded and practiced in written language, the greatest challenge is posed by the poem as a place where language and the void come together. In this context, the claim that a new humanities and its exponent, an expert humanist, is capable of producing new knowledge at fundamental levels of thought is grounded in the analysis and interpretation of works of art, and specifically of poems.

This humanistic conception of the way in which the new enters the collective mind of society is hardly useful to a government maintaining a short-term focus on economic outcomes. But it does draw attention to the limitations of policies for knowledge and innovation which are defined by the closed circuit between techno-scientific knowledge creation, business and the economy. Treating that segment as a subset of a socially much more extensive and inclusive process of innovation through knowledge created culturally by citizens in every aspect of human living opens the possibility of a major re-orientation of policy priorities towards the cultural seed beds of discovery by singular minds informed by the cultural inventories which they have been able to accumulate through life-times of experience and learning. As this whole study shows, it is only government which can create the conditions for socially distributed innovation, and the umbrella under which this work should be carried out is cultural policy.

6.4 Creating the conditions

Government cannot anticipate or plan for innovation, but it can manage the conditions which encourage the invention and application of new ideas, as Milton argued in his own time for the city of London as an engine of discovery. One critical condition is the role of the public sector, which needs to be repositioned as a public resource, like tertiary education institutions,

for the evaluation and application of world knowledge to local social and economic development and democratic decision-making. Another is cultural policy focused on the twin social media environments of education and communication, with the aim of ensuring that: the classroom, like society's memory institutions and its coffee bars, is enriched by the exchange of all kinds of knowledge and experience: the communications networks of society are open and accessible to everyone; and human rights – civic, political, economic, social and cultural – are woven into the law, education, and the fabric of social practice and cultural values. A third is the vigour and diversity of civil society organisations as the social space in which individuals can give active expression to their knowledge and values. Specifically, guiding a new form of knowledge politics in a public conversation concerned to anticipate the social effects of new knowledge has become a critical democratic responsibility. Each of us has to find what connects us to the evolution of the long term purposes of the society into which we are born; governments lose the plot when they try to manage in the short term the outcomes of what is fundamentally a personal and lifelong search for meaning and discovery of value. Creativity and innovation, which have their roots in each person, are intrinsic to human living and to society's ability to adapt to and direct change in beneficial ways. Cultural policy is the proper context within which the state's and nation's interests in this fundamental work of embodied knowing and acting can be delineated and sustained, and where the framing goals are the axioms and principles informing conceptions of the just society and the true life.

This book is an assemblage of written voices, brought into one conversation among the innumerable conversations which their words might, do and will engage. As Carr did, it asks its readers to "Think with me", to wonder about what it could possibly mean to be human, to explore the swarming richness of our human inheritance of thought, to formulate possible futures from that inheritance and the terms of living and thinking in our local presents, to converse with others and to decide, moment by moment, how to embody those meanings in social action. To leave the last (for the moment) word to Derrida. He, like Sidney and Badiou and Carr and the poets discussed in Chapter Five, locates the ultimate purpose of knowledge creation in the intellectually and morally informed actions of individuals who are motivated to participate in and work out the ongoing evolution of the city as the primary scene of the revelation of what it does, can and should mean to be human.

Here, then, is the ultimate purpose of a new humanities, to create new knowledge – to reframe and repurpose the idea of humanity - from the texts of the semiosphere (and most profoundly from the texts of the poets), a collective process founded on singular minds contextualised by their life histories. Humanistic knowledge is formed and expressed in momentary decisions and actions situated in local times and cultural spaces (embodied as texts and persons) which are open to some part of the infinite in thought and the to-come. It is a mode of learning in which acquiring knowledge carries with it a double imperative, to question its own foundations and

> to aspire to something more consequential, to change things and to intervene in an efficient and responsible (though always, of course, in a mediated way), not only in the profession but in what one calls the city, the *polis*, and more generally the world. Not to change things in the no doubt rather naive sense of calculated, deliberate, and strategically controlled intervention, but in the sense of maximum intensification of a transformation in progress (Derrida 1992: 8-9, author's emphasis).

Appendix

The Interim HUMANZ Council (1992)

John Barsby (Otago)
Richard Benton (Wellington)
Alistair Fox (Otago)
Mary Houston (Wellington)
John Jennings (Canterbury)
Grant McMillan (Canterbury)
Jonathan Mané-Wheoki (Canterbury)
Graham Oddie (Manawatu)
Brian Opie (Wellington)
Anne O'Rourke (Wellington)

The HUMANZ Council (1993-2006)

Richard Corballis (Manawatu) 1993-96
Alastair Fox (Otago) 1993
Mary Houston (Wellington) 1993-2002
Deborah Jones (Waikato) 1993-95
Jonathan Mané-Wheoki (Canterbury) 1993-2006
Brian Opie (Wellington) 1993-2006
Terry Sturm (Auckland) 1993
Michael Volkerling (Wellington) 1993-96
Heath Lees (Auckland 1994-95
Barbara Brookes Otago) 1994-95
Kate Coolahan (Wellington) 1995-2006
Reina Whaitiri (Auckland) 1995
Michael Wooliscroft (Otago) 1995-1998
Keith Beattie (Manawatu) 1996-1997
Ann McEwan (Waikato) 1996- 2003
Michael Peters (Auckland) 1996-1998
Peter Roberts (Auckland) 1997-2001

Julie Smith (Manawatu) 1998
Allen Meek (Manawatu) 2000-2003
Sharon Harvey (Auckland) 2001-2004
Andrew Leach (Wellington) 2002-2003
Derek Wallace (Wellington) 2002-2006
Duncan Campbell (Wellington) 2002-2006
Warwick Slinn (Manawatu) 2003-2006

Hon Legal Advisor: Michael Okkerse (1994-2008)

Humanities Research Network (2004 - 2009)

HUMANZ Council Inaugural HRN Board members (2005-)
Jonathan Mane-Wheoki (Chair), Brian Opie (Executive Director), Louise O'Brien (HRN Site Administrator), Michael Okkerse (Honorary Legal Advisor), Margaret Calder (Chief Librarian, Alexander Turnbull Library), Keith Webster (Librarian, VUW Library), Derek LeDayn (General Manager, LCoNZ) and Russell Brown (Public Address).

New members 2006: Alison Stevenson (NZETC); Trustee: Haami Piripi.
Resignations: Russell Brown (2006), Haami Piripi (2007), Margaret Calder (2007), Michael Okkerse (2008).

New members 2008: Chris Szekely (Chief Librarian, Alexander Turnbull Library), Trustee: Huhana Rokx
Board expanded to manage Creative Commons (2008)
Jane Hornibrook (CC Site Administrator), Jill Wilson (CWA), Paul Reynolds (LIAC), Andrew Matangi (CC Legal Team), Paul Sumpter (CC Legal Team), Susan Frankel (CC Legal Team), Dean Carroll (Ministry of Education), Danyl Strype (Indymedia).

Interim Council for the Humanities (2004-2005)

Professor Rob Allen
Pro Vice Chancellor, Learning and Teaching and Dean, Faculty of Applied Humanities, Auckland University of Technology

Margaret Calder
Chief Librarian, Alexander Turnbull Library

Penny Carnaby
Chief Executive/Chief Librarian, National Library of NZ

Professor John Drummond
Dean of the School of Language, Literature & Performing Arts, University of Otago

Arapata Hakiwai
Director Matauranga Maori, Te Papa Tongarewa Museum of New Zealand

Dr Patricia Laing
Social Science Committee, Royal Society of New Zealand

Professor Don MacRaild
School of History, Philosophy, Political Science and International Relations, Victoria University of Wellington

Jonathan Mané-Wheoki
President, HUMANZ

Professor John Morrow
Dean of Arts, University of Auckland

Professor Karen Nero
Macmillan Brown Centre for Pacific Studies, University of Canterbury

Dr Claudia Orange
Director History and Pacific Cultures, Te Papa Tongarewa Museum of New Zealand

Haami Piripi
Chief Executive, Te Taura Whiri I Te Reo Maori Maori Language Commission

Professor Warwick Slinn
Head, School of English and Media Studies, Massey University

Dame Cheryll Sotheran
Director, Creative Industries Sector, New Zealand Trade and Enterprise

Professor Ken Strongman (Chair)
Pro-Vice Chancellor, College of Arts, University of Canterbury

Te Kenehi Teira
Kaihautu, New Zealand Historic Places Trust

Dr Bill Tramposch
Chief Executive, New Zealand Historic Places Trust

Keith Webster
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